On September 18 I mentioned the investment firm Calyon and its sudden discovery that it had a big position in credit derivatives it didn’t want. Today, the plot thickened:
The Calyon trader fired last month for alleged unauthorized trading that led to 250 million euros ($353 million) of losses said his bosses knew what he was doing and considered him a “golden child” of the New York office.”There was nothing deceptive or rogue,” Richard “Chip” Bierbaum, 26, said in an interview. “My positions were reported on a daily basis. It did not blow up. I expect there were some losses but nowhere near the amounts they are discussing. I was the golden child of credit trading in New York.”
It will be most interesting to see how this unfolds; but when things go wrong, all bureaucrats go into ass-covering mode, integrity be hanged. A trading loss of $353-million is a mere bagatelle anyway.
James Hamilton of Econbrowser writes about the return of backwardation to oil futures. A friend of mine claims that the recent contango in oil futures showed that there was no real North American oil shortage; contango implies that you can buy spot, sell futures, pay storage and make a profit. Therefore, the huge amount of contango in the recent past simply proved that there was so much oil around that the market had run out of places to store it for a few months … therefore no shortage. The current backwardation implies that the market is returning to normal, at any rate – as long as one considers a spot price of USD 80+ normal!
We will probably be hearing a lot about free trade in the next year, as the American presidential cycle ticks over. There are some polls that show the average North American supports free trade; other polls that show the opposite. The Republican front-runners are largely in favour; the Cato Institute considers Hillary Clinton to be an “interventionist” in its classification:
On the basis of their voting records, members of the 107th Congress can be classified in four categories: free traders, who oppose both trade barriers and subsidies; internationalists, who oppose barriers and support subsidies; isolationists, who support barriers and oppose subsidies; and interventionists, who support barriers and subsidies.
Her website does not discuss free trade as an issue. Anyway, in the grand tradition of American politics, we’re going to hear a lot of disingenuous statements, unfounded assertions and outright lies over the next year. Jagdish Bhagwati has written a short essay on current economic thought.
Eric Rosengren of the Boston Fed has spoken in favour of the concept of sub-prime mortgages and noted that important regional benefits resulted from their existence. His speech, published on the Boston Fed’s website, conveys some fascinating detail:
A first finding is that recent foreclosures have been disproportionately related to multi-family dwellings. In Middlesex County, Massachusetts, multi-family properties accounted for approximately 10 percent of all homes, but 27 percent of foreclosures in 2007. This highlights a potentially serious problem for tenants, who may not have known that the owner might be in a precarious financial position.
Second, the Bank’s research shows that the duration of a subprime mortgages is on average quite short – for a sample of subprime mortgages used to purchase a home between 1999 and 2004, two-thirds have prepaid within two years and almost 90 percent have prepaid within three years. Prepayment will occur if the home is refinanced or if it is sold. While some of those sales may have been under difficult circumstances, it is plausible that many borrowers who purchased homes with subprime products did benefit from the appreciation of home prices in New England that occurred over the last decade.
…
First, many subprime borrowers have respectable credit histories. LoanPerformance data from Middlesex County show that almost two-thirds (64 cent) of borrowers who received subprime loans had FICO scores greater than 620, and 18 percent had scores over 700. They may have been in subprime products because they chose to make a highly leveraged home purchase, or they may have been steered to a more costly mortgage for which they might have otherwise qualified. Either way, it is encouraging to note that these borrowers could be in a position to refinance to another product.Third, many borrowers of so-called “teaser” 2/28 mortgages were actually paying a much higher rate than is found on prime loans. The average “teaser” rate was 7.3 percent in 2005 and 8.35 percent in 2006 for loans located in Middlesex County in Massachusetts. This suggests that if these borrowers could qualify for a prime product, they would likely see a significant reduction in their interest rate.
Second, many subprime borrowers have held their house long enough for it to appreciate, so they may now have sufficient equity in their house to facilitate refinancing into a prime product.
Sorry to include such a long quote – but seeing some actual data on subPrime, as opposed to reporters’ drivel, is very exciting!
He even included a rather puzzling note, that may be an elliptic reference to Canadian ABCP:
Much of the asset-backed commercial paper had liquidity and often credit enhancements provided by banks, to insure that investors would receive their money should they decide they no longer wanted to hold the commercial paper. The success of the asset-backed commercial paper in financing assets has encouraged some organizations to choose structures that were less reliant on liquidity provisions by banks.
But … that’s it for me. I have better things to do this evening; I will be updating HIMIPref™ data later and may have time for some comments (and perhaps some snarky comments about the election) but no guarantees!
Update: So … the Ontario election results are in and it looks like John Tory will have to run for Prime Minister next time. It’s a bit of a shame, in many ways, because he ran an absolutely masterful campaign. The faith-based-school thing (which was only charter-school-lite, anyway) was a beautiful distraction from the completely ludicrous budgetary plan and he managed to escape with a reputation as an earnestly mistaken zealot, rather than a dangerous bozo.
What has happened to the (Progressive) Conservative party to which I used to belong in pre-Harper, pre-Eves days? It used to be the party of fiscal responsibility and competent management; it has become the party of moronic tax cuts and vindictive politics of resentment.
Ontario voters have also shown good sense in rejecting proportional representation; a number of supporters are showing all the intellectual honesty of unrepentent Stalinists: ‘It’s a great system! It just wasn’t done right!’. Still rejection of the changes as written provides Ontario with an opportunity to increase revenues at some point in the future … instead of presenting the party leaders with a batch of seats to sell, the province might in the future sell them directly, at so much per year. This makes a lot more fiscal sense in these troubled times.
It was another bad day for prefs, with the PerpetualDiscount index down just over a third of a percentage point. PerpetualPremiums were down marginally.
I received some more fascinating correspondence tonight and will post about it tomorrow.
Update 2007-10-11
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30 | |||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) | Mean YTW | Mean Average Trading Value | Mean Mod Dur (YTW) | Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 4.69% | 4.63% | 739,258 | 15.99 | 1 | -0.0408% | 1,043.7 |
Fixed-Floater | 4.87% | 4.75% | 104,097 | 15.84 | 7 | +0.3158% | 1,040.0 |
Floater | 4.53% | 4.52% | 77,642 | 11.27 | 3 | -0.7793% | 1,035.8 |
Op. Retract | 4.86% | 3.95% | 77,331 | 3.15 | 15 | -0.1174% | 1,027.6 |
Split-Share | 5.14% | 4.76% | 85,311 | 4.04 | 15 | -0.0748% | 1,046.2 |
Interest Bearing | 6.29% | 6.40% | 56,493 | 3.64 | 4 | +0.5475% | 1,051.1 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.65% | 5.41% | 94,826 | 8.89 | 17 | -0.0422% | 1,017.5 |
Perpetual-Discount | 5.38% | 5.42% | 266,215 | 14.81 | 46 | -0.3463% | 935.5 |
Major Price Changes | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
RY.PR.F | PerpetualDiscount | -2.5058% | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.01 and a limitMaturity. |
LBS.PR.A | SplitShare | -1.5385% | Asset coverage of 2.5+:1 as of 2007-10-4, according to Brompton. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.81% based on a bid of 10.24 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00. |
BAM.PR.K | Floater | -1.3790% | |
BNS.PR.M | PerpetualDiscount | -1.1163% | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 21.26 and a limitMaturity. |
BSD.PR.A | InterestBearing | +2.4202% | Asset coverage of 1.79:1 as of October 5, according to Brookfield. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.35% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.31 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00. |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Volume | Notes |
SLF.PR.C | PerpetualDiscount | 275,564 | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.0469% on the day. |
SLF.PR.D | PerpetualDiscount | 413,039 | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.7438% on the day. |
BMO.PR.J | PerpetualDiscount | 336,250 | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.6993% on the day. |
MFC.PR.C | PerpetualDiscount | 307,740 | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 21.75 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.2294% on the day. |
MFC.PR.B | PerpetualDiscount | 306,000 | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.9434% on the day. |
FAL.PR.A | Scraps (Would be Floater, but there are credit concerns) | 175,526 | Down 0.3241% on the day. |
GWO.PR.G | PerpetualDiscount | 107,850 | Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 24.35 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.7338% on the day. |
There were fourteen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.
What Affects Preferred Shares Prices?
Wednesday, October 10th, 2007There have been some questions about this issue recently, both on FWF:
and in my eMail:
Well, let’s begin with the first statement: the thing to remember about preferred shares is that they are fixed income investments. A $25.00 par-value preferred share paying $1.3125 annually to yield 5.25% will never change its dividend just because the company is doing well. Whether the issue is priced at $30 (to yield 4.375% of market price) or at $20 (to yield 6.5625% of market price) is another matter entirely.
‘They never change their dividends?’, you ask, ‘What, never?’ Well … hardly ever. Every now and then a company will seek to change the terms of a preferred share issue (extending the maturity date of a split-share preferred is a recent example) and sweeten the dividend to make the change more palatable. Such examples are notable mainly for their rarity.
Another exception is “fixed-reset” issues, in which the company resets the fixed-rate every five years and gives the holder the option to convert to floating rate. BCE.PR.A / BCE.PR.B is an example of such a pair. The company’s motives in setting the rate, however, will be to minimize their expense, not to ‘share the wealth’ if they do well.
The price of preferreds will be affected by the fortunes of the company only to the extent that the company’s ability to pay the agreed dividends and principal changes. In the case of TD Bank, an improvement in their financial position will have an extremely limited effect, because both the markets and the credit rating agencies agree that the probability of them being able to meet their committments is pretty close to 100% right now; therefore, any possible increase in this probability is extremely small and therefore will have a very limited effect on market price.
On the other hand, a deterioration in the company’s ability to pay can have a very marked effect on market price. Recently, for instance, Weston has run into difficulties – not as exciting as the fears of imminent bankruptcy that plagued Nortel a few years back, or the silliness that affected Bombardier preferreds, but difficulties nevertheless, and their ability to pay the agreed dividends is not considered to be as secure as it once was.
WN.PR.E is very similar in its terms to SLF.PR.A, and therefore it should respond similarly to general financial market pressures – any differences will be almost entirely due to company-specific factors. I have graphed the flatBidPrice of these issues … you can see that the detioration in Weston’s credit quality has had a huge effect. Credit, credit, credit! You always have to pay attention to credit!
As far as Weston is concerned, an investor might well look at what they’re doing and take the view that they’re going to do so well that market perceptions of their ability to pay will become much rosier; in such a case, we’d expect the spread between SLF.PR.A and WN.PR.E to narrow; and hence, WN.PR.E would (if the analysis is correct!) outperform. This type of analysis is called Credit Anticipation and represents a blurring of the lines between fixed income and equity analysis. As far as TD is concerned though, they’re recognized as such a strong company already that “ability to pay” simply doesn’t have much room to improve.
OK – on to the second question!
My correspondent is quite correct in his understanding about the inverse relationship between interest rates and preferred share prices, but I have to quibble over the use of the “Prime” interest rate.
“Prime” is for very short term loans and is related to the Bank of Canada’s overnight target rate. Preferreds, particularly perpetual preferreds, will be related to the long rate – and the corporate long rate at that.
The two are not necessarily directly related. Long term bonds – those maturing in 20-30 years – are sensitive to perceptions of inflation, while short term bonds – those maturing in less than 5 years – are sensitive to monetary policy as executed via the overnight rate. The Bank of Canada might, for instance, cut overnight rates to 1% … not very likely, perhaps, but possible! In such a case, short rates would decline (trading at a relatively constant spread to overnight), but long rates would almost certainly skyrocket, as investors decided that such easy money would fuel inflation.
Additionally, I will stress that it is Corporate long rates that we are concerned with when analyzing perpetual prefs. According to CanadianBondIndices.com, corporate long bonds have returned -3.82% in the year to October 9 and the yield is about 5.9%, compared to about 5.2% at the beginning of the year. Government long bonds, on the other hand, have returned -1.25% … a fair loss, but the fact that this is so much less than the loss on corporates indicates that spreads have increased. In other words, the perceived risk of holding corporates has increased and investors want more money in compensation.
Additionally, there will be a spread between Corporate Long Bonds and Perpetual Preferreds due simply to the fact that there is a different pool of investors. Pension funds, for instance, will not normally hold preferreds; since pension funds are not taxable, there are no tax advantages to be gained by receiving dividend income rather than interest. And retail panics a lot, besides; since there is no institutional hot money (or less of it, at any rate) cruising around looking for a cheap buy in the preferred mariket place, price swings can be more pronounced.
With respect to the two specific issues mentioned in the eMail: MFC.PR.A is a retractible issue; in December 2015, holders are entitled to get their $25 capital back from the company. There are some details to be understood about this – holders might actually get $26.00 worth of common stock, which they would then have to sell – but basically, an investment in MFC.PR.A is roughly comparable to an eight-year bond. I wrote an article comparing perpetuals to retractibles a while ago; and a more recent one comparing retractibles to bonds. PWF.PR.F is a perpetual; a fair number of perpetuals have been issued in the past year; and the recent credit crunch has scared off a few investors who are more concerned with price fluctuations than with income.
There are many investors who want only retractibles; they will not look at perpetuals regardless of price. Which is why retractibles of operating companies are usually so expensive and not worth buying!
Information regarding the attributes of preferred share issues is almost always available on SEDAR (as long as the prospectus was issued within the last 10-odd years); mostly available on my summary website PrefInfo.com (I track almost all of the liquid issues … the tiny little guys are a bit more hit-and-miss); and often available on the company website, as either a summary or a full prospectus – sometimes both! To find a company website, get a quote for the issue from the TSX, then click “Company Information”.
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