Archive for August, 2007

Proof that the Sub-Prime Panic has Reached the Silly Stage

Thursday, August 2nd, 2007

OK, maybe this isn’t really worth a post all of its own. But I can’t resist.

Bloomberg has a story up now, Taiwan Life Has Loss on Subprime Fund; Shares Fall:

Taiwan Life Insurance Co. booked a NT$428 million ($13 million) loss in the first half on its investment in a Bear Stearns Cos. fund containing U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The company’s shares slumped. The life insurer wrote off its entire investment in the Bear Stearns High Grade Credit Strategies fund to fully reflect the fund’s value, Taipei-based Taiwan Life said in an e-mailed statement today.

Taiwan Life had a first-half profit of NT$1.66 billion, including the loss on the Bear Stearns fund, up from NT$660 million a year earlier, according to the statement.

I also had a look at Taiwan Life’s English language website, which is pretty amateurish, but much better than my Chinese language website:

Presently, the shareholders include state-owned banks and the conglomerate: the Bank of Taiwan, the Land Bank of Taiwan, the Long Bon Development Company, with a total asset reaching NT$3.4 trillion. It is a reliable insurance company that has rich financial resources, stable management and unlimited responsibilities for its insurants. 

So let’s see if we have things straight here:

  • 1H07 Profit: 1,660-million
  • After Bear-Stearns Fund Loss of: 448-million
  • Total Assets: 3,400,000-million

I’m sure that the shareholders of Taiwan Life did not appreciate seeing 20% of their first half’s profit getting vapourized, but is this really a significant enough event to warrant Bloomberg home-page coverage? Is it really?

August 1, 2007

Wednesday, August 1st, 2007

A wild day for stocks, as American equities gained sharply in the last hour to record good performance on the day, while Canadian stocks … shoulda stood in bed.

Meanwhile, Treasuries fell sharply, which may be due to reallocation to equities, reduced hopes for a rate cut, or simply because they felt like it. Ask a priest.  Fitch cut ratings on a lot of sub-primes (which, I’ll bet, still doesn’t get the ratings in line with the prices) and clarified some of their rating processes. Canada still doesn’t have a dedicated bond blog or even any decent wire services (if I’m wrong, tell me!), so you’ll have to trust me again … Canadas did not have an exciting day. Flat-to-boring about sums it up.

Yesterday I highlighted a Bloomberg story claiming that some major brokerage bonds were trading as junk. Tom Graff says that’s a load of hooey, and provides some examples of bellwether junk bonds vs. the brokers of interest … broker spreads are wide, he says, but not actually junk!

Back to prefs … CM.PR.C has been redeemed and been removed from the “PerpetualPremium” index. To my shame, I confess that the HIMIPref™ Indices have not been rebalanced for July month-end and I will have to catch up at another time – hopefully tomorrow. The market had a good day – as suggested by the “Major Price Changes”, but beyond that, I’m afraid you’ll have to wait.

Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.7951% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.40% (as interest) based on a bid of 9.30 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.1057% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.92% based on a bid of 22.86 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1236% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
CFS.PR.A SplitShare +1.2024% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.07% based on a bid of 10.10 and a hardMaturity 2012-1-31 at 10.00
MFC.PR.A OpRet +1.2893% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.11% based on a bid of 25.14 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00
MIC.PR.A PerpetualPremium +1.5625% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 26.00 and a call 2012-1-30 at 25.00
BNS.PR.J PerpetualPremium +1.7316% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.67% based on a bid of 25.85 and a call 2013-11-28 at 25.00
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 69,146 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.07% based on a bid of 22.16 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 58,150 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 22.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.22% based on a bid of 26.71 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00.
ACO.PR.A OpRet 40,171 Scotia crossed 39,500 at 27.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.22% based on a bid of 26.71 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 37,825 TD sold 10,700 to RBC, bought 10,200 from HSBC four minutes later and, after a pause, crossed 11,000; all at 24.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.00% based on a bid of 24.10 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 29,450 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 22.73 and a limitMaturity.

There were eleven other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Update, 2007-08-02

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.85% 4.88% 28,380 15.81 1 +0.0000% 1,039.4
Fixed-Floater 4.98% 5.09% 131,776 15.49 8 -0.0206% 1,021.3
Floater 4.87% 0.15% 76,300 8.22 4 +0.0442% 1,051.1
Op. Retract 4.84% 3.79% 85,096 3.08 16 +0.1672% 1,022.0
Split-Share 5.04% 4.49% 111,069 3.93 15 +0.0277% 1,046.8
Interest Bearing 6.28% 6.76% 62,720 4.63 3 -0.5402% 1,026.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.53% 5.18% 105,751 5.66 24 +0.2230% 1,024.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.08% 5.11% 323,671 15.32 39 +0.1887% 975.2

MAPF Portfolio Composition: July 31, 2007

Wednesday, August 1st, 2007

Not a lot of change in the sectoral composition of the fund’s holdings since the June 29, 2007 analysis. Were it not for the other tables, readers might be forgiven for wondering whether there have been any changes at all!

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2007-7-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 38% 4.64% 5.51
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 26% 5.28% 4.30
PerpetualDiscount 36% 5.31% 15.01
Scraps 1% 4.39% 5.65
Cash -1% 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.10% 8.69

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.), and readers may make their own adjustments to reflect interest. MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2007-7-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 19.3%
Pfd-1(low) 25.9%
Pfd-2(high) 0%
Pfd-2 38.4%
Pfd-2(low) 17.5%
Cash -1.1%

There has been a slight decline in credit quality,  but quality is still well within normal bounds. The variances in credit be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2007-7-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.7%
$50,000 – $100,000 30.1%
$100,000 – $200,000 43.2%
$200,000 – $300,000 19.4%
>$300,000 7.7%
Cash -1.1%

Liquidity has declined somewhat from June’s elevated levels and are now comparable to that found in the analysis of the Claymore ETF April Portfolio.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available on the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A discussion of July’s performance is available here.

MAPF Performance: July, 2007

Wednesday, August 1st, 2007

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for July, 2007, month-end. The unit value is $9.3627. Returns over various periods are:

MAPF Returns to July 31, 2007
One Month +0.55%
Three Months +0.22%
One Year +5.58%
Two Years (annualized) +5.07%
Three Years (annualized) +5.83%
Four Years (annualized) +9.02%
Five Years (annualized) +9.88%
Six Years (annualized) +10.12%

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

I’m very happy with the results. The NAV for the Claymore ETF (CPD on the TSX) is not yet available, but as of July 30, they were up only 5bp-and-a-hair on the month, so it looks like I earned my fees. Note that last month I expressed concern that I would underperform this month, since the BCE/Teachers deal was announced subsequent to month-end and was expected to boost returns of the BCE Prefs considerably. Well, returns of BCE Prefs were outrageous this month, I didn’t hold any, CPD did … but I outperformed anyway. Sometimes it works! (Not all the time, unfortunately!)

I will discuss performance further tomorrow, in an update to this post.

Update & Bump, 2007-08-01:

Claymore has published their final monthly numbers and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to July 31
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
April 30, 2007 19.91 0.00    
May 31 19.44 0.00 -2.36% -2.36%
June 26 18.97 $0.198800 -1.40% -1.40%
June 29 18.97   0.00%
July 31, 2007 18.95 0.00 -0.11% -0.11%
Quarterly Return  -3.83%

It should be explicitly noted that the CPD returns are shown AFTER ALL FEES AND EXPENSES, while the MAPF numbers are shown after expenses, but before fees … so to make the numbers more comparable, take the annual fee from the fund’s web page and divide by the appropriate number to obtain the period’s fee.

Still, I’m very pleased with these recent results.

Trading during the month returned to normal levels (about 30-35% of the portfolio turned over in July) from June’s frenetic activity. I would certainly like to see more volatility, but I’ll take what I can get! The recent excitement with US Junk Bonds hasn’t really affected the Canadian Preferred market to any huge degree, but it should be noted that Pfd-3 credit spread has increased markedly. The spreads referred to in the linked graph, by the way, represents the spread between Pfd-2 and Pfd-3, and are shown on an after-tax basis.

However, MAPF doesn’t really care a lot about the Pfd-3 spread – holdings continue to be of higher quality and this is not expected to change. Those tempted by the higher yields on Pfd-3 issues should take to heart my cardinal rule: no more than 10% of total holdings in Pfd-3 issues, and no more than 5% in any single Pfd-3 name.

And now … we will see what August brings!

Update, 2007-08-03 The DPS.UN NAV for August 1 has been published, so we can calculate the July-ish returns for it:

DPS.UN NAV Return, July-ish 2007
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
June 27, 2007 $21.95    
August 1, 2007 $22.23 $0.00 1.28%
Time-Weighted, July-ish +1.38%
CPD had an NAV of $19.01 on June 27 and $18.97 on June 29. The pre-July stub period return for CPD was therefore -0.21%.        

CPD had a NAV of $18.95 on July 31 and $18.97 on August 1. The post-July stub period return for CPD was therefore +0.11%.

Inclusion of these two stub periods therefore had the net effect of decreasing DPS.UN’s returns by about 0.10%; adding this back to the measured returns for the  measured period results in a July-ish return fro DPS.UN of +1.38%.

It should be noted that the DPS.UN returns for July, estimated as +1.38%, slightly exceed the “BMO Capital Markets 50” index, which came in at +1.33%. DPS.UN strongly outperformed CPD, with a heartfelt ‘thank-you’ to its overweighting in BCE issues.

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for June-ish and May-ish and construct the following table:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-July-ish, 2007
May-ish -2.67%
June-ish -1.33%
July-ish +1.38%
Three-months-ish -2.64%

So by this measure MAPF did indeed underperform the competition in July, due to relative weightings in BCE, but out-performed quite handsomely over the prior three months. Note that the DPS.UN returns are net of all fees and expense, while the MAPF returns shown at the top of this post are after expenses, but BEFORE FEES.

To see MAPF performance for a wide variety of periods, with comparisons to the BMO Capital Markets 50 Index (formerly the BMO-NB 50 Index), please see the fund’s main page, where there are numerous links under the heading “Performance”.

Update #2, 2007-08-03: Y’know, something’s just occurred to me, looking at that quarterly data and particularly the monthly data whence it is derived.

At some point in the future some extremely sophisticated ultra-quantitative high-powered analytical shop is going to look at these results with a view towards recommending whether their client should allocate Hymas Investment some assets. They’ll put an MBA in charge of the research.

As we all know, a long time ago, MBA stood for “More Bad Assets”. Then it stood for “Mexico, Brazil, Argentina”. I suppose that someday soon it will stand for “Mortgages, Banks, ABXs”. But that’s beside the point.

Anyway, this MBA won’t know or care about what I held vis a vis the index in the past few months. “Meaningless details!”, he’ll bark. “I’m an extremely sophisticated high-powered ultra-quant! Just yesterday, I showed my mummy a spreadsheet! Results! Don’t give me stories, give me results! Do you know who I had lunch with last week?”

So he’ll look at my results. While the past few months, taken as a whole, will certainly improve the relative returns of my fund, they will also significantly increase the standard deviation of my returns.

I’ll end up losing the account. “Too much variance! Nice returns – but too risky!” Disdaining BCE prefs might end up costing me business.

Update, 2007-8-6: Portfolio composition is discussed here.

GWO Reports: No purchases in 2Q07 of GWO.PR.E / GWO.PR.X

Wednesday, August 1st, 2007

I have mentioned earlier that I was looking forward to today’s GWO Earnings Release for hints of what they will be doing with preferreds.

No news! And no purchases through the GWO.PR.E / GWO.PR.X Issuer Bid so far this year either. These two issues are currently trading at what I consider to be elevated levels, with pre-tax bid-YTWs in the 3.8% range. This is an interest equivalent (at a factor of 1.4x) of about 5.3%, which in turn is about where Great-West bond paper is trading. Given all the current uncertainty in the credit markets, there is not much incentive for them to purchase on the open market from a strictly financial point of view – there may be regulatory considerations of which I am not aware), so I think we can write off the next few months in terms of hoping for purchases and cancellations of these issues.

As far as CL.PR.B is concerned … who knows? It pays $1.5625, is currently callable at $26.00 and the redemption price declines by $0.25 p.a. every December 1 until 2010-12-31, after which it is callable at $25.00. Thus, net cost to the company of leaving it out is only $1.3125 p.a., which is 5.25% of par, which is probably what it would take to issue a new perpetual in size in this market. I suspect the window of opportunity for redemption of this issue has closed – at least for now.