Archive for October, 2007

October 10, 2007

Wednesday, October 10th, 2007

On September 18 I mentioned the investment firm Calyon and its sudden discovery that it had a big position in credit derivatives it didn’t want. Today, the plot thickened:

The Calyon trader fired last month for alleged unauthorized trading that led to 250 million euros ($353 million) of losses said his bosses knew what he was doing and considered him a “golden child” of the New York office.”There was nothing deceptive or rogue,” Richard “Chip” Bierbaum, 26, said in an interview. “My positions were reported on a daily basis. It did not blow up. I expect there were some losses but nowhere near the amounts they are discussing. I was the golden child of credit trading in New York.”

It will be most interesting to see how this unfolds; but when things go wrong, all bureaucrats go into ass-covering mode, integrity be hanged. A trading loss of $353-million is a mere bagatelle anyway.

James Hamilton of Econbrowser writes about the return of backwardation to oil futures. A friend of mine claims that the recent contango in oil futures showed that there was no real North American oil shortage; contango implies that you can buy spot, sell futures, pay storage and make a profit. Therefore, the huge amount of contango in the recent past simply proved that there was so much oil around that the market had run out of places to store it for a few months … therefore no shortage. The current backwardation implies that the market is returning to normal, at any rate – as long as one considers a spot price of USD 80+ normal!

We will probably be hearing a lot about free trade in the next year, as the American presidential cycle ticks over. There are some polls that show the average North American supports free trade; other polls that show the opposite. The Republican front-runners are largely in favour; the Cato Institute considers Hillary Clinton to be an “interventionist” in its classification:

On the basis of their voting records, members of the 107th Congress can be classified in four categories: free traders, who oppose both trade barriers and subsidies; internationalists, who oppose barriers and support subsidies; isolationists, who support barriers and oppose subsidies; and interventionists, who support barriers and subsidies.

Her website does not discuss free trade as an issue. Anyway, in the grand tradition of American politics, we’re going to hear a lot of disingenuous statements, unfounded assertions and outright lies over the next year. Jagdish Bhagwati has written a short essay on current economic thought.

Eric Rosengren of the Boston Fed has spoken in favour of the concept of sub-prime mortgages and noted that important regional benefits resulted from their existence. His speech, published on the Boston Fed’s website, conveys some fascinating detail:

A  first finding is that recent foreclosures have been disproportionately related to multi-family dwellings.  In Middlesex County, Massachusetts, multi-family properties accounted for approximately 10 percent of all homes, but 27 percent of foreclosures in 2007.  This highlights a potentially serious problem for tenants, who may not have known that the owner might be in a precarious financial position.

Second, the Bank’s research shows that the duration of a subprime mortgages is on average quite short – for a sample of subprime mortgages used to purchase a home between 1999 and 2004,  two-thirds have prepaid within two years and almost 90 percent have prepaid within three years.  Prepayment will occur if the home is refinanced or if it is sold.  While some of those sales may have been under difficult circumstances, it is plausible that many borrowers who purchased homes with subprime products did benefit from the appreciation of home prices in New England that occurred over the last decade.

First, many subprime borrowers have respectable credit histories.  LoanPerformance data from Middlesex County show that almost two-thirds (64 cent) of borrowers who received subprime loans had FICO scores greater than 620, and 18 percent had scores over 700.  They may have been in subprime products because they chose to make a highly leveraged home purchase, or they may have been steered to a more costly mortgage for which they might have otherwise qualified.  Either way, it is encouraging to note that these borrowers could be in a position to refinance to another product.

Third, many borrowers of so-called “teaser” 2/28 mortgages were actually paying a much higher rate than is found on prime loans.  The average “teaser” rate was 7.3 percent in 2005 and 8.35 percent in 2006 for loans located in Middlesex County in Massachusetts.  This suggests that if these borrowers could qualify for a prime product, they would likely see a significant reduction in their interest rate.

Second, many subprime borrowers have held their house long enough for it to appreciate, so they may now have sufficient equity in their house to facilitate refinancing into a prime product.

Sorry to include such a long quote – but seeing some actual data on subPrime, as opposed to reporters’ drivel, is very exciting!

He even included a rather puzzling note, that may be an elliptic reference to Canadian ABCP:

Much of the asset-backed commercial paper had liquidity and often credit enhancements provided by banks, to insure that investors would receive their money should they decide they no longer wanted to hold the commercial paper.  The success of the asset-backed commercial paper in financing assets has encouraged some organizations to choose structures that were less reliant on liquidity provisions by banks.

But … that’s it for me. I have better things to do this evening; I will be updating HIMIPref™ data later and may have time for some comments (and perhaps some snarky comments about the election) but no guarantees!

Update: So … the Ontario election results are in and it looks like John Tory will have to run for Prime Minister next time. It’s a bit of a shame, in many ways, because he ran an absolutely masterful campaign. The faith-based-school thing (which was only charter-school-lite, anyway) was a beautiful distraction from the completely ludicrous budgetary plan and he managed to escape with a reputation as an earnestly mistaken zealot, rather than a dangerous bozo.

What has happened to the (Progressive) Conservative party to which I used to belong in pre-Harper, pre-Eves days? It used to be the party of fiscal responsibility and competent management; it has become the party of moronic tax cuts and vindictive politics of resentment.

Ontario voters have also shown good sense in rejecting proportional representation; a number of supporters are showing all the intellectual honesty of unrepentent Stalinists: ‘It’s a great system! It just wasn’t done right!’. Still rejection of the changes as written provides Ontario with an opportunity to increase revenues at some point in the future … instead of presenting the party leaders with a batch of seats to sell, the province might in the future sell them directly, at so much per year. This makes a lot more fiscal sense in these troubled times.

It was another bad day for prefs, with the PerpetualDiscount index down just over a third of a percentage point. PerpetualPremiums were down marginally.

I received some more fascinating correspondence tonight and will post about it tomorrow.

Update 2007-10-11

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.69% 4.63% 739,258 15.99 1 -0.0408% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.87% 4.75% 104,097 15.84 7 +0.3158% 1,040.0
Floater 4.53% 4.52% 77,642 11.27 3 -0.7793% 1,035.8
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.95% 77,331 3.15 15 -0.1174% 1,027.6
Split-Share 5.14% 4.76% 85,311 4.04 15 -0.0748% 1,046.2
Interest Bearing 6.29% 6.40% 56,493 3.64 4 +0.5475% 1,051.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.65% 5.41% 94,826 8.89 17 -0.0422% 1,017.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.38% 5.42% 266,215 14.81 46 -0.3463% 935.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -2.5058% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.01 and a limitMaturity.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -1.5385% Asset coverage of 2.5+:1 as of 2007-10-4, according to Brompton. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.81% based on a bid of 10.24 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.3790%  
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.1163% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 21.26 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +2.4202% Asset coverage of 1.79:1 as of October 5, according to Brookfield. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.35% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.31 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 275,564 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.0469% on the day.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 413,039 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.7438% on the day.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 336,250 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.6993% on the day.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 307,740 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 21.75 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.2294% on the day.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 306,000 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.9434% on the day.
FAL.PR.A Scraps (Would be Floater, but there are credit concerns) 175,526 Down 0.3241% on the day.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 107,850 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 24.35 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.7338% on the day.

There were fourteen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

What Affects Preferred Shares Prices?

Wednesday, October 10th, 2007

There have been some questions about this issue recently, both on FWF:

My limited understanding of prefs is that they are a lot less volatile than commons and trade in a “short” range. TD is on its way up. They just bought Commerce Bancorp at a time when our loonie is worth huge. If they do well, even their prefs are going to appreciate somewhat. Even if they don’t do so well, the US. $ will eventually find it’s way back and they’re going to make it on the exchange.

and in my eMail:

The one thing I don’t understand about preferreds is how their shared price is affected.  I assume like bonds they trend inverse to the prime rate and I get that part of the discount. Over the past several years I have held preferreds and noticed very little fluctuation in the share price but lately they are falling and I don’t fundamentally understand why as interest rates appear stable (or am I wrong here?).  Further, some hold their value better than others (e.g., MFC.PR.A versus PWF.PR.F – I’d consider ManuLife and Power Financial equally sound companies for the long term yet one share price is falling while the other is not).  How concerned does one need to be about share price and if they do go down what are the factors that will bring them back to book value (e.g., something is making ManuLife more stable than Power and I don’t understand what that is).  Sorry, if the question comes across as naive but I find it hard to get my head around all the factors affecting these preferreds.  Thanks in advance.

Well, let’s begin with the first statement: the thing to remember about preferred shares is that they are fixed income investments. A $25.00 par-value preferred share paying $1.3125 annually to yield 5.25% will never change its dividend just because the company is doing well. Whether the issue is priced at $30 (to yield 4.375% of market price) or at $20 (to yield 6.5625% of market price) is another matter entirely.

‘They never change their dividends?’, you ask, ‘What, never?’ Well … hardly ever. Every now and then a company will seek to change the terms of a preferred share issue (extending the maturity date of a split-share preferred is a recent example) and sweeten the dividend to make the change more palatable. Such examples are notable mainly for their rarity.

Another exception is “fixed-reset” issues, in which the company resets the fixed-rate every five years and gives the holder the option to convert to floating rate. BCE.PR.A / BCE.PR.B is an example of such a pair. The company’s motives in setting the rate, however, will be to minimize their expense, not to ‘share the wealth’ if they do well.

The price of preferreds will be affected by the fortunes of the company only to the extent that the company’s ability to pay the agreed dividends and principal changes. In the case of TD Bank, an improvement in their financial position will have an extremely limited effect, because both the markets and the credit rating agencies agree that the probability of them being able to meet their committments is pretty close to 100% right now; therefore, any possible increase in this probability is extremely small and therefore will have a very limited effect on market price.

On the other hand, a deterioration in the company’s ability to pay can have a very marked effect on market price. Recently, for instance, Weston has run into difficulties – not as exciting as the fears of imminent bankruptcy that plagued Nortel a few years back, or the silliness that affected Bombardier preferreds, but difficulties nevertheless, and their ability to pay the agreed dividends is not considered to be as secure as it once was.

WN.PR.E is very similar in its terms to SLF.PR.A, and therefore it should respond similarly to general financial market pressures – any differences will be almost entirely due to company-specific factors. I have graphed the flatBidPrice of these issues … you can see that the detioration in Weston’s credit quality has had a huge effect. Credit, credit, credit! You always have to pay attention to credit!

As far as Weston is concerned, an investor might well look at what they’re doing and take the view that they’re going to do so well that market perceptions of their ability to pay will become much rosier; in such a case, we’d expect the spread between SLF.PR.A and WN.PR.E to narrow; and hence, WN.PR.E would (if the analysis is correct!) outperform. This type of analysis is called Credit Anticipation and represents a blurring of the lines between fixed income and equity analysis. As far as TD is concerned though, they’re recognized as such a strong company already that “ability to pay” simply doesn’t have much room to improve.

OK – on to the second question!

My correspondent is quite correct in his understanding about the inverse relationship between interest rates and preferred share prices, but I have to quibble over the use of the “Prime” interest rate.

“Prime” is for very short term loans and is related to the Bank of Canada’s overnight target rate. Preferreds, particularly perpetual preferreds, will be related to the long rate – and the corporate long rate at that.

The two are not necessarily directly related. Long term bonds – those maturing in 20-30 years – are sensitive to perceptions of inflation, while short term bonds – those maturing in less than 5 years – are sensitive to monetary policy as executed via the overnight rate. The Bank of Canada might, for instance, cut overnight rates to 1% … not very likely, perhaps, but possible! In such a case, short rates would decline (trading at a relatively constant spread to overnight), but long rates would almost certainly skyrocket, as investors decided that such easy money would fuel inflation.

Additionally, I will stress that it is Corporate long rates that we are concerned with when analyzing perpetual prefs. According to CanadianBondIndices.com, corporate long bonds have returned -3.82% in the year to October 9 and the yield is about 5.9%, compared to about 5.2% at the beginning of the year. Government long bonds, on the other hand, have returned -1.25% … a fair loss, but the fact that this is so much less than the loss on corporates indicates that spreads have increased. In other words, the perceived risk of holding corporates has increased and investors want more money in compensation.

Additionally, there will be a spread between Corporate Long Bonds and Perpetual Preferreds due simply to the fact that there is a different pool of investors. Pension funds, for instance, will not normally hold preferreds; since pension funds are not taxable, there are no tax advantages to be gained by receiving dividend income rather than interest. And retail panics a lot, besides; since there is no institutional hot money (or less of it, at any rate) cruising around looking for a cheap buy in the preferred mariket place, price swings can be more pronounced.

With respect to the two specific issues mentioned in the eMail: MFC.PR.A is a retractible issue; in December 2015, holders are entitled to get their $25 capital back from the company. There are some details to be understood about this – holders might actually get $26.00 worth of common stock, which they would then have to sell – but basically, an investment in MFC.PR.A is roughly comparable to an eight-year bond. I wrote an article comparing perpetuals to retractibles a while ago; and a more recent one comparing retractibles to bonds. PWF.PR.F is a perpetual; a fair number of perpetuals have been issued in the past year; and the recent credit crunch has scared off a few investors who are more concerned with price fluctuations than with income.

There are many investors who want only retractibles; they will not look at perpetuals regardless of price. Which is why retractibles of operating companies are usually so expensive and not worth buying!

Information regarding the attributes of preferred share issues is almost always available on SEDAR (as long as the prospectus was issued within the last 10-odd years); mostly available on my summary website PrefInfo.com (I track almost all of the liquid issues … the tiny little guys are a bit more hit-and-miss); and often available on the company website, as either a summary or a full prospectus – sometimes both! To find a company website, get a quote for the issue from the TSX, then click “Company Information”.

October 9, 2007

Tuesday, October 9th, 2007

Worry over the fate of the USD continues to be a theme in the markets, and Menzie Chinn of Econbrowser has posted a review of the issues. I will admit, this post is notable mainly for its links to definitions and prior reviews of the issue, but these are good links. The 2005 post includes a link to a paper showing the futility of forecasting: it’s always gratifying to get some agreement with one’s prejudices! The examination of the interest-rate parity predictions are interesting, if only because I have seen it claimed – by a sophisticated retail investor – that carry trades are intrinsically unsound because interest-rate parity is guaranteed. Well … not in this world!

Accrued Interest reviewed the jobs numbers on the weekend, with a view to discussing the investment difference between “lawyers” and “detectives” – the former seeking evidence to support a particular view; the latter (greatly favoured) seeking to examine evidence to form a view.

What’s a good name for those, such as myself, who feel that the process is pointless because natural chaos will destroy any prediction as soon as it’s made? Weatherman, perhaps? I’m not going to predict a hurricane, but I will say that if there is a hurricane, you should have a good solid house; but if it’s sunny and pleasant, you’ll want nice windows; so build your house with the objective of surviving hurricanes with not too much damage while being able to enjoy the sunny times.

Perhaps this is stretching a metaphor too far! The markets can be outperformed, but you have to get your hands dirty and examine a wide variety of scenarios. And – assuming you are a rational investor and avoid the One Big Bet school of thought – you’re not going to double your money while everyone else goes broke, either! Ideally, you’ll outperform by a constant, small-but-worthwhile amount, irregardless of economic conditions.

The Northern Rock Saga continues:

Northern Rock, based in Newcastle, England, said in a statement today that money deposited after Sept. 19 will now be covered by the Bank of England, the U.K. Treasury and Financial Services Authority. The authorities previously only protected deposits made before then.

“This may make Northern Rock easier to sell,” said Philip Shaw, chief European economist at Investec Bank in London.

The case has been “damaging” for the reputation of the U.K., Financial Services Authority Chairman Callum McCarthy told the Treasury Select Committee of lawmakers today. Still, it was “impossible” to predict closure of the markets both for securitization and for short-term repurchase agreements, he said.

“We didn’t identify the probability of that happening,” McCarthy said. “No regulator anywhere around the world succeeded in predicting that.”

Sion Simon, a Labour Party member of the committee, said he had heard that relations between the FSA and the Bank of England were “poisonous” and compared McCarthy to a boxer.

“You are the Sugar Ray Leonard of the financial-services sector. You are a world-class ducker and diver.” Simon told McCarthy. “There was a run on the bank, the nation was a global laughing stock, and you say the provisions worked?”

Instead of saying ‘We didn’t predict it and neither did anybody else’, McCarthy should have blamed the credit rating agencies. That technique is working beautifully in North America!

Speaking of credit rating agencies, I see in the Globe today that State Street (among other Money-Market-Fund sponsors) is seeing a big uptick in business:

Executives at many small to mid-sized companies across Canada woke up in mid-August to find a portion of their supposedly liquid cash holdings were frozen, as a $30-billion segment of the asset-backed commercial paper market (ABCP) collapsed. Airline Transat A.T. Inc., for example, has $154-million of its $340-million in cash reserves stuck in a holding pattern.

“Corporate treasurers suddenly became aware that they face risks in their cash holdings, and they’re rushing to deal with these risks,” said Gregory Chrispin, president of State Street’s Canadian arm and former treasurer of Export Development Canada.

It is nice to see that some companies are taking my advice to stick to what they’re good at and pay for portfolio management. Whether or not there will be a surge of CFO replacements to accompany the sudden discovery that treasury departments have been speculating with shareholder assets remains to be seen! 

Treasuries drifted downwards, attributed to a ‘no-recession’ indication by the Fed, though today’s retail sales number provided no indication of a huge economic boom. Canadas fell, as a strong housing number decreased chances for a rate cut. US equities rose (no recession!) while Canadian equities were pretty quiet.

The news in the preferred share market today was that the TD New Issue and the closing of the BMO new issue combined to drive the PerpetualDiscount index to a new low. The prior low (since the temporary index was started, as of 2006-6-30, that is) was set on June 12, 2007. The four main indices since then have returned:

Total Return
2007-6-12 to 2007-10-9
Index Return
OpRet +0.82%
SplitShare +1.56%
PerpetualPremium +1.05%
Perpetual Discount -0.48%

If we look at returns for CPD …

CPD Returns for period of interest
After all fees and Expenses
Date NAV Distribution Period Return
June 12, 2007 $18.97 N/A N/A
June 26 18.97 $0.1998 +1.05%
Sept 25 18.76 $0.2185 +0.04%
October 9, 2007 $18.49 $0.00 -1.44%
Total (after fees & expenses) -0.37%

So, speculating on price movements in prefs has not been a jolly time for the past four months! Fortunately, the investments are paying the same income as they have done in the past, so income – which is the entire reason for investing in prefs, right? – is unaffected. Market timers may wish to kick themselves for getting it wrong, but an honest market timer is always kicking himself anyway, so there’s not much difference there.

It was nice to see some good volume in the pref market today, with a few good-sized crosses courtesy of Scotia.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.68% 4.62% 769,935 16.01 1 +0.0408% 1,044.1
Fixed-Floater 4.89% 4.77% 104,381 15.82 7 -0.1098% 1,036.7
Floater 4.50% 3.01% 76,099 10.71 3 -0.1365% 1,043.9
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.98% 78,046 3.27 15 +0.0216% 1,028.9
Split-Share 5.13% 4.80% 85,029 4.05 15 -0.0962% 1,047.0
Interest Bearing 6.33% 6.48% 56,152 3.62 4 -0.1268% 1,045.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.64% 5.40% 94,703 8.28 17 -0.2043% 1,018.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.36% 5.40% 264,377 14.84 46 -0.6242% 938.8
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.8558% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.75% based on a bid of 20.75 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -2.0478% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 22.96 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount -1.9624% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 23.48 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.8893% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 22.33 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.6529% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 22.61 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.6355% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.05 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.5894% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 22.29 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualPremium -1.4168% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 25.05 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.4061% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 23.84 and a limitMaturity.
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualDiscount -1.2159% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.57% based on a bid of 49.56 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.1404% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 22.54 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.1106% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 22.26 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1034% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 24.20 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualPremium (for now!) -1.0334% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 24.90 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.0223% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.1379% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 23.11 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.1759% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 21.51 and a limitMaturity.
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.5208% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.63% based on a bid of 24.70 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
NTL.PR.F Scraps (would be ratchet, but there are credit concerns) 153,926 Scotia crossed 150,000 at 15.50.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 84,620 New issue closed today. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 24.50 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 83,925 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 21.47 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 63,200 Scotia crossed 49,000 at 21.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 21.40 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 59,776 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 21.51 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 58,600 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 21.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 21.45 and a limitMaturity.

There were sixteen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

BMO.PR.K Slithers onto Market

Tuesday, October 9th, 2007

This new issue, announced on September 27 initially looked pretty good … but market yields kept increasing and it looked less and less like a good thing as time went on.

The new issue announcement by TD today probably didn’t help a lot either.

Opening day wasn’t very good, but was at least better than the EPP.PR.A, BAM.PR.N and CCS.PR.A opening days of late last spring. 84,620 shares traded in a range of 24.50-70, closing at 24.50-55, 10×32.

As of the close, HIMIPref™ estimates the fair value of this issue to be 24.67. The issue has been entered into the HIMIPref™ database with a securityCode of A40007. A reorgDataEntry has been created to reflect the change from the preIssue code of P25008.

Update: This issue has been added to the PerpetualDiscount Index.

TD New Issue : 5.25% Perp

Tuesday, October 9th, 2007

Well, TD responded to my plea for TD Perps, but I suppose I should have specified that I want a decent coupon! Come on, guys! 5.25% was a great coupon, back in the old days of late September when comparables were trading to yield 5%, but it doesn’t cut the mustard today. This issue, which joins the 5.25% BNS Perps and the 5.25% BMO Perps is expensive compared to comparables and cannot be recommended at the issue price, given the recent increase in market yields.

Description: Toronto Dominion Bank Non-cumulative Class A First Preferred Shares, Series P

Size: 10-million shares (=$250-million); underwriters option (hah!) for another 2-million shares (=$50-million)

Ratings: DBRS Pfd-1; S&P P-1(low); Moodys Aa2. Another Moodys rating! I remarked on this when posting about the BMO new issue. This is an interesting development … is Moody’s making a big push into the Canadian preferred market? Are the underwriters hearing whispers that retail doesn’t like DBRS any more? Is there rating-shopping going on? A less exciting possibility is that both BMO and TD have relationships with Moody’s due to their US operations and therefore the marginal cost of having another rating for the preferred is negligible. It will be fascinating to see how this unfolds.

Dividends: 5.25% = 1.3125 per annum, payable quarterly, last day of Jan., April, July, October. First dividend of $0.327226, assuming November 1 closing.

Redemption: Redeemable at $26.00 commencing November 1, 2012; redemption price declines by $0.25 annually until October 31, 2016; redeemable at $25.00 thereafter.

Seniority: Parri passu with all other Class A First Preferred Shares; senior to common; junior to everything else.

Distribution: Bought deal with “disaster out”, “regulatory out”, “rating change out” and “material adverse change out” clauses. TD Securities is underwriting

Closing: November 1, 2007.

This issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database with a preIssue securityCode of P75006.

When priced against the HIMIPref™ universe as of the close, October 5, fair value is estimated at $24.71.

Update: There has been a query regarding the “material adverse change out” clause:

I wonder if TD might re-price these if brokers pressure and threaten to exercise (if they can) the “material adverse change out” 

The answer is – I really don’t think so. The underwriting agreement for this particular issue has not yet been released on SEDAR, but I will presume for a moment that it will be very similar to the one for the BMO New Issue (in SEDAR, the Bank of Montreal “Underwriting or Agency Agreement” is filed under “Other”, with a date of September 28). The “material adverse change out” clause” in this agreement reads:

In addition to any other remedies which may be available to the Underwriters, any Underwriter shall be entitled, at the Underwriter’s option, to terminate and cancel, without any liability on the Underwriter’s part, the Underwriter’s obligations under this Agreement:

(b) if, during the period from the date of this Agreement to the Closing Time, there has occurred any material adverse change, financial or otherwise, in the business, financial condition, affairs, operations, assets, liabilities (contingent or otherwise) or capital of the Bank and its subsidiaries, taken together, or there should be discovered any previously undisclosed material fact (other than a material fact related solely to any of the Underwriters) required to be disclosed in the Shelf Prospectus, and such material change, in the sole opinion of the Underwriters, acting reasonably, would be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the market price or value of the Securities;

 

In other words, it’s a material change to the company, not to the markets. If the underwriters had permission to cancel just because the markets had gone down and they didn’t want to be left holding the baby, this would be referred to as a “market out clause”.

I don’t know of any instances of a major pref issue having had any “out” clauses exercised at all. If somebody knows better – let me know!

Update, 2007-10-10: As of the close today, fair value is estimated at 24.45.

Update, 2007-10-11: As of the close today, fair value is estimated at 24.36.

Update, 2007-10-22: As of the close today, fair value is estimated at 24.05.

Update, 2007-10-26: As of the close today, fair value is estimated at 23.77.

Update, 2007-10-31: As of the close today, fair value is estimated at 23.77. It starts trading tomorrow with the symbol TD.PR.P.

October 5, 2007

Friday, October 5th, 2007

Remember last month’s US jobs number? Don’t. It’s been revised upwards with an entirely solid number reported for September, which has been enthusiastically greeted by most economists, ( including JDH of Econbrowser) although Noriel Roubini sees the devil in the details. There was much the same thing in Canada. So, basically, bad news for bonds.

But in a reminder that, yes, sub-prime is really still a concern, both Merrill Lynch and Washington Mutual took big housing-related write-downs amidst reports of fire-sale liquidations and horrifying lack of quality in 2007-vintage sub-prime loans. Concern, yes; end of the world, no. For sure, $150-billion in sub-prime losses ($50-billion? $100-billion?) sounds like a very big number, but I’ll just take a moment to remind readers of Nortel’s market cap in 2000: almost $400-billion. So by all means, worry. But don’t try to tell me that this is an unprecedented disaster requiring extensive regulation. Accrued Interest has taken a look at contagion in non-RMBS asset-backed paper.

There’s entirely too much speculation that the credit crunch is over. Accrued Interest is concerned that the pendulum, having swung too far one way, will promply over-correct in the other direction. Panic, ecstasy … just another day in the markets. Those who wish to profit from panic without having access to institutional markets might wish to take a look at DG.UN, which was mentioned here on August 28 when it suspended redemptions (ABCP financing dried up). According to their September 26 Press Release:

its net asset value (“NAV”) per unit as at August 31, 2007 was $7.92 based on an indicative price received from a large international bank (the “Bank”) as of August 28, 2007.

The NAV on a particular date is equal to the aggregate value of the assets of the Trust, less the aggregate value of its liabilities (calculated in conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)). The NAV does not reflect any eventual write-down resulting from the interruption of payments that MMAI is required to make to Global DIGIT under the swaps, nor does it reflect any potential impairment in the value of the assets of Global DIGIT from any eventual restructuring of MMAI debts, as it not possible at present to determine if, when and to what extent such payments to Global DIGIT under the swaps will resume or the effect of any eventual restructuring of any such MMAI debts.

So … there’s some warnings there and there could be legal problems and all sorts of things. But from what I could make out with a VERY brief look, the underlying credit was fine – it’s just liquidity that causes concern … and it’s quoted today on the TSX at 2.80-00, 8×23; so it seems to me it’s worth closer inspection by those willing to rip apart the books and make a few ‘phone calls prior to a decision.

The Economist has published a commentary on bank liquidity that echoes Dodge’s comments on the seemingly very high level of liquidity guarantees given by the banks. I suggest that one thing that be considered is a sliding scale of capital charges for liquidity guarantees: the charge is now a 10% CCF across the board; perhaps something like … “10% on the first capital-equivalent, 15% on the next, 20%…” might permit the market to operate efficiently while keeping the number of lines under control.

Brad Setser continues to worry about the USD, which has been a topic of some concern lately.

I added an ad to the recent reader inquiry; you don’t really need to do it all yourselves, you know! I’m willing to help!

The jobs numbers crushed bonds in both the US and Canada today.

It was an interesting day for prefs! The yield on PerpetualPremiums is finally back below PerpetualDiscounts, which is only sensible given the greater interest rate risk on the latter. Operating Retractibles and SplitShares have been virtually immune to the recent declines in perpetuals … this makes sense up to a point, but only up to that point.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.67% 4.61% 801,880 16.03 1 0.0000% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.88% 4.76% 106,122 15.83 7 +0.1472% 1,037.8
Floater 4.49% 1.35% 76,979 10.70 3 +0.1101% 1,045.3
Op. Retract 4.86% 4.22% 78,850 3.35 15 +0.0146% 1,028.6
Split-Share 5.13% 4.78% 85,731 4.06 15 +0.0266% 1,048.0
Interest Bearing 6.32% 6.44% 55,585 3.64 4 +0.1296% 1,046.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.63% 5.28% 95,732 6.99 17 +0.1899% 1,020.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.33% 5.36% 208,578 14.90 45 -0.1066% 944.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.5777% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 24.33 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.5741% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.26 and a limitMaturity.
TCA.PR.X PerpetualDiscount -1.4000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 49.30 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.3755% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.1132% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.29% based on a bid of 21.32 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium (for now!) +1.0818% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.79% based on a bid of 24.81 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.J OpRet +1.1801% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.07% based on a bid of 25.75 and a softMaturity 2013-7-30 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
NTL.PR.F Scraps (would be ratchet, but there are credit concerns) 361,040  
EPP.PR.A Scraps (would be PerpetualDiscount but there are credit concerns) 196,050 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.70% based on a bid of 18.28 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.R FixFloat 53,000 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 24.67.
BCE.PR.C FixFloat 52,700 Nesbitt crossed two lots of 25,000 at 24.85 each.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat 51,010 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 24.81.
TD.PR.N OpRet 35,400 Nesbitt crossed 15,700 at 26.25, then another 15,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.98% based on a bid of 25.80 and a softMaturity 2014-1-30 at 25.00
GWO.PR.X OpRet 31,477 This one, in the “Volume Leaders”, again? Something’s up. Maybe. Scotia crossed 25,000 at 26.70. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.42% based on a bid of 26.65 and a call 2009-10-30 at 26.00 … the after-tax equivalent interest yield is 4.79% … most corporate bonds will get you more than that.

There were four other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

BBD.PR.C / BBD.PR.D Dividends

Friday, October 5th, 2007

Why is it that Bombardier updates its shareholder information dividend pages only after pay-date, instead of immediately after declaration date, the way a company might if, you know, it thought about what it was doing?

Memo to the Bombardier Board and Webmaster: when redesigning your Investor Relations section, please remember that while past dividend dates are of great interest to historians, your actual investors will be more interested in the current dividend and the specifics of its ex-date, record-date, pay-date and amount.

Anyway … the current BBD.PR.C / BBD.PR.D dividend has a record date of 10/19 and a pay-date of 10/31. You heard it here first.

IQW.PR.C / IQW.PR.D Downgraded by DBRS … Again

Friday, October 5th, 2007

It was only about five weeks ago that these issues were last downgraded and now DBRS has announced:

DBRS has today downgraded the long-term debt of Quebecor World Inc. (Quebecor World or the Company) and its debt-issuing subsidiaries to B from B (high) and the preferred share ratings to Pfd-5 from Pfd-5 (high). The trend on all ratings remains Negative.

The downgrade is a result of DBRS’s concern over the significance and nature of security pledged as part of the Company’s renegotiated bank agreement, which may have reduced the future financial flexibility of Quebecor World. Additionally, DBRS notes continued concern over the Company’s near-term liquidity constraints which could restrict its ability to execute on its longer-term business and financing plans.

The issues continue to be rated P-5 (Watch Negative) by S&P.

IQW.PR.C was mentioned as an arbitrage possibility on September 11 when it closed at 23.35-50, but potential profits have been greatly reduced in the last three-weeks-odd: it closed today at 24.36-98.

PrefBlog Now a Member of Blogburst

Friday, October 5th, 2007

I am pleased to announce that PrefBlog is now a member of the BlogBurst network.

BlogBurst is an aggregator with an impressive client list – including Reuters, which displays the feed on their story pages.

October 4, 2007

Thursday, October 4th, 2007

There was a report today of another sub-prime winner:

Harbinger Capital Partners, the hedge fund firm run by former Barclays Capital trader Philip Falcone, generated returns of more than 65 percent this year, helped by bets against subprime-mortgage bonds and gains on commodities.Harbinger’s $2.5 billion Special Situations fund increased 9.9 percent last month and more than 100 percent in 2007, said two of the firm’s investors. The $11 billion Harbinger Capital Partners fund rose 5.4 percent last month and 65 percent this year.

Lucky or smart? Does it matter?

The Fed released Commercial Paper Outstandings today; it would appear the situation is normalizing rapidly. ABCP outstanding was down about $6-billion on the week, a nice chunk of change but relatively small in the context of the $906-billion total outstanding. Quality spreads, while still high compared to the last six years, are in decline.

The following posts were either written or updated today:

… which should go a long way towards explaining the brevity of today’s round-up!

There are some very thoughtful essays regarding the Northern Rock bail-out in the WSG Economics Blog and the Economist. There’s another link to an Economist article about the funding gap in British banking … there is an increased reliance on commercial paper, as opposed to deposits, to fund bank loans:

 

Meanwhile, the preferred share market showed a little stability today. There were some rather violent individual moves, but most of these were reversals of previous silliness.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.67% 4.61% 835,153 16.04 1 0.0000% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.89% 4.76% 102,176 15.82 7 +0.2812% 1,036.3
Floater 4.50% 2.84% 78,528 10.72 3 +0.0275% 1,044.2
Op. Retract 4.85% 4.04% 78,762 3.16 15 +0.0129% 1,028.5
Split-Share 5.13% 4.78% 86,372 4.06 15 +0.0997% 1,047.7
Interest Bearing 6.33% 6.40% 55,359 3.63 3 +0.1539% 1,045.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.62% 5.38% 96,670 8.30 17 +0.2682% 1,018.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.32% 5.35% 211,463 14.90 45 +0.0100% 945.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.5730% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 21.90 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.3514% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 25.55 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.0816% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 21.95 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.1848% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.I PerpetualPremium +1.4769% This has just gone ex-dividend for $0.375, so expect to see a drop in trading price on October 5. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 26.11 and a call 2012-5-30 at 25.00.
POW.PR.C PerpetualPremium (for now!) +2.0483% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.84% based on a bid of 24.91 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat 153,168  
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 115,690 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 19.85 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet 105,732 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.62% based on a bid of 25.91 and a call 2009-4-30 at 26.00.
RY.PR.K OpRet 84,864 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 25.15. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.87% based on a bid of 25.10 and a softMaturity 2008-8-23 at 25.00.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 62,980 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 21.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.23% based on a bid of 21.60 and a limitMaturity.

There were eleven other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.