Archive for July, 2010

New Issue: FFH FixedReset 5.00%+256

Tuesday, July 20th, 2010

Fairfax Financial Holdings has announced:

that it will issue in Canada 8 million Preferred Shares, Series G at a price of $25.00 per share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $200 million, on a bought deal basis to a syndicate of Canadian underwriters.

Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series G will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 5.0% annually for the initial five year period ending September 30, 2015. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the then current 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.56%.

Holders of Preferred Shares, Series G will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Preferred Shares, Series H, subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2015, and on September 30 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series H will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the then current three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.56%.

Fairfax has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part at any time up to 9:00 am on the date that is two business days prior to the closing date, to purchase an additional 2 million Preferred Shares, Series G at the same offering price for additional gross proceeds of $50 million.

Fairfax intends to use the net proceeds of the offering to augment its cash position, to increase short term investments and marketable securities held at the holding company level, to retire outstanding debt and other corporate obligations from time to time, and for general corporate purposes. The offering is expected to close on or about July 28, 2010.

July 19, 2010

Monday, July 19th, 2010

BIS has released a Countercyclical capital buffer proposal:

The countercyclical capital buffer will work by giving each jurisdiction the ability to use their judgement to extend the size of the minimum buffer range established by the capital conservation buffer.

Under this proposal, buffer add-on decisions would be preannounced by 12 months to give banks time to meet the additional capital requirements before they take effect, while reductions in the buffer would take effect immediately to help to reduce the risk of the supply of credit being constrained by regulatory capital requirements.

A buffer range is established above the regulatory minimum Tier 1 capital requirement and capital distribution constraints will be imposed on the bank when capital levels fall within this range. The constraints imposed only relate to distributions, not the fundamental operations of the bank.

The distribution constraints imposed on banks when their capital levels fall into the range increase as the banks’ capital levels approach the minimum requirement. By design, the constraints imposed on banks with capital levels at the top of the range would be minimal. This reflects an expectation that banks’ capital levels will from time to time fall into this range. The Basel Committee does not wish to impose constraints for entering the range that would be so restrictive as to result in the range being viewed as establishing a new minimum capital requirement.

The table below illustrates how it is proposed that the capital conservation buffer operates using discrete bands. The numbers in the table are illustrative as the proposal still needs to be calibrated. Using the table as an example, the buffer range is divided into quartiles. If a bank suffers losses such that its capital level falls into the second quartile above the minimum requirement then the bank would be required to conserve 80% of its earnings in the subsequent financial year9 (ie payout no more than 20% in terms of dividends, share buybacks and discretionary bonus payments). If the bank wants to make payments in excess of the constraints imposed by this regime, it would have the option of raising capital in the private sector equal to the amount above the constraint which they wish to distribute. This would be discussed with the bank’s supervisor as part of the capital planning process.

Perhaps stung by IMF criticism of the pace of reforms, BIS has released a statement of progress highlighting their consultation paper on countercyclical buffers discussed above and inchoate proposals for contingent capital:

The Committee also reviewed proposals for the role of “gone concern” contingent capital in the regulatory capital framework and will issue shortly a proposal for consultation. It continues to assess proposals on contingent capital from a “going concern” perspective.

Themis Trading reports that internet gamers take their avocation more seriously than the average investment manager takes their fiduciary duty … and opines that this is a good thing:

Today we just got a call from a firm that sells specialized computing hardware for the online gaming industry. Apparently there are folks who play Call of Duty version XYZ, or whatever game, professionally for money, and these guys need faster speed. Anyways, this firm sells computer servers that are sitting in liquid, so that they are cooler, and can be faster. The gaming professionals buy these servers for this reason. This firm bragged to us that they just sold their server to a High Frequency Trading firm for the first time, and thought we might want one too.

Is this what are markets have come to?

Are the capital markets really about making sure that these guys can turn the markets into a giant arms race, where everyone has to pay up for liquid-submersible computers and co-location rents just so that they can get fair access to the same bids and offers?

Moody’s cut Ireland a notch to Aa2.

The EU Stwess Tests will be published on June 23.

There was good volume on the Canadian preferred share market today, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 11bp and FixedResets lost 3bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.81 % 2.89 % 23,625 20.29 1 0.2375 % 2,083.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2479 % 3,143.2
Floater 2.29 % 1.96 % 39,759 22.47 4 -0.2479 % 2,240.3
OpRet 4.88 % 1.64 % 103,036 0.28 11 -0.0778 % 2,339.4
SplitShare 6.29 % 6.16 % 77,073 3.42 2 0.1303 % 2,204.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0778 % 2,139.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.93 % 5.64 % 108,551 1.82 4 -0.0394 % 1,933.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.84 % 5.91 % 187,209 14.01 73 0.1090 % 1,849.6
FixedReset 5.31 % 3.54 % 327,793 3.46 47 -0.0253 % 2,221.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-19
Maturity Price : 24.29
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-19
Maturity Price : 24.35
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-19
Maturity Price : 24.25
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-19
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-19
Maturity Price : 19.05
Evaluated at bid price : 19.05
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.E FixedReset 134,850 RBC crossed three blocks, of 30,000 shares, 40,000 and 50,000, all at 27.64.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.59
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 63,210 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from Scotia at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.48
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 55,765 RBC crossed 50,000 at 27.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.88
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 52,900 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.84.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-19
Maturity Price : 24.46
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 41,979 RBC bought 12,300 from Nesbitt at 27.75, then crossed 24,300 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.76
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 31,721 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-19
Maturity Price : 21.55
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

HFT: A Boon for Value Investors?

Sunday, July 18th, 2010

Reginald Smith of the Bouchet-Franklin Institute (not a brand name institution, by any measure) has written a paper titled Is high-frequency trading inducing changes in market microstructure and dynamics?:

Using high-frequency time series of stock prices and share volumes sizes from January 2002-May 2009, this paper investigates whether the effects of the onset of high-frequency trading, most prominent since 2005, are apparent in the dynamics of the dollar traded volume. Indeed it is found in almost all of 14 heavily traded stocks, that there has been an increase in the Hurst exponent of dollar traded volume from Gaussian noise in the earlier years to more self-similar dynamics in later years. This shift is linked both temporally to the Reg NMS reforms allowing high-frequency trading to flourish as well as to the declining average size of trades with smaller trades showing markedly higher degrees of self-similarity.

The abstract immediately suggested the title of this post. If large stocks are correlated with each other (rather than, you know, with how their business is doing) then deviations from fair value will be more frequent, offering value traders more entry and exit points.

In addition, the HFT strategy of taking advantage of pricing signals from large orders has forced many orders off exchanges into proprietary trading networks called ‘dark pools’ which get their name from the fact they are private networks which only report the prices of transactions after the transaction has occurred and typically anonymously match large orders without price advertisements.

I can assure you that this is correct; I can assure you that the size of an order required to move the market is smaller than you might think; and I can assure you that there are many, many institutional PMs who will grin at you condescendingly when you tell them this. This comes from personal experience with S&P 500 stocks, not the preferred share backwater, by the way.

Given the relative burstiness of signals with H > 0.5 we can also determine that volatility in trading patterns is no longer due to just adverse events but is becoming an increasingly intrinsic part of trading activity. Like internet traffic Leland et. al. (1994), if HFT trades are self-similar with H > 0.5, more participants in the market generate more volatility, not more predictable behavior.

Traded value, and by extension trading volume, fluctuations are starting to show self-similarity at increasingly shorter timescales. Values which were once only present on the orders of several hours or days are now commonplace in the timescale of seconds or minutes. It is important that the trading algorithms of HFT traders, as well as those who seek to understand, improve, or regulate HFT realize that the overall structure of trading is influenced in a measurable manner by HFT and that Gaussian noise models of short term trading volume fluctuations likely are increasingly inapplicable.

July 16, 2010

Friday, July 16th, 2010

The penny just dropped on US Financial Reform:

Bank of America Corp. led financial stocks lower after saying U.S. curbs on debit-card fees may trigger a $10 billion charge, spurring speculation that rival banks have underestimated their own costs.

The slide began after Bank of America said rules in the financial industry overhaul, including the Durbin amendment’s curbs on debit-card fees, may prompt the charge and trim annual revenue by $2.3 billion, more than some of the most pessimistic estimates. JPMorgan Chase & Co., ranked second by assets in the U.S., dropped as much as 3.6 percent.

Moody’s Investors Service said in June that Bank of America, Wells Fargo and JPMorgan, the three biggest U.S. debit-card issuers, may face $1.38 billion in annual lost revenue from the proposed cap on “swipe” fees. DBRS Inc., the Toronto-based ratings firm had said the impact just for Bank of America could be $1.9 billion.

Bank of America’s debit-card revenue could shrink by $1.8 billion to $2.3 billion starting in the third quarter of next year because of restrictions on fees merchants can charge for each swipe of a debit card, Chief Executive Brian Moynihan said in a presentation today.

The bank also expects a goodwill charge of $7 billion to $10 billion in the third quarter tied to the value of the business after President Barack Obama signs the regulatory reform law approved by Congress this week, Chief Financial Officer Charles Noski said on a conference call.

Note that it looks like the Credit Rating Agencies got it wrong! It must be because they’re corrupt! They’re paid by the issuers, you know! Quick, make them a public utility, so they can be run as efficiently as the Toronto Transit Commission!

Speaking of the CRAs, DBRS has announced a GREAT LEAP FORWARD!!!

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs (IOSCO Code) requires that SF ratings be differentiated from corporate bond ratings, preferably through a different rating symbology.*

Currently, DBRS press releases specify the type of rating being published, such as whether it is an SF rating, a Financial Institutions rating or a Public Finance rating (the PR Notation). Effective August 16, 2010, the PR Notation on all DBRS press releases will no longer be used.

For its SF modifier, DBRS will use the symbol “(sf)” next to the rating category for ratings that meet the requested criteria in its public press releases and rating reports. The “(sf)” symbol will only indicate that the security is an SF instrument and will not change the meaning or definition of the rating in any other way nor will it change the risk of any particular SF instrument. DBRS’s expectation of the performance of each rated SF instrument is not adjusted in any way by the SF modifier.

Isn’t that convenient? Investors will no longer have to read the prospectus to discover deeply hidden facts like such-and-such is a structured investment, it will be right there in the rating! No need for any thought at all! Thank you, IOSCO!

Another strong day on high volume for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 24bp and FixedResets up 16bp, taking the median weighted average Yield-to-Worst of the latter class down to 3.57%. The all-time low yield for that index is 3.31% on March 26.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.81 % 2.89 % 23,676 20.29 1 0.0000 % 2,078.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0652 % 3,151.0
Floater 2.28 % 1.96 % 41,290 22.47 4 -0.0652 % 2,245.9
OpRet 4.88 % 1.59 % 101,758 0.29 11 -0.0247 % 2,341.3
SplitShare 6.30 % 6.17 % 77,477 3.43 2 0.0435 % 2,201.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0247 % 2,140.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.93 % 5.33 % 110,226 1.83 4 0.1777 % 1,934.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.85 % 5.92 % 184,665 14.00 73 0.2413 % 1,847.6
FixedReset 5.31 % 3.57 % 330,742 3.47 47 0.1550 % 2,221.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.17
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 19.32
Evaluated at bid price : 19.32
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.91
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 20.44
Evaluated at bid price : 20.44
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 24.28
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.62
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 23.87
Evaluated at bid price : 24.06
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 20.96
Evaluated at bid price : 20.96
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 20.72
Evaluated at bid price : 20.72
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet 199,920 Dropped from TXPR as of the opening Monday 19th, which means selling pressure from CPD, from other indexers & closet-indexers, and possibly speculators. We shall see how the three-month rebalancing period unfolds! Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 122,200, both at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 82,430 Added to TXPR. Nesbitt crossed three blocks of 25,000 each at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 24.73
Evaluated at bid price : 24.78
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 57,163 Added to TXPR. RBC bought 11,000 from National at 24.33.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 24.28
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 55,413 Added to TXPR. TD crossed 38,100 at 23.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 23.18
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 49,614 TD crossed 25,700 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 44,835 RBC crossed 26,500 at 19.93.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-16
Maturity Price : 19.95
Evaluated at bid price : 19.95
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

LSC.PR.C: Partial Redemption and Change of Terms

Friday, July 16th, 2010

Lifeco Split Corporation Inc. has announced:

that in relation to its previously announced reorganization, the Company has called 15,194 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on July 30, 2010, representing approximately 6.6035% of the outstanding Preferred Shares. The Company is redeeming the 15,194 Preferred Shares in order to increase the downside protection on the remaining Preferred Shares to approximately 38.8%, as at July 15, 2010. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on July 29, 2010 will have approximately 6.6035% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. Holders of the Preferred Shares being redeemed will still be entitled to the dividend payable on July 30, 2010. The redemption price of the Preferred Shares will be equal to the lesser of (i) Unit Value on July 26, 2010 (the “Valuation Date”) and (ii) $51.19. As at the close of business yesterday, Unit Value was $76.20. The Preferred Shares will commence trading on a post redemption basis commencing July 27, 2010.

Immediately following the redemption of the Preferred Shares, the Company will subdivide the remaining Preferred Shares on a 1.39-for-1 basis in order to maintain the ratio of two Capital Shares for each Preferred Share. Accordingly, the redemption price of the Preferred Shares will be adjusted so that after the subdivision, the Preferred Shares will be redeemable for a cash amount equal to the lesser of (i) Unit Value and (ii) $36.84. The quarterly fixed distribution of the Preferred Shares will be also be adjusted, effective July 30, 2010, so that after the subdivision, holders of Preferred Shares will be entitled to quarterly fixed distributions equal to $0.3684. On an annualized basis, the fixed distribution will continue to represent a yield of 4.00% on the redemption price of $36.84. The subdivision will be effected as at the close of business on August 5, 2010 and the Preferred Shares will commence trading on a post subdivision basis commencing August 3, 2010.

It is not clear to me whether these 15,194 shares are including or in addition to the redemption of 10,107 shares due to unmatched capital unit retractions announced in June.

The downside protection on the remaining Preferred Shares to approximately 38.8% equates to Asset Coverage of 1.6+:1.

LSC.PR.C is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

WFS.PR.A: Warrants for Capital Unitholders

Thursday, July 15th, 2010

World Financial Split Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a preliminary short form prospectus relating to an offering of Warrants to holders of its Class A Shares. Each Class A shareholder of record on the record date will receive one Warrant for each Class A Share held.

Each Warrant will entitle its holder to acquire one Class A Share and one Preferred Share upon payment of the subscription price. The record date and the subscription price will be determined at the time the Fund files its final prospectus for the offering. The Fund has applied to list the Warrants and the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares issuable upon the exercise thereof on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

The exercise of Warrants by holders will provide the Fund with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities and is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares and to reduce the management expense ratio of the Fund.

The Fund invests in a portfolio that includes common equity securities selected from the ten largest financial services companies by market capitalization in each of Canada, the United States and the rest of the world (the “Portfolio Universe”). In addition, up to 20% of the NAV of the Fund may be invested in common equity securities of financial services companies that are not in the Portfolio Universe but meet certain market capitalization and credit rating thresholds. To generate additional returns above the distributions earned on its securities, the Fund may, from time to time, write covered call options in respect of some or all of the securities in its portfolio. The Fund may also, from time to time, write cash-covered put options in respect of securities in which the Fund is permitted to invest. The Fund’s investment portfolio is managed by its investment manager, Mulvihill Capital Management Inc.

WFS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it’s last warrant offering was 10% subscribed. WFS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

July 15, 2010

Thursday, July 15th, 2010

Bernanke announced that his boss is doing a great job. The American Bankers’ Association isn’t so sure:

The American Bankers Association is very disappointed with the regulatory reform bill that is now headed for enactment. While its core provisions provide needed reform, it is overloaded with new rules and restrictions on traditional banks that did not cause the financial crisis. The result will be over 5,000 pages of new regulations on traditional banks and years of uncertainty as to what the massive new rules will mean.

To my great disappointment, Goldman knuckled under to regulatory extortion:

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that Goldman, Sachs & Co. will pay $550 million and reform its business practices to settle SEC charges that Goldman misled investors in a subprime mortgage product just as the U.S. housing market was starting to collapse.

However, the SEC agrees that Goldman committed no actual wrongdoing:

Goldman agreed to settle the SEC’s charges without admitting or denying the allegations by consenting to the entry of a final judgment that provides for a permanent injunction from violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933.

The SEC trumpets the Goldman statement:

Goldman acknowledges that the marketing materials for the ABACUS 2007-ACI transaction contained incomplete information. In particular, it was a mistake for the Goldman marketing materials to state that the reference portfolio was “selected by” ACA Management LLC without disclosing the role of Paulson & Co. Inc. in the portfolio selection process and that Paulson’s economic interests were adverse to CDO investors. Goldman regrets that the marketing materials did not contain that disclosure.

I can see it’s time to take legal advice; perhaps my fund documents should include a disclosure to the effect that “Everything the fund owns was sold to it by somebody else.”. Perhaps that will help keep me out of trouble.

The rally in the Canadian preferred share market continued on heavy volume today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 24bp and FixedResets up 18bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.81 % 2.89 % 23,300 20.30 1 0.0000 % 2,078.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0652 % 3,153.0
Floater 2.28 % 1.96 % 42,883 22.47 4 0.0652 % 2,247.3
OpRet 4.88 % 1.71 % 94,234 0.29 11 -0.0071 % 2,341.8
SplitShare 6.30 % 6.19 % 80,101 3.43 2 -0.1085 % 2,200.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0071 % 2,141.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.94 % 5.62 % 111,426 1.83 4 0.3070 % 1,930.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.86 % 5.91 % 184,415 14.03 73 0.2425 % 1,843.2
FixedReset 5.32 % 3.63 % 325,281 3.47 47 0.1790 % 2,218.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.86
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 1.96 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-15
Maturity Price : 23.40
Evaluated at bid price : 23.59
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.25
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-15
Maturity Price : 18.56
Evaluated at bid price : 18.56
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-15
Maturity Price : 18.73
Evaluated at bid price : 18.73
Bid-YTW : 6.41 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.96 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-15
Maturity Price : 15.64
Evaluated at bid price : 15.64
Bid-YTW : 2.81 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 143,200 RBC crossed two blocks of 50,000 each at 21.12.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.04
Evaluated at bid price : 21.04
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 132,015 HSBC sold 11,300 to anonymous at 26.00. Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 50,000 each at 26.05. Nesbitt sold 18,600 to TD at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 79,663 Scotia crossed 33,300 at 20.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-15
Maturity Price : 19.71
Evaluated at bid price : 19.71
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 61,872 RBC crossed 50,000 at 20.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.12
Evaluated at bid price : 20.12
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 52,704 TD crossed 44,000 at 27.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 51,441 TD sold 10,000 to RBC at 27.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.75
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
There were 53 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MAPF Now Available through Odlum Brown

Thursday, July 15th, 2010

I am pleased to announce that Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund (MAPF) is now available for purchase through Odlum Brown Limited, an independent, full-service investment firm providing disciplined investment advice and objective research with a singular focus on clients.

MAPF a “unit trust” focussed on the Canadian preferred share market, managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance figures and audited financials are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

Note that MAPF may not be held in RRSPs or other registered accounts.

CSA Updates Status of Market Microstructure Inquiry

Thursday, July 15th, 2010

The Canadian Securities Administrators have released CSA/IIROC Joint Staff Notice 23-308 – Update on Forum to Discuss CSA/IIROC Joint Consultation Paper 23-404 “Dark Pools, Dark Orders and Other Developments in Market Structure in Canada” and Next Steps. Film of the semi-open meeting is available from IIROC.

Use of SORs by Marketplaces

This issue revolves around the concept of a marketplace-owned smart order router using information about hidden orders on that marketplace when making routing decisions. Although some felt that this practice was not a concern as this is a routing decision only, others thought that all visible orders at a given price should have priority over all hidden orders.

CSA staff are assessing whether the use of marketplace-owned SORs which take into account hidden liquidity available on their own book gives that marketplace an unfair advantage over other marketplaces and SORs. CSA staff are also considering the impact that this practice has on investors and will be examining whether marketplaces that provide information on hidden liquidity to their proprietary SORs should be required to provide the same information to other third-party SORs in order to meet the fair access provisions of NI 21-101.8

I think it’s just disgusting that marketplaces use proprietary information to improve their product and compete. If they want business, they should take their old school buddies out to lunch, just like everybody else.

Market-Pegged Orders

Some forum participants raised concerns over market-pegged orders, specifically whether market-pegged orders have a negative impact on price discovery because they are simply free-riding the quotes from other marketplaces or whether the unrestricted use of such orders created a disincentive to display liquidity. Others were of the view that many order types are variations of pegs, and that the concept was simply centralizing a process which could be, and is currently, done by dealer algorithms or manually, and thus would result in a reduction of message traffic between market participants. This was also consistent with the majority of the responses to the Consultation Paper, which did not raise concerns with pegged orders.We will continue to review proposed order types from marketplaces.

Perhaps not the most ringing endorsement of Pegged Orders, which I strongly endorse (as an option, not as a panacea), but a positive development nevertheless.

High Frequency Trading

It was suggested at the forum that regulators also review high frequency trading, particularly as its growth may have impacted time priority benefits and the ability of some market participants to achieve trade execution. We continue to monitor developments in this area, and particularly recent initiatives in the U.S. aimed at reviewing short-term trading strategies and their impact on the market. A review of issues associated with high frequency trading was also included in the scope of the project to examine electronic trading discussed above.

IIROC staff continue to monitor changes in patterns of trading on Canadian marketplaces, and the impact of “high frequency trading” is included in that monitoring. Changes in technology and the development of competitive multiple marketplaces have significantly increased message traffic and order to trade ratios. Future rates of growth in high frequency trading will be dependent upon decisions which may be made with respect to such issues as sub-penny pricing.

I continue to be dismayed at the fact that High Frequency Trading is considered an actual issue; my reasoning is:

  • A High Frequency Trader requires a 12% return on equity from trading to make it worth their while
  • A long-term investor requres a 0% return on equity from trading to make it worth their while. They make money for their clients from overall market moves, their uncanny ability to assess big picture issues and the impressive depth of their analysis (but mainly overall market moves).
  • Therefore, the established long-term players have a 12% cost of capital advantage over HFT, but cannot compete despite this.
  • Therefore, most institutional money managers are lazy and stupid. Those who complain are lazy and stupid blowhards

I’ve examined every link in this chain of reasoning and have been unable to find a flaw; but perhaps an Assiduous Reader will help me out a bit.

Opinion: Predatory Trading

Thursday, July 15th, 2010

Pegged Orders have the potential to allow retail investors to compete more effectively with institutions … if their brokerages let them!

Look for the research link!