Archive for May, 2011

May 13, 2011

Friday, May 13th, 2011

Well, let’s think about bankruptcy … banks are no longer allowed to go bust … countries are no longer allowed to go bust … now, it would appear, power companies can no longer go bust:

Japan’s government will provide financial aid for Tokyo Electric Power Co. to protect the utility from bankruptcy as it pays compensation to those affected by the worst nuclear disaster in 25 years.

Japan’s government will create a body to handle claims made against Tepco, as the company is called, and will issue bonds to fund them, according to a statement released today after a meeting of Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s cabinet.

“Our requirement is that the company continues to operate as a listed company and continue to provide a stable supply of power,” Trade Minister Banri Kaieda told reporters after the statement was released. He said Tepco bondholders rights will be maintained.

Power companies that operate nuclear stations will be required to pay into the compensation organization being set up by the government, according to the statement.

Tepco will be monitored by the government as a condition for aid to ensure full compensation will be paid to those affected by the disaster, Kaieda said earlier this week.

“Eventually, the matter could become one of how to share the burden between Tepco and the government, but it will be something to be decided in the distant future,” [Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio] Edano said.

Still, it hasn’t done the Samurai market any harm:

HSBC’s unit HSBC Bank Plc sold 108.2 billion yen of five- year, 0.91 percent bonds priced to yield 31 basis points more than the yen swap rate, and 35.2 billion yen of floating-rate notes that pay 46 basis points over the three-month London interbank offered rate, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The bank had planned to sell at least 50 billion yen of notes, according to a person familiar with the matter, who asked not to be identified because the information is private.

Lehman defaulted on 195 billion yen of Samurai bonds when it filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, a collapse that froze global credit markets and curbed investor demand for all but the safest government debt. Today’s sale is the biggest without a sovereign guarantee since Citigroup Inc. sold 186.5 billion yen of three-year, 2.66 percent Samurai bonds to individual investors in June 2008, Bloomberg data show.

US inflation ticked up a bit:

The cost of living in the U.S. rose in April, led by increases in food and fuel costs that are starting to filter down to other goods and services.

The consumer-price index increased 0.4 percent, matching the median forecast of economists surveyed by Bloomberg News and following a 0.5 percent advance in March, figures from the Labor Department showed today in Washington. Excluding volatile food and energy, the so-called core gauge rose 0.2 percent, also as projected.

Oh, the joys of doing business in kleptocracies run by thugs:

Yahoo! Inc. fell for a third day as signs of tension with Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. raised speculation it may benefit less from part ownership of China’s largest e-commerce provider.

Concerns surfaced after a May 10 Yahoo filing that said Alibaba Group spun off the lucrative Alipay online-payments business, and then deepened the next two days amid conflicting statements from Yahoo and Alibaba over Alibaba Group’s disclosure of the transfer.

Yahoo, based in Sunnyvale, California, fell as much as 7.1 percent to $15.96 in Nasdaq Stock Market trading. It has lost 10 percent since May 10, when it said the entire equity of Alipay had been transferred to a company controlled by Alibaba Chief Executive Officer Jack Ma.

Alibaba was paid about 300 million yuan ($46 million) for Alipay by a company controlled by Ma, Caing.com reported today, citing public company registry data. Alibaba’s Spelich declined to comment on the report.

Alipay has a value of $5 billion, Brett Harriss, an analyst at Gabelli & Co., wrote in a report yesterday.

The Bank of Canada has released a discussion paper by David Bolder, Simon Deeley titled The Canadian Debt-Strategy Model: An Overview of the Principal Elements:

As part of managing a debt portfolio, debt managers face the challenging task of choosing a strategy that minimizes the cost of debt, subject to limitations on risk. The Bank of Canada provides debt-management analysis and advice to the Government of Canada to assist in this task, with the Canadian debt-strategy model being developed to help in this regard. The authors outline the main elements of the model, which include: cost and risk measures, inflation-linked debt, optimization techniques, the framework used to model the government’s funding requirement, the sensitivity of results to the choice of joint stochastic macroeconomic term-structure model, the effects of shocks to macroeconomic and term-structure variables and changes to their long-term values, and the relationship between issuance yield and issuance amount. Emphasis is placed on the degree to which changes to the formulation of model elements impact key results. The model is an important part of the decision-making process for the determination of the government’s debt strategy. However, it remains one of many tools that are available to debt managers and is to be used in conjunction with the judgment of an experienced debt manager.

I mentioned Jonathan Weill’s excellent column Greeks Blaming Speculators Sure Sign of Panic yesterday and now there’s reason to mention it again, now that Irshad Manji has written a column in the Globe titled The paranoid can’t handle the truth:

Routine, reactionary denial is a dead end. When conspiracy-peddling persists, what can ever be true? Indeed, the very idea of truth loses meaning. Which is why I can’t ascribe the popular label “truthers” to those who claim that 9/11 was itself an inside job.

It’s easy to dismiss the hyperventilating as simple nuttiness. But the nutters have an outsized impact on shared values, a crucial aspect of the glue that holds societies together. The decibel level of conspiracy merchants, amplified by the explosion of media platforms through which to express themselves, infects our very capacity for common purpose – and our human need for hope.

Is there a solution? I’d argue that students should be taught to think not just critically, but also “generatively,” so they can rationally reassemble the pieces of what they’ve just ripped apart. Thinking critically enables us to question the information we’re being fed, and that’s a good thing. But what then? Unless we can reason our way to factual accuracy, critical thinking easily degenerates into emotionalism – conflating emotion with evidence. Not a good thing.

Americans, for starters, should ask at what point Ronald Reagan’s adage of “trust but verify” encounters its corollary – “verified, now trust.”

Without insisting on each of these halves, citizens in any society can’t achieve a consensus that’s whole enough to move on to new challenges. Blowhards will keep poking holes in old news, falling through those holes and toward a pit where believing in nothing becomes the hallmark of truth. Sounds to me like a lie.

This is an interesting counterpoint to Jonathan Weill’s observatins:

For instance, the first paragraph of the article said euro- area finance ministers and European Commission officials had scheduled a secret meeting for that night in Luxembourg. That same day, a spokesman for Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, who is chairman of the euro area’s council of finance ministers, told reporters for several news outlets that there was no meeting and that this part of the Spiegel story was wrong. Actually such a meeting did occur on May 6. The spokesman, Guy Schuller, later conceded he had lied.

Asked to explain why, Schuller told the Wall Street Journal that “I was told to say there was no meeting,” and that “we had certain necessities to consider.” The euro was falling on the Spiegel report and “there was a very good reason to deny that the meeting was taking place,” he said, namely “self- preservation.” Besides, he said, when Juncker says something to the markets, “nobody seems to believe it.”

And let’s not even get into Spend-Every-Penny’s blase dismissal of the Junior Republicans’ campaign pledge on the deficit.

Ms. Manji makes good points, but she ignores the other side of the equation. A world in which lying has become acceptable is a fertile ground for conspiracy-theory wingnuts.

A relatively quiet day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 10bp, FixedResets gaining 3bp and DeemedRetractibles basically flat. There were two entries in the Performance Highlights tables, both MFC issues which went ex-Dividend today. Volume was low, although there were some pockets of size.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1174 % 2,447.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1174 % 3,680.4
Floater 2.46 % 2.26 % 37,982 21.61 4 0.1174 % 2,642.2
OpRet 4.87 % 3.50 % 62,253 0.45 9 -0.0445 % 2,420.0
SplitShare 5.19 % -1.70 % 61,775 0.59 6 0.0420 % 2,507.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0445 % 2,212.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.21 % 130,728 1.01 9 -0.0176 % 2,063.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.53 % 5.55 % 121,482 14.51 15 0.1016 % 2,150.5
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.26 % 198,139 2.89 57 0.0266 % 2,311.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.18 % 4.92 % 294,823 8.14 53 -0.0006 % 2,120.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.R FixedReset 165,735 Desjardins crossed two blocks of 79,500 each at 27.02. These were 26 minutes apart, so it’s possible that it was the same 79,500 shares.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.03
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
CM.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 153,840 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.50. RBC crossed blocks of 30,000 and 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 113,661 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 24.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.58 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 65,059 TD bought 10,000 from National at 24.30, then crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 63,060 RBC crossed 25,000 at 22.96; Desjardins crossed 30,800 at 22.93.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 57,991 Desjardins crossed 55,000 at 26.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CM.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 27.81 – 28.44
Spot Rate : 0.6300
Average : 0.4247

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.81
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %

PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.16 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2205

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-08-16
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.75 – 22.06
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2074

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-13
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %

NA.PR.O FixedReset Quote: 27.50 – 27.75
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1660

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 27.10 – 28.15
Spot Rate : 1.0500
Average : 0.9987

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.21 – 22.40
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1393

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %

Ottawa Issues Covered Bond Consultation Paper

Friday, May 13th, 2011

Ogilvy Renault has reported Canadian Covered Bond Legislation Consultation Paper Released:

Following the Canadian Government’s announcement in its 2010 budget of its intention to introduce a legislative framework for covered bonds, the Department of Finance yesterday released its much anticipated consultation paper on the proposed framework.

In the consultation paper, the Government reiterates its objective of ensuring financial institutions have access to covered bonds as a funding source. It also acknowledges the increased importance of covered bonds to Canadian banks in recent years with issuances by Canadian financial institutions having increased to over $30 billion since the first covered bonds were issued by a Canadian bank in 2007. Further, the Government recognizes that the stability of financial institutions and the financial sector can be enhanced by providing funding options that are robust under stress and that a legislative framework for covered bonds will benefit Canadians.

It this wasn’t a PrefLetter Weekend, I’d be spending a lot more time on this … but I’ll have to leave that until later. From a quick glance, it does not appear as if Bankers’ Acceptances are intended to be covered by the legislation – they should be!

Covered Bonds were last discussed in the post US Covered Bond Legislation Moving Forward. A previous article discussed the question of BAs or BDNs: What’s the Difference?.

Hat tip to Assiduous Reader GA, who brought the Ogilvy Renault article to my attention.

Update, 2011-5-25: The consultation period ends 2011-6-10.

DGS.PR.A: Private Placement

Friday, May 13th, 2011

Dividend Growth Split Corp has announced:

that the board of directors has approved a private placement of 468,480 preferred shares at $10.30. The private placement is being made in order to maintain an equal number of outstanding preferred shares and class A shares of Dividend Growth Split Corp. following its merger with Brompton Equity Split Corp.

The closing of the private placement, as well as the merger, is expected to take place on May 18, 2011, subject to regulatory approvals. As a result of the private placement, there will be no requirement for Brompton Equity Split Corp. to redeem any of its class A shares, as more fully described in the joint management information circular of Brompton Equity Split Corp. and Dividend Growth Split Corp. dated March 11, 2011.

Based on the April 28, 2011 net asset values, the class A share exchange ratio for the merger is 1.493584 Dividend Growth Split Corp. class A shares for each Brompton Equity Split Corp. class A share. After giving effect to the private placement and the merger, Dividend Growth Split Corp. will have 6,374,149 class A shares and preferred shares outstanding.

I find it rather odd that the private placement was necessary: the implication is that a large number of preferred shareholders retracted at $10 rather than selling into the market at a higher price.

DGS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the merger and term extension were approved. DGS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

May 12, 2011

Thursday, May 12th, 2011

Foreclosures are down in the States, but it’s not really good news:

Foreclosure filings in the U.S. fell 34 percent last month from a year earlier as lenders already swamped with seized homes delayed action on thousands of additional delinquent mortgages, RealtyTrac Inc. said.

A total of 219,258 properties received default, auction or repossession notices in April, the fewest in 40 months, the Irvine, California-based data seller said today in a statement. It was the seventh straight month that filings dropped from a year earlier. They were down 9 percent from March. One in 593 U.S. households got a notice.

“Banks already sitting on thousands of properties they can’t sell as quickly and profitably as they’d like aren’t going to be anxious to accelerate foreclosures on tens of thousands more,” Rick Sharga, RealtyTrac’s senior vice president, said in an e-mail.

But commercial real-estate is doing well enough:

Investors are turning to secondary markets as credit availability improves and surging demand for properties in New York, Washington and San Francisco boosts prices and reduces returns in those areas. Cities such as Dallas and Houston are attracting real estate buyers because of the prospects for job and population growth, according to Robert Bach, chief economist for Grubb & Ellis Co., a Santa Ana, California-based broker.

Jonathan Weil made a good observation yesterday:

Whenever you see an issuer of securities — be it a sovereign nation or a Wall Street bank — blame speculators, journalists or rumor- mongerers for its troubles, you know the bosses there are panicking.

One could even add “bloggers” to that list, nowadays!

It was a mixed day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 6bp, FixedResets up 3bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 12bp; but all three entries in the Performance Highlights table were positive. Volume was very light and spreads on some of the less liquid issues reached ridiculous levels.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1524 % 2,444.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1524 % 3,676.1
Floater 2.47 % 2.26 % 38,498 21.60 4 -0.1524 % 2,639.1
OpRet 4.87 % 3.63 % 62,588 0.46 9 -0.0643 % 2,421.1
SplitShare 5.20 % -1.69 % 64,323 0.59 6 0.2219 % 2,506.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0643 % 2,213.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 4.96 % 132,218 1.01 9 -0.0463 % 2,063.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.53 % 5.55 % 118,497 14.52 15 -0.0649 % 2,148.3
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.24 % 205,004 2.86 57 0.0264 % 2,310.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.18 % 4.91 % 297,928 8.08 53 0.1238 % 2,120.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TDS.PR.C SplitShare 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.38
Bid-YTW : -1.69 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-12
Maturity Price : 23.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.87
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 232,222 RBC crossed blocks of 100,000 and 114,800, both at 27.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.51
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 38,231 Desjardins crossed 29,400 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 34,600 TD crossed 25,000 at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 29,430 TD crossed 25,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 27,637 Desjardins bought 11,500 from Nesbitt at 24.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.37
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 24,243 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.24
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.86 – 28.66
Spot Rate : 1.8000
Average : 1.0566

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.86
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.95 – 28.25
Spot Rate : 1.3000
Average : 0.9425

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %

BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 24.77 – 25.45
Spot Rate : 0.6800
Average : 0.5586

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 23.49 – 23.80
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2139

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-12
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 23.49
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 26.02 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1476

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.10 – 23.33
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1499

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-12
Maturity Price : 22.90
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %

May 11, 2011

Wednesday, May 11th, 2011

Nothing happened today.

It was another good solid day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 4bp, FixedResets gaining 13bp and DeemedRetractibles ahead 11bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.55%, equivalent to 7.22% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Volatility was muted and volume was average. Long Corporates now yield 5.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now 180bp, a little wider than the April 27 figure of 175bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3765 % 2,448.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3765 % 3,681.7
Floater 2.46 % 2.26 % 38,207 21.61 4 0.3765 % 2,643.1
OpRet 4.86 % 2.57 % 62,713 1.17 9 0.0799 % 2,422.6
SplitShare 5.21 % 0.11 % 65,257 0.59 6 0.0300 % 2,501.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0799 % 2,215.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.11 % 134,007 0.87 9 0.1316 % 2,064.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.53 % 5.55 % 118,393 14.52 15 0.0441 % 2,149.7
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.22 % 207,660 2.87 57 0.1279 % 2,309.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.18 % 4.94 % 300,198 8.08 53 0.1108 % 2,118.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.03
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 90,820 Desjardins crossed 85,000 at 26.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 2.87 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 62,940 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 47,499 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 24.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-11
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 23.89
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 42,990 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 27.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.29
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 39,566 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 24.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.31
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 38,920 TD crossed 31,000 at 27.83.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.63
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 24.76 – 25.45
Spot Rate : 0.6900
Average : 0.4254

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.09 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.9000
Average : 0.7104

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.09
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %

SLF.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 27.35 – 27.72
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2808

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %

CM.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 27.73 – 28.05
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2320

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.73
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %

ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.50 – 22.74
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1624

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %

BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.41 – 24.66
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1739

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %

RON.PR.A: DBRS Changes Trend to Negative

Wednesday, May 11th, 2011

DBRS has revised the trend on the Pfd-3 rating of RON.PR.A from stable to negative:

DBRS has today changed the trend on the BBB Senior Unsecured Debt rating and Pfd-3 Preferred Shares rating of RONA inc. (RONA or the Company) to Negative from Stable. The rating action reflects DBRS’s concern that weak operating performance and a challenging consumer environment may result in RONA’s credit risk profile to deteriorate to a level that is no longer consistent with the current rating categories.

May 10, 2011

Wednesday, May 11th, 2011

Global markets are getting more efficient:

Computer-based trading in India’s $1.5 trillion stock market may double to half of all orders within three years as demand for speedier execution surges, according to the Bombay Stock Exchange.

Automated programs carry out about 25 percent of Indian orders currently, Sayee Srinivasan, head of product strategy at Asia’s oldest bourse, said in an interview yesterday. About 60 percent of U.S. stock trades daily come from firms that rely on fast-paced executions, according to Tabb Group LLC.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) and Nomura Holdings Inc. (8604) say a mix of tight buy and sell spreads, a large volume of smaller orders and no midday break make India ideally suited for growth in algorithmic trading.

The BSE and National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., the nation’s biggest, started high-speed trading in 2009, about a year before the Tokyo Stock Exchange Group Inc. introduced its Arrowhead platform that cut processing to 5 milliseconds from 2 to 3 seconds. Australia’s ASX Ltd. in December moved to a platform that reduced the average time to 250 microseconds from 3 milliseconds.

India “is a big priority for us,” Murat Atamer, head of electronic trading product at Credit Suisse in Hong Kong, said in a phone interview. High-frequency trading accounts for as much as 60 percent of trades done by some of firm’s clients in the South Asian nation, greater than the proportion in Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore, he said.

The TMX Annual Report talks a lot about its “low latency”, but doesn’t provide any numbers … which reminds me of the time, years ago, when I was buying a new computer. Due to the state of the art at the time, the speed of the L2 onboard cache was an important determinant of total speed – so I asked the friendly salesman what it was. After nagging him for a couple of days, I finally got an exasperated answer: “Look, it’s fast OK? It’s fast.”. I changed suppliers shortly afterwards.

All I can find for the TSX is a 6-millisecond response time for the Quantum system in 2008, but I don’t even know whether that measurement is comparable to the latencies discussed above. Still, if they were tops you know we’d never hear the end of it. A recent TMX release trumpets “40,000 order messages per second”, which imples 25-microseconds per message if they’re sequential, but again I don’t know if that’s a comparable number – I suspect not, since the feeds are partitioned.

Gwyn Morgan shows a prediliction for easy answers in his column Wanted: clear thinking on educating the work force:

In a recent column, I criticized Canadian universities for turning away up to half of applicants for in-demand programs such as engineering, information technology and health care, while continuing to allocate much of their money to programs with poor job prospects.

The person went on to say that arts and classics students “understand that their mind is theirs to educate for their fulfilment, not to train for some random future employer.” Another respondent noted that liberal arts courses “educate the mind to think.” Both apparently believe that possession of an arts degree is a vital prerequisite to one’s ability to actually think.

Naturally, there is no discussion on the actual hiring process. In my experience, corporate hiring is abysmal, with grossly incompetent Human Resource people trying to find precise matches of presumed skills to presumed needs. The best example is Commerce degrees – does anybody know anybody with a B.Comm. who can actually do anything? Who did anything in University other than regurgitate superficial explanations of high-level economics? Yet these people are in demand – hiring them is a low-risk proposition for an HR specialist.

Aside from those with actual skill-sets (such as engineering, hard sciences, nursing, etc.), the only people worth hiring for entry-level jobs are those who adored their University studies and as a result worked their buns off. Doesn’t matter if the particular subject was Ancient Greek Pottery or Economics. Once you know how to work, how to think, how to meet a deadline … the rest is just details.

Mind you, for analytical work I have a strong preference for science grads – hard science, mind you – on the grounds that by both prediliction and training, they are likely to believe that for any question, there’s exactly one correct answer.

Royal Bank’s American unit was downgraded:

Standard & Poor’s has downgraded its ratings on RBC Bank (USA) to BBB from A- as a result of changes to Royal Bank of Canada’s long-term strategic plan for its U.S. commercial banking subsidiary amid reports the operation is up for sale.

The rating agency said this is primarily a result of the highliy competitive U.S. banking landscape and RBC Bank’s small regional presence.

S&P also revised its view of RBC Bank to “non-strategically important” from “strategically important,” which shaved three notches off its rating. However, it applied one notch of support to reflect the bank’s shared branding, infrastructure, management, liquidity and capital support from its parent.

The Portuguese Emperor is contemplating action against the boy who shouted ‘No clothes!’:

Portuguese authorities have opened a criminal inquiry into three international credit rating agencies following a complaint, the Attorney General’s office said Monday.

The inquiry is based on a complaint filed last month by four Portuguese academics, an official with the Attorney General’s office said on condition of anonymity, in keeping with departmental regulations.

The four economists claimed the agencies — Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch — caused severe financial losses for Portugal and demanded to know whether they profited from the ratings.

They also complained that the agencies dominated the ratings market and want to know whether competition rules were broken.

The inquiry will determine whether there is evidence for charges to be brought.

It was another strong day across the board for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 31bp, FixedResets gaining 11bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 23bp. Not much volatility. Good volume, with some very impressive spikes.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0235 % 2,438.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0235 % 3,667.9
Floater 2.47 % 2.25 % 37,636 21.62 4 0.0235 % 2,633.2
OpRet 4.85 % 2.58 % 62,104 1.17 9 0.1499 % 2,420.7
SplitShare 5.20 % -1.52 % 66,290 0.60 6 0.0849 % 2,500.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1499 % 2,213.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.52 % 133,247 2.33 9 0.0573 % 2,061.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.53 % 5.54 % 117,105 14.48 15 0.3054 % 2,148.8
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.29 % 208,473 2.87 57 0.1092 % 2,306.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.19 % 4.96 % 302,096 8.07 53 0.2298 % 2,115.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-10
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-10
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 23.73
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 923,250 RBC crossed 811,100 at 25.95; Nesbitt crossed 92,000 at 26.03; RBC crossed 13,900 at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
FTS.PR.C OpRet 334,434 Raymond James bought 22,400 from anonymous at 26.00 and 20,600 from Scotia at the same price. Scotia crossed 242,500 and 45,600 at the same price again. Scotia is a relatively infrequent name on this table; I bet they’re pissed RBC stole their thunder on today’s very nice tickets with the bigger deal shown above.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -1.29 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 160,075 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 135,470 Desjardins crossed blocks of 100,000 and 30,000, both at 26.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.91
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
CM.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 119,390 Nesbit crossed 100,000 at 25.50; RBC crossed 15,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 98,340 RBC crossed 82,300 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.95 – 28.25
Spot Rate : 1.3000
Average : 0.7263

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.33 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.6600
Average : 0.5025

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %

RY.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.50 – 27.02
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3684

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.88 – 27.20
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1994

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.88
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.60 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2969

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.60 – 24.95
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2601

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %

May 9, 2011

Monday, May 9th, 2011

One thing that may be helping the US economy is squatters’ rent:

Millions of Americans have more money to spend since they fell delinquent on their mortgages amid the worst housing collapse since the Great Depression. They are staying in their homes for free about a year and a half on average, buying time to restructure their finances and providing an unexpected support for consumer spending, which makes up about 70 percent of the economy.

So-called “squatter’s rent,” or the increase to income from withheld mortgage payments, will be an estimated $50 billion this year, according to Michael Feroli, chief U.S. economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co. in New York. The extra cash could represent a boost to spending that’s equal to about half the estimated savings generated by cuts to payroll withholding in December’s bipartisan tax plan.

Even after all the carnage, the situation is still deteriorating:

More than 28 percent of U.S. homeowners owed more than their properties were worth in the first quarter as values fell the most since 2008, Zillow Inc. said today.

Homeowners with negative equity increased from 22 percent a year earlier as home prices slumped 8.2 percent over the past 12 months, the Seattle-based company said. About 27 percent of homes were “underwater” in the fourth quarter, according to Zillow, which runs a website with property-value estimates and real-estate listings.

Home prices fell 3 percent in the first quarter and will drop as much as 9 percent this year as foreclosures spread and unemployment remains high, Zillow Chief Economist Stan Humphries said. Prices won’t find a floor until 2012, he said.

Thinking of protesting your credit card bill? Don’t:

Three Citibank debt collectors allegedly killed Irzen Octa, 50, secretary general of the National Unity Party (PPB), on Tuesday after he protested an increased credit card bill, the police said on Thursday.

“The motive of the murder is due to debt [issues], a credit card bill that didn’t fit [the formerly-given figure],” South Jakarta Police chief detective Adj. Sr. Comr. Budi Irawan said on Thursday.

Budi said the victim objected to his Citibank credit card bill, which had grown to Rp 100 million (US$11,500) from the Rp 48 million of which Irzen had been expecting.

Irzen only learned of the “unfitting” bill as he was about to pay it at the Citibank office branch at Jamsostek Tower in South Jakarta on Tuesday, the police said.

“We’ve found evidence at the crime scene in form of blood traces on the curtains and on the walls of the room on the fifth floor,” he added.

Budi said Citibank debt collectors A., H. and D., now named suspects, attacked Irzen because they were angered by his protest.

Forensic results show broken blood vessels in the victim’s brain.

SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro used an opportunity to vilify High Frequency Trading in a speech to the Investment Company Institute:

In thinking through our next steps, we need to consider several important questions:

  • First, what is “excessive short-term volatility?” Put another way, what level of volatility is appropriate in continuous trading, and at what point should circuit breakers or limit up/limit down take effect?
  • Second, how does excessive volatility affect – and how is it affected by – different market participants, including traders, investors, individual securities and mutual funds?
  • And finally, should high-frequency traders, who often derive significant benefit from their role as de facto market makers, also have the obligations of market makers as well as other responsibilities with respect to the impact of their technology and trading strategies on the markets?

There are a number of similarities between 1962 and 2010. For example, neither of these severe price moves could be readily explained by a particular news event. On both days, some market data systems were overwhelmed by the heavy volume.

And, in both instances, the sudden declines struck at investor confidence, leading them to question the stability and integrity of the equity markets.

But the differences between those two events are even more striking.

First, the magnitude of the declines, both at the broad market index level and for worst-hit individual securities, was much more severe in 2010 than 1962. In ‘62, the Dow declined to intraday lows of 6.3 percent compared to 9.9 percent on May 6. And one of the worst-hit individual securities in 1962 dropped 9.3 percent in a 12-minute period. In 2010, many securities lost 100 percent of their value in a matter of seconds.

Perhaps the biggest difference – and one that may help explain the difference in the magnitudes of the declines – is the volume and trading behavior of the professional traders who were expected to be the primary liquidity providers.

In ’62, the specialists who were then the primary liquidity providers, represented approximately 17 percent of market volume and were net buyers in aggregate during the decline. In 2010, the high frequency traders who are today’s liquidity providers represented well more than 50 percent of market volume and were net aggressive sellers during the broad index price decline.

High frequency traders turned what was a very down day for many investors into a very profitable one for themselves by taking liquidity rather than providing it. I think their activity that day should cause us to thoroughly examine their current role.

Also, if the plan is approved, these pauses could provide a period in which market participants have an opportunity to assess the market and decide whether and at what prices they wish to buy or sell. The result should be trading driven less by momentum-seeking algorithms and more by rational trading based on fundamentals.

We need to continue examining the effects of high speed trading on the markets and on buy-side and fundamental investors. The role of these traders, whose prominence in the markets seems only to increase, should be subject to further scrutiny. The possibility of imposing obligations during times of potential turmoil must remain on the table. And we need to pay attention to other potential flaws that could bring about equally disruptive events.

I’m sure that anybody offered the chance to get the deal that market-makers got in 1962 would jump at the chance. Fixed Commissions! One-eighth ticks! Preferential access to the order book!

She continues to ignore the impact of Stop-Loss orders – and it is Stop-Loss orders, I remain convinced, that turned a hiccup into a rout. There’s an example of a “momentum-seeking algorithm” if ever there was one!

It is also interesting that she refers to profits of HFT – I haven’t seen the question of HFT profitability addressed before. I’m sure that there are some players who made good money – but where are the figures?

The other statement of interest is the notion of imposing obligations on HFT to make markets. Generally, market makers have obligations for which they are paid in privileges. I find it very difficult to believe that the SEC intends to grant privileges to HFT, so the SEC will have to recast some otherwise normal elements of market activity as privileges. This is a very slippery slope; and there is still nothing being done about the Stop-Loss Orders.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City has released the May 2011 Edition of Fed Letter:

The May 2011 issue of Fed Letter contains the following articles: Ag finance conditions strengthen, databook finds; Community Affairs newsletter now available; District manufacturing moderates in April; Latest Economic Review research available; and Regulatory Developments.

Remember Basis Yield Alpha Fund? It was one of the first hedge funds to go under during the credit crunch, despite the managers’ assurances that they were pretty smart cookies. But the whining continues:

The day after the United States Senate released what has been described as a “scathing report” on the activities of Goldman Sachs leading up to and during the financial crisis, Australian-based Basis Yield Alpha Fund (which has waged a legal battle with the investment bank over its Timberwolf CDO), released a comment saying “Yesterday’s Senate Report confirms that in fact Goldman made a concerted effort to mislead and defraud investors, including Basis.”

The Basis Fund suit was filed in June 2010 after the fund saw an $80m investment into Timberwolf disintegrated in a matter of weeks (the suit alleges the fund lost $50m in losses and margin calls). The fund is arguing that Goldman used aggressive sales tactics and assurances that the secondary CDO market was stable, knowing that these statements were false. In August 2010, Goldman submitted a motion asking that the case be thrown out entirely due to jurisdiction because The Basis Fund executives are based in Australia. That motion was denied and the case is still working itself through the US Federal Court System.

In Thursday’s statement the Basis Fund legal team says that having asked Goldman executives questions regarding the Timberwolf security “they were met with carefully constructed lies and non-disclosures.” Eric Lewis, lead counsel for the fund says “Goldman created Timberwolf to fail, so Goldman could bet against it, and Goldman then sold the security to Basis as stable and well priced, when its own internal analysis showed that Timberwolf’s value was sinking like a stone. It is time for Goldman to be held accountable.”

I last mocked the fund and its crybaby principals on 2010-5-18. In essence, these superstars of analytical prowess bought the issue with clients’ money because Goldman said it was good. They should lose their licenses, if they still have them.

David Papell, Professor of Economics at the University of Houston, writes an interesting guest-post on Econbrowser, titled The Taylor Rule and QE2:

What are the implications of our research for current policy? With Taylor’s original rule, the prescribed federal funds rate for 2009 – 2010 is zero or slightly negative. With a variant of the Taylor rule that doubles the size of the output gap coefficient, it is about negative four percent. This is important because, with the constraint of a zero lower bound on the federal funds rate, large negative prescribed interest rates provide a rationale for the Fed’s quantitative easing in 2009 (QE1) and 2010-2011 (QE2). Our paper does not say whether or not QE1 and QE2 were good policies, a topic that is beyond the scope of our research. It does say that, if you are going to use negative prescribed interest rates to justify quantitative easing, you need to use a rule that can be justified by historical experience. Taylor’s original rule, which can be justified by historical experience, does not produce negative prescribed interest rates for 2009-2011. Variants of Taylor rules with larger output gap coefficients, which do produce negative interest rates, cannot be justified by historical experience. The Taylor rule does not provide a rationale for quantitative easing.

Strange things are happening with the TMX-LSE deal:

Traders who profit from mergers and acquisitions are betting for the first time a higher offer will trump the London Stock Exchange Group Plc (LSE)’s deal for Toronto- based TMX Group Inc. (X), leaving both bidders as losers.

A group of Canadian banks is in talks with the nation’s pension funds on alternatives to LSE’s $3.1 billion bid to keep the Toronto Stock Exchange under local ownership, the head of the pension plan in Alberta said last week. The discussions caused TMX’s share price to rise above LSE’s all-stock offer on May 6 for the first time since it was announced in February, as arbitragers bet a competing bid will emerge once LSE gains regulatory approval, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

S&P has downgraded Greece:

  • Under our sovereign ratings criteria, a commercial debt rescheduling typically constitutes a default.
  • In our view, there is increased risk that Greece will take steps to restructure the terms of its commercial debt, including its previously-issued government bonds.
  • Accordingly, we are lowering both the long- and short-term ratings on Greece to ‘B’ and ‘C’, respectively.
  • We are leaving both ratings on CreditWatch

Greek bonds reacted:

The premium investors demand to hold Greek 10-year securities instead of benchmark German bunds rose 27 basis points to 1,261 basis points. The cost of insuring Greek debt for five years rose 30 basis points to a record 1,371 basis points, according to CMA prices for credit-default swaps. The Portuguese 10-year yield increased 12 basis points to 9.67 percent, while the equivalent-maturity Spanish yield advanced 8 basis points to 5.32 percent.

European leaders had an unscheduled meeting over the weekend, with Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker saying Greece “does need a further adjustment program.” Another credit-rating cut would make Greece the lowest-rated country in Europe as today’s reduction, the fourth by S&P since April 2010, left it even with Belarus.

And it was a good day of across the board strength in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 16bp, FixedResets gaining 14bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 19bp. Not a lot of volatility, with only three entries in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0235 % 2,438.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0235 % 3,667.0
Floater 2.47 % 2.26 % 39,160 21.62 4 0.0235 % 2,632.6
OpRet 4.86 % 3.68 % 61,056 1.17 9 -0.1411 % 2,417.1
SplitShare 5.20 % -0.06 % 66,767 0.60 6 -0.0628 % 2,498.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1411 % 2,210.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.52 % 137,847 2.33 9 -0.0022 % 2,060.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.54 % 5.55 % 117,991 14.50 15 0.1643 % 2,142.2
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.34 % 208,185 2.87 57 0.1419 % 2,304.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.20 % 4.99 % 306,161 8.12 53 0.1945 % 2,110.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.71
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 104,232 Desjardins crossed three blocks 24,900 at 23.87, followed by 45,000 and 25,000 at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.91
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 60,500 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 58,570 Scotia crossed 15,000 at 24.62; Desjardins crosed 10,900 and 11,900 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
CM.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 54,200 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-06-08
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : -3.16 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 52,860 TD bought 10,000 from anonymous at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 49,135 Desjardins crossed blocks of 22,400 and 10,100, both at 24.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.18
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.35 – 26.80
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3299

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.61 – 22.99
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2941

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-09
Maturity Price : 22.45
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %

BAM.PR.H OpRet Quote: 25.29 – 25.57
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1980

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.60 – 25.87
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1971

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.80 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3328

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %

NA.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.60 – 26.80
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1403

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %

US Covered Bond Legislation Moving Forward

Sunday, May 8th, 2011

Jim Hamilton of Jim Hamilton’s World of Securities Regulation reports House Marks Up Bi-Partisan US Covered Bond Legislation:

The House Capital Markets Subcommittee marked up legislation creating a covered bond market for the US. This is bi-partisan legislation with a good chance of passing Congress this year. The U.S. Covered Bond Act of 2011 was introduced by Rep. Scott Garrett (R-NJ), Chairman of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), Ranking Member of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit. H.R. 940 will help facilitate a robust covered bond market in the U.S. to add liquidity and certainty to the capital markets. The legislation was passed out of the subcommittee by voice vote and will now be considered by the full Financial Services Committee and is expected to garner wide bipartisan support.

According to recent testimony from the US Covered Bond Council, the public supervision of covered-bond programs by a federal regulator, whose mission is the protection of covered bondholders, is central to any legislative framework. In the European Union, this feature is enshrined in the Directive on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (the UCITS Directive), compliance with which is what has given covered bonds their unique status in Europe, including privileged risk weighting under the Capital Requirements Directive and preferential treatment by the European Central Bank in Eurosystem credit operations. Issuances by regulated financial institutions is another fundamental element of covered bonds that is also recognized in the UCITS Directive. One other indispensable feature of covered bonds is a cover pool that contains performing assets and that is replenished and kept sufficient at all times to fully secure the claims of covered bondholders. This too receives specific mention in the UCITS Directive.

With covered-bond programs subject to rigorous public supervision, investors will be well protected. As a result, an expansion of existing securities-law exemptions may be appropriate.

I wrote a very brief primer on covered bonds a while ago. The proposed and defeated federal budget promised covered bond legislation, but so did the prior year’s: you can’t take these clowns too seriously.

SEC Grinding Forward on MMF Regulation

Saturday, May 7th, 2011

The Securities and Exchange Commission has announced:

the panelists and final agenda for the Money Market Funds and Systemic Risk Roundtable to be held May 10.

The roundtable will address:

  • The potential for money market funds to pose a systemic risk to broader financial markets – what makes money market funds vulnerable to runs and how should the role of money market funds be viewed through the prism of systemic risk analysis.
  • Possible options for further regulatory reform and their implications, including floating NAV, bank regulation, and options that reflect a hybrid of these regulatory approaches: a private liquidity bank; mandatory reserve or capital requirements; and liquidity fees.

The agenda and list of panelists can be found on the SEC website.

The roundtable discussion will begin at 2 p.m. and be available by webcast on the SEC website. The webcast also will be archived for later viewing.

I am very pleased to see Paul Volcker on the list of participants. It was his discussion of the issue and plan for regulation that got me interested in the subject, which I subsequently addressed in an article.

The sessions won’t be particularly long, but will serve as a basis for further discussion:

2:20-3:05 p.m. Discussion — Potential for Money Market Funds to Pose a Systemic Risk to Broader Markets

  • What makes money market funds vulnerable to runs?
  • How should the role of money market funds in the short-term funding market be viewed through the prism of systemic risk analysis?


3:20-5:00 p.m. Discussion — Regulatory Options and their Implications

  • Floating NAV vs. Bank regulation
  • Hybrid approaches to regulation: Private liquidity bank
  • Hybrid approaches to regulation: Mandatory reserve/capital requirements
  • Hybrid approaches to regulation: Liquidity fees

On this general topic, the Chicago Fed notes:

Firms face increasing pressure to weigh the value proposition MMFs offer over the intermediate term. Budget projections factor MMF waivers well into next year. While MMF fee waivers have been subsidized by higher asset management fee revenues a second abrupt market decline could cause further strain.

MMFs have reduced their holdings of CP in favor of repos and government debt. At the same time, CP issuers seek to lock in longer term funding rates due to Basel III higher liquidity standards. Net result is a more limited, concentrated pool of eligible CP debt offerings for MMFs. MMFs are a major funding source for bank issued CP, comprising 40% of all CP issuances.

Update, 2011-5-11: The stable NAV is the focus of criticism:

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair called money-market mutual funds “destabilizing” to the financial system and said investors would be served just as well if share prices floated.

“Money-market funds are maintaining a fiction of a stable” net-asset value, as shown by the September 2008 failure of the $62.5 billion Reserve Primary Fund, Bair said yesterday at a round-table meeting of fund-company executives and regulators arranged by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington. “That is skewing investment dollars into a structure that is highly unstable in a crisis.”

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker called a floating share price the “simplest” solution to the risk posed by money funds, which trade at a constant $1 a share.

This may be because it’s the only possible measure that can be introduced that won’t cost anybody any money!