There is one problem with directing tax revenue to debt reduction: it means you can’t spend it. EU plans are running into roadblocks:
Greece joined Italy in objecting to annual numerical debt-reduction targets in a fresh challenge to the German-led drive for tougher economic safeguards to underpin the euro.
Greece, the first deficit-riddled euro country to fall back on financial aid, says the proposed rule would force it to make impossibly large cuts once its support package runs out in 2013, according to a draft of European Union legislation.
“All member states except two already accepted the proposal,” said an EU briefing note obtained by Bloomberg News before next week’s debate among finance ministers. “Italy and Greece have a reserve on the numerical benchmark.”
Greece or Italy alone could veto the rule, undercutting the tougher enforcement demanded by Germany as a condition for beefing up the 750 billion-euro ($1 trillion) rescue fund for distressed states.
Assiduous Readers will remember it was France and Germany who scuttled the 3% deficit rule when it was no longer convenient to them.
The Fannie & Freddie problem is lurching towards the limelight:
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner presented Congress with a set of options for weaning the $11 trillion mortgage market from its dependence on the government, while calling for changes to be phased in “responsibly and carefully” to avoid economic disruptions.
…
The options suggest differing degrees of government involvement in the system. The most dramatic would involve a “privatized” system of housing finance, with a government role to help “narrowly targeted” low-income and veteran buyers.A middle ground would replace Fannie and Freddie with a system that helps low-income and veteran buyers in normal times and also provides an expanded guarantee that the government could ramp up in a crisis. The paper suggests using high-priced guarantee fees or restricted amounts of public insurance to achieve this goal.
A third option has the biggest government role and would hew closest to the current system. It would impose more regulation and give the government a role in “catastrophic reinsurance behind significant private capital,” so as to provide a backstop in times of crisis.
We have a wee bit of xenophobia happening:
Ontario Finance Minister Dwight Duncan has turned up the heat in the political debate surrounding the proposed transatlantic stock-exchange transaction, saying he does not want a “strategic asset” owned by the Middle East.
“We do business with the Middle East,” Mr. Duncan told reporters at Queen’s Park on Friday. “I am just not sure I want them owning our stock exchange.”
Then buy it yourself – jerk. He doesn’t even have the “finite natural resource” excuse. Seems to me that if a foreign-owned TMX stops doing its job properly, then there are a few Alternative Trading Systems that would be pleased to pick up the slack. Or somebody will write the code to start up a new one. But I guess Duncan thinks Canadians are too stupid to do that.
It was a quiet day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 1bp, FixedResets down 6bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 5bp. Volatility was small and volume was muted.
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0477 % | 2,393.9 |
FixedFloater | 4.78 % | 3.50 % | 19,654 | 19.08 | 1 | 0.0440 % | 3,557.8 |
Floater | 2.50 % | 2.28 % | 46,655 | 21.56 | 4 | 0.0477 % | 2,584.8 |
OpRet | 4.82 % | 3.64 % | 61,182 | 2.23 | 8 | 0.0966 % | 2,390.0 |
SplitShare | 5.31 % | 1.11 % | 299,217 | 0.83 | 4 | -0.2748 % | 2,460.7 |
Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0966 % | 2,185.4 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.74 % | 5.39 % | 118,092 | 1.24 | 9 | 0.0171 % | 2,035.6 |
Perpetual-Discount | 5.55 % | 5.59 % | 132,911 | 14.40 | 15 | 0.0113 % | 2,109.6 |
FixedReset | 5.24 % | 3.69 % | 171,992 | 3.05 | 54 | -0.0561 % | 2,263.0 |
Deemed-Retractible | 5.21 % | 5.21 % | 410,268 | 8.28 | 53 | 0.0537 % | 2,080.0 |
Performance Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
BNA.PR.E | SplitShare | -1.20 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2017-12-10 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.60 Bid-YTW : 5.29 % |
PWF.PR.I | Perpetual-Premium | -1.02 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2012-05-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.25 Bid-YTW : 5.39 % |
IAG.PR.A | Deemed-Retractible | 1.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.80 Bid-YTW : 5.79 % |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
RY.PR.E | Deemed-Retractible | 47,760 | TD crossed 29,900 at 23.76. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 23.75 Bid-YTW : 5.11 % |
TD.PR.E | FixedReset | 46,611 | Desjardins crossed 38,000 at 27.07 … possibly related to TD.PR.S, below? YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-05-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.06 Bid-YTW : 3.74 % |
TD.PR.S | FixedReset | 40,415 | Desjardins crossed 38,000 at 25.85 … possibly related to TD.PR.E, above? YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2013-08-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.85 Bid-YTW : 3.69 % |
BMO.PR.J | Deemed-Retractible | 31,915 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 23.78 Bid-YTW : 5.10 % |
TD.PR.O | Deemed-Retractible | 28,898 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2022-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.38 Bid-YTW : 5.20 % |
BAM.PR.X | FixedReset | 24,490 | Recent new issue. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2041-02-11 Maturity Price : 23.06 Evaluated at bid price : 24.90 Bid-YTW : 4.51 % |
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. |
Wide Spread Highlights | ||
Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
FTS.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 23.23 – 23.65 Spot Rate : 0.4200 Average : 0.2844 YTW SCENARIO |
IAG.PR.C | FixedReset | Quote: 26.71 – 27.24 Spot Rate : 0.5300 Average : 0.4132 YTW SCENARIO |
RY.PR.Y | FixedReset | Quote: 26.95 – 27.30 Spot Rate : 0.3500 Average : 0.2366 YTW SCENARIO |
SLF.PR.G | FixedReset | Quote: 25.30 – 25.75 Spot Rate : 0.4500 Average : 0.3418 YTW SCENARIO |
BNA.PR.E | SplitShare | Quote: 24.60 – 25.00 Spot Rate : 0.4000 Average : 0.2935 YTW SCENARIO |
FTS.PR.H | FixedReset | Quote: 25.30 – 25.60 Spot Rate : 0.3000 Average : 0.1971 YTW SCENARIO |
I agree with your comment on xenophobia, and on the idiocy of thinking of the TSX as a “strategic asset”. However, the TSX is a regulator, as absurd as it may be to think of a for profit entity as a regulator. It’s status as such comes by virtue of operating agreements with the relevant securities commissions. As such, it seems to me that it is legitimate to ask whether the owner of the regulator is fit to be a regulator. Ethnicity and place of residence should not be determinative, but the question of fitness to operate is legitimate. To be clear, though, I agree that the question posed by the Finance Minister is not.
The OSC / IIROC and other regulators may well wish to reconsider their delegation of authority if they are no longer comfortable with their delegate – I have no problem with that.
I see that as being an administrative matter, though, not a political one.
I’m not sure what you mean by administrative, but a shift of the sort you are suggesting, while perhaps prudent, cannot possibly occur before the merger is to complete. It would involve profound changes in policy and staffing, involving most, if not all, of the securities commissions. As such, fitness to operate remains a legitimate issue in relation to the proposed merger.
With respect to Exchange’s regulatory authority, the Globe and Mail had a good piece on Saturday:
I’m not convinced that this is a good system worth keeping in the first place. There’s an inherent conflict of interest; and it’s not clear to me that the extra layer of regulation can be justified.
Exchanges don’t investigate mutual funds, for instance.
Why have the link between trading and permission to trade? Particularly in an age where setting up a market is no big deal?
While it might seem hard-hearted, I’m not particularly concerned about changes in staffing. The CNSX is a recognized Exchange, it can grant listed status, so it’s not as if we’d be without one if the TMX packs up.