Archive for April, 2011

NEW.PR.C Warrant Offering Completely Subscribed

Tuesday, April 5th, 2011

NewGrowth Corp. has announced:

the closing of its warrant offering. The gross proceeds of the offering totaled $91.5 million, representing 100% of the maximum available subscription amount.

The net proceeds of the offering will be invested in accordance with the investment objectives of the Company.

NewGrowth Corp. is a mutual fund corporation whose investment portfolio consists of publicly-listed securities of selected Canadian chartered banks, telecommunication, pipeline and utility issuers. The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares of NewGrowth Corp. are all listed for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols NEW.A and NEW.PR.C respectively.

NEW.PR.C was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was added to the HIMIPref™ database. It is currently assigned to the SplitShares index.

ASC.PR.A: Preferred Shareholders Victorious!

Tuesday, April 5th, 2011

Manulife Asset Management Limited has announced:

that securityholders of the Corporation did not approve the extension of the termination date of the Class A Shares and Preferred Shares of the Corporation for an additional term of five years from May 31, 2011 to May 31, 2016. The Corporation will, therefore, terminate effective May 31, 2011 in accordance with its constating documents. On termination, shares of the Corporation will be redeemed and, following the payment or reservation for payment of all liabilities of the Corporation, the remaining property of the Corporation will be distributed to the Corporation’s shareholders in accordance with the terms of the Corporation’s constating documents. Shareholders need not take any action to receive the final distribution proceeds on termination of the Corporation.

This constitutes a rare victory of preferred shareholders over abusive management-inspired shareholder votes, for which the main cheerleaders were the directors:

  • Paul Lorentz
  • Sheila Hart
  • Jennifer Mercanti
  • Warren Law

Preferred share investors should exercise greater than usual caution before purchasing preferred shares issued by any corporation which includes any of these persons as directors.

ASC.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in the post ASC.PR.A Rigamarole Extraordinarily Abusive. ASC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

April 4, 2011

Monday, April 4th, 2011

The predicted hike in the European policy rate is causing some angst:

Primed to raise its benchmark interest rate this week for the first time in almost three years, President Trichet’s European Central Bank again faces the conundrum that its monetary policy rarely suits all 17 members of the euro area, where the kaleidoscope of growth ranges from record expansion to recession paired with a sovereign-debt crisis.

The upshot may be that the normalization of rates from a record low of 1 percent will disproportionately hurt Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland, while failing to nip inflation threats in Germany. Such uneven fallout risks exacerbating the two-speed European recovery and dealing further damage to the bonds of so-called peripheral nations.

But the outlook for Treasuries continues to be bright (according to some):

Treasuries are signaling that the $9 trillion market will weather the end of the Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing program in June without suffering a selloff that drives long-term borrowing cost higher.

The class of investors that includes foreign central banks purchased 60 percent of the $66 billion in benchmark 10-year U.S. notes sold this year, up from 42 percent in 2010.

Rising demand from international investors and financial institutions bodes well for bonds with the Fed’s plan to buy more than $600 billion of Treasuries more than 80 percent complete. U.S. fixed-income assets are retaining their appeal as the credit quality of European sovereign debt deteriorates and banks meet tighter risk standards governing the capital they need cushion against losses.

Algos gone wild? RBC bought 2100 shares of CIU.PR.C in 12 transactions starting at 25.05 at 12:04pm and finishing at 27.00 at 12:18. Too much time-span to be a retail market order … I wonder what happened there? The lucky seller was Byron Securities (who?), which sold 900 shares at an average price of 25.85.

Other than that, it was a relatively quiet day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 1bp, FixedResets gaining 4bp and DeemedRetractibles up 5bp. Only three entries on the performance highlights table, and volume was nothing special.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0951 % 2,412.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0951 % 3,628.1
Floater 2.49 % 2.27 % 40,298 21.57 4 0.0951 % 2,604.7
OpRet 4.91 % 3.46 % 91,412 2.11 8 0.0144 % 2,412.4
SplitShare 5.20 % -1.59 % 120,314 0.69 6 0.0729 % 2,493.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0144 % 2,205.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 5.60 % 127,436 1.18 8 0.0445 % 2,046.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.52 % 5.53 % 135,230 14.45 16 -0.0118 % 2,138.4
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.38 % 222,776 2.97 57 0.0410 % 2,293.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.21 % 5.08 % 301,803 8.23 53 0.0521 % 2,098.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-04
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 23.53
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-04
Maturity Price : 21.40
Evaluated at bid price : 21.40
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 53,990 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 42,805 Desjardins crossed 20,500 at 24.99.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-04
Maturity Price : 24.96
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 39,411 TD crossed 17,500 at 23.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 36,065 TD bought 23,200 from RBC at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 33,935 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 24.89.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 33,919 Desjardins bought 10,000 from anonymous at 24.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.31
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.06 – 27.00
Spot Rate : 1.9400
Average : 1.0467

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.61 – 26.14
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3819

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %

BAM.PR.H OpRet Quote: 25.47 – 25.82
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2292

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-05-04
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : -4.27 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.53 – 23.86
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2177

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-04
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 23.53
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %

HSB.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 27.46 – 27.70
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1643

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.50 – 22.88
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.3048

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-04
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %

MAPF Performance: March 2011

Sunday, April 3rd, 2011

The fund had a poor month with a return of -0.44%, underperforming the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index (TXPR), which returned +0.50%. Figures for the BMO-CM “50” index, which I favour, are not yet available.

The fund’s poor performance is attributable to its heavy position in DeemedRetractibles issued by insurers, which did very poorly.

Well, it has to happen sometimes! Fortunately, the first two months of the quarter were good enough to keep the fund well ahead of the index over the three month period.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close January 31 was $11.0560 after a distribution of 0.131577.

Returns to March 31, 2011
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month -0.44% +0.60% +0.44%
Three Months +3.92% +3.06% +2.28%
One Year +22.95% +13.11% +10.47%
Two Years (annualized) +33.87% +19.57% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +24.49% +7.18% +4.74%
Four Years (annualized) +17.39% +3.42%  
Five Years (annualized) +14.90% +3.59%  
Six Years (annualized) +13.69% +3.86%  
Seven Years (annualized) +12.55% +3.60%  
Eight Years (annualized) +15.68% +4.49%  
Nine Years (annualized) +13.37% +4.46%  
Ten Years (annualized) +13.64% +4.14%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.41%, +2.43% and +11.37%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +5.93%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.50%, +0.87% and +6.54% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.08%, +1.42% & +6.35%, respectively
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF are not yet available (inception date 2010-11-23)

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.2857 0.3628
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.2857 0.3885
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.2857 0.4112
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.2857 0.4672
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.2857 $0.4112
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.2857 $0.4672
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.2857 $0.5737
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.2857 $0.6046
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.2857 $0.6029
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.2857 $0.5802
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0819 $0.5714
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0819 $0.5759
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0819 $0.5850
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.0819 $0.5832
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0000 $0.5822
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0000 $0.6594
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
Analysis of yields changed in February 2011 to include the concept of DeemedRetractible issues. DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital and the January & February, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. This deemed maturity has a significant effect on calculated yields.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on February 28; all of the former and most of the latter currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in a SplitShare (BNA.PR.C) which also has its yield calculated with the expectation of a maturity.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.60% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: March 2011 analysis (which is slightly in excess of the 5.54% index yield on March 31). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $11.0560 * 0.0560 = $0.6191, a decline from the $11.2375 * 0.0567 = $0.6371 reported in February, but an increase from the $11.1030 * 0.0546 = $0.6062 reported in January.

Note that there will be a drag on the calculation in up-markets due to presence of shorter-term issues (or, at least, presumed shorter term issues!); the question is whether the positive effect of these issues in down markets will outweight their negative effect in up-markets – all I can say is … that’s what I keep working towards!

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: March 2011

Sunday, April 3rd, 2011

Turnover declined dramatically in March, to about 17%. Now that the portfolio has repositioned itself to account for OSFI’s refusal to grandfather extant Tier 1 Capital, we are back to the slow trading of positions based on changes in relative value.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2011-3-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 4.2% (+2.4) 6.28% 6.43
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 5.9% (-5.2) 5.60% 14.54
Fixed-Reset 8.4% (-2) 3.43% 2.86
Deemed-Retractible 71.9% (+6.6) 6.12% 8.18
Scraps (Various) 10.2% (+0.4) 7.06% 10.68
Cash -0.6% (-2.0) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.00% 8.33
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital and the January, February and March, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2011-3-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 43.1% (+3.4)
Pfd-2(high) 28.0% (+1.8)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 18.7% (-4.1)
Pfd-3(high) 6.6% (+1.5)
Pfd-3 3.6% (+0.3)
Pfd-3(low) 0.0% (-1.6)
Cash -0.6% (-2.0)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.
A position held in ELF preferreds has been assigned to Pfd-2(low)

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2011-3-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.0% (-1.6)
$50,000 – $100,000 14.2% (-9.3)
$100,000 – $200,000 40.0% (+16.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 5.8% (-7.5)
>$300,000 40.5% (+4.4)
Cash -0.6% (-2.0)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2010, and published in the September, 2010, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is slightly more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

April 1, 2011

Saturday, April 2nd, 2011

There’s a new bid for the NYSE:

Nasdaq OMX Group Inc. (NDAQ) and IntercontinentalExchange Inc. (ICE) made an unsolicited bid of about $11.3 billion for NYSE Euronext, trying to snatch the owner of the New York Stock Exchange away from Deutsche Boerse AG. (DB1)

Nasdaq OMX and ICE offered $42.50 in cash and stock for each NYSE Euronext share, according to a statement released today. The shares closed at $35.17 yesterday. Deutsche Boerse’s February all-stock agreement to purchase NYSE Euronext values the company at about $35.04 a share.

Ireland’s credit rating has been cut again:

Ireland’s credit rating was cut one level by Standard & Poor’s and put on watch for a possible downgrade by Fitch Ratings after the cost of rescuing Irish banks reached as much as 100 billion euros ($141.5 billion).

S&P today lowered the rating to BBB+ from A-, putting the country on the same level as Thailand and the Bahamas. The outlook is stable, S&P said in a statement. Fitch placed its long-term foreign and local-currency issuer default ratings of BBB+ on negative, “indicating a heightened probability of a downgrade in the near term,” it said in a statement.

But the interesting part is the wrangling over the banks’ senior debt:

Ireland agreed yesterday to inject as much as 24 billion euros into four banks, while leaving bondholders untouched. The government already funneled 46.3 billion euros into the financial system and set up an agency that paid more than 30 billion euros to assume risky property loans. The total equates to about two-thirds the size of the Irish economy.

“The government’s position is very clear: It doesn’t want to take action on senior bondholders for the four banks that are going forward,” said Matthew Elderfield, head of regulation at the central bank, said in an interview with Bloomberg Television. “It recognizes that, on balance, that if you want to have these viable banks able to return to the market that would hurt their capacity to do that.”

During an election campaign last month, Eamon Gilmore, now deputy prime minister, dismissed ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet as a “civil servant” who would answer to politicians. As recently as March 28, Agriculture Minister Simon Coveney said the government planned to impose losses on senior bondholders in the banks to cut the costs of its bailout.

The cost of insuring against losses on the senior debt of European banks fell to the lowest in more than five months today. The Markit iTraxx Financial Index, linked to the senior debt of 25 banks and insurers, dropped as much as 6 basis points to 137, the lowest since November 19, before paring the decline, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. Credit-default swaps on Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain also declined.

California has problems of its own:

[California Governor Jerry ] Brown said yesterday he’s also putting together a plan to deal with the growing gap between assets and expected obligations of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, the second-largest public pension in the U.S.

Calstrs’ so-called unfunded liability grew to $56 billion at the end of June, according to a report released yesterday. The 38 percent increase will require the state to boost its annual contribution by $140 million to $150 million, according to the pension fund. California paid $573 million toward teacher retirements last year.

Since 1999, teachers have been allowed to purchase up to five years of service credit to retire early and collect a full pension. Brown would repeal that benefit beginning in July.

DBRS has published a comment letter on the new ESMA guidelines:

The Consultation Paper seeks to clarify the endorsement regime and update the endorsement guidelines. ESMA currently interprets that “as stringent as” CRA requirements must be established by law or regulation in a third country by June 7, 2011 in order for the use of endorsement. It does not currently support the interpretation that a third country CRA would be permitted to follow “as stringent as” standards through its own policies and procedures. The Consultation Paper states that the CRA Regulation does not envisage a dual system of compliance or some combination of a third country legal/regulatory regime topped up by policies and procedures adopted by the third country CRA.

By way of background, endorsement allows the use in the EU of ratings issued outside the EU under certain conditions.

DBRS does not support ESMA’s current interpretation that it cannot supervise EU-registered CRAs who use endorsement without an equivalent third country regulatory regime in place. The key test should be whether a third country CRA adheres to standards as stringent as those required by the CRA Regulation, whether or not a third country regime has been enacted into law.

Endorsement is important because, according to the consultation paper:

A credit rating that a registered CRA endorses in compliance with the conditions set out in article 4.3 “shall be considered to be a credit rating issued by a credit rating agency established in the Community and registered in accordance with this Regulation” (art. 4.4). These ratings can be therefore used for regulatory purposes and be distributed to the public by registered CRAs.

This endorsement process started in October, 2009. The Canadian Securities Administrators published proposed regulatory changes on March 18, due to pressure from the Europeans:

The CESR’s stance is that the “comply or explain” model is insufficient, and thus they indicated to the CSA that they would not provide an equivalency recommendation to the European Commission should the CSA proceed on that basis. As the CSA notes in the introduction to the revised proposal, it’s a threat worth paying attention to:

The failure to obtain an equivalency determination from the European Commission, and the consequent inability of a CRO that issues ratings out of Canada to rely on the endorsement or certification models in the EU Regulation, would have a negative impact on such CROs. The issuers that such CROs rate might also be negatively impacted to the extent those ratings are used for regulatory purposes in the European Union.

As a result, the CSA are now proposing that, in the absence of exemptive relief, DROs must establish codes of conduct which do not deviate from the provisions set out in the proposed Instrument. Those provisions have also been revised somewhat, to require that a DRO establish certain governance protections, such as a majority of independent directors, and a formal internal controls system.

Thus, we finally have a clear statement from the regulator that Credit Rating Agencies have the function of cheerleading for issuers. Yay.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 3bp, FixedResets up 9bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 6bp. Volatility was muted, volume was fair.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0476 % 2,410.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0476 % 3,624.7
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 40,183 21.58 4 0.0476 % 2,602.2
OpRet 4.91 % 3.14 % 58,613 2.12 8 0.0337 % 2,412.0
SplitShare 5.21 % -0.75 % 118,513 0.70 6 0.0676 % 2,491.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0337 % 2,205.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.42 % 128,564 1.19 8 0.2081 % 2,045.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.52 % 5.53 % 130,895 14.46 16 -0.0263 % 2,138.7
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.40 % 226,258 2.98 57 0.0915 % 2,292.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.21 % 5.10 % 304,941 8.25 53 0.0597 % 2,097.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 5.36 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 103,180 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 73,323 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 54,390 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 52,600 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 52,103 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 48,934 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 24.32 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 2.1800
Average : 1.3125

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.32
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.85 – 28.25
Spot Rate : 1.4000
Average : 0.9335

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.29 – 24.63
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2204

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-01
Maturity Price : 24.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.29
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.09 – 24.45
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2507

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-01
Maturity Price : 23.79
Evaluated at bid price : 24.09
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %

BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 24.77 – 25.04
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1683

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %

TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.98 – 25.25
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1720

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %

LBS.PR.A Warrant Offering Successful

Friday, April 1st, 2011

Brompton Group has announced:

the closing of warrant offerings for four of its funds under
management.

LBS / LBS.PR.A sold 3.3-million units for gross proceeds of $63.0-million.

LBS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when I noted that the warrants were in the money. LBS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

"You Are Stupid", say Canadian Securities Administrators

Friday, April 1st, 2011

Janet McFarland reports in the Globe and Mail :

Canadian regulators are proposing major new restrictions on the sale of securitized financial products like asset-backed commercial paper, arguing unsophisticated investors should not be buying products that are potentially too complex and risky.

The Canadian Securities Administrators, an umbrella group for Canada’s provincial securities commissions, has unveiled a host of reforms to govern the sale of securitized products, responding to calls for tighter regulation following the melt-down of Canada’s $32-billion market for non-bank asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) in the summer of 2007.

In the CSA’s own words:

A key element of the proposed rules is the narrowing of the class of investors who can buy securitized products in the exempt market to a smaller, more sophisticated group. This feature is intended to help investors avoid products whose risk profiles and underlying components may be unsuitable for their investment objectives.

The CSA is seeking input from investors and marketplace participants on the proposals. The comment period is open until July 1, 2011.

The Requiest for Comment states:

The following is a summary of several significant features of the Proposed Exempt Distribution Rules.
(i) Removal of existing prospectus exemptions
We propose that the following prospectus exemptions in NI 45-106 be unavailable for distributions of securitized products that are not covered bonds or non-debt securities of MIEs:

  • • section 2.3 (the accredited investor exemption);
  • • section 2.4 (the private issuer exemption);
  • • section 2.9 (the offering memorandum exemption);
  • • section 2.10 (the minimum amount investment exemption);
  • • subsection 2.34(2)(d) and (d.1) (financial institution or Schedule III bank specified debt exemption);
  • • section 2.35 (the short-term debt exemption).

Instead, we propose to add a new prospectus exemption for the distribution of securitized products.
(ii) New Securitized Product Exemption (section 2.44)
Proposed section 2.44 contains the new prospectus exemption for distributions of securitized products to an “eligible securitized product investor” purchasing as principal (the Securitized Product Exemption). The definition of “eligible securitized product investor” essentially is the same as the definition of “permitted client” in National Instrument 31-103 Registration Requirements and Exemptions.

The definition comes later:

“eligible securitized product investor” means
(a) a Canadian financial institution or a Schedule III bank;
(b) the Business Development Bank of Canada incorporated under the Business Development Bank of Canada
Act (Canada);
(c) a subsidiary of any person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b), if the person owns all of the voting securities of the subsidiary, except the voting securities required by law to be owned by directors of the subsidiary;
(d) a person registered under the securities legislation of a jurisdiction of Canada as an adviser or dealer, other than as a scholarship plan dealer or a restricted dealer;
(e) a pension fund that is regulated by either the federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (Canada) or a pension commission or similar regulatory authority of a jurisdiction of Canada or a wholly owned subsidiary of such a pension fund;
(f) an entity organized in a foreign jurisdiction that is analogous to any of the entities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e);
(g) the Government of Canada or a jurisdiction of Canada, or any Crown corporation, agency or wholly-owned entity of the Government of Canada or a jurisdiction of Canada;
(h) any national, federal, state, provincial, territorial or municipal government of or in any foreign jurisdiction, or any agency of that government;
(i) a municipality, public board or commission in Canada and a metropolitan community, school board, the Comité de gestion de la taxe scolaire de l’île de Montréal or an intermunicipal management board in Québec; (j) a trust company or trust corporation registered or authorized to carry on business under the Trust and Loan Companies Act (Canada) or under comparable legislation in a jurisdiction of Canada or a foreign jurisdiction, acting on behalf of a managed account managed by the trust company or trust corporation, as the case may be;
(k) a person acting on behalf of a fully managed account managed by the person, if the person is registered or authorized to carry on business as an adviser or the equivalent under the securities legislation of a jurisdiction of Canada or a foreign jurisdiction;
(l) an investment fund if it is one or both of the following:
(i) managed by a person registered as an investment fund manager under the securities legislation of a
jurisdiction of Canada;
(ii) advised by a person authorized to act as an adviser under the securities legislation of a jurisdiction of
Canada;
(m) a registered charity under the Income Tax Act (Canada) that obtains advice from an eligibility adviser or an adviser registered under the securities legislation of the jurisdiction of the registered charity;
(n) an individual who beneficially owns financial assets, as defined in section 1.1 having an aggregate realizable value that, before taxes but net of any related liabilities, exceeds $5 million;
(o) a person that is entirely owned by an individual, or individuals referred to in paragraph (n), who holds the beneficial ownership interest in the person directly or through a trust, the trustee of which is a trust company or trust corporation registered or authorized to carry on business under the Trust and Loan Companies Act (Canada) or under comparable legislation in a jurisdiction of Canada or a foreign jurisdiction;
(p) a person, other than an individual or an investment fund, that has net assets of at least $25 million as shown on its most recently prepared financial statements;
(q) a person that distributes securities of its own issue in Canada only to persons referred to in paragraphs (a) to (p);”

I told you that things like this were going to happen! The regulators will not be happy until the only investment options available to retail are homogenized vanilla funds sold by banks, who must be good, since they employ a lot of ex-regulators.