February 11, 2011

There is one problem with directing tax revenue to debt reduction: it means you can’t spend it. EU plans are running into roadblocks:

Greece joined Italy in objecting to annual numerical debt-reduction targets in a fresh challenge to the German-led drive for tougher economic safeguards to underpin the euro.

Greece, the first deficit-riddled euro country to fall back on financial aid, says the proposed rule would force it to make impossibly large cuts once its support package runs out in 2013, according to a draft of European Union legislation.

“All member states except two already accepted the proposal,” said an EU briefing note obtained by Bloomberg News before next week’s debate among finance ministers. “Italy and Greece have a reserve on the numerical benchmark.”

Greece or Italy alone could veto the rule, undercutting the tougher enforcement demanded by Germany as a condition for beefing up the 750 billion-euro ($1 trillion) rescue fund for distressed states.

Assiduous Readers will remember it was France and Germany who scuttled the 3% deficit rule when it was no longer convenient to them.

The Fannie & Freddie problem is lurching towards the limelight:

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner presented Congress with a set of options for weaning the $11 trillion mortgage market from its dependence on the government, while calling for changes to be phased in “responsibly and carefully” to avoid economic disruptions.

The options suggest differing degrees of government involvement in the system. The most dramatic would involve a “privatized” system of housing finance, with a government role to help “narrowly targeted” low-income and veteran buyers.

A middle ground would replace Fannie and Freddie with a system that helps low-income and veteran buyers in normal times and also provides an expanded guarantee that the government could ramp up in a crisis. The paper suggests using high-priced guarantee fees or restricted amounts of public insurance to achieve this goal.

A third option has the biggest government role and would hew closest to the current system. It would impose more regulation and give the government a role in “catastrophic reinsurance behind significant private capital,” so as to provide a backstop in times of crisis.

We have a wee bit of xenophobia happening:

Ontario Finance Minister Dwight Duncan has turned up the heat in the political debate surrounding the proposed transatlantic stock-exchange transaction, saying he does not want a “strategic asset” owned by the Middle East.

“We do business with the Middle East,” Mr. Duncan told reporters at Queen’s Park on Friday. “I am just not sure I want them owning our stock exchange.”

Then buy it yourself – jerk. He doesn’t even have the “finite natural resource” excuse. Seems to me that if a foreign-owned TMX stops doing its job properly, then there are a few Alternative Trading Systems that would be pleased to pick up the slack. Or somebody will write the code to start up a new one. But I guess Duncan thinks Canadians are too stupid to do that.

It was a quiet day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 1bp, FixedResets down 6bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 5bp. Volatility was small and volume was muted.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0477 % 2,393.9
FixedFloater 4.78 % 3.50 % 19,654 19.08 1 0.0440 % 3,557.8
Floater 2.50 % 2.28 % 46,655 21.56 4 0.0477 % 2,584.8
OpRet 4.82 % 3.64 % 61,182 2.23 8 0.0966 % 2,390.0
SplitShare 5.31 % 1.11 % 299,217 0.83 4 -0.2748 % 2,460.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0966 % 2,185.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.39 % 118,092 1.24 9 0.0171 % 2,035.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.55 % 5.59 % 132,911 14.40 15 0.0113 % 2,109.6
FixedReset 5.24 % 3.69 % 171,992 3.05 54 -0.0561 % 2,263.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.21 % 5.21 % 410,268 8.28 53 0.0537 % 2,080.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 47,760 TD crossed 29,900 at 23.76.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 46,611 Desjardins crossed 38,000 at 27.07 … possibly related to TD.PR.S, below?
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 40,415 Desjardins crossed 38,000 at 25.85 … possibly related to TD.PR.E, above?
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 31,915 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 28,898 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.38
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 24,490 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-11
Maturity Price : 23.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.23 – 23.65
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2844

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-11
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 23.23
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.71 – 27.24
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.4132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.71
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %

RY.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 26.95 – 27.30
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2366

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.30 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3418

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.60 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2935

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.30 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1971

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %

4 Responses to “February 11, 2011”

  1. Drew says:

    I agree with your comment on xenophobia, and on the idiocy of thinking of the TSX as a “strategic asset”. However, the TSX is a regulator, as absurd as it may be to think of a for profit entity as a regulator. It’s status as such comes by virtue of operating agreements with the relevant securities commissions. As such, it seems to me that it is legitimate to ask whether the owner of the regulator is fit to be a regulator. Ethnicity and place of residence should not be determinative, but the question of fitness to operate is legitimate. To be clear, though, I agree that the question posed by the Finance Minister is not.

  2. jiHymas says:

    The OSC / IIROC and other regulators may well wish to reconsider their delegation of authority if they are no longer comfortable with their delegate – I have no problem with that.

    I see that as being an administrative matter, though, not a political one.

  3. Drew says:

    I’m not sure what you mean by administrative, but a shift of the sort you are suggesting, while perhaps prudent, cannot possibly occur before the merger is to complete. It would involve profound changes in policy and staffing, involving most, if not all, of the securities commissions. As such, fitness to operate remains a legitimate issue in relation to the proposed merger.

  4. jiHymas says:

    With respect to Exchange’s regulatory authority, the Globe and Mail had a good piece on Saturday:

    When the exchange was the only place to trade stocks, giving up Canadian control would have been unthinkable. But the monopoly no longer exists, and the actual trading system itself is not irreplaceable. It is just a lot of very fast computers, wires and software. In fact, building a new stock market can be done for relatively little money with off-the-shelf technology. The proof is in the fact that six alternatives to the TSX have sprung up in the past few years as regulators have encouraged new competitors. But the TSX has something those markets don’t, something that is harder to replicate. They are markets; it is an exchange. The distinction is subtle, but important.

    An exchange has been granted dispensation by regulators to be a gatekeeper to public markets. Exchanges vet companies before agreeing to list their shares, ensuring that standards are kept to protect investors. That confers upon the stock a legitimacy that attracts big investors, enabling companies to raise large amounts of money. Without a marquee exchange listing, companies are forced to exist in a grey market with little investor interest.

    I’m not convinced that this is a good system worth keeping in the first place. There’s an inherent conflict of interest; and it’s not clear to me that the extra layer of regulation can be justified.

    Exchanges don’t investigate mutual funds, for instance.

    Why have the link between trading and permission to trade? Particularly in an age where setting up a market is no big deal?

    While it might seem hard-hearted, I’m not particularly concerned about changes in staffing. The CNSX is a recognized Exchange, it can grant listed status, so it’s not as if we’d be without one if the TMX packs up.

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