Archive for June, 2011

Carrick: Why the preferred-shares party might be winding down

Friday, June 10th, 2011

Rob Carrick wrote an article with the title Why the preferred-shares party might be winding down, which quoted me extensively:

There are two reasons why bank rate resets will be redeemed at the earliest opportunity, argues James Hymas, president of Hymas Investment Management Inc. and a preferred share specialist. The first is that the dividend these shares must pay on reset is a reflection of a financial marketplace in crisis and not today’s much calmer environment.

“Now, banks wouldn’t have to pay more than 100 basis points over Government of Canada bonds,” Mr. Hymas said. “Even some of the junkier issues [of rate-reset preferred shares] are coming out at a spread of 200 basis points.”

The other reason why banks are expected to redeem their rate-reset preferreds and, in fact, other preferred-share issues as well, is a new set of global banking rules that will be gradually phased in ahead of a 2022 implementation date. The rules will not allow banks to include preferred shares in the key measure of their financial solidity.

Banks are expected to phase out their preferred-share holdings as a result, and this suggests almost all rate resets are going to be redeemed at the first opportunity.

Mr. Hymas said 2014 is when most bank-issued rate resets will hit their first reset/redemption date. Should investors get out now? “Those looking for a long-term investment can do much better elsewhere,” Mr. Hymas said.

He suggests looking at bank and insurance company perpetual preferred shares. Generally, perpetuals have no fixed redemption date and offer no rate-reset potential. Really, they’re a lot like open-ended bonds with no maturity date.

Mr. Hymas argues that most perpetuals issued by banks are a different animal because the 2022 regulatory deadline is almost like a drop-dead date for redemption. In fact, he regards them as being nearly as good as retractable preferred shares, which have a preset date for redemption.

Retractables are considered a desirable kind of preferred share because they offer an escape hatch that perpetuals lack.

The term “deemed retractable” has been coined by Mr. Hymas to describe bank perpetuals that he expects to be redeemed by 2022. An example of this type of share from his recommended list is Royal Bank of Canada Series AD, which have a dividend yield of about 4.6 per cent based on a share price of $24.37. If you hold until redemption at $25, your total return (share price gain plus dividends) is a littler bit higher.

There’s some uncertainty right now about whether insurance companies will be bound by the same rules as banks on preferred shares. Mr. Hymas thinks they will be, and he therefore suggests insurance company perpetuals as another potential landing spot for people selling bank-issued rate resets.

An example from his recommended list is the Great-West Lifeco Inc. Series I, which have a current yield of 5 per cent based on a price of $22.46. In his May newsletter, Mr. Hymas projected the yield based on a $25 redemption in 2022 at 6.25 per cent.

CNPF: US-Listed Canadian Preferred Stock ETF

Friday, June 10th, 2011

It has been announced that GLOBAL X FUNDS LAUNCHES FIRST CANADA PREFERRED ETF (CNPF):

Global X Funds, the New York based provider of exchange traded funds, today launched the Global X Canada Preferred ETF (Ticker: CNPF). This is the first ETF to target Canadian companies that issue preferred stock.

For investors seeking income, preferred shares are an asset class worth considering due to their unique combination of bond and equity characteristics. Like bonds, preferred shares generally pay stable dividends with more frequent distributions than common shares. Like equity, preferred shares trade on an exchange and have the potential to appreciate in value, offering additional income growth potential for investors. Moreover, preferred shareholders have priority over common shareholders with regard to claims on company earnings and assets, which provide some downside protection.

In addition, preferred shares of Canadian companies offer investors an opportunity to diversify outside the U.S. and increase their international issuer and currency exposure, which may help reduce overall portfolio risk. A shrinking budget deficit paired with strong economic growth and higher commodity prices make Canada a strong contender for investment dollars when compared to the current budget and debt issues of its southern neighbor (Wall Street Journal, 2011).

“CNPF provides a relatively efficient way for investors to reap the benefits of this hybrid asset class as well as receive international exposure via the Canadian issuers traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange,” said Bruno del Ama, chief executive officer of Global X Funds. “We are pleased to expand our global offering to income generating asset classes.”

The Global X Canada Preferred ETF tracks the Solactive Canada Preferred Stock Index, which is designed to measure the performance of preferred stocks from Canadian issuers traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The Underlying Index does not seek to directly reflect the performance of the companies issuing the preferred stock. The Underlying Index is comprised of preferred shares that meet certain criteria relating to size, liquidity, issuer rating, maturity and other requirements as determined by Structured Solutions AG. As of May 16, 2011, the three largest components of the index were Transcanada Corp., Manulife Financial Corp., and Canadian Imperial Bank.

I can think of some people who just may take issue with the statement that “This is the first ETF to target Canadian companies that issue preferred stock.”! Michael Johnson of ETFdb notes:

There are multiple ETFs listed in Canada offering exposure to the country’s preferred stock market; the Claymore S&P/TSX CDN Preferred Share Trust has more than $600 million in AUM, and the actively-managed Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (HPR) is another options for accessing this asset class. iShares filed earlier this year for an international preferred stock ETF that would include a heavy tilt towards Canadian securities, along with issuers from Japan, New Zealand, and the U.K.

The Solactive Canada Preferred Stock Index is admirably transparent. The indexing agent is Structured Solutions AG, which is based in Frankfurt. My, aren’t we getting international! They appear to do a lot of business with Global X, a New York based firm that has a hatful of thinly sliced ETFs.

At 58bp, this ETF doesn’t have anything special going for it on the fee side. I have not yet checked – and may never check! – the composition of the index, so I won’t comment on that. I am also being lazy and not checking whether Canadian dividends will retain their character for Canadian investors when routed through a US ETF, but it’s something I would find out before plunking any money down! In the meantime, I’m wondering (a) why Americans would buy Canadian preferreds on a passive basis, when they have no tax advantage, and (b) when the first Canadian listed US Municipal bond ETF will start up.

Barron’s gave the fund a civil mention. ETFdb reports the fund has $3.75-million in market cap.

CNPF is NYSE listed and, according to Yahoo!, closed today at 14.20-12, 10×2. If that spread is any indication of normality, it might be fun to make a market in it!

Many thanks to Assiduous Reader NS for bringing this to my attention. He’s wondering whether this listing is a sign of doom … maybe it is, but more likely for the increasingly ridiculous ETF market than for Canadian preferreds.

June 10, 2011

Friday, June 10th, 2011

I find the US Municipal bond market of great interest, simply because the investor profile is so similar to that of Canadian preferred shares. I was recently looking for some estimates of holdings by investor group; now that I don’t need it any more, of course, I found it:

Citigroup Inc. analysts say there’s something missing from the Federal Reserve’s tally of the municipal-bond market’s size: more than $700 billion of the securities were bought directly by individual investors.

The Fed’s quarterly figures, released yesterday, put the market at $2.9 trillion, 37 percent of which the central bank says is owned by households. Citigroup’s analysts George Friedlander, Mikhail Foux and Vikram Rai say individuals play an even larger role, holding half of a $3.7 trillion market that has been whipsawed by speculation about municipal defaults that is now starting to ebb.

“The instability in the muni market in late 2010 was exacerbated by individual investors becoming overly concerned about the fiscal strength of state and local governments,” Rai said in an e-mail after Citigroup’s report on the market was published on June 3. “Unsurprisingly, as credit fears abated, it resulted in lower volatility and a rally in the tax-exempt and taxable market.”

Citigroup’s analysts didn’t challenge the Federal Reserve’s data on holdings by institutional investors such as mutual funds and insurance companies, which can be gleaned from corporate filings and other outside data sources. Without similar information on households, the analysts say, the Fed had to guess.

By underestimating the market, they’ve also diminished the extent to which individuals dominate it, they said. Citigroup estimates individuals they held $1.8 trillion, or half, of the municipal bonds outstanding at the end of 2010, compared with about $1.1 trillion estimated by the Federal Reserve.

“We always believed that the influence of retail investors in the municipal market was understated,” Rai said.

The Federal Reserve said it’s looking into the discrepancy, said Susan Stawick, a spokeswoman.

S&P Discusses Some Observations On Canada’s Consultation Paper For A Proposed Legislative Regime For Covered Bonds:

  • On May 11, 2011, the Canadian Department of Finance released a consultation paper on its proposed covered bond legislation.
  • We believe that, in general, the introduction of specific covered bond legislation would be positive, and would likely provide further assurances for investors.
  • However, we note that the proposed codification of an overcollateralization cap may limit an issuer’s ability to manage and support its covered bond program by increasing the level of collateral and may, under our current analytical approach, potentially constrain the ability of issuers to achieve or maintain the highest potential ratings.

DBRS also commented:

One particular area of concern for DBRS is the proposed cap of 10% on the amount of overcollateralization that will be permitted for a Canadian covered bond program. In the event that additional overcollateralization is necessary to maintain a AAA rating on the covered bonds that have been issued, the 10% cap on overcollateralization may adversely affect the ratings on the existing covered bonds. However, DBRS notes that all of the existing Canadian covered bond programs rated by DBRS to date currently have required overcollateralization amounts that are less than 10%. Another area of concern for DBRS is the proposal to standardize asset valuation, particularly if an issuer is not permitted to issue covered bonds outside of the legislative framework, as the proposed asset valuation method may not be consistent with what is currently used in the Canadian covered bond programs that have been rated by DBRS to date.

Fabulous Fab is going to trial:

Fabrice Tourre, the Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) trader accused of misleading investors in a collateralized debt obligation, failed to get a suit brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission dismissed.

While U.S. District Judge Barbara Jones in Manhattan did narrow some of the claims against him in her decision today, she said the SEC met its burden that Tourre violated a securities law designed to prevent fraudulent sales of securities and should stand trial on that claim.

The SEC initially sued the London-based trader in April 2010, saying he defrauded investors by not disclosing that hedge fund Paulson & Co. had helped pick the underlying securities for a CDO as Abacus and planned to bet against them. After reaching a $550 million settlement with New York-based Goldman Sachs, the SEC filed a new claim against Tourre, saying he gave the company “substantial assistance” as it misled investors.

Citing last year’s U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the judge threw out some claims involving Duesseldorf, Germany-based IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG, which allegedly lost almost all of its $150 million investment, and ABN Amro Bank NV, which assumed the credit risk associated with a portion of Abacus.

Jones let the case proceed on a claim against Tourre that he “knowingly, recklessly or negligently” made misrepresentations in the sale of securities to ACA Management LLC, IKB and ABN Amro.

Rhapsody in Yellow? A little cacaphonous today. The issues went ex-Dividend – good luck to anybody attempting to draw conclusions from the Dividend Drop Off Rate, which will be 100% if the total return is to be 0%.

YLO Issues, 2011-6-10
Ticker Quote
6/9
Quote
6/10
Bid YTW
6/10
YTW
Scenario
6/10
Performance
6/10
(bid/bid)
Div. Div.
DOR
YLO.PR.A 22.25-39 22.51-78 11.28% Soft Maturity
2012-12-30
+2.36% 0.265630 -98%
YLO.PR.B 16.51-64 16.24-39 13.58% Soft Maturity
2017-06-29
+0.92% 0.3125 51%
YLO.PR.C 16.85-95 16.24-39 9.95% Limit Maturity -1.12% 0.42188 145%
YLO.PR.D 17.01-41 16.75-80 9.84% Limit Maturity +1.01% 0.43125 60%

It was an off day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 12bp, FixedResets down 3bp and DeemedRetractibles shrinking 5bp. Volatility was again muted, with no entries in the Performance Highlights table, but volume picked up and was only a little below average – RY DeemedRetractibles dominated the volume table.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,476.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 3,724.4
Floater 2.43 % 2.22 % 42,593 21.68 4 0.0000 % 2,673.8
OpRet 4.86 % 2.78 % 69,094 0.38 9 -0.0642 % 2,426.1
SplitShare 5.24 % -0.07 % 61,254 0.51 6 -0.0899 % 2,502.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0642 % 2,218.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.66 % 4.91 % 151,976 1.40 12 -0.1460 % 2,075.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.44 % 5.53 % 120,203 14.49 18 -0.1187 % 2,183.1
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.22 % 183,838 2.82 57 -0.0337 % 2,314.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.87 % 304,904 8.09 47 -0.0455 % 2,154.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 206,620 RBC crossed 198,200 at 24.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.89
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 109,675 TD crossed 43,100 at 24.36 and 25,000 at 24.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 80,810 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 58,400 TD crossed 50,000 at 24.38.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.34
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 54,820 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
BNS.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 53,433 TD crossed blocks of 20,000 and 23,600, both at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.56 – 22.89
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2033

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.56
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %

NA.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.60 – 27.90
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2038

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.30 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2043

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.80 – 26.04
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1490

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.80 – 26.09
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2073

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.58 – 25.85
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1991

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %

June 9, 2011

Thursday, June 9th, 2011

Today’s top news is that Interactive Brokers thinks about what they’re doing:

Interactive Brokers Group Inc., the electronic market maker and securities firm, raised margin requirements to 100 percent for some Chinese stocks, because of “elevated risk concerns,” according to a statement on its website. Sina and Sohu were among more than 100 Chinese companies on the list. The increase went into effect June 6 in stages and will be completed by the end of this week, the brokerage said.

Given the fate of other brokerages that think about what they do (by which I mean Goldman Sachs and … and … probably lots and lots of others) we can expect the invective against IB to start pouring out any day now.

The Fed may have overestimated the market’s appetite for risk:

Federal Reserve auctions of mortgage securities that the central bank assumed in the rescue of American International Group Inc. are fueling a selloff in credit markets as Wall Street rushes to hedge against losses on stockpiled debt.

Declines in credit-default swaps indexes used to protect against losses on subprime housing debt and commercial mortgages accelerated this month, reaching almost 20 percent in the past five weeks as the cost of the insurance climbs, according to Markit Group Ltd. The plunge this week started infecting everything from junk bonds to the debt of financial companies.

The Fed has been selling the $31 billion Maiden Lane II portfolio piecemeal after rejecting a $15.7 billion bid from AIG for the entire pool in March.

Wall Street banks, which through May 25 increased their holdings of corporate and asset-backed debt to the highest level in 13 months, have been using both so-called Markit ABX and CMBX indexes to hedge against the deteriorating values of mortgage debt, said Christopher Sullivan, chief investment officer at United Nations Federal Credit Union in New York. That’s contributing to the drop in prices of the underlying bonds and helped push up relative yields on speculative-grade, or junk, corporate bonds to the widest level this year.

I have complained for a long time that we, as a continent, are not spending enough on infrastructure. Here’s another datapoint:

With its intricately interdependent and increasingly complex electronic components, the U.S. electric grid operates on an ever-shrinking margin for error. The larger and more interconnected the grid becomes, the more vulnerable it is to catastrophic cascading failures. A recent article in Scientific American (see note 1) estimates that there is a one in 20 chance of a solar super-storm in the next 15 years.

The House Energy and Commerce Committee unveiled the Grid Reliability and Infrastructure Defense Act on May 20, 2011. Among the draft bill’s provisions are requirements that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issue orders spelling out procedures and requirements for dealing with immediate and longer-term threats to the grid.

Overview

  • The U.S. electricity transmission grid is vulnerable to solar activity.
  • Scientists estimate that there is a one in 20 chance over the next 15 years of a disabling solar storm.
  • Grid operators are looking at ways to protect it from such events.

More harrassment today from volunteer organizations using automated dialers because their time is ever so much more valuable than mine. Hint to organizers: if you want something from me, don’t insult me before I’ve even picked up the ‘phone.

YLO was boring today, so there is no Yellow Fever Report.

It was another mixed day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 9bp, FixedResets losing 8bp and DeemedRetractibles up 4bp. There were no entries in the Performance Highlights table. Volume continued to be very sluggish.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0695 % 2,476.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0695 % 3,724.4
Floater 2.43 % 2.22 % 42,400 21.68 4 -0.0695 % 2,673.8
OpRet 4.86 % 2.50 % 67,999 0.38 9 0.1200 % 2,427.7
SplitShare 5.23 % -0.63 % 61,795 0.51 6 0.1650 % 2,505.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1200 % 2,219.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.65 % 4.90 % 152,214 1.40 12 0.0575 % 2,078.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.43 % 5.50 % 119,904 14.53 18 0.0862 % 2,185.7
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.22 % 183,990 2.82 57 -0.0759 % 2,315.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.85 % 282,263 8.12 47 0.0438 % 2,155.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 218,632 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 1.41 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 211,872 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.00; Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at the same price; RBC crossed 50,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 104,732 RBC crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 2.50 %
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 75,280 RBC crosse 48,400 at 25.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 4.69 %
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 69,000 RBC crossed 65,000 at 26.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-05-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 67,280 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 24.88.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.37 – 24.72
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2526

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-09
Maturity Price : 24.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.37
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %

GWO.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 26.55 – 27.00
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3610

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.75 – 24.01
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1869

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-09
Maturity Price : 23.52
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.85 – 26.07
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1747

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %

BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.26 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.1400
Average : 0.1000

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-05-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %

GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.80 – 23.98
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1403

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %

June 8, 2011

Wednesday, June 8th, 2011

Why are so many investors unhappy with their advisors? Because they got what they deserved:

Investors would rather pay commissions for the financial advice they receive than a fee based on assets under management, said Cerulli Associates.

About 47 percent of 7,800 households surveyed prefer paying commissions, compared with 27 percent that would rather contribute a fee based on assets, according to the report released today by the Boston-based research firm. About 18 percent said they prefer paying retainer fees, which are generally lump sums negotiated between advisers and clients, and 8 percent said they opt for an hourly fee structure.

About 33 percent of investors surveyed said they didn’t know how they pay for the investment advice they receive, and 31 percent said they thought their adviser or broker provided investment advice for free. Those who were unsure of how they pay for advice were most likely to be unhappy with their financial adviser, with 47 percent reporting dissatisfaction, the study said. About 27 percent of those who said they pay commissions reported being dissatisfied.

About 64 percent of those surveyed said they believe their financial adviser is held to a fiduciary standard of care, and 63 percent of clients of the largest broker-dealers said they thought that as well.

Brokers currently must meet a standard to offer clients “suitable investments,” whereas registered investment advisers have a fiduciary obligation to put clients’ best interests first.

In January, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission released a report recommending a common fiduciary standard for brokers and registered investment advisers who provide personalized investment advice. The SEC is scheduled to propose a rule on the standard between August and the end of the year, according to its website. Holding brokers to a fiduciary standard won’t preclude them from accepting commissions, the SEC report said.

Perhaps somebody, somewhere, will somehow explain to me how fiduciary responsibility is compatible with a transaction-based fee structure. But I doubt it.

In trouble over hockey arenas? Try a distraction, like paternalistic, invasive regulation:

The Quebec government, desperate to head off a looming collapse of household finances when interest rates rise, has tabled a bill that would force credit card holders to boost their monthly payments and settle their debts faster.

Among the new rules proposed Wednesday by the Liberal government of Jean Charest, lenders would be required to raise the minimum monthly credit card payment to 5% of the outstanding balance from the current 2%. The measure would be phased in over three years.

The government is worried its citizens will have a hard time paying off what they owe and saving money when interest rates start their inevitable climb.

I don’t pay a lot of attention, but credit card rates aren’t all that sensitive to prime, are they?

There’s another coercive Irish tender:

DBRS Inc. (DBRS) today has downgraded the Dated Subordinated Debt rating of Irish Life & Permanent plc (IL&P or the Group) to “C” from CCC. Today’s downgrade follows the announcement by IL&P that it has commenced an offer to purchase the aforementioned securities for cash and a solicitation of consents in relation to the securities. Moreover, DBRS expects to downgrade the Dated Subordinated Debt to “D” at completion of the buyback; as such, the securities remain Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on 3 December 2010.

In DBRS’s view, the purchase offer, when completed, is tantamount to a default as defined by DBRS policy. DBRS views the proposed purchase offer as coercive as the offer affords bondholders limited options. Should the bondholder reject the proposed offer, at an 80% discount on the majority of the tendered securities, they risk receiving substantially less if the proposed consent amendments are ratified. Remaining bondholders would then receive 0.001% of par value, should the consent to allow the “clean-up” of residual notes be accepted by tendering bondholders.

The FRB-Boston has released a Public Policy Discussion Paper by Christopher L. Foote and Jane S. Little titled Oil and the Macroeconomy in a Changing World: A Conference Summary:

Analysis of oil-price movements is once again an important feature of economic policy discussions. To provide some background for this analysis, this paper summarizes a conference on the oil market held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in June 2010. Four cross-cutting themes emerged from this symposium, which included scientific experts, market participants, business leaders, academics, and policymakers. First, the decline in real oil prices that followed the 1970s’ oil shocks is unlikely to be repeated today, because there are fewer ways in which oil-importing countries can reduce oil demand or expand domestic supplies in response to higher prices. The second lesson of the conference, however, is that any prediction about oil markets is highly uncertain, a fact illustrated by the wide confidence intervals that result when futures-market data are used to quantify forecast uncertainty. Third, there is little consensus on whether new financial investment in commodity index funds has increased the volatility of oil prices. Finally, changes in oil prices still have large effects on the economy. Some research suggests that the rapid run-up in oil prices in 2007–08 may have significantly weakened the U.S. economy in the early stages of the Great Recession.

I don’t expect the third point to get much attention from the politicians and regulators!

The Big Yellow Machine continued to break down:

YLO Issues, 2011-6-8
Ticker Quote
6/7
Quote
6/8
Bid YTW
6/8
YTW
Scenario
6/8
Performance
6/8
(bid/bid)
YLO.PR.A 22.05-30 22.30-40 12.72% Soft Maturity
2012-12-30
+1.13%
YLO.PR.B 15.77-86 16.20-42 14.17% Soft Maturity
2017-06-29
+2.73%
YLO.PR.C 17.60-98 16.91-08 9.84% Limit Maturity -3.92%
YLO.PR.D 18.00-20 17.07-25 9.95% Limit Maturity -5.17%

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 8bp, FixedResets up 11bp and DeemedRetractibles down 10bp. There was a nice little bit of volatility, mainly to the downsider for the insurer DeemedRetractibles that have done so well lately. Volume continued to be pathetic – all the players must be enjoying the good weather!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2321 % 2,478.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2321 % 3,727.0
Floater 2.43 % 2.21 % 43,018 21.70 4 0.2321 % 2,675.7
OpRet 4.86 % 2.68 % 67,468 0.38 9 -0.1626 % 2,424.8
SplitShare 5.24 % -0.06 % 60,062 0.52 6 -0.1985 % 2,501.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1626 % 2,217.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.65 % 5.01 % 153,034 1.41 12 -0.1803 % 2,077.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.44 % 5.53 % 114,588 14.53 18 -0.0815 % 2,183.8
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.20 % 191,309 2.82 57 0.1090 % 2,317.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.88 % 316,962 8.14 47 -0.1038 % 2,154.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.41
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-08
Maturity Price : 23.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.92
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 61,870 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-08
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 57,186 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-08
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 56,559 Desjardins crossed 40,000 at 25.16.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 56,547 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 44,406 TD crossed 40,000 at 27.17.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.17
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 41,742 TD crossed 25,000 at 27.42.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.I OpRet Quote: 25.61 – 25.98
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2886

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 2.68 %

BAM.PR.H OpRet Quote: 25.41 – 25.71
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2220

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.35 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1794

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 26.00 – 26.33
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2634

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.42 – 22.80
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.3148

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-08
Maturity Price : 22.27
Evaluated at bid price : 22.42
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.48 – 24.70
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1651

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %

June 7, 2011

Tuesday, June 7th, 2011

The Sino-Forest plot thickens:

Muddy Waters Research, the firm founded by short seller Carson Block, “pre-marketed” its June 2 report on Sino-Forest Corp. (TRE) to hedge funds for the past five weeks, said an analyst at Dundee Securities Ltd.

“Muddy Waters pre-marketed this smoking-gun report on Sino-Forest to hedge funds over the last five weeks,” said Richard Kelertas, a Montreal-based analyst at Dundee, which helped sell shares in Sino-Forest as recently as December 2009.

Kelertas said that the Muddy Waters report was inaccurate and there’s nothing fraudulent about Sino-Forest “to the best of our knowledge.” He recommended buying Sino-Forest shares from September 2007 until June 3, when he put his rating on the company under review.

Dundee was among institutions that helped Sino-Forest sell shares in December 2009 and also in May 2009.

Short selling, or selling borrowed shares with the hope of profiting when they fall, more than doubled to a record 35 percent of Sino-Forest’s outstanding stock as of June 3, up from 17 percent at the beginning of May and 13 percent at the end of 2010, according to Data Explorers, a New York-based research firm. Sino-Forest was the most-shorted stock in the Standard & Poor’s TSX Composite Index, which has an average short interest of 4.8 percent.

Offering a report to hedge funds before making it public is not illegal, said James Fanto, who teaches classes on international financial regulation and securities laws at Brooklyn Law School in New York.

“Muddy Waters can profit from this information itself, or allow others to profit from their insights as well,” Fanto said in an e-mail message. “The only problems emerge when research is in fact based on insider tips. But that doesn’t seem to be the case here.”

I haven’t heard such an impassioned defense of company from a dealer since Bre-X! I hope everybody has popcorn at hand to watch the rest of this show.

Speaking of companies getting trashed, there was another outbreak of yellow fever today:

YLO Issues, 2011-6-7
Ticker Quote
6/6
Quote
6/7
Bid YTW
6/7
YTW
Scenario
6/7
Performance
6/7
(bid/bid)
YLO.PR.A 22.69-85 22.05-30 13.50% Soft Maturity
2012-12-30
-2.82%
YLO.PR.B 16.38-52 15.77-86 14.75% Soft Maturity
2017-06-29
-3.72%
YLO.PR.C 18.33-40 17.60-98 9.44% Limit Maturity -3.98%
YLO.PR.D 18.73-95 18.00-20 9.41% Limit Maturity -3.90%

It was another muted day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 6bp, FixedResets basically flat and DeemedRetractibles up 3bp. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3377 % 2,472.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3377 % 3,718.4
Floater 2.44 % 2.22 % 44,769 21.68 4 0.3377 % 2,669.5
OpRet 4.86 % 2.88 % 64,130 0.39 9 0.3650 % 2,428.7
SplitShare 5.23 % -1.55 % 60,469 0.52 6 0.0636 % 2,506.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3650 % 2,220.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.64 % 5.02 % 154,009 1.41 12 0.0640 % 2,081.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.43 % 5.51 % 115,849 14.52 18 0.0582 % 2,185.6
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.18 % 192,969 2.83 57 0.0033 % 2,314.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.89 % 307,121 8.13 47 0.0326 % 2,156.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 168,548 National bought 25,000 from Nesbitt at 25.60, then crossed 65,000 at the same price. RBC crossed 50,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 121,650 RBC crosed blocks of 50,000 shares, 36,900 and 30,000, all at 25.71.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-07
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : -1.94 %
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 110,016 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-07
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 2.05 %
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 76,911 Desjardins crossed 33,700 at 25.11; Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 54,800 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Premium 52,333 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.41.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-07
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : -0.58 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.42 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.3671

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %

GWO.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 26.35 – 26.72
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2781

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.02 – 23.43
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.3186

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-07
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.54 – 26.81
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.2009

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.54
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 26.70 – 27.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2362

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.50 – 22.80
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2433

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-07
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %

ABK.PR.B Warrants 40% Subscribed

Tuesday, June 7th, 2011

Allbanc Split Corp. has announced:

the completion of its warrant offering. The gross proceeds from the exercise of the warrants previously issued totaled $26.9 million, representing 40% of the maximum available subscription amount.

The net proceeds from the exercise of the warrants will be invested in accordance with the investment objectives of the Company.

AllBanc Split Corp. is a mutual fund corporation created to hold a portfolio of publicly listed common shares of selected Canadian chartered banks. Class A Capital Shares and Class B Preferred Shares of AllBanc Split Corp. are listed for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols ABK.A and ABK.PR.B respectively.

As previously noted, the warrants were significantly in-the-money, but sometimes that doesn’t mean the money comes in!

Sadly, this leaves the preferred shares with only about $34-million worth outstanding … getting up there, but still a little on the small side to be included in the HIMIPref™ universe. Maybe next time!

MAPF Performance: May 2011

Tuesday, June 7th, 2011

The fund had a superb month, bouncing back from the underperformance of March and April with a return of +3.84%.

The highly variable nature of the fund’s recent relative return is attributable to uncertainty and ignorance regarding OSFI’s policies concerning capital markets. The NVCC Draft Advisory has not yet been finalized, despite the fact that the deadline for (top secret) comments passed nearly three months ago. In addition, there has been nothing released regarding the potential application of this draft to insurers. Thus, the main question posed to preferred share investors has nothing to do with economics or credit quality or any of that old fashioned guff: the question is “what will OSFI do next?” OSFI may well have its own opinions on the matter but I take the view that this is gross negligence that has caused great damage to the capital markets.

I have uploaded two graphs comparing very similar issues: GWO.PR.I and CM.PR.I, updating the graphs shown last month:

These two issues are both considered to be DeemedRetractibles; I consider it more prudent to assume they will be redeemed on or before 2022-1-31 than to assume otherwise.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close May 31 was $11.3297.

Returns to May 31, 2011
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +3.84% +1.82% +1.31%
Three Months +2.02% +2.80% +1.76%
One Year +27.08% +17.53% +13.32%
Two Years (annualized) +23.53% +14.37% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +24.63% +7.46% +4.69%
Four Years (annualized) +18.74% +5.03%  
Five Years (annualized) +15.90% +4.21%  
Six Years (annualized) +14.05% +4.02%  
Seven Years (annualized) +13.49% +4.41%  
Eight Years (annualized) +14.44% +4.38%  
Nine Years (annualized) +13.53% +4.76%  
Ten Years (annualized) +13.81% +4.47%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.51%, +1.92% and +14.90%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +6.07%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.82%, +1.17% and +9.47% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.71%, +1.71% & +11.39%, respectively
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF are not yet available (inception date 2010-11-23)

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.2857 0.3628
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.2857 0.3885
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.2857 0.4112
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.2857 0.4672
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.2857 $0.4112
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.2857 $0.4672
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.2857 $0.5737
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.2857 $0.6046
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.2857 $0.6029
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.2857 $0.5802
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0819 $0.5714
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0819 $0.5759
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0819 $0.5850
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.0819 $0.5832
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0000 $0.5822
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0000 $0.6594
May, 2011 11.3297 5.75% 1.009 5.802% 1.0000 $0.6573
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February and March, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on May 31; all of the former and most of the latter currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in a SplitShare (BNA.PR.C) and an OperatingRetractible Scrap (YLO.PR.B) which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.68% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: May 2011 analysis (which is greater than the 5.52% index yield on May 31). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $11.3297 * 0.0568 = $0.6435, an increase from the $10.9105 * 0.0554 = $0.6044 reported in April.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: May 2011

Tuesday, June 7th, 2011

Turnover increased in May, to about 23%.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2011-5-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 9.2% (+4.4) 6.30% 6.34
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 12.5% (+5.7) 5.68% 14.34
Fixed-Reset 10.2% (+2.1) 3.18% 2.75
Deemed-Retractible 57.5% (-12.5) 5.73% 7.99
Scraps (Various) 9.7% (-0.3) 8.70% 9.17
Cash +0.9% (+0.6) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.75% 8.14
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February and March, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2011-5-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 47.1% (+3.9)
Pfd-2(high) 22.7% (-4.1)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 19.6% (-0.1)
Pfd-3(high) 6.5% (0)
Pfd-3 3.2% (-0.3)
Cash +0.9% (+0.6)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end.
A position held in ELF preferreds has been assigned to Pfd-2(low)

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2011-5-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 6.8% (+6.8)
$50,000 – $100,000 11.0% (-6.9)
$100,000 – $200,000 36.1% (+0.9)
$200,000 – $300,000 15.3% (+0.5)
>$300,000 29.9% (-1.9)
Cash +0.9% (+0.6)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2010, and published in the September, 2010, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is slightly more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

June 6, 2011

Monday, June 6th, 2011

This is old, but Laurie Carver wrote a good piece on Credit Rating Agencies titled Losing Credit:

Brooks says the NAIC decided to move to the new methodology because of rating agencies’ failure to accurately capture the risk of severity of loss in structured credit (and consequently its flipside – recovery). “Under the old regime, ratings were a kind of blunt tool for determining the risk-based capital, whereas now we’re doing a more detailed analysis of each security held by the insurer.”

He sees the old rating-based RBC charges as creating ‘cliff risk’, because their focus on the first dollar of loss in the whole structure caused sudden downgrades to be assigned to tranches that were actually likely to recoup or profit. For instance, under the old regime, AAA securities would carry a capital charge of just 0.4%, compared to 23% for a CCC security. “This very sharp change in the RBC charge can happen without a material effect on the actual return on the insurer’s investment,” says Brooks.

“The rating agencies’ methodology is binary – they take account of the probability of default but not the severity of loss to the insurer’s specific position. Just because there’s a default, doesn’t mean that the security held by the insurer is going to experience 100% loss.”

Trichet has figured out that maybe the EU should have paid attention when Greece announced it was cooking its books:

The economic crisis in Europe is not a crisis of the euro currency or of the monetary union, says the president of the European Central Bank.

“The current crisis stems rather from insufficient monitoring of economic policies in a number of member states,” Jean-Claude Trichet said in a speech at the Conference of Montreal. “Today, it’s not the monetary pillar of economic and monetary union that is at stake but the economic pillar,” he said.

Gee, and I thought it was all Goldman Sachs’ fault, as mocked 2010-4-19.

I’m tired of YLO – bor-ring! I wish Sino-Forest had preferred shares.

A mildly depressing day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 8bp, FixedResets off 4bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 9bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was dead. D-E-D. Dead.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0349 % 2,464.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0349 % 3,705.9
Floater 2.45 % 2.24 % 46,590 21.62 4 -0.0349 % 2,660.5
OpRet 4.87 % 3.39 % 64,273 0.95 9 -0.1886 % 2,419.9
SplitShare 5.24 % 0.12 % 60,345 0.52 6 -0.1168 % 2,504.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1886 % 2,212.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.65 % 4.99 % 156,258 1.41 12 0.1281 % 2,080.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.44 % 5.49 % 120,492 14.55 18 -0.0838 % 2,184.3
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.19 % 193,408 2.83 57 -0.0383 % 2,314.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.88 % 293,927 8.13 47 -0.0875 % 2,155.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.69
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.69
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 29,368 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-06
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 1.89 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 28,709 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-06
Maturity Price : 24.34
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 24,800 Desjardins crossed 14,300 at 23.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.36
Evaluated at bid price : 23.65
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 23,171 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.87
Bid-YTW : 4.64 %
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 21,185 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 20,561 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
There were 18 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.69 – 27.24
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3883

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.69
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.69 – 24.12
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2937

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.69
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %

BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.53 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2628

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.66 – 22.94
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1805

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.66
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.45 – 25.86
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.3124

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %

TD.PR.S FixedReset Quote: 26.02 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1432

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %