Archive for March, 2008

AR.PR.B Removed from HIMIPref™

Wednesday, March 5th, 2008

This is actually rather amusing.

Those familiar with my work will know that I’m somewhat obsessive about errors. They can creep in anywhere, with severe consequences for quantitative systems! I therefore have the philosophy: if anything can be checked, it should be checked!

A number of these checks occur in the calculation of flatBidPrice. The programme calculates the so-called accruedDividend either by using the two actual dividendRecords, or by estimating the next dividend by using the appropriate fields of the instrumentDataRecord, if necessary.

AR.PR.B has a par value of $50 and is supposed to pay a dividend of $2.70 annually. Poor old Argus has been in default for years, but that’s what it’s supposed to do. And it turns out that the accruedDividend as of 2008-3-5 should be about $0.26.

But! Here’s where the check comes in! What if the next dividend record is screwed up, or something else horrible has occured? What if, due to some glitch or other, the data shows that the next dividend should be $1,000? This is something that can be checked and therefore should be checked. The form of the control is: The calculated accrued dividend must be less than the bid price of the security … if anything, this is a rather generous error tolerance, but when this sort of error occurs it’s usually not just for a few pennies.

So the accrued dividend calculated today was about $0.26 … and the bid price is $0.25. ERROR!

AR.PR.B, which has been tracked by HIMIPref™ from the very earliest date in the database, has now had its coverage halted. A reorg entry has been added with a reorgType of REORG_DISCONTINUED and a take-out price of $0.25.

Ave atque vale!

BoC to LVTS: ABCP! OK for SLF?

Wednesday, March 5th, 2008

The Bank of Canada is attempting to re-start a market in Canadian ABCP … or, at least, that is my interpretation of the call for comments released today.

The Bank of Canada is seeking comments from direct participants in the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) and other interested parties on the proposed eligibility criteria for accepting asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) as collateral for the Bank of Canada’s Standing Liquidity Facility (SLF). Written comments are requested by 14 March 2008. The final terms and conditions for accepting ABCP as collateral for the SLF will be announced by 31 March 2008. Recognizing that the market for ABCP in Canada is still evolving, the Bank of Canada intends to review these criteria in a year’s time and announce the results of that review by 30 June 2009.

The proposed eligibility criteria require the sponsor to be “a deposit-taking institution that is federally or provincially regulated and that has a minimum stand-alone credit rating equivalent to at least A.” – which is to say, a bank or credit union. They may have good reasons for this requirement, but it’s not disclosed.

Other eligibility criteria are:

  • The liquidity agreement(s) include an obligation to provide funding except in the event of insolvency of the conduit or near-default status of the underlying assets.
  • The program must not contain any actual or potential exposure to securitized assets, with the exception of National Housing Act mortgage-backed securities.
  • The program has received the highest possible short-term credit rating from at least two rating agencies.

Of perhaps even greater interest are the transparency requirements:

  • The Bank must receive a single, concise document that is provided by and validated by the sponsor, and that includes all relevant investment information.
  • This document must be easily accessible to all investors.
  • The sponsor must agree to provide timely disclosure to all investors of any significant change to the information contained in this document.
  • At a minimum, relevant investment information would include:
    • The identity of the sponsor, the financial services agent, and liquidity providers
    • The range of assets that may be held by the program, including maximum or minimum proportion, if applicable, and when/how asset composition could change
    • Characteristics of the asset pools, including at a minimum: composition, foreign currency exposures, performance measures, credit enhancements, and hedging methods. Other information such as average remaining term, current payment speeds, and geographic locations should be disclosed if relevant to the investor.
    • Where the investor could obtain updates of relevant investment information
    • The nature of the liquidity facilities, including the amount of support from each liquidity provider
    • The nature and amount of program-wide credit enhancements
    • The flow of funds, including payment allocations, rights, and distribution priorities

I maintain rather enormous doubts as to the number of investors who will actually make use of the transparency information, but at least the few who are sufficiently interested will have the ability to look.

From a practical perspective, how is the word “concise”, as in “The Bank must receive a single, concise document”  defined?

And as a last quote, here’s one in the eye for the conspiracy theorists:

The Bank will also consult other available documents, including credit-rating reports, to assess whether an ABCP program meets its criteria.

Golly, credit rating reports? From Credit Rating Agencies? Don’t they get paid by – gasp! – the issuers?

The bank is to be applauded for taking this action – securitization markets are a Good Thing. However, I remain concerned about the appropriate level of capital that the liquidity-guaranteeing bank must put up in respect of their guarantee … I suspect that the current credit conversion factor is simply too low. Additionally, it seems to me that the sponsoring bank (Bank!) should be putting up capital to reflect the reputational risk that it runs if there are actual credit problems in the vehicle.

These are not directly BoC concerns, however – determination of this matter belongs to OSFI and other BIS members.

Crosses

Wednesday, March 5th, 2008

The following has been copied from the comments to March 4, 2008. The rule of thumb is: if one person asks, twenty want to know! The question was:

I enjoy your blog but I still have a lot to learn. What do you mean by “crossed” in the Notes section of the volume highlights when you write “RBC crossed 15,000 at 19.07″ or “RBC crossed 100,000 at 23.20, then Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price”? I assume you mean they bought the stock at that price but I am just not sure. Thks

 

A dealer “crosses” a trade when he acts for both the buyer and the seller. In institutional trading, it is very common for large trades not to be posted publicly – showing too much size might scare away counterparties, and lead to other traders playing traders’ games. 

There are other, better reasons: say, for instance that you are the investment manager for 100 clients holding varying numbers of shares. If you were to put it up publicly and only get a partial fill – say, 57,600 shares – you’ve got headaches splitting it up fairly and headaches having all those clients with tiny, virtually untradeable positions.

The best reason for doing this is if the order is contingent: maybe you want to sell PWF.PR.K to buy POW.PR.D and take out $0.45 on the switch. In that case, the dealer’s got two orders to fill. Maybe he can sell the PWF.PR.K, but can’t find any POW.PR.D for you (or he finds some, but he can’t put the deal together in such a way that you take out your $0.45). In that case, nothing will happen – and the next day, maybe you’ll call another dealer.

Whatever your reason, if you want to sell 100,000 shares of PWF.PR.K, you will not get your dealer to put this on the board for you. What you will do is ask him to find a buyer. He then checks his rolodex for people who have shown interest in PWF.PR.K in the past – or managers he’s talked to recently who have expressed a longing to purchase a high quality perpetual discount issue of any nature – and start dealing. Once he’s found a buyer who is willing to pay what you’re willing to sell for, he’s happy.

The exchange requires that this trade be recorded on their books. As long as the price is equal to or higher than the posted bid, and equal to or lower than the posted offer, then everything is OK and the trade gets filled as a cross.

A more specialized type of cross is when the dealer is acting for both the buyer and the seller – and so is the investment manager! This is an internal cross. The investment manager might have two funds: Acme Dividend Fund and Acme Preferred Share Fund. These two funds have differing cash flows, such that Dividend Fund needs to raise $2.5-million, and Preferred Fund needs to invest the same amount. In many cases – not all cases, but many cases – it makes sense according to the mandates of both funds that one sells to other. The investment manager gets the dealer to do it for him, the dealer ensures the price is fair, marks the trade as an “internal cross”, and Bob’s your uncle.

There are other specialized cross types as well.

March 4, 2008

Tuesday, March 4th, 2008

Accrued Interest leads off with an interesting post on the US Municipal market:

What’s the result? Friday it was possible to buy 5-year pre-refunded municipals (which are backed by Treasury bonds held in escrow) at yields in the 3.50’s. In other words, around 80bps higher than Treasury rates. That is literally Treasury credit at a 80bps spread to Treasuries tax-exempt. Dozens of large new issue municipal deals came at significant spreads to Treasury rates.

There’s an interesting aside to this escrow issue which may be unfamiliar to Canadians – when the municipalities buy Treasuries to defease their issues, they don’t really care (too much) about the price. They have their list of things to buy which, while not carved in stone, is pretty inflexible: too much mismatch with their bond liabilities and the assets won’t pass muster. So they’ll go on the Street and sweep up whichever Treasuries they need.

Very often, they’ll buy more than is available, with the dealers shorting the issues to them. The end result is often that firstly the issue trades well off the yield curve AND goes special in the repo market (when you borrow bonds, you collateralize with cash. The bond lender pays interest on this cash at the “GC”, “General Collateral” rate. If the particular bond issue is scarce on the repo market, the bond lender can get away with paying less than the GC rate, which is referred to as going special).

This state of affairs affects off-the-run Treasuries in the under-three-year term. And the moral of the story is … don’t invent bond strategies that assume all short treasuries can be borrowed at the GC rate, because very often they can’t!

Related to the US Municipals story is MBIA – in the news again today with one investor placing a big bet:

Third Avenue Management LLC’s flagship mutual fund purchased 10.6 million of MBIA’s common shares at $12.15 each in February, Whitman said in a letter to shareholders released this week. New York-based Third Avenue, which Whitman founded in 1986, also bought $197 million of MBIA surplus notes.

This follows disclosure of long-term restructuring plans:

A plan to split MBIA’s structured-finance business from its municipal insurance operation in the next five years will make the Armonk, New York-based company more transparent, Chief Executive Officer Jay Brown said in an interview today on Bloomberg Television.

It’s an interesting story to watch!

Getting back to municipals for a moment, there is at least one indication that the market is – slowly – normalizing:

California, the largest borrower in the U.S. municipal market, sold $1.75 billion of bonds after attracting record demand from individuals amid the highest tax- exempt yields in more than three years.

The state got orders from more than 4,000 investors equal to over 72 percent of the bonds available, said Tom Dresslar, spokesman for California Treasurer Bill Lockyer. Officials, who were to complete the sale tomorrow, were able to wrap it up a day early after selling the rest of the debt to institutions.

… which just goes to show ya … ignore the headlines … behave sensibly … you’ll do fine.

On the other hand, though, there’s one market that’s getting sillier. Naked Capitalism brings to my attention the fact that real yields on 5-Year TIPS are negative:

Yields on five-year Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities fell below zero for a third day on investor speculation that inflation will quicken as the U.S. economy slows.

Yields on the securities, known as TIPS, dropped to minus 0.036 percent on Feb. 29, according to Barclays Capital Inc., the biggest dealer of the securities. It was the first foray below zero since five-year TIPS were first sold in 1997, according to the firm, one of the 20 primary dealers that trade directly with the Federal Reserve.

It brings to mind one of my favourite factoids …. at times during the Great Depression, T-Bills traded above par. This doesn’t make a lot of sense until you consider the alternatives … put your cash in the bank and the bank fails … keep your cash under your mattress and get robbed. I can’t find hard proof of this factoid, however … anybody who can help me will deserve my most earnest thanks. 

Speaking of interest rates, how about that Bank of Canada, eh? Scotia has announced prime of 5.25% effective 3/5; so has TD and National and CIBC and BMO. I don’t see anything for RBC yet, but it’s a pretty good bet! Oddly, each of the three Prime-Rate-Dependent HIMIPref™ indices was up on the day. Well, I find it odd, anyway! Were traders of these shares pricing in a bigger cut? Are they now looking forward to faster hikes sooner? Is it just random chaos? Somebody tell me, because I don’t know.

TD announced today that the new issue greenshoe was fully exercised, indicating that the underwriting did very well, even as the preferred market went down (which might indicate indigestion). Will other issuers find the situation encouraging or not? The Shadow knows!

The market was weak, but the volume was up … maybe the Technical Analysis guys will short whatever they can get on this news. That’s fine … I’ll sell em some liquidity!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.54% 5.56% 35,932 14.6 2 +0.1446% 1,082.1
Fixed-Floater 4.79% 5.61% 66,598 14.75 8 +0.4160% 1,037.4
Floater 5.18% 5.26% 90,360 14.96 2 +0.1324% 866.4
Op. Retract 4.81% 2.36% 76,678 2.39 15 +0.2425% 1,049.4
Split-Share 5.25% 5.16% 98,745 4.03 14 -0.1808% 1,047.4
Interest Bearing 6.20% 6.58% 66,424 4.24 3 -0.6022% 1,081.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.74% 5.42% 308,730 5.54 17 -0.1939% 1,026.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.40% 5.44% 275,695 14.74 51 -0.4112% 953.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -2.7813% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 22.72 and a limitMaturity.
 
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.6789% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.18% based on a bid of 9.37 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.6762% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 24.05 and a limitMaturity. 
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.5909% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 21.65 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -1.5690% Asset coverage of 3.3+:1 as of January 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.44% based on a bid of 21.33 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (2.18% to call 2008-4-3 at 25.50) and BNA.PR.C (6.81% to hardMaturity 2019-1-10).
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.4453% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 21.82 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.4214% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.3272% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 21.56 and a limitMaturity. 
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.1299% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 22.75 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.0979% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.19% based on a bid of 21.61 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.0909% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 21.76 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.0124% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 21.51 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.0795% Asset coverage of 2.0+:1 as of February 15, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.76% based on a bid of 10.30 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. 
BCE.PR.R FixFloat +1.2552%  
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +2.0000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.92% based on a bid of 20.40 and a limitMaturity. 
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 154,700 RBC crossed 100,000 at 23.20, then Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 23.11 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 66,700 Nesbitt crossed 48,400 at 20.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.92% based on a bid of 20.40 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 58,400 RBC crossed 15,000 at 19.07, then 15,000 at 19.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.38% based on a bid of 19.00 and a limitMaturity. Note that this issue closed at 19.00-14, 2×5, while the virtually identical (Weak Pair) BAM.PR.M closed at 19.70-79, 3×10. I love this market!
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 45,900 Scotia crossed 33,000 at 22.75. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 22.72 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 37,896 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW 5.72% based on a bid of 23.87 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-five other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

RS Goes After TD for High-Closing

Tuesday, March 4th, 2008

In a developement that will bring tears of joy to (until recently?) Assiduous Reader madequota, Regulation Services has released a notice of hearing in a contested case against TD Securities and some of its traders.

The allegations against the individual traders may be summarized as:

During the relevant period, Nott, Sadeghi, Kaplan, Nemy and Poulstrup (collectively, the “Individual Respondents”) entered orders to purchase securities of one or more of African Copper PLC (“ACU”), Canaco Resources Inc. (“CAN.H” until May 26, 2005 while listed on the NEX and “CAN” as of May 27, 2005 while listed on the TSXV), Central Canada Foods Corporation (“CDF.A”), Peterborough Capital Corp. (“PEC”) and Titanium Corporation Inc. (“TIC”) without any intention that the orders would be executed and for no bona fide purpose. The Individual Respondents entered the orders with the intention of establishing a high closing bid price in order to improve the daily profit and loss position of the shares held in their inventory accounts, or to assist their colleagues improve their daily profit and loss position, and thereby to misrepresent the performance of the securities. The high closing bid prices were artificial in that they were not justified by any real demand for the securities. The high closing bid prices misrepresented the performance and actual demand for the securities to the market and to other market participants.

… while the allegation regarding TDSI is …

During the relevant period, TDSI failed to implement a trade supervision system that was adequate, taking into account its business and affairs, to ensure compliance with UMIR 2.2(2)(b). TDSI failed to ensure that the risks associated with proprietary trading by the Trade Execution Group (the “TEG”), and specifically the Burlington sub-branch, had been identified and that appropriate supervision practices and procedures to manage those risks had been implemented. As a result, TDSI failed to adequately review and monitor the Individual Respondents’ order entry activity and failed to detect or prevent the Individual Respondents from violating UMIR 2.2(2)(b).

The date of the hearing is yet to be determined. The Notice of Hearing, linked above provides the usual excruciating detail regarding the allegations.

Two of the traders were fired shortly after TDSI commenced its internal investigation of some of the actions at issue. There is some speculation that RS is trophy-hunting:

What’s got the Street’s attention is RS’s decision to go after TD Securities. “RS is trying to put a big trophy on the mantle by targeting the dealer, as well as the traders,” said a senior executive at a rival firm. Talk on trading desks is that TD Securities appeared to do everything right, by reporting a problem once supervisors realized what was taking place.

The danger of RS’s approach in going after TDSI is that it will simply encourage cover-ups. Whenever there’s a screw-up, the second guessing starts … I should have noticed this, I should have checked that, instead of sending a polite inquiry I should have stormed into his office and banged my fist on his desk. And I can assure everybody, RS included, that there will always be fault to find by somebody who wants to find it.

So … you’re a supervisor, you figure something may be happening that’s against the rules. What do you do? Do you actually investigate? If you find something and report it, RS will go after you for not finding it faster, fine you and possibly lift your license. Even if they don’t lift your license – even if they don’t go after you at all – your employer might fire you, just to make themselves look good (particularly if, as in the case of David Berry, they’re looking for an excuse anyway).

So … do you investigate thoroughly? Do you communicate your findings after a thorough investigation? Or do you just casually drift into the trading room and announce to nobody in particular that there’s some new procedures designed to catch some behaviour, to be put into effect next week?

The last option makes you, ethically if not legally, party to a cover-up. Which may, of course, be RS’s intention … if everybody’s guilty of something, then they have uncontrolled power to end careers at a whim. Then, finally, they’ll get some respect!

Quite frankly, high-closing isn’t a trading issue I get all that excited about – when the price of something gets high, I sell it. When the price gets low, I buy it. All this seems pretty simple to me. The high-closing / market manipulation rules are in place solely to protect the stupid, who would be much better off if they just got better investment advice.

I am much more annoyed with the RS restrictions on algorithmic trading which, in requiring algorithmic trading engines to be vetted by the executing broker, have a clear effect of stifling creativity, increasing the inefficiency of the market and encouraging high-closing. If I were to suspect high-closing on a particular issue I was watching, for instance, I could build an algorithm to jump on those bids within a second of order entry … and make the little snot pay through the nose for his temerity.

But then, that would leave RS with less to regulate …

RS Asserts Jurisdiction Over David Berry

Tuesday, March 4th, 2008

Regulation Services has released a decision regarding the challenge to its jurisdiction over David Berry. The hearing was reported on PrefBlog on December 12 … the upshot is:

We are therefore of the view that we have the necessary jurisdiction to hear and decide the case brought by RS against the Respondent. It follows that the Motion to Stay the proceedings should be, and hereby is, dismissed.

The next chronological step in this process is the OSC hearing on March 6, which has been brought by David Berry to obtain disclosure of materials relating to the RS investigation of the affair and the RS settlements with Scotia and Marc McQuillen. The OSC is being appealed to after a denial of such disclosure by a Regulation Services panel.

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: February 2008

Tuesday, March 4th, 2008
HIMI Index Changes, February 29, 2008
Issue From To Because
TOC.PR.B Floater Scraps Volume
FAL.PR.B Scraps FixFloat Volume
MST.PR.A InterestBearing Scraps Volume
MUH.PR.A SplitShare Scraps Rating
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price

To my shame, I must confess that MUH.PR.A should have been moved to “Scraps” as of the December month-end rebalancing. This will be fixed in the final version of the indices. 

There were no intra-month changes.

MAPF Performance: February 2008

Tuesday, March 4th, 2008

Sometimes it works … sometimes it doesn’t … sometimes it really really works!

Assiduous Readers will be only too aware that I am fond of saying that if I’m right 60% of the time, then I’m doing well and the fund will do well. Assiduous Readers will also be thoroughly fed up with my constant reiteration that financial markets represent a chaotic system, with the implication that long-term, large-scale market timing is doomed to failure, and that “selling liquidity” and making small differentiations between similar issues is the key to success.

So, while I like to think I’m correct on these small differentiations 60% of the time, it’s not 60% each and every month, or even each and every quarter.

I am very pleased to announce that Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund had another very good month in February, to make it three in a row. The Net Asset Value Per Unit as of February 29 was $9.4527, with the result that returns are:

Returns to February 29, 2008
Period MAPF Index
One Month +3.62% +1.68%
Three Months +9.67% +3.23%
One Year +3.55% -4.16%
Two Years (annualized) +5.10% +0.07%
Three Years (annualized) +5.29% +1.34%
Four Years (annualized) +6.25% +1.92%
Five Years (annualized) +10.70% +3.46%
Six Years (annualized) +9.02% +3.24%
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The competition was outpaced: the fund outperformed the closed-end fund (DPS.UN), which returned an estimated +2.04% on the month and an estimated +3.00% on the quarter, as well as the exchange-traded fund (CPD) which returned +2.17% and +3.33% on the month and quarter. Calculation details for these two performances have been posted separately.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 0.5288
February, 2008 9.4527 5.93% 1.072 0.5229
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.

It should be noted that I do not have this calculation audited in any way, so once the audited financials are available you will not be able to see an explicit confirmation of these figures, although you will be able to derive the year end figure for yourselves. Readers should also note that the fund is indifferent to whether investment returns are in the form of capital gains or dividends – portfolio management seeks to maximize total return after tax for a notional high-marginal-rate investor based in Ontario. It should also be noted that this sustainable income figure is not targetted in any manner; it may well go down if, for instance, it is decided that quality is cheap and trades are executed to increase credit quality at the expense of yield.

For all that, though, there is a point to the calculation – it shows that in the recent past, and subject to the usual warning that historical performance is not necessarily indicative of future returns:

  • Income expectations are a lot more stable than market prices, and
  • the overall trend is upwards

The market was seems to have recovered from the horrors of 2007; while this did not trigger any issuance of note in February, a new issue was announced on March 3, which has knocked the market down a bit but only time will tell whether or not this is a trend reversal. Of greater interest were the taxation changes in the Federal Budget which, over the long term, are preferred unfriendly … but remember what I said above about long-range macro-forecasts! For what it’s worth, I consider preferreds to be cheap to long corporates at the present time, and long corporates to be cheap to long Canadas.

The fund did considerable trading during the month, but most of this trading was simply opportunistic switching between issues with similar characteristics. The reversal of a BNA.PR.C / BAM.PR.N switch was the high point of the month; this has been discussed elsewhere. Critics, naysayers and other unkind souls may wish to observe that a large portion of the fund’s outperformance in February was due to its holding of BNA.PR.C (which had an astonishing return) … I can only point out that this issue underperformed in December and January and that performance through the three months – while quite good and well worth taking the position – was not quite so dramatic.

March 3, 2008

Monday, March 3rd, 2008

All the problems with Municipal Auction Rate Securities lead one to the not terribly difficult conclusion that the issuers, where possible, will redeem them and replace them with fixed-rate debt … unfortunately, that highway looks gridlocked:

U.S. states and local governments may extend the worst slump in municipal bonds on record as they replace as much as $166 billion of auction-rate securities.

California, Boston’s biggest hospital and Duke Energy Corp. are converting their bonds to other types of tax-exempt debt after auction failures drove rates as high as 20 percent. The potential supply equals almost 40 percent of the municipal securities sold last year, overwhelming a market that tumbled 4.9 percent last month, according to indexes maintained by Merrill Lynch & Co., which began compiling market data in 1989.

This prompted Naked Capitalism to launch another vitriolic attack on the Credit Rating Agencies:

Now the New York Times piece, on page one, is no doubt intended for a broad audience, so it explains (without giving comparative default rates, which would have been useful), that rating agencies grade muni bonds more harshly than corporates:

At every rating, municipal bonds default less often than similarly rated corporate bonds, according to Moody’s. In fact, since 1970, A-rated municipal bonds have defaulted far less frequently than corporate bonds with top triple-A ratings. Furthermore, when municipalities do default, investors usually receive some — or even all — of their money back, unlike in most corporate bankruptcies….. Moody’s estimates that more than half of the market would be rated triple A or double A using the corporate scale. Triple-A securities are considered nearly as safe as Treasury bonds issued by the federal government.

However, the piece notes rather blandly the central conflict of interest: that rating agencies have good reason to have established and perpetuated this double standard. When less than AAA municipalities go to buy bond insurance, they are paid again to issue the second rating.

Naked Capitalism does not explain why all fault lies with the Credit Rating Agencies and not with the issuers and investors; nor does he speculate why Moody’s, for instance, would choose to publish explanations of their municipal rating scale if it’s such a big secret.

There’s a thread on Financial Webring Forum discussing long-term equity premia. It is clear that the long term equity premium will vary, moving marginally up and down in response to transient mispricing – this was discussed in a paper by Campbell, Diamond & Shoven, presented to the (American) Social Security Advisory Board in August 2001 (quoted with a different author for each paragraph):

The yield on long-term inflation-indexed Treasury securities (TIPS) is about 3.5%, while shortterm real interest rates have recently averaged about 3%. Thus 3% to 3.5% would be a reasonable guess for safe real interest rates in the future, implying a long-run average equity premium of 1.5% to 2.5% in geometric terms or about 3% to 4% in arithmetic terms.

In evaluating proposals for reforming Social Security that involve stock investments, the Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) has generally used a 7.0 percent real return for stocks. The 1994-96 Advisory Council specified that OCACT should use that return in making its 75-year projections of investment-based reform proposals. The assumed ultimate real return on Treasury bonds of 3.0 percent implies a long-run equity premium of 4.0 percent. There are two equitypremium concepts: the realized equity premium, which is measured by the actual rates of return; and the required equity premium, which investors expect to receive for being willing to hold available stocks and bonds. Over the past two centuries, the realized premium was 3.5 percent on average, but 5.2 percent for 1926 to 1998.

My own estimate for the long-run real return to equities looking forward is 6 to 6.5 percent. I come to that using roughly the parameters chosen above. If the P-E ratio fluctuates around 20, the cash payouts to shareholders should range from 3 to 3.5 percent. I am relatively optimistic about the possible steady-state growth rate of GDP and would choose 3 percent for that number.

Note that the paper was written near the height of the tech-bubble; the authors agreed that the market was over-valued at time of writing. 

However, there seems to be a belief by some that long-term GDP growth caps the equity premium, which is nonsense. Long-term GDP growth may well cap corporate revenue, but not equity returns. A corporation that has grown (at 10% p.a., say) until it has reached the limits to growth (revenue of some percentage of GDP) can then pay dividends comprised of the earnings it doesn’t need to retain. Alternatively but almost equivalently, it may choose to buy back stock – presumably, the choice would be made according to whether the market price of the stock was considered cheap or expensive on a long-term basis.

Corporations will pay dividends and buy back stock in order to maximize returns on equity while at the same time providing themselves with enough cushion to survive a downturn. Investors will demand a premium to compensate for the chance they’ll have to sell during one of those downturns. There is no mathematical limit to the size of the equity premium; the practical limit historically has been about 5%.

Taxation muddles matters, of course, but this debate has implications for preferred share investors, since the equity premium should set a cap on preferred spreads. How much of the equity premium can be captured, vs. how much equity risk is inherent in prefs? Now, me, I don’t think this is a topic doing a LOT of work on with respect to asset allocation, given standard market chaos, but is something to keep an eye on!

The big preferred share news today was the long-anticipated (by me, anyway!) new issue – an issuer finally looked at the recent improvement in the market and decided to test the market. It was TD 5.60% perps – and I understand the offering of $200-million went very well.

This knocked the market down considerably, but volume was nothing special … the rest of the week will be interesting … will other issuers attempt to jam in their own issues while the window’s open? Regardless of whether they do or not, is today’s price action an automatic and transient response to a new issue, or a sign of saturation? Stay tuned!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.55% 5.57% 34,657 14.5 2 -0.0206% 1,080.5
Fixed-Floater 4.81% 5.57% 64,302 14.80 8 +0.0000% 1,033.1
Floater 5.19% 5.27% 90,515 14.96 2 +0.7531% 865.3
Op. Retract 4.82% 3.49% 75,341 2.39 15 -0.1389% 1,046.9
Split-Share 5.24% 5.31% 99,094 4.09 14 -0.1007% 1,049.3
Interest Bearing 6.16% 6.47% 66,987 4.26 4 -0.2346% 1,087.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.73% 5.27% 310,320 5.45 17 -0.4942% 1,028.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.38% 5.42% 274,751 14.78 51 -0.2874% 957.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.9126% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.04% based on a bid of 20.00 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.C PerpetualPremium -1.9223% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 25.51 and a call 2012-1-5 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -1.8750%  
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -1.8072% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 24.45 and limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium -1.6803% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 25.16 and a call 2017-3-2 at 25.00.
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.5830% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.80% based on a bid of 25.49 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium -1.5246% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 25.19 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.5106% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 22.82 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.4339% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.31 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.1639% Asset coverage of 2.0+:1 as of February 15, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 10.19 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. 
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.1038% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 22.40 and limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +1.4455% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.17% based on a bid of 19.65 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat +1.4675%  
FBS.PR.B SplitShare +1.5385% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of February 28, according to TD Securities. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 9.90 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 100,610 RBC bought 17,400 from Nesbitt at 22.25 in two tranches to close the day. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.09% based on a bid of 22.16 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 57,481 Bailing out of the old issue into the new one? Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 25.16 and a call 2017-3-2 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium 48,272 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 25.19 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount 34,813 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.24% based on a bid of 23.51 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 19,900 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW 5.38% based on a bid of 24.46 and a limitMaturity.

There were eleven other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

SXT.PR.A : Partial Call for Redemption

Monday, March 3rd, 2008

Sixty-Split Corporation has announced:

it has called 181,733 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on March 14, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 20.257% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 363,490 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on March 13, 2008 will have approximately 20.257% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $25.00 per share.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including March 14, 2008.

Payment of the amount due to holders of Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on March 14, 2008. From and after March 14, 2008 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any right in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

SXT.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is not currently included in the HIMIPref™ Indices due to low averageTradingValue. It was last moved to “Scraps” on the March 30, 2007 Rebalancing