Archive for February, 2011

February 14, 2011

Monday, February 14th, 2011

The Basel Committee has released its Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework – updated as of 31 December 2010, complete with a PDF that has now crashed my Internet Explorer twice. The press release states:

Since the financial crisis began in mid-2007, an important source of losses and of the build up of leverage occurred in the trading book. A main contributing factor was that the current capital framework for market risk, based on the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market risks, does not capture some key risks. In response, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) supplements the current value-at-risk based trading book framework with an incremental risk capital charge, which includes default risk as well as migration risk, for unsecuritised credit products. For securitised products, the capital charges of the banking book will apply with a limited exception for certain so-called correlation trading activities, where banks may be allowed by their supervisor to calculate a comprehensive risk capital charge subject to strict qualitative minimum requirements as well as stress testing requirements. These measures will reduce the incentive for regulatory arbitrage between the banking and trading books.

An additional response to the crisis is the introduction of a stressed value-at-risk requirement. Losses in most banks’ trading books during the financial crisis have been significantly higher than the minimum capital requirements under the former Pillar 1 market risk rules. The Committee therefore requires banks to calculate a stressed value-at-risk taking into account a one-year observation period relating to significant losses, which must be calculated in addition to the value-at-risk based on the most recent one-year observation period. The additional stressed value-at-risk requirement will also help reduce the procyclicality of the minimum capital requirements for market risk.

As I have often stated here, I’m not completely certain that this is a step forward. Trading is functionally different from holding, and a trader may well wish to hold a position in El Crapola Corporation paper for a while because he knows he’s got a buyer. Problems can arise – and did arise during the crisis – when the paper that couldn’t be sold was kept on the trading book, instead of migrating to the banking book as it aged.

I haven’t seen any discussion of this point anywhere, so this is either a very profound point, or a very naive one. Take your pick.

Sell Side analysts are a hoot:

So, when analysts are raising their recommendations on a stock, that should be telling people to buy more of it (or, sell less of it); when they are cutting their recommendations, that’s telling people to sell more (or, buy less). In both cases, especially when you’re talking about well-known analysts at major firms, we would expect this to filter down to the stocks themselves – downgrades serve to drive stock prices lower, upgrades to push them higher. Right?

As it turns out, not so much. In fact, it would appear that as long as they spell your company’s name right,upgrades and downgrades are both good news for your stock.

Laszlo Birinyi and Amanda Crumb, of independent stock-market research firm Birinyi Associates Inc., recently analyzed more than 2,700 upgrades and downgrades issued by 19 Wall Street firms since the market bottomed in March, 2009. They found that – as expected – upgraded stocks rose an average of 2.03 per cent on the day of their upgrade, while downgraded stocks averaged a 2.02-per-cent drop on the day of the news.

But once they looked even a mere week further out, this expected trend no longer held. Yes, the upgraded stocks continued to move higher, both on an absolute basis and relative to the S&P 500 benchmark, and these gains got stronger as time passed. What wasn’t expected, though, was that the same was also true for the downgrades.

Downgraded stocks not only typically rose in the weeks to months following the downgrades, but after an initial underperformance relative to the S&P 500 in the first week, they significantly outperformed the benchmark at one month and three months out. What’s more, this surprising upward trend among downgrades didn’t appear to have been skewed by some large incorrect calls at a couple of firms; the gains were seen across virtually all 19 investing firms.

Remember 2005? Remember how it was so friggin’ obvious that subprime was a nascent disaster? Remember giving learned lectures about how big the real estate bubble was? Remember how it was all the fault of evil bonus-loving Wall Street vampires? I don’t. The Boston Fed has a similarly faulty memory. And, it would seem, John Paulso, most famous for making a fortune betting against it, and second-most famous for being disrespected in the Boston Fed paper, can’t remember that either:

As one of the few winners from the financial crisis, John A. Paulson looks pretty smart. His hedge fund firm, Paulson and Company, netted $15 billion betting against the subprime mortgage market — and he continues to profit from his wager on gold.

But in audio recordings recently released by Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Mr. Paulson reveals just how much flack he got from professionals and peers, who in the early days of the turmoil derided his big bet as the misguided move of a “novice.”

“Most of them, when we did express our viewpoints, thought we were inexperienced novices in the mortgage market,” Mr. Paulson said in an interview with the commission in 2010. “We were very, very much in the minority. If I said a thousand-to-one, we were the one. Even friends of ours thought we were so wrong, they felt sorry for us.”

The Evil, bonus-seeking Fabulous Fab, as one may recall, was the one who (as discussed on April 21, 2010) conspired with the smart cookies at ACA and IKB to fleece the poor neophyte. Oh, no, wait, sorry, it was the other way ’round.

It was another relatively quiet, slowly rising day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 5bp, FixedResets gaining 1bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 9bp, all on quiet, “normal” volume with very little price volatility.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1549 % 2,397.6
FixedFloater 4.78 % 3.49 % 18,882 19.08 1 0.1320 % 3,562.5
Floater 2.50 % 2.28 % 46,352 21.56 4 0.1549 % 2,588.8
OpRet 4.81 % 3.57 % 59,074 2.23 8 0.0965 % 2,392.3
SplitShare 5.31 % 1.24 % 287,356 0.82 4 0.0451 % 2,461.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0965 % 2,187.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.50 % 116,869 1.23 9 0.0110 % 2,035.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.54 % 5.64 % 132,206 14.40 15 0.0509 % 2,110.7
FixedReset 5.24 % 3.74 % 170,640 3.04 54 0.0077 % 2,263.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.20 % 5.23 % 409,744 8.27 53 0.0933 % 2,082.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.B FixedReset -2.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 47,748 Nesbitt crossed 26,500 at 24.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.98
Bid-YTW : 5.25 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 34,000 Nesbitt crossed 16,700 at 17.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 32,850 Nesbitt crossed 29,100 at 22.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 31,449 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 31,140 RBC crossed 25,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 29,570 Nesbitt crossed 19,400 at 23.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-14
Maturity Price : 22.79
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 27.30 – 27.75
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2933

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.75 – 23.10
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2469

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-14
Maturity Price : 22.59
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %

BMO.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.51 – 26.74
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1551

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.58 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.3544

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.58
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %

HSB.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 27.75 – 27.95
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1445

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.75
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %

BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.20 – 25.35
Spot Rate : 0.1500
Average : 0.0967

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.85 %

Credit Suisse Contingent Capital

Monday, February 14th, 2011

Credit Suisse is issuing contingent capital:

The bank agreed to sell $3.5 billion of contingent convertibles with a coupon of 9.5 percent, and 2.5 billion francs with a coupon of 9 percent, it said. The sale will happen no earlier than October 2013, which is the first call date on $3.5 billion of 11 percent and 2.5 billion francs of 10 percent Tier 1 capital notes the bank sold in 2008.

The notes will convert into shares if the bank’s Basel III common equity Tier 1 ratio falls below 7 percent. The conversion price will be the higher of the floor price of $20 or 20 francs per share or the daily weighted average sale price of ordinary shares over the trading period preceding the notice of conversion, the bank said.

The transaction is subject to the implementation of Swiss regulations and the approval of shareholders, the bank said. The Swiss committee proposed that the country’s two biggest banks should hold common equity equal to at least 10 percent of their assets, weighted according to risks. In addition, the companies may hold up to 3 percent in so-called high-trigger CoCos that would convert into shares if the bank’s common equity ratio falls below 7 percent, plus 6 percent in CoCos that would convert at a 5 percent trigger.

Credit Suisse said the 6 billion-franc sale would satisfy about 50 percent of the high-trigger requirement. The bank said it would like to see the market for contingent convertible bonds expand to a wider group of buyers and is pursuing an additional offering of such notes to potential investors outside the U.S. and certain other countries.

On the positive side, conversion occurs well before the the point of non-viability. On the negative – the trigger is based on Capital Ratios, which I have strongly criticized in the past and continue to criticize.

The Financial Times comments:

Switzerland’s other big bank, UBS, takes a diametrically opposed view to Credit Suisse, on cocos, arguing that they will be excessively expensive because no one knows how to price them properly. UBS prefers the “haircut bond” as an instrument.

But investors believe that other UK banks, such as HSBC, could be drawn to cocos. “That would really seal cocos’ reputation,” said one London-based investor. “But in the meantime, we expect the Nordics, particularly Sweden, to be big issuers. We also think this will take off in the US.” In spite of a lack of enthusiasm from US regulators, the likes of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are privately intrigued by cocos.

Senior bankers at BNP and Société Générale have similarly signalled a willingness to consider coco issuance to finance buffers. Analysts at Barclays Capital said the market for European cocos alone could be close to €700bn ($945bn) by 2018.

Many traditional fixed-income investors are barred from owning instruments such as cocos that can convert into equity.

Update, 2011-2-23: The deal was a huge success:

Investors rushed to take up the benchmark issue by Credit Suisse of a new financial instrument hailed by regulators as a key tool for rebuilding the capital strength of banks, placing orders of $22bn – 11 times the $2bn on offer.

The deluge of orders represented a big vote of confidence in the nascent market for contingent capital bonds, dubbed cocos.

Asset managers took about two-thirds of Credit Suisse’s cocos, while private banks took a third on behalf of their clients. A total of 550 different investors – an unusually large number – put in orders for the bonds. The strong demand from asset managers was particularly important since they will form the backbone of any sustainable market for the products.

Credit Suisse’s deal was helped by the fact the bank anchored its coco deal by simultaneously announcing a agreement to swap $6.2bn of its existing hybrid debt for cocos – covering in one go about half the total cocos the bank needs to issue.

February Edition of PrefLetter Released!

Monday, February 14th, 2011

The February, 2011, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The February edition discusses the recent OSFI decisions on Bank Tier 1 Capital and their effect on the Canadian preferred share market.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the February, 2011, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the March, 2011, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close March 11 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on March 14.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

February PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

Friday, February 11th, 2011

The markets have closed and the February edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The February edition will contain an appendix discussing the OSFI Advisory on extant Bank Tier 1 Capital and the analytical implications going forward.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is now available to all residents of Canada.

The February issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the February issue.

MAPF Performance: January 2011

Friday, February 11th, 2011

This is grossly abbreviated. My apologies, but since the OSFI announcement on extant Tier 1 Capital, time has been at a premium.

The fund got the year off to a good start by outperforming its benchmark significantly, assisted by its relatively heavy weight in PerpetualDiscounts, which outperformed.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close January 31 was $11.1030.

Returns to January 31, 2011
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +3.13% +1.62% +0.87%
Three Months +4.21% +2.24% +1.10%
One Year +17.77% +11.21% +8.11%
Two Years (annualized) +34.38% +18.01% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +23.72% +6.26% +3.96%
Four Years (annualized) +17.48% +3.24%  
Five Years (annualized) +15.00% +3.44%  
Six Years (annualized) +13.40% +3.45%  
Seven Years (annualized) +13.15% +3.60%  
Eight Years (annualized) +14.82% +4.23%  
Nine Years (annualized) +13.41% +4.07%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.24%, +1.73% and +9.44%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +5.37%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.15%, -0.10% & +5.83% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.68%, +0.80% & +6.01%, respectively
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF are not yet available (inception date 2010-11-23)

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.2857 0.3628
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.2857 0.3885
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.2857 0.4112
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.2857 0.4672
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.2857 $0.4112
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.2857 $0.4672
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.2857 $0.5737
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.2857 $0.6046
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.2857 $0.6029
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.2857 $0.5802
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0819 $0.5714
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0819 $0.5759
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0819 $0.5850
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.0819 $0.5832
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0000 $0.5822
January, 2011 11.1030 5.21% 0.996 5.231% 1.0000 $0.5807
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.

Significant positions were held in Fixed-Reset issues on December 31; all of which (with the exception of YLO.PR.C) currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in a SplitShare (BNA.PR.C) which also has its yield calculated with the expectation of a maturity.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.46% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: January 2011 analysis (which is in excess of the 5.28% index yield on January 31). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $11.1030 * 0.0546 = $0.6062, a slight increase from the $0.6029 reported last month.

Note that there will be a drag on the calculation in up-markets due to presence of shorter-term issues (or, at least, presumed shorter term issues!); the question is whether the positive effect of these issues in down markets will outweight their negative effect in up-markets – all I can say is … it has in the past!

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: January 2011

Friday, February 11th, 2011

This is grossly abbreviated. My apologies, but since the OSFI announcement on extant Tier 1 Capital, time has been at a premium.

Turnover picked up in January, to about 54%

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2011-1-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 2.0% (-0.1) 6.07% 6.53
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 25.5% (+16.8) 5.52% 5.61
PerpetualDiscount 48.3% (-24.0) 5.46% 14.70
Fixed-Reset 19.8% (+7.2) 3.67% 3.34
Scraps (FixedReset) 4.8% (+1.2) 6.63% 13.00
Cash -0.4% (-1.1) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.21% 9.94
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2011-1-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 58.4% (+3.2)
Pfd-2(high) 18.0% (-3.0)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 19.3% (-0.3)
Pfd-3(high) 3.3% (-0.3)
Pfd-3 1.5% (+1.5)
Cash -0.4% (-1.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.
A position held in ELF preferreds has been assigned to Pfd-2(low)

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2011-1-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.0% (0)
$50,000 – $100,000 11.1% (-0.4)
$100,000 – $200,000 13.1% (-5.7)
$200,000 – $300,000 46.4% (+14.8)
>$300,000 29.8% (-7.6)
Cash -0.4% (-1.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2010, and published in the September, 2010, PrefLetter. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to Straight Perpetuals
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is slightly more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

HIMIPref™ Index Performance: January 2011

Friday, February 11th, 2011

This is grossly abbreviated. My apologies, but since the OSFI announcement on extant Tier 1 Capital, time has been at a premium.

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for January, 2011, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
January 2011
Three Months
to
January 31, 2011
Ratchet +4.03% *** +9.80% ***
FixFloat +3.76% ** +9.24% **
Floater +4.03% +9.80%
OpRet -0.35% +0.62%
SplitShare +0.78% +2.91%
Interest -0.35%**** +0.62%****
PerpetualPremium +0.81% +0.99%
PerpetualDiscount +2.96% +3.21%
FixedReset -0.11% -0.32%
** The last member of the FixedFloater index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index. The index was repopulated at the October, 2010, rebalancing
*** The last member of the RatchetRate index was transferred to Scraps at the July, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
**** The last member of the InterestBearing index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2009, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the OperatingRetractible index
Passive Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +0.87% +1.09%
DPS.UN +1.21% +2.24%
Index
BMO-CM 50 +1.62% +2.24%
TXPR Total Return +0.87% +1.17%

The pre-tax interest equivalent spread of PerpetualDiscounts over Long Corporates (which I also refer to as the Seniority Spread) ended the month at 190bp, a significant decline from the 225bp reported at year-end. The decline may be attribute with a fair level of confidence to speculation (ultimately proved correct) that OSFI would not grandfather extant Tier 1 Capital.

Claymore has published NAV and distribution data (problems with the page in IE8 can be kludged by using compatibility view) for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to January 31, 2011
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
October 29, 2010 17.24      
November 25 17.25 0.069 +0.46% +0.23%
November 30 17.21   -0.23%
December 24 17.09 0.069 -0.30% -0.01%
December 31, 2010 17.14   +0.29%
January 26, 2011 17.20 0.069 +0.75% +0.87%
January 31, 2011 17.22   +0.12%
Quarterly Return +1.20%

Claymore currently holds $623,497,812 (advisor & common combined) in CPD assets, up about $27-million (4.50%) from the $596,621,272 reported at December month-end.

The DPS.UN NAV for February 2 has been published so we may calculate the approximate January returns.

DPS.UN NAV Return, January-ish 2011
Date NAV Distribution Return for sub-period Return for period
December 29 21.01    
February 2 21.352     +1.63%
Estimated December Ending Stub -0.29% *****
Estimated February Beginning Stub -0.12% *
Estimated January Return +1.21% ******
*CPD had a NAVPU of 17.22 on January 31 and 17.24 on February 2, therefore the return for the period was +0.12%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
*****CPD had a NAVPU of 17.09 on December 29 and 17.14 on December 31, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.29%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
**** The estimated January return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of three period returns, +1.63%, -0.29%, -0.12%, to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +1.21%

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for November and December:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-December-ish, 2010
November-ish +0.88%
December-ish +0.14%
January-ish +1.21%
Three-months-ish +2.24%

Sentry Select is now publishing performance data for DPS.UN, but this appears to be price-based, rather than NAV-based. I will continue to report NAV-based figures.

February 11, 2011

Friday, February 11th, 2011

There is one problem with directing tax revenue to debt reduction: it means you can’t spend it. EU plans are running into roadblocks:

Greece joined Italy in objecting to annual numerical debt-reduction targets in a fresh challenge to the German-led drive for tougher economic safeguards to underpin the euro.

Greece, the first deficit-riddled euro country to fall back on financial aid, says the proposed rule would force it to make impossibly large cuts once its support package runs out in 2013, according to a draft of European Union legislation.

“All member states except two already accepted the proposal,” said an EU briefing note obtained by Bloomberg News before next week’s debate among finance ministers. “Italy and Greece have a reserve on the numerical benchmark.”

Greece or Italy alone could veto the rule, undercutting the tougher enforcement demanded by Germany as a condition for beefing up the 750 billion-euro ($1 trillion) rescue fund for distressed states.

Assiduous Readers will remember it was France and Germany who scuttled the 3% deficit rule when it was no longer convenient to them.

The Fannie & Freddie problem is lurching towards the limelight:

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner presented Congress with a set of options for weaning the $11 trillion mortgage market from its dependence on the government, while calling for changes to be phased in “responsibly and carefully” to avoid economic disruptions.

The options suggest differing degrees of government involvement in the system. The most dramatic would involve a “privatized” system of housing finance, with a government role to help “narrowly targeted” low-income and veteran buyers.

A middle ground would replace Fannie and Freddie with a system that helps low-income and veteran buyers in normal times and also provides an expanded guarantee that the government could ramp up in a crisis. The paper suggests using high-priced guarantee fees or restricted amounts of public insurance to achieve this goal.

A third option has the biggest government role and would hew closest to the current system. It would impose more regulation and give the government a role in “catastrophic reinsurance behind significant private capital,” so as to provide a backstop in times of crisis.

We have a wee bit of xenophobia happening:

Ontario Finance Minister Dwight Duncan has turned up the heat in the political debate surrounding the proposed transatlantic stock-exchange transaction, saying he does not want a “strategic asset” owned by the Middle East.

“We do business with the Middle East,” Mr. Duncan told reporters at Queen’s Park on Friday. “I am just not sure I want them owning our stock exchange.”

Then buy it yourself – jerk. He doesn’t even have the “finite natural resource” excuse. Seems to me that if a foreign-owned TMX stops doing its job properly, then there are a few Alternative Trading Systems that would be pleased to pick up the slack. Or somebody will write the code to start up a new one. But I guess Duncan thinks Canadians are too stupid to do that.

It was a quiet day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 1bp, FixedResets down 6bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 5bp. Volatility was small and volume was muted.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0477 % 2,393.9
FixedFloater 4.78 % 3.50 % 19,654 19.08 1 0.0440 % 3,557.8
Floater 2.50 % 2.28 % 46,655 21.56 4 0.0477 % 2,584.8
OpRet 4.82 % 3.64 % 61,182 2.23 8 0.0966 % 2,390.0
SplitShare 5.31 % 1.11 % 299,217 0.83 4 -0.2748 % 2,460.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0966 % 2,185.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.39 % 118,092 1.24 9 0.0171 % 2,035.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.55 % 5.59 % 132,911 14.40 15 0.0113 % 2,109.6
FixedReset 5.24 % 3.69 % 171,992 3.05 54 -0.0561 % 2,263.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.21 % 5.21 % 410,268 8.28 53 0.0537 % 2,080.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 47,760 TD crossed 29,900 at 23.76.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 46,611 Desjardins crossed 38,000 at 27.07 … possibly related to TD.PR.S, below?
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 40,415 Desjardins crossed 38,000 at 25.85 … possibly related to TD.PR.E, above?
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 31,915 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 28,898 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.38
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 24,490 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-11
Maturity Price : 23.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.23 – 23.65
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2844

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-11
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 23.23
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.71 – 27.24
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.4132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.71
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %

RY.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 26.95 – 27.30
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2366

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.30 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3418

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.60 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2935

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.30 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1971

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %

LBS.PR.A Finalizes Warrant Offering

Friday, February 11th, 2011

Brompton Group’s Life & Banc Split Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a final prospectus for an offering of warrants to Class A shareholders of the Company. Each Class A shareholder of record on February 22, 2011 will receive one half of one warrant for each Class A share held.

One warrant will entitle the holder to purchase a Unit (consisting of one Class A share and one Preferred share of the Company) upon payment of the subscription price of $18.87, which is the sum of:
a) the most recently calculated NAV per Unit prior to the date of filing the preliminary prospectus; and
b) the estimated per Unit fees and expenses of the offering.

Warrants may be exercised on or before the expiry date of March 24, 2011. The Company has applied to list the warrants on the TSX under the ticker symbol LBS.WT. Warrants will be distributed to client accounts on a best-efforts basis after the February 22, 2011 record date. There is no additional subscription privilege under this offering. A holder of warrants may only subscribe for Units by exercising their warrants by the expiry date. The closing prices on February 9, 2011 for both the Class A shares ($9.96) and Preferred shares ($10.40) amounted to $20.36, which was above the subscription price.

The filing of the preliminary prospectus has been previously reported. LBS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

February 10, 2011

Thursday, February 10th, 2011

There’s always a new wrinkle:

ETFs have emerged as a possible mechanism for maximizing gains in one stock while potentially masking trading patterns, people familiar with the matter say.

In one scenario, a trader could learn information about a company, buy an ETF that includes the company’s stock, and short sell the other stocks in the ETF.

The practice, known as ETF-stripping, would allow the trader to benefit from movements in the company’s share price without directly buying or selling that stock.

It was a good day in the Canadian preferred share market as PerpetualDiscounts gained 4bp, FixedResets were up 2bp and DeemedRetractibles leapt ahead by 21bp. Not much volatility, with ony four entries on the Performance Highlights table. Volume remained well above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2150 % 2,392.8
FixedFloater 4.79 % 3.50 % 20,458 19.08 1 0.0440 % 3,556.3
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 46,301 21.59 4 0.2150 % 2,583.6
OpRet 4.82 % 3.74 % 63,616 2.24 8 0.0097 % 2,387.7
SplitShare 5.30 % 1.23 % 303,532 0.83 4 0.2856 % 2,467.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0097 % 2,183.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.73 % 5.44 % 119,319 0.50 9 0.0837 % 2,035.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.55 % 5.59 % 130,254 14.40 15 0.0396 % 2,109.4
FixedReset 5.24 % 3.68 % 173,747 3.05 54 0.0189 % 2,264.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.21 % 5.25 % 414,850 8.28 53 0.2082 % 2,078.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.57
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.44
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 109,808 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 24.25; TD crossed blocks of 39,000 and 15,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 87,730 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 23.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.73
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 78,297 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 23.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 73,526 Nesbitt crossed 70,000 at 23.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-10
Maturity Price : 22.71
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 2.27 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 67,821 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.07.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 61,419 RBC crossed 46,700 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.81 – 27.25
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2851

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 25.46 – 25.94
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3290

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %

BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 24.44 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.4288

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.44
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %

BAM.PR.H OpRet Quote: 25.40 – 25.87
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3635

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.45 – 25.72
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1840

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.50 – 25.84
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2550

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-10
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %