Archive for July, 2009

July 7, 2009

Tuesday, July 7th, 2009

Treasury is going to avoid voting its shares in companies that received TARP funds:

On many resolutions offered by investors — from demanding pro- environment policies to allowing domestic partner benefits to reining in executive bonuses — the Treasury plans to ask that its ballots be counted in the same proportion as the votes of other stockholders so it won’t impact the results.

An investment manager could probably go to jail for that! But Dealbreaker, bless its heart, sees the truth:

As Kenny Lewis can attest to, when it comes to the stuff that really matters, backroom waterboarding is a far more compelling tool than shareholder votes.

The Lewis affair was discussed on April 24: Lewis’ BofA was basically forced by Treasury to buy Merrill, despite “staggering deterioration” of Merrill’s balance sheet.

Looks like there will be increased regulatory control over oil & gas speculation. There is, naturally, considerable doubt as to whether speculation is harmful.

California’s having a little difficulty getting its IOUs accepted:

A group of the biggest U.S. banks said they would stop accepting California’s IOUs on Friday, adding pressure on the state to close its $26.3 billion annual budget gap.

Amid the budget deadlock, Fitch Ratings on Monday dropped California’s bond rating to BBB, down from A minus, the latest in a series of ratings downgrades for the state.

The group of banks included Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo & Co. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., among others. The banks had previously committed to accepting state IOUs as payment. California plans to issue more than $3 billion of IOUs in July.

BIS has released a working paper by Naohiko Baba and Frank Packer titled From turmoil to crisis: dislocations in the FX swap market before and after the failure of Lehman Brothers:

This paper investigates dislocations in the foreign exchange (FX) swap market between the US dollar and three major European currencies. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, deviations from covered interest parity (CIP) were negatively associated with the creditworthiness of US financial institutions (as well as that of European institutions), consistent with the deepening of a dollar liquidity problem into a global phenomenon. US dollar term funding auctions by the ECB, SNB, and BoE, as well as the US Federal Reserve commitment to provide unlimited dollar swap lines are found to have ameliorated the FX swap market dislocations.

The Ontario Securities Commission has released its 2009 Annual Report. To my mind, the most interesting sentence was:

The OSC, Quebec’s Autorité des marchés financiers and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) are reviewing complaints received in connection with the organization, sale or distribution of non-bank sponsored ABCP products.

Not much price action today, but the PerpetualDiscount and FixedReset sectors both posted gains, with yields on FixedResets continuing what seems like an inexorable march downwards.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1648 % 1,175.8
FixedFloater 7.08 % 5.46 % 37,415 16.37 1 0.0651 % 2,130.7
Floater 3.24 % 3.75 % 80,252 17.99 3 0.1648 % 1,468.9
OpRet 4.97 % -4.67 % 125,348 0.09 15 0.1123 % 2,218.6
SplitShare 5.73 % 6.35 % 70,025 4.18 3 0.2412 % 1,902.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1123 % 2,028.7
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0817 % 1,752.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.34 % 160,984 13.43 71 0.0817 % 1,614.4
FixedReset 5.58 % 4.34 % 478,925 4.30 40 0.1380 % 2,056.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.87
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 15.57
Evaluated at bid price : 15.57
Bid-YTW : 7.71 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 22.81
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 19.41
Evaluated at bid price : 19.41
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 10.55
Evaluated at bid price : 10.55
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 88,977 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 83,191 National Bank crossed 20,000 at 27.21.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.21
Bid-YTW : 4.55 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 82,463 RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 69,261 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.16.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 25.05
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 56,838 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 56,480 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-07
Maturity Price : 18.06
Evaluated at bid price : 18.06
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
There were 52 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

YPG 4-Year Bond Issue comes with 6.50% Coupon

Tuesday, July 7th, 2009

Last week, YPG announced:

an offering by YPG Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) of Medium Term Notes for gross proceeds of $90 million. The net proceeds from the issuance of the Notes will be used for general corporate purposes, to repay indebtedness outstanding under the Company’s commercial paper program and to repay an amount of $50 million under its term credit facility. This offering is scheduled to close on or about July 3, 2009.

Pursuant to this offering, the Company will issue $90 million of 6.85% Series 8 Notes (compounded semi-annually), which will be dated July 3, 2009, will mature on December 3, 2013 and will be issued at a price of $100.00.

The Series 8 Notes will be guaranteed by Yellow Pages Income Fund (TSX: YLO.UN), YPG Trust, YPG LP, Yellow Pages Group Co., Trader Corporation, YPG (USA) Holdings, Inc., Yellow Pages Group, LLC and YPG Directories, LLC. The Notes have been assigned a rating of BBB (high) with a stable trend by DBRS Limited and a rating of BBB- with a stable outlook from Standard & Poor’s Rating Service.

… and now they have announced:

an offering by YPG Holdings Inc. (the “Company”) of Medium Term Notes Series 9 and an additional offering of Medium Term Notes Series 8 for combined gross proceeds of $165 million. All of the net proceeds from the issuance of the Series 9 Notes and Series 8 Notes will be used to repay indebtedness outstanding under the Company’s term credit facility. Both offerings are scheduled to close on or about July 10, 2009.

Pursuant to these offerings, the Company will issue $130 million of 6.50% Series 9 Notes (compounded semi-annually), which will be dated July 10, 2009, will mature on July 10, 2013 and will be issued at a price of $100.00. The Company will also increase the size of its $90 million offering of 6.85% Series 8 Notes, which were issued on July 3, 2009, by issuing a further $35 million of 6.85% Series 8 Notes (compounded semi-annually). The Series 8 Notes mature on December 3, 2013.

The Series 9 Notes and the Series 8 Notes will be guaranteed by Yellow Pages Income Fund (TSX: YLO.UN), YPG Trust, YPG LP, Yellow Pages Group Co., Trader Corporation, YPG (USA) Holdings, Inc., Yellow Pages Group, LLC and YPG Directories, LLC. The Series 9 Notes and Series 8 Notes have been assigned a rating of BBB (high) with a stable trend by DBRS Limited and a rating of BBB- with a stable outlook from Standard & Poor’s Rating Service.

YPG is certainly showing that it can access the bond market and is chipping away steadily at its bank debt (as noted in mid-June); it’s certainly encouraging, but a 10-year issue would increase confidence in YPG.PR.B given the term structure of their debt.

July 6, 2009

Monday, July 6th, 2009

Willem Buiter wants to clamp down on CDS trading:

CDS provide an example. Just as short selling equity is potentially efficiency enhancing but naked short selling is just gambling, so insuring credit default risk is potentially efficiency enhancing when the buyer has an insurable interest and the writer of the CDS is sufficiently capitalised. Current arrangements permit ‘naked’ CDS buying (buying CDS on a security in excess of the face value of your holdings of that security).

I would not follow George Soros and ban CDS outright. I would require that any writer of CDS or other forms of credit risk insurance be properly capitalised and post additional collateral immediately when his creditworthiness is adversely affected. In addition, I would stipulate that it is only possible to buy CDS when you have an insurable interest in the security it is written on, and that you cannot make good, following default on a security, any claim under a CDS written on that security unless you can present to the writer of the CDS an amount of that security with the same face value as your claim.

The reference to George Soros links to a column by Ed Hammond:

George Soros, the billionaire financier, this week called for the scrapping of CDS contracts. He used the example of the bankruptcy of General Motors as a reason for outlawing these contracts. This, he said, was because it was in the interest of some bondholders to see the company go under as they were also in possession of CDS contracts, which paid out on the carmaker’s default.

… which is just the old debt-decoupling problem that has so many people (not me!) so upset.

I fail to understand Mr. Buiter’s equation of naked-shorting (protection buying) with gambling. The exposure to the shorting party is the same; there may well be risk to the counterparty that is not disclosed in a naked short; and this potential counter-party risk may well be destabilizing and therefore Bad; but I don’t understand why it should be deprecated as gambling and thus distinguished from the price-discovery process assisted by shorting.

I do try to stay away from politics in this blog – except where they explicitly impinge on the financial world, but this Toronto Star article is too good to pass by: Green Bins: A wasted effort:

The City of Toronto boasts that its green bin program diverts a third of our garbage and turns it into “black gold” compost. But a Star investigation shows that the program – although nobly conceived – is a sham.

There are two problems. First, the city’s claim of how much waste the program diverts from landfill is inflated. Second, some of the compost that is being produced will kill your plants because of its high salt content, according to laboratory tests.

The Star’s headline is incorrect: the Green Bin programme is serving its purpose perfectly. It is enabling earnest feel-gooders to feel good about themselves. If the purpose was actually to accomplish something useful, we’d just incinerate it all. But that’s regulation for you!

UK CMBS are not feeling very happy:

Investor Simon Halabi’s real-estate companies failed to remedy a default on 1.15 billion pounds ($1.9 billion) of commercial mortgage bonds at a time when, according to Fitch Ratings, “pretty much” all such European deals would breach loan-to-value conditions if they were tested.

“With capital values having fallen on average by 43 percent, pretty much any loan that has a loan-to-value covenant if tested today would be in breach,” said Andrew Currie, head of Europe commercial mortgage-backed securities at Fitch Ratings in London. Most servicers of commercial mortgage bonds haven’t tested these conditions, “storing up trouble” for the future, he said before today’s announcement.

White Tower is the largest commercial mortgage bond sold by a single borrower to default this year in Britain, which is Europe’s largest market and accounts for about 50 percent of issuance, according to Fitch. Banks that financed a real-estate buying spree at the top of the market are weighed down with about 230 billion pounds of commercial property loans, data compiled by De Montford University show, making them unwilling to refinance existing deals when they come due.

FixedResets continued to roar ahead (as well as hogging up all the spots on the volume highlights table) and are now more than two points through perpetuals, a price that sounds really, really extreme. At current spreads, of course, redemption at first call looks more likely than not, but there is still a significant amount of extension risk in the structure … we will see how it turns out. My bet? It ends in tears.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.1675 % 1,173.8
FixedFloater 7.08 % 5.47 % 37,463 16.36 1 -0.0651 % 2,129.4
Floater 3.25 % 3.74 % 81,288 18.00 3 -1.1675 % 1,466.4
OpRet 4.97 % -3.96 % 120,673 0.09 15 0.1047 % 2,216.1
SplitShare 5.75 % 6.51 % 70,056 4.18 3 0.1208 % 1,897.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1047 % 2,026.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0829 % 1,751.5
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.35 % 160,007 13.41 71 0.0829 % 1,613.1
FixedReset 5.59 % 4.30 % 475,321 4.30 40 0.3999 % 2,053.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 10.43
Evaluated at bid price : 10.43
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 7.33 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 15.75
Evaluated at bid price : 15.75
Bid-YTW : 7.62 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 20.15
Evaluated at bid price : 20.15
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 10.57
Evaluated at bid price : 10.57
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.85
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 25.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 18.04
Evaluated at bid price : 18.04
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 21.76
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 19.19
Evaluated at bid price : 19.19
Bid-YTW : 6.55 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 24.98
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.85
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.28
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 81,799 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-06
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.85 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 50,257 RBC crossed 13,800 at 27.24.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 46,006 RBC bought 10,400 from anonymous at 27.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 44,964 RBC crossed 17,800 at 26.24.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.04
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 39,079 RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.59.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 38,392 RBC crossed 17,900 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.28
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MFC: Innovative Tier 1 Capital Issue

Monday, July 6th, 2009

Manulife Financial has announced:

that Manulife Financial Capital Trust II (the “Trust”), a trust wholly-owned by The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company (“MLI”), will issue $1 billion of Manulife Financial Capital Trust II Notes – Series 1 due December 31, 2108 (“MaCS II – Series 1”). The MaCS II – Series 1 are expected to qualify as Tier 1 capital of MLI for regulatory purposes. The Trust intends to file a final prospectus with the Canadian securities regulators as soon as possible.

Interest on the MaCS II – Series 1 is payable semi-annually. From the date of issue to but excluding December 31, 2019, the rate of interest on the MaCS II – Series 1 will be fixed at 7.405% per annum. Starting on December 31, 2019, and on every fifth anniversary after such date, the rate of interest on the MaCS II – Series 1 will be reset as described in the prospectus filed by the Trust and MLI.
On or after December 31, 2014, the Trust may, at its option and subject to certain conditions, redeem the MaCS II – Series 1, in whole or in part.

In certain circumstances, the MaCS II – Series 1 or interest thereon may be automatically exchanged or paid by the issuance of non-cumulative Class 1 Preferred Shares of MLI.

The transaction is expected to close on July 10, 2009. An amount equivalent to the net proceeds will be used by Manulife Financial Corporation (“MFC”) to acquire liquid assets for possible future retirement of amounts outstanding under MFC’s credit facility or for general corporate purposes. The offering is not expected to initially result in an increase to MLI’s reported MCCSR ratio (Minimum Continuing Capital and Surplus Requirements for Life Insurance Companies).

The use of proceeds is not entirely clear to me, but no prospectus is yet available. MLI has “Adjusted Net Tier 1 Capital” of a little under $13.6-billion as of 1Q09, according to OSFI, and these notes, according to the press release, will add to this total. But the offering is not expected to increase MLI’s MCCSR, and proceeds may be used to pay of MFC’s debt.

So how will the money flow from MLI to its parent MFC? Share buyback? Redemption of bonds? Enormous dividend? It must be out of Tier 1 Capital somehow, but it’s just not clear.

Be that as it may, the yield of 7.405% seems about right. MFC’s preferreds are trading to yield around 6.4% (the perps) or 4.85%-5.35% for the fixed Resets. The reset mechanism of this new issue is not specified in the press release, but can probably be expected to be similar to FixedResets (check the prospectus!).

Most importantly, however, these notes are Tier 1 Capital of the operating subsidiary, not the parent, which is worth a notch or two in credit quality all by itself. DBRS rates MLI‘s prefs at Pfd-1 and sub-debt at AA(low), compared to MFC’s Pfd-1(low) and senior debt (MTNs) at AA(low).

Update 2009-7-7: From the Preliminary Prospectus (via SEDAR):

The gross proceeds to the Trust from the Offering of $

Boston Fed Paper on Mortgage Renegotiation and Securitization

Monday, July 6th, 2009

The Boston Fed has released a new Public Policy Discussion Paper by Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen, Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? The Myth of Securitization:

We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment-reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securitization: servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios. Our results are robust to different definitions of renegotiation, including the one most likely to be affected by securitization, and to different definitions of delinquency. Our results are strongest in subsamples in which unobserved heterogeneity between portfolio and securitized loans is likely to be small, and for subprime loans. We use a theoretical model to show that redefault risk, the possibility that a borrower will still default despite costly renegotiation, and self-cure risk, the possibility that a seriously delinquent borrower will
become current without renegotiation, make renegotiation unattractive to investors.

This follows the earlier Boston Fed paper, Reducing Foreclosures, which argued that it was income shocks and housing price declines, not high payment-to-income ratios at origination, that were the driving force in the foreclosure boom.

S&P Places BAM on Outlook Negative

Monday, July 6th, 2009

Standard & Poors has announced:

it revised its outlook on Brookfield Asset Management Inc. to negative from stable. At the same time, we affirmed the ratings, including the ‘A-‘ long-term corporate credit rating on the company.

“The outlook revision reflects what we view as pressure on the credit risk profile of Brookfield’s core subsidiaries, Brookfield Properties Corp. and Brookfield Renewable Power Inc., as well as our expectation of weaker operating cash flows, in particular, a lower level of investment gains,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Greg Pau.

In the past two months, we have revised the outlook on the ‘BBB’ ratings on both Brookfield Properties (BBB/Negative/–) and Brookfield Renewable Power (BBB/Negative/A-3) to negative from stable to reflect the pressure on their respective credit standings. In the case of Brookfield Properties, we expect that valuation declines on its commercial properties and stricter lender underwriting could heighten refinancing risks of maturing debt, particularly that in the pro rata US$1.6 billion debt maturing in its U.S. fund in 2011. With the generally weak state of commercial property market in major U.S. cities and financial centers, we believe that any recovery in valuation could be slow and modest.

The negative outlook reflects our expectation that pressures on Brookfield’s core subsidiaries’ credit risk profile, cash flow volatility from potentially lower investment gains, and the challenging market conditions could weaken the company’s own financial risk profile. Standard & Poor’s could consider lowering the rating if the credit risk profiles of Brookfield Properties and Brookfield Renewable Power deteriorate further. We could also lower the rating if remitted cash flows further weaken to result in remitted OCF interest coverage falling below 4x or OCF to total debt falling below 20%. Conversely, we could revise the outlook to stable when the company’s cash flows strengthen again when market conditions improve or the company materially reduces its corporate level debts, resulting in OCF coverage measures returning to levels similar to those attained in 2008.

On a perhaps not entirely unrelated note, DBRS has confirmed Brookfield Renewable Power following a shuffling of assets down the line:

DBRS has today confirmed the Senior Unsecured Debentures and Notes rating of Brookfield Renewable Power Inc. (BRP or the Company) at BBB (high), with a Stable trend. This action follows today’s announcement that BRP intends to sell substantially all of its renewable generating facilities in Canada with a total capacity of 387 MW to its 50.01% owned Great Lakes Hydro Income Fund (the Fund, rated STA-2 (high)). BRP will also amend two existing power purchase arrangements (PPAs) under which it acquires power from two of the Fund’s generating assets, and will provide a price guarantee in connection with the bulk of the transferred assets.

Total consideration payable by the Fund to BRP is $945 million, to be funded with the net proceeds from the sale of $760 million of Fund units, and a $200 million senior unsecured note to BRP. BRP will subscribe for 50.01% of the $760 million equity offering in order to maintain its current ownership percentage. Initial cash proceeds to BRP will be approximately $365 million, with an additional $200 million when the note matures.

BRP’s consolidated financial profile is not expected to be materially changed as a result of the Transaction as the Company will continue to consolidate the Fund’s results. On a non-consolidated basis, while BRP would lose a modest amount of operating cash flow from the sale of the physical generating assets, and will take on additional price exposure through the additional/amended power purchase agreements with certain of the Fund’s assets, these challenges are viewed as largely offset by the considerable Transaction consideration to be received, the expectation of BRP continuing with a prudent hedging strategy, and the Company maintaining its ownership position in the Fund.

The following BAM issues are tracked by HIMIPref™: BAM.PR.B, BAM.PR.E, BAM.PR.G, BAM.PR.H, BAM.PR.I, BAM.PR.J, BAM.PR.K, BAM.PR.M, BAM.PR.N, BAM.PR.O & BAM.PR.P.

Additionally, the ratings of BAM Split Corp are capped by BAM’s rating: BNA.PR.A, BNA.PR.B, BNA.PR.C and the new issue that closes 2009-7-9.

July 3, 2009

Friday, July 3rd, 2009

The FDIC – which shut down a boatload of banks yesterday – has published draft rules for private equity buyers interested in sniffing around the assets. Very, very stringent, and at first glance, I have to agree with the statement:

“The FDIC’s proposed guidance would deter future private investments in banks that need fresh capital,” Douglas Lowenstein, president of the industry group the Private Equity Council, said in a statement yesterday.

The rules that catch my eye have to do with a 15% minimum Tier 1 Capital Ratio, three year ownership lockup and cross-guarantees from other depository institutions owned by the investor. Unfortunately, the proposals are presented in bald, finished form without discussion, so I am at a loss to determine whether there is any real purpose being served by the proposals.

There was some more some more Chinese mischief-making today:

“There should be a system to maintain the stability of the major reserve currencies,” Zeng, the head of a Chinese research center, said in Beijing today. He advocated supervision of fiscal and current-account deficits, adding that “your currency is likely to become my problem.”

Premier Wen Jiabao said in March that he was “worried” about his nation’s holdings of Treasuries as spiraling U.S. debt threatens the value of the dollar. China, the owner of the world’s biggest foreign-exchange reserves, called yesterday for a stable dollar and damped speculation that it is seeking talks on a new international reserve currency at next week’s Group of Eight meeting.

If China doesn’t like the USD as a reserve currency, that’s an easy problem to solve: don’t hold it. They can keep their reserves in gold, if they like, although copper or oil would probably be a better choice. And making their currency freely exchangeable and doing so much business with the rest of the world that the remnimbi becomes a reserve currency is another option.

And the idea of solemnly going into the G-8 meeting proposing to elect a new reserve currency is utter nonsense. It’s like having a vote to determine who’s tallest. I’m convinced that this is all just posturing to put the US on notice China won’t be pushed around at the meeting … but there’s a better way to do that, too … aircraft carriers.

Sabre-rattling aside, looks like they’re going for the asset-backed reserve currency idea:

Teck Resources Ltd., Canada’s largest diversified mining company, sold a 17 percent stake to China’s $200 billion fund sovereign wealth fund for C$1.74 billion ($1.5 billion) to reduce debt.

China Investment Corp., also known as CIC, will buy 101.3 million Class B subordinate voting shares for C$17.21 each, Vancouver-based Teck Resources said today in a statement. Teck said the deal will give CIC a 6.7 percent voting interest.

There’s some talk about an Argentinian oil deal, too.

Macroblog‘s John Robertson was kind enough to mention an old PrefBlog post in his commentary, A funny thing happened on the way to the federal funds market. While the institution of the Excess Balance Account will relieve some of the leverage-driven selling of Fed Funds, there’s yet another nuance:

Technically, the FHLBs [Federal Home Loan Banks], like other government-sponsored enterprises, are ineligible to earn interest on their own reserve balances held at the Fed, but the FHLBs were given an exemption under the interim rule published last year, which did not distinguish between an FHLB’s own reserve balances and those of their respondents. With the amended Reg. D, the pooling of reserves will no longer be allowed. Thus, the FHLBs will not be able to earn interest on their own reserve balances.

Will this change matter to them? A look at the FHLB consolidated balance sheet suggests it could. For instance, as of Sept. 30, 2008, the FHLBs were sellers of some $94 billion of fed funds and held zero on deposit at the Fed. But as of Dec. 31, 2008, after the Fed started paying interest on reserves, the FHLBs sold only $40 billion of fed funds and held $47 billion on deposit at the Fed.

Fed funds market nerds stay tuned.

I object! I’m not a Fed Funds nerd; I’m a Fed Funds geek!

Another strong day for preferreds – especially FixedResets! – on reduced volume; probably due to the US holiday.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5670 % 1,187.7
FixedFloater 7.08 % 5.47 % 34,811 16.36 1 -0.3245 % 2,130.7
Floater 3.21 % 3.70 % 81,989 18.10 3 -0.5670 % 1,483.8
OpRet 4.97 % 2.34 % 118,588 0.09 15 0.1777 % 2,213.8
SplitShare 5.75 % 6.40 % 68,952 4.19 3 0.0151 % 1,895.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1777 % 2,024.3
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1561 % 1,750.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.37 % 159,489 13.42 71 0.1561 % 1,611.8
FixedReset 5.60 % 4.49 % 474,879 4.34 40 0.2274 % 2,045.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.51
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 20.38
Evaluated at bid price : 20.38
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 25.44
Evaluated at bid price : 25.49
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 16.01
Evaluated at bid price : 16.01
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 21.04
Evaluated at bid price : 21.04
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 2.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 103,060 Scotia bought 19,100 from anonymous at 25.40, then crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 72,350 RBC bought 18,800 from anonymous at 25.04; then crossed 18,400 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 24.96
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 54,257 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
GWO.PR.X OpRet 40,162 RBC crossed two blocks, 25,000 and 12,000 shares, both at 26.11.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.67
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 36,851 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 29,603 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 19.83
Evaluated at bid price : 19.83
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MAPF Performance: June 2009

Friday, July 3rd, 2009

The fund performed well in another month of recovery for the preferred share market. As noted in the report of Index Performance, June 2009, both the FixedReset and PerpetualDiscount now have positive total return over the past years – rather a back-handed compliment, but it’s a lot better than has been the case lately!

Fund performance was hurt by the underweighting in FixedReset issues noted in MAPF Portfolio Composition: June 2009, as well as an underweighting in lower quality issues (which also outperformed), but these allocation hurdles were handsomely overcome by security selection and trading within the actual portfolio.

Note that the passive funds (DPS.UN and CPD) both have relatively high weightings in Pfd-3-tier issues; as shown in the uploaded chart, these “Credit Class 3” issues have tightened massively recently. Note that in the chart, the Credit Class 3 spread is shown as a spread against Credit Class 2; while the Credit Class 2 spread is shown as a spread against Credit Class 1.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close June 30 was $10.9846 after a dividend distribution of $0.168846 per unit.

Returns to June 30, 2009
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +4.93% +1.60% +1.38%
Three Months +26.29% +13.49% +12.77%
One Year +42.19% -0.18% -0.47%
Two Years (annualized) +16.60% -2.28%  
Three Years (annualized) +12.69% -1.63%  
Four Years (annualized) +10.60% -0.55%  
Five Years (annualized) +10.44% +0.82%  
Six Years (annualized) +12.04% +1.39%  
Seven Years (annualized) +11.32% +2.31%  
Eight Years (annualized) +11.82% +2.41%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are 2.0%, 12.7% and -1.0%%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are N/A, N/A & N/A, respectively, according to Morningstar and the Globe and Mail
Figures for AIC Preferred Income Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.7%, N/A & N/A, respectively

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

I am very pleased with the returns, but implore Assiduous Readers not to project this level of outperformance for the indefinite future. The past year in the preferred share market has been filled with episodes of panic and euphoria, together with many new entrants who do not appear to know what they are doing; perfect conditions for a disciplined quantitative approach. While I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform, it should be borne in mind that beating the index by 500bp represents a good year, and there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The outperformance of the fund is almost – not quite! – embarrassing. You will find no shortage of people who will be willing to state flatly that it is not possible to achieve such returns without incredible risks; there will be others who deprecate the size of the fund and say that trading in size would eliminate every scrap of outperformance. These are the same things I kept hearing when I was trading Canada bonds for pension funds. All I can do is point to my portfolio composition, financial statements & trading records and state that I see lots of silly prices on the Exchange that I can’t take full advantage of because I’ve reached my position limits. There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. Just don’t expect index+4237bp every year, OK?

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 0.5288
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 0.5216
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% $0.5287
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% $0.6006
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% $0.7375
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% $0.7633
June 2009 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% $0.7752
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.
“Portfolio YTW” includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
“Securities YTW” divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
“Sustainable Income” is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per unit, before fees and expenses.

As discussed in the post MAPF Portfolio Composition: May 2009, the fund has positions in splitShares (almost all BNA.PR.C) and an operating retractible, both of which have high yields that are not sustainable: at some point they will be called or mature and the funds will have to be reinvested. Therefore, both of these positions skew the calculation upwards.. Since the yield on thes positions is higher than that of the perpetuals despite the fact that the term is limited, the sustainability of the calculated “sustainable yield” is suspect, as discussed in August, 2008.

Significant positions were also held in Fixed-Reset issues on June 30; all of which currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. It is the increase in exposure to the lower-yielding Fixed-Reset class that accounts for the apparent stall in the increase of sustainable income per unit in the past six months. In December 2008, FixedReset exposure was zero; it is now 11.5%. Exposure to the extraordinarily high-yielding SplitShare class has also been reduced due to credit concerns.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 6.58% shown in the June 30 Portfolio Composition analysis (which is in excess of the 6.36% index yield on June 30). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be 10.9846 * 0.0658 = $0.7228, an increase from the $0.7154 derived by a similar calculation last month, despite the negative effects on the calculation of having distributed the accumulated dividends.

Different assumptions lead to different calculations, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Index Performance: June 2009

Friday, July 3rd, 2009

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for June, 2009, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
June 2009
Three Months
to
June 30, 2009
Ratchet -8.20% * +36.36% *
FixFloat +1.86% +51.30% **
Floater -8.20% +36.36%
OpRet +1.93% +6.52%
SplitShare +4.02% +15.63%
Interest +2.03% +4.77%
PerpetualPremium +1.66%*** +15.34%***
PerpetualDiscount +1.66% +15.34%
FixedReset +2.70% +11.39%
* The last member of the RatchetRate index was transferred to Scraps at the February, 2009, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
** The last member of the FixedFloater index was transferred to Scraps at the February, 2009, rebalancing. Performance figures to 2009-5-29 are set equal to the Floater index. The FixedFloater index acquired a member on 2009-5-29.
*** The last member of the PerpetualPremium index was transferred to PerpetualDiscount at the October, 2008, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the PerpetualDiscount index
Passive Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +1.38% +12.73%
DPS.UN +2.28% +17.17%
Index
BMO-CM 50 +1.60% +13.49%

The major indices have managed to stagger into the black over the trailing 12-month period. Full speed ahead!


Click for big

And yes, what you see is true: PerpetualDiscounts have outperformed FixedResets over the past twelve months. June 2008, now dropped from the trailing year’s return was a horrible, horrible month for them.

Claymore has published NAV and distribution data (problems with the page in IE8 can be kludged by using compatibility view) for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to June, 2009
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
March 31, 2009 14.28    
April 30 15.27 0.00   +6.93%
May 29, 2009 15.88 0.00   +3.99%
June 25 15.88 0.2100 +1.32% +1.38%
June 30, 2009 15.89   +0.06%
Quarterly Return +12.73%

The DPS.UN NAV for June 24 has been published so we may calculate the June returns (approximately!) for this closed end fund. I am rather annoyed that this calculation will not include the distribution with the June 26 ex-Date!

DPS.UN NAV Return, June-ish 2009
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
May 27, 2009 18.18    
Estimated May Ending Stub -0.19% *
June 24, 2009 18.56   +2.09%
Estimated June Ending Stub** +0.375%
Estimated June Return +2.28%
** CPD had a NAV of $16.04 on June 24, paid $0.21 June 25 with a NAV of 15.88 and a NAV of $15.89 on June 30. The return for the period was therefore +0.375%. This figure is added to the DPS.UN period return to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month.
* CPD had a NAV of $15.85 on May 27 and a NAV of $15.88 on May 29. The return for the period was therefore +0.19%. This figure is subtracted from the DPS.UN period return to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month.
The June return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of three period returns, -0.19%, +2.09% and +0.375% to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +2.28%

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for April and May:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-June-ish, 2009
April-ish +7.72%
May-ish +6.35%
June-ish +2.28%
Three-months-ish +17.17%

July 2, 2009

Thursday, July 2nd, 2009

Interesting news from Peru today:

IShares, the world’s biggest provider of exchange-traded funds, reached an agreement with Peru’s pension funds that will increase the assets of the first Peruvian exchange traded fund in the U.S., according to Gonzalo Presa, a pension fund manager at Lima-based AFP Horizonte.

The Peruvian pension funds, known as AFPs, will swap shares of local companies in exchange for shares in the iShares MSCI All Peru Capped Index Fund, said Presa. BlackRock Inc. agreed to buy Barclays Plc’s global fund unit, including iShares, for $13.5 billion in June.

“We’ll give Barclays shares to build up this ETF,” Presa, who helps manage $3.4 billion as head of local equities at AFP Horizonte, said in a phone interview. “The idea is to issue $300 million in new shares in two, three weeks.”

Presa said it would be “very difficult” for Barclays to acquire the shares in the local market because of the lack of liquidity.

There’s no information given as to whether the pension funds got a sweetheart deal on fees.

I hadn’t known this in advance, but to my astonishment there was no early close of the bond markets today:

“SIFMA’s Board of Directors and membership reassessed the early close policy, recognizing that additional access to the liquidity provided by our members would benefit all market participants. The interconnected, global nature of the fixed income markets and the significant–and nearly round the clock–access to liquidity that many members provide would be enhanced by this change. Since shortened trading days may limit the liquidity window and create possible market risks which could be mitigated with a full functioning fixed income market on days when liquidity could be normal, we have determined eliminating some of the early closes is a better solution,” said Randy Snook, executive vice president at SIFMA. “This step will allow firms of all sizes around the globe to have access to fixed income liquidity on an almost continuous basis on most trading days of the year.”

Early close recommendations will be eliminated for the following holidays:

· Friday before Martin Luther King, Jr. Day
· Friday before President’s Day
· Day before Independence Day
· Friday before Labor Day
· Day before Columbus Day
· Day before Veterans Day
· Day before Thanksgiving

I’ve heard a rumour that this is TARP-related, which may well be true, but I’m glad of it anyway. Ever since I got into this business, I’ve been amazed that the highest paid profession on earth has had a half-day in advance of long weekends. All the B-School Babies will be whining about having to put in a full day’s work, poor things.

The SEC may be preparing a short-selling cosmetic makeover:

Given the climate in Washington, as well as the running suspicion of Wall Street, new rules seem inevitable, analysts say. Mary L. Schapiro, chairwoman of the S.E.C., has said that considering new rules restricting short-selling is a priority. Members of Congress like Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who heads the House financial services committee, are calling for quick action.

For the moment, the most likely outcome may be for the S.E.C. to reinstate a rule that the commission itself abolished with a unanimous vote in 2007, under its previous chairman, Christopher S. Cox. Known as the uptick rule, it would bar investors from shorting a stock until its price ticks at least a penny above its previous trading price.

But current and former S.E.C. staff members appear to doubt that reinstating the uptick rule would have much of an effect on trading. Some say the change would be merely cosmetic.

Sally Miller, a spokesman for the A.B.A., said the member banks thought there was clear link between the market turmoil and the rule change. “All of a sudden subsequent to 2007 they can see all their stocks going haywire,” Ms. Miller said. “It’s cause and effect.”

I wonder what Ms. Miller actually said, in context. She surely can’t be claiming that the most important determinant of bank equity price volatility in the 2007-09 period was the removal of the uptick rule!

Still and all, I wonder what BIS thinks of it. Their annual report contains an argument in favour of short sales as a bubble-controller.

Continued strength in FixedResets brings the yield-to-worst down to 4.55%! Holy smokes, how low can they go?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6522 % 1,194.5
FixedFloater 7.06 % 5.46 % 35,241 16.37 1 0.3909 % 2,137.7
Floater 3.19 % 3.68 % 82,780 18.15 3 0.6522 % 1,492.2
OpRet 4.98 % 3.41 % 118,629 0.88 15 0.0575 % 2,209.8
SplitShare 5.76 % 6.38 % 69,320 4.19 3 -0.3160 % 1,894.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0575 % 2,024.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0938 % 1,747.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.38 % 161,955 13.40 71 -0.0938 % 1,609.2
FixedReset 5.60 % 4.55 % 483,655 4.34 40 0.3709 % 2,040.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 20.71
Evaluated at bid price : 20.71
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 18.18
Evaluated at bid price : 18.18
Bid-YTW : 7.33 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 20.92
Evaluated at bid price : 20.92
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 17.72
Evaluated at bid price : 17.72
Bid-YTW : 6.76 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 10.74
Evaluated at bid price : 10.74
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.65
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.88
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 25.62
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.67
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 2.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 15.55
Evaluated at bid price : 15.55
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 85,595 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 81,135 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 67,360 Scotia crossed 63,500 at 16.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 16.77
Evaluated at bid price : 16.77
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 61,780 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 18.26
Evaluated at bid price : 18.26
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 57,359 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.71
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 51,633 National Bank bought two blocks from anonymous, 10,000 and 13,500 shares, both at 27.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 4.85 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.