Archive for January, 2009

ABCP: The Finale

Wednesday, January 21st, 2009

DBRS has announced that it:

today assigned final ratings of “A” to the Master Asset Vehicle I Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes and the Master Asset Vehicle II Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes. DBRS has also assigned final ratings to certain of the Master Asset Vehicle III Notes as follows: Class 5A Notes – AAA, Class 7A Notes – AAA, Class 10A Notes – AA (high), Class 12A Notes – AA (high), Class 15A Notes – AAA and Class 16A Notes – A (low).

There was a teleconference at noon today; slides are available.

I have no information as yet regarding quotations on these instruments. I suspect that these notes will not be available to retail because, you know, you’re just not smart enough.

Update: A replay of the teleconference is available:

until the close of business on January 28, 2009.

The teleconference presentation slides are also available at www.dbrs.com or by clicking the link below.

TELECONFERENCE REPLAY ACCESS NUMBERS
Telephone: +1 416 695 5800 or +1 800 408 3053
Pass Code: 328-1452

Banks: How Big is too Big?

Wednesday, January 21st, 2009

Willem Buiter has an excellent blog post today advocating that the UK nationalize all “high-street” banks:

But even if the UK is not the next European country to face a sovereign debt challenge, there is a non-negligible risk that before too long, the growing exposure of the British sovereign to the banking system (and especially to the foreign currency funding risk faced by the UK banking system), together with the 9 and 10 percent of GDP general government fiscal deficits expected for the next couple of years, may prompt a loss of confidence by the global financial community in the British banks, currency and sovereign.

We may well witness the UK authorities going cap-in-hand to the IMF, the EU, the ECB and the fiscally super-solvent EU member states (if there are any left), prompted by a triple crisis (banking, sterling and sovereign debt), to request a bail out.

The balance sheets of the British banks are too large and the quality of the assets they hold too uncertain/dodgy, for the British government to be able to continue its current policy of extending its guarantees to ever-growing shares of the banks’ liabilities and assets, without this impairing the solvency of the sovereign.

Limiting the exposure of the sovereign to what is fiscally sustainable may imply giving up on saving (all of) the banks.

This builds upon his analysis of the Icelandic situation, which was discussed on November 5.

What caught my eye,however, was the massive numbers involved in British banking:

RBS, at the end of June 2008 had a balance sheet of just under two trillion pounds. The pro forma figure ws £1,730 bn, the statutory figure £1,948 (don’t ask). For reference, UK GDP is around £1,500 bn. Equity was £67 bn pro forma and £ 104bn statutory, respectively, giving leverage ratios of 25.8 (pro forma) and 18.7 (statutory), respectively.

Lloyds-TSB Group (now part of the Lloyds Banking Group) reported a balance sheet as of June 30, 2008 of £ 368 bn and shareholders equity of £11 bn, giving a leverage ratio of just over 33. Of course, for all these banks, the risk-adjusted assets to capital ratios are much lower, but because the risk-weightings depend both on private information of the banks (including internal models) and on the rating agencies, they are, in my view, worth nothing – they are the answer from the banks to the question “how much capital do you want to hold?”. That the answer is “not very much, really”, should not come as a surprise. For the same date, HBOS, the other half of the new Lloyds Banking Group, reported assets of £681 bn and equity of £21 bn, giving a leverage ratio of just over 32; Barclays reported total assets of £1,366 bn and shareholders equity of £33bn giving a leverage ratio of 41, and HSBC (including subsidiaries) reported assets of £2,547 bn and equity of £134 bn for a leverage ratio of 19.

The total balance sheets of these banks about to around 440% of annual UK GDP.

440%! While it must be remembered that a balance sheet is a measure of wealth, while GDP is a measure of income, this is a staggering figure anyway.

And let us not forget the mechanism whereby Royal Bank of Scotland got into trouble:

The scale of losses at RBS is breathtaking. The bank, which also owns NatWest, estimated that bad debts and writedowns on past acquisitions could leave it as much as £28 billion in the red for 2008, nearly double Vodafone’s record £15 billion loss in 2006.

The bank’s admission that it had paid between £15 billion and £20 billion too much for the Dutch bank ABN Amro last year prompted an angry response from Mr Brown.

The Prime Minister was furious that British taxpayers were now having to pay for losses that were incurred on foreign investments.

“Almost all their losses are in the sub-prime markets in America and related to the acquisition of the bank ABN Amro,” he said. “And these are irresponsible risks which were taken by a bank with people’s money in the United Kingdom.”

So, I took myself to the OSFI Bank Data Lookup Page and found that “Total All Banks CONSOLIDATED MONTHLY BALANCE SHEET” as of November 30 showed total assets of $3,213,563-million, supported by common equity of $122,117-million, preferred shares of $14,205-million, and sub-debt of $41,235-million (I’m pretty sure that OSFI’s line for sub-debt includes Innovative Tier 1 Capital). So, for quick comparison purposes, banks reporting to OSFI lever up their common equity with a ratio of 26:1 (total capital is levered up 18:1).

Also, Statistics Canada reports that Canada’s GDP at current prices is $1,639,540-million … so, rounding off a few million here and there, we arrive at a bank asset to GDP ratio of about 200% … well below the UK figure, even though the UK figure includes only their megabanks, while I have no reason to believe that the OSFI figure is not comprehensive.

It’s early days yet, but I’m beginning to wonder whether or not banking regulation should be rationed … Canada might say, for instance, “Only 300% of GDP will be allowed. Licences to purchase the right to have regulated – and implicitly protected – assets will be auctioned off annually for staggered 5- and 10-year terms.” Only a rough idea, but rough ideas are where good ideas come from … sometimes, eventually.

Such rationing runs the risk – if you want to call it that – of bloating the shadow-banking system, made up of things like non-banking leasing companies, payroll cheque cashing outfits, hedge funds and, currently, money market funds but that is not necessarily a bad thing.

January 20, 2009

Tuesday, January 20th, 2009

Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton is advocating executive compensation laws:

Lehman Brothers: $27 million for CEO Richard Fuld. The financial freeze that followed the collapse of Lehman is seen by many as the key event that turned the recession of 2007-08 into the frightening freefall currently under way

What caused that principle to go so badly awry in the present instance? I believe there was an unfortunate interaction between financial innovations and lack of regulatory oversight, which allowed the construction of new financial instruments with essentially any risk-reward profile desired and the ability to leverage one’s way into an arbitrarily large position in such an instrument. The underlying instrument of choice was a security with a high probability of doing slightly better than the market and a small probability of a big loss. For example, a subprime loan extended in 2005 would earn the lender a higher yield in the event that house prices continued to rise, but perform quite badly when the housing market turned down. By taking a leveraged position in such assets, the slightly higher yield became an enormously higher yield, and while the game was on, the short-term performance looked wonderful. If the agent is compensated on the basis of current performance alone, and the principal lacks good information on the exact nature of the risks, the result is a tragically toxic incentive structure.

My interest in this issue is not so much to exact revenge on those who created our current problems, but instead to ask, how can we change the incentives so that this kind of problem is not repeated again? And that in turn leads me to wonder, why limit the proposals above only to a handful of companies?

Despite Prof. Hamilton’s protestations, I consider this a classic example of American vindictiveness.

In the first place, it was not Fuld’s compensation that caused the credit freeze of 4Q08: it was the sudden withdrawal of $400-billion from money market funds that accomplished that little trick. No individual, no company and not even any industry is able – or willing – to withstand the cumulative effect of uninformed decisions by millions of retail customers.

To ascribe blame for the Credit Crunch on Wall Street policies is as superficial as blaming the Tech Boom and subsequent wreck on IPO specialists and Tech Funds. Retail was coming to them, insisting on get-rich-quick internet investments – and got them. End of story.

Our reaction to the Credit Crunch should be informed by our reaction to, say, a horrific and avoidable traffic accident. We can throw the book at the driver, if it makes us feel better. It won’t stop future accidents. We can improve the regulation of that particular intersection, with improved sightlines and signage; it might cut accidents at that corner, but won’t do a thing for the next block down the street. If we’re really serious about banning accidents, we have to ban cars; we will probably find that the cure is worse than the disease.

There are definitely some aspects of regulation that can be improved – removing the right of directors and shareholders to hire whoever they like at whatever it costs is not one of them – but to try and tame the business cycle with regulation is a fool’s game. As with the Great Moderation, as with the Soviet Union, that’s the sort of thing that works very, very well … until one day, quite suddenly, it doesn’t.

I will also note Dealbreaker‘s estimate of $1-trillion in fees paid in the course of the mortgage boom … so, in defense of the executives:

  • if they’d turned down that kind of money, investors would have hired a pig more aggressive in getting to the trough
  • what killed the investment banks was not so much their horrific losses, but risk-aversion by their lenders

Am I giving Wall Street a free pass? No. I pointed out in the post SEC & BSC that Wall Street covered its need to tick the “risk management” box by hiring people who didn’t know what they were doing and then ignoring what they said. But the way to get ahead in any large organization – whether it’s an investment bank, a regulator, government, or Honest Bob’s Financial Planning Boutique – is to figure out what your boss (and your clients) want to hear and telling it to them. No amount of well-intentioned regulation will ever change that.

On a related topic, US & International financials got cremated today:

Banks fell after the U.K.’s second bank-bailout plan in three months raised concern the financial crisis is deepening. The government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown said it will spend an extra 100 billion pounds ($142 billion) to support banks and increase its stake in Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (RBS:LN).

Royal Bank of Scotland American depositary receipts (RBS:US) plunged 69 percent to $3.33. ADRs of Lloyds Banking Group Plc (LYG:US), the U.K.’s biggest mortgage lender, tumbled 58 percent to $2.61.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM:US) retreated 21 percent to $18.09. Citigroup Inc. (C:US) lost 20 percent to $2.80. Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC:US), which Friedman Billings Ramsey Group Inc. said will probably cut its dividend during the first half of this year, sank 24 percent to $14.23.

Bank of America Corp. (BAC:US) dropped the most in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, slumping 29 percent to $5.10. The biggest U.S. lender by assets needs at least $80 billion to restore capital to minimum levels required by regulators, according to Friedman, Billings, Ramsey Group Inc. analyst Paul Miller.

MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG:US) slid 24 percent, the most since Dec. 1, to $2.13. The largest U.S. mortgage insurer posted a sixth straight loss and predicted an unprofitable 2009 as the deepening U.S. recession will cause more homeowner defaults. The company’s fourth-quarter operating loss of $2.06 a share was worse than the expected deficit of $1.14, according to the average estimate of six analysts surveyed by Bloomberg.

Regions Financial Corp. (RF:US) lost 24 percent to $4.60, the steepest decline since Sept. 29. The Alabama bank that expanded in Florida a year before the mortgage market collapsed posted a fourth-quarter loss of 35 cents a share, excluding a goodwill charge. Nineteen analysts surveyed by Bloomberg estimated Regions would post a 9-cent loss for the quarter.

Other regional banks also slipped. PNC Financial Services Group Inc. (PNC:US) sank 41 percent to $22. Sovereign Bancorp Inc. (SOV:US) fell 18 percent to $2.

State Street Corp. (STT:US) had the biggest drop in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index, sliding 59 percent to $14.89. The world’s largest money manager for institutions said 2009 operating profit will be little changed from last year after fourth quarter earnings fell 71 percent.

Other asset-management firms also declined. Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (BK:US) fell 17 percent to $19. Northern Trust Corp. (NTRS:US) slid 14 percent to $43.93. Legg Mason Inc. (LM:US) fell 18 percent to $17.34. American Capital Ltd. (ACAS:US) dropped 20 percent to $3.66. Calamos Asset Management Inc. (CLMS:US) slid 16 percent to $5.29.

Not a bad day, altogether. SplitShares got whacked, not surprisingly given their dependence on financial common stock. But if the decline in PerpetualDiscounts was credit-related, then why were Fixed-Resets up? Volume continues to be quite good. BNS.PR.T closes tomorrow … and then there will be no more new issues announced but not closed!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 6.88 % 7.45 % 39,695 13.62 2 -0.3459 % 868.3
FixedFloater 7.32 % 6.93 % 159,135 13.76 8 -1.1259 % 1,399.1
Floater 6.02 % 5.60 % 33,854 14.51 4 -0.5615 % 1,014.3
OpRet 5.31 % 4.78 % 147,879 4.06 15 0.5441 % 2,020.7
SplitShare 6.21 % 9.97 % 86,174 4.14 15 -2.8635 % 1,791.2
Interest-Bearing 7.19 % 8.77 % 38,622 0.90 2 -1.0453 % 1,967.8
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3602 % 1,560.1
Perpetual-Discount 6.86 % 6.84 % 233,027 12.75 71 -0.3602 % 1,436.8
FixedReset 5.90 % 4.79 % 846,152 15.32 21 0.1879 % 1,833.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
WFS.PR.A SplitShare -7.32 % Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of January 8 according to Mulvihill. Hardly surprising that something with a name like “World Financial Services” got hammered today!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-06-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.86
Bid-YTW : 10.91 %
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -5.69 % Asset coverage of 1.1+:1 as of January 15, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.46
Bid-YTW : 11.48 %
FTN.PR.A SplitShare -5.21 % Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of January 15, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.01
Bid-YTW : 9.38 %
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -5.17 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-11-29
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.25
Bid-YTW : 9.97 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare -4.13 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.81
Bid-YTW : 7.95 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -3.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 17.42
Evaluated at bid price : 17.42
Bid-YTW : 7.15 %
ALB.PR.A SplitShare -3.20 % Asset coverage of 1.2-:1 as of January 15, according to Scotia.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.65
Bid-YTW : 17.22 %
BCE.PR.Z FixedFloater -3.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.11
Bid-YTW : 7.51 %
FIG.PR.A Interest-Bearing -3.07 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 19, based on Capital Units NAV of 1.70 and 0.53 Capital Units per preferred.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.27
Bid-YTW : 13.21 %
BCE.PR.R FixedFloater -3.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.00
Bid-YTW : 7.03 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.96 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 8.51
Evaluated at bid price : 8.51
Bid-YTW : 7.29 %
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -2.91 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 15, according to TD Securities.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.01
Bid-YTW : 13.56 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -2.74 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 11.94 %
BCE.PR.C FixedFloater -2.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.00
Bid-YTW : 7.18 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -2.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 18.12
Evaluated at bid price : 18.12
Bid-YTW : 6.97 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 16.77
Evaluated at bid price : 16.77
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
DF.PR.A SplitShare -1.80 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of January 15, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.75
Bid-YTW : 8.09 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.73 % Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of January 8 according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.11
Bid-YTW : 7.18 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 17.80
Evaluated at bid price : 17.80
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 24.35
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 15.79
Evaluated at bid price : 15.79
Bid-YTW : 7.22 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 17.20
Evaluated at bid price : 17.20
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 11.87
Evaluated at bid price : 11.87
Bid-YTW : 10.19 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare -1.54 % Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.93
Bid-YTW : 8.36 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 22.41
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 8.01
Evaluated at bid price : 8.01
Bid-YTW : 7.75 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 17.02
Evaluated at bid price : 17.02
Bid-YTW : 7.15 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 17.68
Evaluated at bid price : 17.68
Bid-YTW : 6.49 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 19.53
Evaluated at bid price : 19.53
Bid-YTW : 7.22 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 18.50
Evaluated at bid price : 18.50
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 15.43
Evaluated at bid price : 15.43
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 16.50
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 7.37 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
BCE.PR.I FixedFloater 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.21
Bid-YTW : 6.92 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 22.57
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
BNA.PR.B SplitShare 1.14 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2016-03-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 7.89 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 13.16
Evaluated at bid price : 13.16
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 23.64
Evaluated at bid price : 23.91
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.45
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 21.72
Evaluated at bid price : 21.72
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 2.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 22.47
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 4.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 12.34 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
WFS.PR.A SplitShare 198,962 Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of January 8 according to Mulvihill. RBC crossed 171,800 at 9.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-06-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.86
Bid-YTW : 10.91 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 109,090 Commission Direct (Who?) crossed 105,000 at 17.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 16.91
Evaluated at bid price : 16.91
Bid-YTW : 6.76 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 104,959 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 89,874 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.32
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset 54,298 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 52,348 National crossed 40,000 at 19.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-20
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Bank Rate cut 50bp to 1.00%; Fully Transmitted to Prime

Tuesday, January 20th, 2009

The Bank of Canada has announced:

that it is lowering its target for the overnight rate by one-half of a percentage point to 1 per cent. The operating band for the overnight rate is correspondingly lowered, and the Bank Rate is now 1 1/4 per cent.

Canadian exports are down sharply, and domestic demand is shrinking as a result of declines in real income, household wealth, and consumer and business confidence. Canada’s economy is projected to contract through mid-2009, with real GDP dropping by 1.2 per cent this year on an annual average basis. As policy actions begin to take hold in Canada and globally, and with support from the past depreciation of the Canadian dollar, real GDP is expected to rebound, growing by 3.8 per cent in 2010.

A wider output gap through 2009 and modest decreases in housing prices should cause core CPI inflation to ease, bottoming at 1.1 per cent in the fourth quarter. Total CPI inflation is expected to dip below zero for two quarters in 2009, reflecting year-on-year drops in energy prices. With inflation expectations well-anchored, total and core inflation should return to the 2 per cent target in the first half of 2011 as the economy returns to potential.

Against this background, the Bank today lowered its policy rate by 50 basis points, bringing the cumulative monetary policy easing to 350 basis points since December 2007. Guided by Canada’s inflation-targeting framework, the Bank will continue to monitor carefully economic and financial developments in judging to what extent further monetary stimulus will be required to achieve the 2 per cent target over the medium term. Low, stable, and predictable inflation is the best contribution monetary policy can make to long-term economic growth and financial stability.

The cut in the bank rate has been transmitted in full to prime:

One can only speculate as to the extent, if any, of jawboning and armtwisting behind the scenes … but frankly, I was expecting to have to wait until 5pm to get the banks’ reactions!

January 19, 2009

Monday, January 19th, 2009

Not much news, in light of the holiday in the US and preparations for tomorrow’s Obama-rama.

Willem Buiter writes a piece with a rather startling message: Time to Take the Banks Into Full Public Ownership.

He points out the Bagehot prescription of readily available expensive liquidity can have an unfortunate side-effect:

But if the state’s financial assistance is priced punitively or has other painful conditionality attached to it, existing shareholders and management will do everything to avoid making use of these government facilities. If a bank has no option but to take the government’s money, it will try to repay it as soon as possible – to get the government out of its hair. Such a bank will therefore be reluctant to take any risk, including the risk of lending to the non-financial private sector. Such a bank will hoard liquidity (sometimes in the form of deposits/reserves with the central bank) to regain its independence from the government. Still independent banks will hoard liquidity to stay out of the clutches of the government.

I believe that this mechanism is at work in a powerful way both in the UK, the US and in continental Europe. Hans Werner Sinn in a recent Financial Times OpED piece pointed out that the German rescue package for banks was fatally flawed for precisely this reason: the acceptance by banks of an injection of public sector capital brings with it a cap on managerial salaries. Rather than accepting a cap on their salaries, managers would prefer to totter along with an under-capitalised bank and restrict the scope and scale of their lending operations.

However, I am unconvinced that the alternatives he suggests are really any better:

By throwing cheap money with little conditionality at the banks, the Fed and the US Treasury may get bank lending going again. By subsidizing new capital injections, they reward bad porfolio choices by the existing shareholders. By letting the executive leadership and the board stay on, they further increase moral hazard, by rewarding failed managers and boards that have failed in their fiduciary duties. All this strengthens the incentives for future excessive risk taking.

There is a better alternative. The alternative is to inject additional capital into the banks by taking all the banks into full public ownership. With the state as sole owner, the existing top executives and the existing board members can be fired without any golden handshakes. That takes care of one important form of moral hazard. Although publicly owned, the banks would be mandated to operate on ordinary commercial principles.

The implicit presumption is that government will be able to do it better. I’m not so convinced; political control over the lending process will – inevitably – mean a relaxation of lending standards to handicapped black lesbians and other disadvantaged groups, on the basis of their disadvantage and political advantage, not ability to pay. We are seeing movement towards of this conditionality in the States already, a by-product of TARP’s cheap money:

House Financial Services Committee chairman Barney Frank, D-Mass., on Friday released proposed legislation to reform the TARP and increase program accountability. Under Frank’s proposed makeover of the TARP, the second half of the $700 billion funds will be “conditioned on the use of a minimum of $50 billion for foreclosure mitigation.” His language would require Paulson to develop a comprehensive plan to prevent and mitigate residential mortgage foreclosures by March 15, 2009. The required elements of the plan include a guarantee program for qualifying loan modifications under a systematic plan and bringing down the costs of Hope for Homeowner loans “either through coverage of fees, purchasing H4H mortgages to ensure affordable rates, or both.” The plan would also need to establish a program for loans to pay down second lien mortgages that are impeding a loan modification, grant servicer incentives and assistance to stimulate modifications, and include the purchase of whole loans for the purpose of modifying or refinancing them.

I suggest that a better alternative to full nationalization that addresses Mr. Buiter’s concerns is to give the funding government a fair bit of call protection on its capital injection, while allowing the subject banks to operate on a business-like basis. The current terms do not allow this:

Our current understanding is that that the preference shares to be acquired by the government will rank pari passu with existing Tier 1 instruments in payment and in liquidation. The new preference shares will carry a 12% coupon and will be callable after five years. Banks selling preference shares to the government may not pay dividends on common equity while any of those preference shares remain outstanding. This clearly gives the banks an incentive to repay the government preference shares as soon as possible.

The five year call-protection makes sense; the restriction on common dividends does not. And, what’s more, these should be public issues, with a prospectus, stock-exchange listing and government guarantee of successful issuance.

Floaters did poorly today, perhaps in a last minute panic about tomorrow’s BoC rate announcement amidst speculation that there will be a 50bp cut to 1.00%. I will be interested not so much as to what happens to the Bank Rate as what happens to prime – I can’t see a cut of more than 25bp in prime whatever happens, but … I’ve been wrong before!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 6.88 % 7.47 % 41,355 13.60 2 0.2427 % 871.3
FixedFloater 7.24 % 6.94 % 160,001 13.82 8 0.9253 % 1,415.0
Floater 5.98 % 5.60 % 34,374 14.51 4 -2.8924 % 1,020.0
OpRet 5.34 % 4.78 % 150,156 4.06 15 -0.0981 % 2,009.8
SplitShare 6.03 % 8.09 % 87,065 4.18 15 0.8890 % 1,844.0
Interest-Bearing 7.11 % 9.32 % 38,655 0.91 2 -0.1160 % 1,988.5
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2928 % 1,565.7
Perpetual-Discount 6.83 % 6.83 % 230,698 12.78 71 0.2928 % 1,442.0
FixedReset 5.91 % 4.77 % 876,406 15.29 21 -0.3108 % 1,829.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -5.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 8.13
Evaluated at bid price : 8.13
Bid-YTW : 7.64 %
PWF.PR.A Floater -5.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 13.01
Evaluated at bid price : 13.01
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset -4.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
BNS.PR.S FixedReset -2.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 25.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -2.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.62
Bid-YTW : 11.54 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare -1.95 % Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of January 15, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.07
Bid-YTW : 7.89 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 10.10 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 7.23 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 12.06
Evaluated at bid price : 12.06
Bid-YTW : 10.03 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 21.96
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 21.47
Evaluated at bid price : 21.47
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 17.35
Evaluated at bid price : 17.35
Bid-YTW : 7.30 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 6.94 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 17.51
Evaluated at bid price : 17.51
Bid-YTW : 7.38 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 16.82
Evaluated at bid price : 16.82
Bid-YTW : 7.18 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 18.10
Evaluated at bid price : 18.10
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 16.69
Evaluated at bid price : 16.69
Bid-YTW : 7.29 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 17.57
Evaluated at bid price : 17.57
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
BNA.PR.B SplitShare 1.25 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2016-03-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 8.09 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 18.32
Evaluated at bid price : 18.32
Bid-YTW : 7.59 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 18.01
Evaluated at bid price : 18.01
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
ALB.PR.A SplitShare 1.50 % Asset coverage of 1.2-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 15.44 %
DF.PR.A SplitShare 1.60 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of January 15, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.91
Bid-YTW : 7.71 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 18.56
Evaluated at bid price : 18.56
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 18.73
Evaluated at bid price : 18.73
Bid-YTW : 7.03 %
FBS.PR.B SplitShare 1.85 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 15 according to TD Securities.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.25
Bid-YTW : 12.38 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 18.13
Evaluated at bid price : 18.13
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 21.27
Evaluated at bid price : 21.27
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare 2.00 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.19
Bid-YTW : 7.07 %
BCE.PR.C FixedFloater 2.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.40
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
LBS.PR.A SplitShare 2.35 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of January 15 according to Brompton Group.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-11-29
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.70
Bid-YTW : 8.66 %
WFS.PR.A SplitShare 2.36 % Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of January 8, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-06-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.56
Bid-YTW : 7.43 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 2.37 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 10.10 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 2.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 22.59
Evaluated at bid price : 23.65
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 2.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
BCE.PR.R FixedFloater 3.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 3.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 3.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.P FixedReset 85,739 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 25.35
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 64,895 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 25.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 43,509 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 16.96
Evaluated at bid price : 16.96
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset 43,362 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 24.96
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 43,325 Nesbitt crossed 33,000 at 15.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 15.63
Evaluated at bid price : 15.63
Bid-YTW : 7.21 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 42,440 Nesbitt crossed 27,300 at 16.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-19
Maturity Price : 16.54
Evaluated at bid price : 16.54
Bid-YTW : 7.15 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

PFD.PR.A to Delist 2009-1-23

Monday, January 19th, 2009

JovFunds Management Inc. has announced:

that the securities of Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corporation (the “Corporation”) will be delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange at the close of business on January 23, 2009 so that the merger of the Corporation into a newly created open-end mutual fund trust (the “Merger”), named the Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund (the “Fund”), may proceed as previously announced on November 12, 2008.

Subject to regulatory approval, the Merger will occur at the close of business on or about January 30, 2009 (the “Effective Date”), at a ratio based on the net asset value of the preferred shares of the Corporation on the Effective Date, and, $10.00, the starting net asset value of the Series A units of the Fund. Units of the Fund will be valued daily and may be
transacted via the FundSERV Network on or about February 2, 2009.

Their intention to merge has been discussed on PrefBlog. JovFunds and Leon Frazer are both owned by Jovian Capital.

IIAC Releases Third Quarter Debt Report

Monday, January 19th, 2009

The Investment Industry Association of Canada has released its 3Q08 Debt Trading and Issuance Report, noting:

Long-term borrowing costs for corporations also increased and, as a result, corporate bond issuance recorded its lowest financing totals in 6 years – $10.8 billion – down $13.2 billion or 55% from the previous quarter (Chart 2).

The third quarter saw only one lonely Maple bond issued, worth a mere $200-million … but that represents an increase from the second quarter!

Volcker to Regulate Money Market Funds as Banks?

Monday, January 19th, 2009

Jim Hamilton of Jim Hamilton’s World of Securities Regulation has posted a piece on regulatory initiatives that are at the discussion stage: Former Fed Chief Volcker Unveils Plan for Reforming Financial Regulation:

Former Federal Reserve Board head Paul Volcker has unveiled a plan for the reform of the regulation of the financial markets that envisions a macro prudential regulator and more robust regulation of credit rating agencies.

In addition, money market mutual funds wishing to continue to offer bank-like services, such as transaction account services, withdrawals on demand at par, and assurances of maintaining a stable net asset value (NAV) at par should be required to reorganize as special-purpose banks, with appropriate prudential regulation, government insurance, and access to central bank lender-of-last-resort facilities.

Those institutions remaining as money market mutual funds should only offer a conservative investment option with modest upside potential at relatively low risk. The vehicles should be clearly differentiated from federally insured instruments offered by banks, such as money market deposit funds, with no explicit or implicit assurances to investors that funds can be withdrawn on demand at a stable NAV. Money market mutual funds should not be permitted to use amortized cost pricing, with the implication that they carry a fluctuating NAV rather than one that is pegged at US$1.00 per share.

I am unable to find primary sources for this assertion, but I’ll keep trying!

This would be a good move, given the effects of the Lehman bankruptcy:

It was the $785 million of losses on Lehman’s securities that pushed the value of the assets of a major money market firm below their $1 per share paid value, described as “breaking the buck.” This caused $400 billion to be taken out of money market funds in a matter of days, while the rest of the funds were frozen in anticipation of further withdrawals. Banks were relying heavily on these funds for their commercial paper and the result was a spiral of illiquidity.

Assiduous Readers will recall my Collateral Proposal of last year:

In practice, banks guarantee the credit quality of the Money Market Funds they sponsor. This guarantee should be reflected when computing their capital ratios.

Update, 2009-1-21: The paper was Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability [new link, updated 2009-6-22], as reported by the Washington Post. The precise wording of the recommendation is:

a. Money market mutual funds wishing to continue to offer bank-like services, such as transaction account services, withdrawals on demand at par, and assurances of maintaining a stable net asset value (NAV) at par should be required to reorganize as special-purpose banks, with appropriate prudential regulation and supervision, government insurance, and access to central bank lender-of-last-resort facilities.

b. Those institutions remaining as money market mutual funds should only offer a conservative investment option with modest upside potential at relatively low risk. The vehicles should be clearly differentiated from federally insured instruments offered by banks, such as money market deposit funds, with no explicit or implicit assurances to investors that funds can be withdrawn on demand at a stable NAV. Money market mutual funds should not be permitted to use amortized cost pricing, with the implication that they carry a fluctuating NAV rather than one that is pegged at US$1.00 per share.

January 16, 2009

Saturday, January 17th, 2009

The day was enlivened somewhat by reports of excited groupies at the Financial Forum and by the closing quote of BNS.PR.S at 26.00-99.99. Whatever happened to the good old days of bid-without? There is still no indication of what SunLife wants to do with its holding; but surely at some point Sections 711 & 712 of the TSX Company Manual will become applicable:

Sec. 711.

TSX will normally consider the delisting of securities of a listed issuer if, in the opinion of TSX, it appears that the public distribution, price, or trading activity of the securities has been so reduced as to make further dealings in the securities on TSX unwarranted.

Sec. 712.

Specifically, participating securities may be delisted if:

(a) the market value of the listed issuer’s issued securities that are listed on TSX is less than $3,000,000 over any period of 30 consecutive trading days; or
(b) the market value of the listed issuer’s freely-tradable, publicly held securities is less than $2,000,000 over any period of 30 consecutive trading days; or
(c) the number of freely-tradable, publicly held securities is less than 500,000; or
(d) the number of public security holders, each holding a board lot or more, is less than 150.
Non-participating securities will be subject to (b) above as well as Section 711

Still and all, you know, I’m sorely tempted to buy 100 shares at 99.99, just so I can insist on delivery!

PerpetualDiscounts were off a bit today, closing to yield 6.85% dividends, equivalent to 9.59% interest at the standard 1.4x conversion factor. Long corporates are still at about 7.5%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread remains at around the 210bp level achieved on January 9.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 6.91 % 7.48 % 41,341 13.59 2 1.9802 % 869.2
FixedFloater 7.31 % 7.03 % 150,522 13.76 8 -1.0442 % 1,402.1
Floater 5.81 % 5.62 % 34,951 14.48 4 -0.5892 % 1,050.4
OpRet 5.34 % 4.77 % 151,495 4.07 15 -0.1902 % 2,011.8
SplitShare 6.09 % 8.45 % 87,367 4.17 15 0.4873 % 1,827.7
Interest-Bearing 7.11 % 9.24 % 40,196 0.91 2 0.0580 % 1,990.9
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1235 % 1,561.1
Perpetual-Discount 6.85 % 6.85 % 231,907 12.74 71 -0.1235 % 1,437.8
FixedReset 5.89 % 4.84 % 882,316 15.33 21 0.1337 % 1,835.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -5.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 8.83
Evaluated at bid price : 8.83
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -3.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 8.60
Evaluated at bid price : 8.60
Bid-YTW : 7.21 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -3.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 12.32
Evaluated at bid price : 12.32
Bid-YTW : 9.80 %
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -3.69 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 15 according to TD Securities.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.10
Bid-YTW : 13.06 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -3.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 12.25
Evaluated at bid price : 12.25
Bid-YTW : 9.86 %
BCE.PR.Z FixedFloater -3.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 7.33 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet -3.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 9.67 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset -3.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 23.04
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -2.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 18.09
Evaluated at bid price : 18.09
Bid-YTW : 7.68 %
DF.PR.A SplitShare -2.66 % Asset coverage of 1.4:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.77
Bid-YTW : 8.02 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -2.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 14.90
Evaluated at bid price : 14.90
Bid-YTW : 8.05 %
ACO.PR.A OpRet -2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 16.50
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 7.37 %
BCE.PR.A FixedFloater -1.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.15
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 20.86
Evaluated at bid price : 20.86
Bid-YTW : 7.11 %
BCE.PR.C FixedFloater -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.05
Bid-YTW : 7.18 %
ALB.PR.A SplitShare -1.57 % Asset coverage of 1.2-:1 as of January 15 according to Scotia Managed Companies.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 16.17 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 17.59
Evaluated at bid price : 17.59
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 7.18 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 17.87
Evaluated at bid price : 17.87
Bid-YTW : 6.60 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 16.06
Evaluated at bid price : 16.06
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 21.95
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 4.75 %
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 43.81
Evaluated at bid price : 44.75
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 16.65
Evaluated at bid price : 16.65
Bid-YTW : 7.25 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 17.38
Evaluated at bid price : 17.38
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare 1.17 % Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.55
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 24.75
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 13.47 %
LBS.PR.A SplitShare 1.80 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-11-29
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.50
Bid-YTW : 9.21 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 17.95
Evaluated at bid price : 17.95
Bid-YTW : 6.39 %
BNS.PR.S FixedReset 1.96 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 7.00 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 2.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 22.32
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 3.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 11.58 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare 3.82 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of December 31, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.25
Bid-YTW : 7.29 %
BCE.PR.Y Ratchet 3.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.81
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 4.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 13.75
Evaluated at bid price : 13.75
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare 4.65 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.01
Bid-YTW : 7.46 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.E OpRet 127,879 TD crossed three blocks totalling 100,000 shares at 25.10; RBC crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 102,265 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 101,797 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset 72,874 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-16
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 70,896 Anonymous bought 59,500 from RBC at 22.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 10.26 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare 60,680 Anonymous crossed 15,000 at 9.35. Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.25
Bid-YTW : 7.29 %
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Thank You, Financial Forum!

Saturday, January 17th, 2009

I was at the Financial Forum today, as previously announced, and was really pleased at the size of the thronging crowd of adoring fans who came out to learn a little bit about preferred shares.

I wasn’t able to get to all of my slides, but the presentation will be on the Canadian Moneysaver website shortly … and I’ve also uploaded it here (Microsoft PowerPoint file).