Archive for June, 2012

New Issue: CU 4.90% Straight (Deja Vu)

Monday, June 18th, 2012

Canadian Utilities has announced:

it has entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters co-led by RBC Capital Markets and BMO Capital Markets, and including TD Securities Inc. and Scotiabank. The underwriters have agreed to buy 6,000,000 4.90% Cumulative Redeemable Second Preferred Shares Series BB at a price of $25.00 per share for aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million.

The Series BB Preferred Shares will be issued to the public at a price of $25.00 per share and holders will be entitled to receive fixed cumulative preferential cash dividends, payable quarterly as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Corporation at an annual rate of $1.225 per share, to yield 4.90% annually. On or after September 1, 2017, the Corporation may redeem the Series BB Preferred Shares in whole or in part from time to time, at $26.00 per share if redeemed during the 12 months commencing September 1, 2017, at $25.75 per share if redeemed during the 12 months commencing September 1, 2018, at $25.50 per share if redeemed during the 12 months commencing September 1, 2019, at $25.25 per share if redeemed during the 12 months commencing September 1, 2020, and at $25.00 per share if redeemed on or after September 1, 2021.

The offering is being made only in the provinces of Canada by means of a prospectus supplement and the closing date of the issue is expected to be on or about July 5, 2012.

Canadian Utilities Limited also announced today that it will redeem on July 19, 2012 all of its outstanding Cumulative Redeemable Second Preferred Shares Series W at a price of $25.00 per share plus accrued and unpaid dividends per share. The $150 million aggregate cost of redemption will be funded from the net proceeds of the Series BB Preferred Share offering and cash.

This news release does not constitute an offer to sell securities, nor is it a solicitation of an offer to buy securities, in any jurisdiction. All sales will be made through registered securities dealers in jurisdictions where the offering has been qualified for distribution.

The redemption announcement for CU.PR.A (Series W) got its own post.

This is rather an unusual situation, in that they announced a different series of 4.90% Straights last month. That new issue, CU.PR.D, settled today, and also got its own post. The call schedules are identical.

CU.PR.A To Be Redeemed

Monday, June 18th, 2012

Canadian Utilities has announced:

Canadian Utilities Limited also announced today that it will redeem on July 19, 2012 all of its outstanding Cumulative Redeemable Second Preferred Shares Series W at a price of $25.00 per share plus accrued and unpaid dividends per share.

CU.PR.A has been tracked by HIMIPref™. It is a member of the PerpetualPremium index and closed Friday at 25.34-40 to yield (7.81%) – (10.56%) based on an immediate call. IIROC halted trading today at 3:12 “pending news”, prior to which the issue had traded 950 shares in a range of 25.34-38.

June 15, 2012

Friday, June 15th, 2012

The BoC has released a working paper by Donald Coletti, René Lalonde, Paul Masson, Dirk Muir and Stephen Snudden titled Commodities and Monetary Policy: Implications for Inflation and Price Level Targeting:

We examine the relative ability of simple inflation targeting (IT) and price level targeting (PLT) monetary policy rules to minimize both inflation variability and business cycle fluctuations in Canada for shocks that have important consequences for global commodity prices. We find that commodities can play a key role in affecting the relative merits of the alternative monetary policy frameworks. In particular, large real adjustment costs in energy supply and demand induce highly persistent cost-push pressures in the economy leading to a significant deterioration in the inflation – output gap trade-off available to central banks, particularly to those pursuing price level targeting.

Jonathan Weil of Bloomberg decries dynamic provisioning:

Dynamic provisioning is a euphemism for an old balance- sheet trick called cookie-jar accounting. The point of the technique is to understate past profits and shift them into later periods, so that companies can mask volatility and bury future losses. Spain’s banks began using the method in 2000 because their regulator, the Bank of Spain, required them to.

The danger with the technique is it can make companies look healthy when they are actually quite ill, sometimes for years, until they finally deplete their excess reserves and crash. The practice also clashed with International Financial Reporting Standards, which Spain adopted several years ago along with the rest of Europe. European Union officials knew this and let Spain proceed with its own brand of accounting anyway.

Assiduous Readers with long memories will remember my post titled FRBB Looks at Dynamic Provisioning. The FRBB paper concluded, in part:

We argue that, had U.S. banks set aside general provisions in positive states of the economy, they would have been in a better position to absorb their portfolios’ loan losses during the recent financial turmoil. The allowances accumulated by means of the hypothetical dynamic provision during the cyclical upswing would have reduced by half the amount of TARP funds required. However, the cyclical buffer for the aggregate U.S. banking system would have been depleted by the first quarter of 2009, which suggests that the proposed provisioning model for expected losses might not entirely solve situations as severe as the one experienced in recent years.

So just remember: just because something is good doesn’t mean it’s a panacea. Ain’t nuthin a panacea.

Meanwhile, Spend-Every-Penny wants countries to guarantee deposits in banks they don’t regulate:

Canada is urging the euro zone to embrace a common bank-deposit guarantee as a concrete step to boost market confidence.

The stand – confirmed Friday in a speech by Finance Minister Jim Flaherty – provides the first specifics as to what Canada will push for next week when Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Mr. Flaherty attend the G20 leaders’ summit in Los Cabos, Mexico.

In his speech in Ottawa, the minister praised a proposal from Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank, who has called for a fund to guarantee bank deposits in the 17-member euro zone.

It’s not clear to me why anybody would think that any rational person would base his finances on the word of a European politician anyway. I wouldn’t have any significant money deposited in any of the shaky-country banks anyway … and, if I lived there, would be inclined to be dubious about any European deposits for fear of post-exit confiscation anyway. My preference would be hard assets, by which I mean a box of Krugerrands and a pistol.

Alpha Trading asks the question – can a bank-owned utility do anything useful?:

Alpha, Canada’s newest stock exchange, wants to become the home to the country’s technology sector.

A Deloitte Inc. study commissioned by Alpha found what most observers of the tech sector in this country already know: that the tech industry is stunted. Tech as a percentage of GDP is below the G-20 average and forecast to fall behind Mexico and Saudi Arabia in a few years, the report found.

The report, which included interviews with 22 tech sector leaders, laid out a five-point agenda for fixing the problem. The proposed solutions include more support for crowdfunding, establishing a pre-initial public offering “grey” market in tech securities and creating an exchange that focuses on tech. Alpha wants to be that exchange.

BBD.PR.D got whacked today after the announcement of the reset rate, closing down 1.40, or 7.89%, on heavy volume (for this issue!) of 32,479 shares. However, even at the quote of 15.90-35, it’s still idiotically expensive relative to BBD.PR.B at 14.95-05, with which it is interconvertible. I’ve been warning of this in PrefLetter for months. With charts and diagrams!

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums off 5bp, FixedResets down 9bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 15bp. Volatility was average. Volume was very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4184 % 2,309.1
FixedFloater 4.46 % 3.85 % 22,933 17.60 1 0.0000 % 3,534.7
Floater 3.15 % 3.15 % 71,980 19.37 3 -0.4184 % 2,493.2
OpRet 4.82 % 2.48 % 39,266 1.02 5 0.1009 % 2,506.0
SplitShare 5.26 % -7.35 % 45,670 0.51 4 -0.0645 % 2,720.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1009 % 2,291.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.44 % 3.00 % 77,148 0.57 26 -0.0534 % 2,230.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.05 % 5.06 % 120,841 15.35 7 -0.2598 % 2,448.9
FixedReset 5.05 % 3.22 % 206,762 7.77 71 -0.0921 % 2,390.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 3.90 % 149,246 2.67 45 0.1537 % 2,303.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-15
Maturity Price : 23.38
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-15
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.27
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.38
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.T FixedReset 134,130 RBC crossed two blocks of 50,000 each and one of 10,000, all at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 79,790 RBC crossed blocks of 10,000 and 62,900, both at 26.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 62,400 RBC crossed 58,000 at 25.77.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-15
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : -0.65 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 54,689 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 26.36.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 42,030 Scotia crossed 14,200 at 26.85; Desjardins crossed 25,300 at 26.88.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 34,443 Scotia crossed 15,300 at 23.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.68
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 16.65 – 17.29
Spot Rate : 0.6400
Average : 0.4604

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-15
Maturity Price : 16.65
Evaluated at bid price : 16.65
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %

IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.86 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4205

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %

CIU.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 26.76 – 27.21
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3219

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.42 – 25.72
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1877

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : -3.39 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.10 – 25.40
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2040

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-15
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.80 – 23.07
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1872

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-15
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %

IAG Prefs & Sub-Debt on Review-Negative by DBRS

Friday, June 15th, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

has today placed the Subordinated Debt and Preferred Shares ratings of Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc. (IAG or the Company) Under Review with Negative Implications. The Claims Paying Rating of IC-2 is not affected by this rating action.

Following the DBRS annual review meetings with IAG management and certain disclosures included in the Company’s Investor Day (June 12, 2012) presentation, DBRS remains concerned that the Company’s exposure to the current low interest rate environment has impaired its financial flexibility at the current rating categories.

The Company’s total debt ratio has increased to 36.6% pro forma the $150 million preferred share issue completed in May 2012, which is above the range established by the DBRS rating methodology for the life insurance industry at the current rating category. Beyond our concerns for the Company’s financial leverage, DBRS observes that the Company continues to have higher-than-average exposures to interest rates by virtue of the relatively large exposure to long-duration life insurance liabilities with embedded interest rate guarantees that are more challenging to meet in the current rate environment.

While the Company is reducing some of its exposure to interest rate risk in the short run through more efficient asset liability matching and forward interest rate locks, and in the longer term through price increases and product redesign, the Company has also suggested that if rates do not increase before year-end 2012, it is likely going to have to take an estimated $120 million charge on account of lower ultimate reinvestment rate assumptions. The Company’s priority is to offset this adverse development with additional one-time earning gains while it waits for a more sustainable interest rate environment.

In the meantime, the Company is operating at a lower Solvency Ratio (the AMF’s MCCSR equivalent) of approximately 186% (March 31, 2012), which, while below the industry average of over 200%, factors in the Company’s inherent conservatism that is estimated to depress the ratio by close to 15 points. Nevertheless, the nine points gained by the addition of $150 million of preferred shares in May was more than absorbed by adverse market developments in April and May, which suggests that the Company and its regulatory capital ratio remain quite vulnerable to exogenous market forces.

With little demonstrable financial flexibility at the current rating category in terms of debt or preferred share capacity and the prospects of continued earnings and market volatility, which has a direct impact on regulatory capital ratios, the Company warrants the Under Review- Negative status at this time. DBRS expects to complete its review of the Company within the next two months.

IAG has the following preferred shares outstanding: IAG.PR.A, IAG.PR.E and IAG.PR.F (DeemedRetractible) and IAG.PR.C & IAG.PR.G (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and all are assigned to the indicated indices.

June 14, 2012

Friday, June 15th, 2012

The ECB won’t disclose records of EU collusion with fuzzy Greek bookkeeping:

The European Central Bank said it can’t release files showing how Greece may have used derivatives to hide its borrowings because disclosure could still inflame the crisis threatening the future of the single currency.

Bloomberg News is suing the ECB to provide the documents under European Union freedom-of-information rules. The papers may help show the role EU authorities played in allowing Greece to mask its deficit for almost a decade before the nation’s troubled finances necessitated a 240 billion-euro ($301 billion) bailout and the biggest debt restructuring in history

Disclosing the files when Bloomberg News first sought them in 2010 would have “fueled negative perceptions about Greece’s ability to honor its debt,” ECB lawyer Marta Lopez Torres said at a hearing of the European Union’s General Court in Luxembourg today. “It’s the same now with Spain” which “isn’t able to borrow money,” she said. “Markets are reacting in very volatile ways. It’s affecting the euro economy.”

Sorry this is so late, folks! There were technical difficulties at TMX DataLinx.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,318.8
FixedFloater 4.46 % 3.84 % 23,702 17.60 1 0.0000 % 3,534.7
Floater 3.14 % 3.13 % 70,961 19.42 3 0.0000 % 2,503.7
OpRet 4.82 % 2.47 % 40,821 1.02 5 -0.0853 % 2,503.5
SplitShare 5.26 % -8.90 % 45,581 0.51 4 0.0695 % 2,721.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0853 % 2,289.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.44 % 2.93 % 77,722 0.58 26 0.1363 % 2,231.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.03 % 5.03 % 121,580 15.43 7 0.1834 % 2,455.2
FixedReset 5.05 % 3.15 % 203,812 4.49 71 0.0742 % 2,392.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.03 % 3.91 % 154,630 2.95 45 -0.0150 % 2,300.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible -1.96 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.29
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.N FixedReset 118,200 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 100,300 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 87,750 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 72,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.48
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 70,494 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.78
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 64,290 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
There were 28 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.88 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.5700
Average : 0.3667

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-14
Maturity Price : 23.51
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %

BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.45 – 25.91
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.2578

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %

GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.00 – 24.30
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1788

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.00 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3741

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %

IFC.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.51 – 25.73
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1326

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.75 – 24.19
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3580

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-14
Maturity Price : 23.27
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %

BBD.PR.D To Reset to 255% of GOC5

Friday, June 15th, 2012

Bombardier Inc. has announced:

the basis for resetting the dividend rate on its Series 3 Preferred Shares in accordance with the terms applicable to those shares.

Holders of Bombardier Inc. Series 2 Preferred Shares have the right to convert all or part of their shares, effective on August 1, 2012, on a one-for-one basis into Series 3 Preferred Shares. Holders of Series 3 Preferred Shares have the right to convert all or part of their shares, effective on August 1, 2012, on a one-for-one basis into Series 2 Preferred Shares. Holders who do not convert their shares will retain their Series 2 Preferred Shares or Series 3 Preferred Shares, as the case may be.

In the case of the Series 2 Preferred Shares, starting as of August 1, 2012, holders will continue to receive a monthly floating adjustable cash dividend, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Bombardier Inc., based on a dividend rate equal to a percentage of the prime rate, subject to certain adjustments in accordance with the terms of such shares.

In the case of the Series 3 Preferred Shares, starting as of August 1, 2012, holders will receive a quarterly fixed cash dividend for the following five years, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Bombardier Inc., based on a fixed rate equal to 255% of the yield on five-year non-callable Government of Canada bonds determined as at July 11, 2012, in accordance with the terms of such shares. The annual dividend rate applicable to the Series 3 Preferred Shares will be published on July 12, 2012 in several newspapers.

Any registered shareholder who wishes to convert his or her Series 2 and/ or Series 3 Preferred Shares must complete and sign the conversion panel contained on the back of the Series 2 or Series 3 Preferred Share certificate as the case may be, and deliver it, at the latest by 5:00 p.m. (Montréal time) on July 18, 2012, to Computershare Investor Services Inc.

Shareholders who are beneficial owners and who wish to exercise their right of conversion should communicate as soon as possible with their broker or other nominee and follow their instructions. In that case, it is important that they follow such instructions and act in the time frame advised so as to provide enough time to their broker or other nominee to meet the July 18, 2012 deadline.

If, after July 18, 2012, Bombardier Inc. determines that there would be less than one million Series 2 Preferred Shares outstanding after the conversion date (being August 1, 2012), then all remaining Series 2 Preferred Shares will automatically be converted into Series 3 Preferred Shares on a one-for-one basis. However, if, after such date, Bombardier Inc. determines that there would be less than one million Series 3 Preferred Shares outstanding after the conversion date (being August 1, 2012), then all remaining Series 3 Preferred Shares will automatically be converted into Series 2 Preferred Shares on a one-for-one basis. In either case, Bombardier Inc. shall give a written notice to that effect to holders of such remaining shares no later than July 25, 2012.

Subject to the conditions mentioned in the previous paragraph, on August 1, 2017, and every five years thereafter, holders of Series 2 Preferred Shares and holders of Series 3 Preferred Shares will have again the right to convert their shares into shares of the other series.

At the current five-year Canada yield (GOC5) of 1.19% (!) the indicated new yield will be 3.0345% or a little over $0.75 p.a. – a steep decline from the current payment of 5.267%, or $1.31675.

I have expressed astonishment in recent editions of PrefLetter that the price differential between BBD.PR.D and BBD.PR.B (the Ratchet Rate issue with which it is interconvertible) has remained so high for so long (closing prices June 14 were 17.75 and 14.90, respectively). But the preferred share market is an inefficient place!

The last arbitrage opportunity was, of course, five years ago. Both BBD.PR.B and BBD.PR.D are tracked by HIMIPref™; both issues are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

BoC Releases Spring 2012 Review and June 2012 Financial Destabilization Report

Thursday, June 14th, 2012

The Bank of Canada has released the Bank of Canada Review – Spring 2012 with articles:

  • On the Adjustment of the Global Economy
  • On the Adjustment of the Global Economy
  • Understanding Systemic Risk in the Banking Sector: A MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework
  • Conference Summary: New Developments in Payments and Settlement

They have also released the June 2012 Financial System Review with articles:

The article by Pothik Chatterjee, Lana Embree and Peter Youngman on central clearing chants the familiar slogan:

The introduction of an appropriately risk-controlled CCP for the fixed-income market improves this market’s resilience by mitigating counterparty credit risk, thus reducing the potential for disruptions to be transmitted through the financial system.

… but does admit …

Given the centrality of the underlying market, the Bank considers that CDCS could pose systemic risk if appropriate risk controls are not in place (i.e., it is systemically important).

It has long been a puzzle to me just exactly why all these art-school dweebs who control politics and regulation are in favour of a system subject to single-point failure as opposed to a network. Can networks freeze? Sure:

During the financial crisis, the Canadian fixed-income repo market, like those in other countries, experienced periods of illiquidity as a result of lenders of cash taking measures to reduce their credit exposures to borrowers. When many lenders undertook these measures simultaneously, the amount of financing available was abruptly reduced, creating severe funding pressures in the repo market.

I always thought that reducing exposure to dubious credits was what bankers are paid to do, but I’m just old fashioned that way. I agree that sometimes this can go too far and lead to an unjustified and harmful credit lock-up, but this does not prove that single-point systems are better; if for no other reason than that is the point at which the central bank is supposed to step in and provide liquidity at above market rates – an alternative which is not discussed.

The authors also point out:

The decrease in repo activity was relatively more pronounced in Canada than in other jurisdictions, since repo business accounted for a greater share of the balance sheets of domestic banks than it did for their global competitors.

Sadly, they do not provide a business purpose for this statistic, nor do they discuss the regulatory implications of this preference.

However, they do disclose that a major source of the industry’s enthusiasm for such a move is regulatory arbitrage via elimination of the gross position:

To minimize the potential contraction of the repo market resulting from balance-sheet pressures during future stressful periods, members of the Investment Industry Association of Canada (the industry) sought ways to increase netting efficiencies in order to offset repo and reverse repo transactions on the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet.[footnote] The industry concluded that an appropriately designed CCP would allow them to reduce their balance-sheet exposures to the repo business by netting offsetting positions without changing their underlying repo activity. Using a CCP would therefore create a more resilient and efficient balance sheet that could absorb financial shocks with greater ease.

[Footnote] Without a CCP, if a bank transacts in both a repo and a reverse repo for the same security and term, but with different counterparties, both a liability and an asset are created on the bank’s balance sheet. If both trades are novated by a CCP, however, the bank would have offsetting trades with the same counterparty, allowing the counterparties to net the trades and not create separate assets and liabilities on their balance sheets.

Sure – just like netting out all deposits and loans would help shrink the balance sheet, too.

Credit risk is addressed as follows:

As depicted in Figure 3, in the event that CDCC faced a credit loss in closing out a member’s positions, the defaulter’s variation and initial margin and clearingfund contributions would be used first to absorb these losses. If this were insufficient, CDCC would use its capital to absorb the next $5 million of losses. If these funds were still not enough, residual losses would be borne by the surviving members’ contributions to the clearing fund. Members would be obliged to make an
additional “top-up” contribution to the clearing fund of up to 100 per cent of the value of their original contribution.

So clearly, another incentive to support the scheme is the ability to collectivize credit risk. You want to do a $20-billion deal with the Bank of Porky’s Corners? No problem! Other guys are worrying about credit quality and in the event of default your competitors will bear most of the cost!

But don’t worry about default. Everybody knows that a 22-year-old regulator with a degree in Medieval Horticulture and a certificate in boxtickingology can make much more judicious credit decisions than any dumb old banker.

You don’t actually have the $20-billion you’re lending to the Bank of Porky’s Corners and you have to fund it yourself with a reverse-repo? Again, no problem! You’ll be able to net out your repo positions and the offsetting transactions won’t attract any capital charge! Jack it up to the skies, man! If you can make a margin of a millionth of a beep, it’s all profitable! It’s all free money!

But that’s not the best part. The best part is:

Completion of the second phase will allow interdealer brokers to offer anonymous trading for repos cleared by the CCP, which are known as “blind” repos.

No moral hazard there, no sir!

Should all of CDCC’s private sources of liquidity be insufficient to manage a default, the Bank of Canada has the discretion to act as liquidity provider of last resort on a secured basis.

There’s no mention of this being done at a stiff premium to market (which didn’t happen during the crisis anyway).

Update, 2012-7-14: Note that the provisions for covering losses are equivalent to Unfunded Contingent Capital – whereas the BCBS speaks approvingly of pre-funded Contingent Capital and so does OSFI boss Dickson. The fact that the CCP’s notional capital is unfunded is a serious flaw in the scheme.

Mind you, though, I have no intrinsic objection to the idea of a CCP … but if it lends like a bank and borrows like a bank, it should be capitalized like a bank and regulated like a bank.

June 13, 2012

Thursday, June 14th, 2012

I can’t say I’m against this move – but it does open up a can of worms:

Denmark’s government agreed to ease rules for the country’s pension firms to help reduce their liabilities as record-low bond yields inflate the value of their obligations.

Pension companies and life insurers will be allowed to raise the discount rate they use to calculate their liabilities to better reflect long-term growth and inflation prospects, the Business and Growth Ministry in Copenhagen said in a statement late yesterday. The decision sent yields on longer-maturity bonds soaring as the industry’s need to buy up debt assets to match their pension obligations was reduced.

The Danish move follows similar changes in Sweden, where 10-year yields surged 30 basis points on June 7 after the country’s regulator put a floor on the discount rate pension funds use to calculate liabilities. Nordic pension funds had come under pressure to increase their asset purchases as the region’s haven status from the debt crisis sent bond values higher and swelled the value of their liabilities.

The US housing market has a new kind of problem:

Funds planning to invest more than $6 billion to buy and rent foreclosed homes are finding it easy to raise money. The difficulty is spending it.

The number of low-cost foreclosed homes coming to market has dropped, bulk sales have been slow to materialize and prices are recovering in markets such as Phoenix, making it hard for private-equity firms, hedge funds and pension systems to buy as many homes as they need.

Investors are trying to spend at least $6.4 billion on single-family rentals, including from funds such as Colony Capital LLC, GTIS Partners, KKR & Co., Oaktree Capital Group LLC (OAK), Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC (OZM) and the Alaska Permanent Fund Corp. They want to take advantage of U.S. home prices that are 35 percent below the 2006 peak and growing demand for rentals as the homeownership rate sits at the lowest level since 1997.

There is brinksmanship in Greece:

Alexis Tsipras said he expects the European Union will do all it can to keep Greece in the euro even if he wins elections and carries out his promise to repeal the austerity measures required to receive emergency loans.

“We have no sense that European partners will follow this tactic of blackmail heard from some quarters and stop funding,” Tsipras, whose Syriza party is vying for first place in pre- election polls, said in an interview in Athens today with Bloomberg Television. “Something like that would be catastrophic not only for Greece but for the entire euro area.”

BIS has released a working paper by Mathias Drehmann, Claudio Borio and Kostas Tsatsaronis titled Characterising the financial cycle: don’t lose sight of the
medium term!
:

We characterise empirically the financial cycle using two approaches: analysis of turning points and frequency-based filters. We identify the financial cycle with the medium-term component in the joint fluctuations of credit and property prices; equity prices do not fit this picture well. We show that financial cycle peaks are very closely associated with financial crises and that the length and amplitude of the financial cycle have increased markedly since the mid-1980s. We argue that this reflects, in particular, financial liberalisation and changes in monetary policy frameworks. So defined, the financial cycle is much longer than the
traditional business cycle. Business cycle recessions are much deeper when they coincide with the contraction phase of the financial cycle. We also draw attention to the “unfinished recession” phenomenon: policy responses that fail to take into account the length of the financial cycle may help contain recessions in the short run but at the expense of larger recessions down the road.

Against this backdrop, if the policymakers “overreact” to short-term developments and lose sight of the (medium-term) financial cycle that may lie behind them, they can store up bigger trouble down the road. Arguably, this is what happened both in the mid-1980s/early 1990s and in the period 2001-2007. In both cases, policymakers reacted strongly to collapses in
equity prices – the global stock market crashes of 1987 and 2001, which ushered in slowdowns in economic growth and/or actual recessions. As we have seen, however, equity prices are not a reliable indicator of the medium-term financial cycle. In fact, in both episodes credit and property prices continued to increase, benefiting from a second breath of life. A few years later, the credit and property price booms in turn collapsed, causing serious financial disruptions and dragging down the economy with them. From the perspective of the medium-term financial and business cycles, the slowdowns or contractions in 1987 and 2001 can thus be regarded as “unfinished recessions”.

We might be headed into one of the periodic outbreaks of handwringing about productivity:

Canada can’t live off its resource wealth forever and must get serious about chronically lagging productivity and innovation, says the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

“Canada is blessed with abundant natural resources, but it needs to do more to develop other sectors of the economy if it is to maintain a high level of employment and equitable distribution of the fruits of growth,” said Peter Jarrett, head of the OECD’s Canada division and one of the authors of the study.

But the 128-page report’s main focus is productivity and innovation policy. The OECD pointed out that while per capita incomes are growing, productivity has stagnated for decades, and has actually declined since 2002.

Canada’s productivity and innovation conundrum isn’t a new theme for Canada. Those challenges were at the heart of last year’s federal task force report on research and development policies, chaired by Open text Corp. chairman Tom Jenkins. Ottawa moved to address several of the report’s recommendations in its March 29 budget.

R&D policies are a joke – they do nothing for productivity, they reward businesses who are willing to jump through the bureaucratic hoops – and reward the specialist lawyers and accountants who help with the application. That’s not productivity, that’s welfare. The three major impediments to Canadian productivity are a coddled financial sector, a coddled transportation sector and a coddled telecommunication sector, but these aren’t the best examples of anti-productive government policy.

I’ll believe that a Canadian government has started to care about about productivity when dairy farmers are told that 50-cow herds, and their massive indirect subsidy granted by import restrictions and dairy quotas, are nothing more than a national cash drain. Dairy farming is the most egregious Canadian example of low productivity.

There’s an interesting funding gap at Deutsche Bank:

Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) has a funding gap of as much as 14 billion euros ($17.5 billion) at its Italian and Spanish units which could reduce capital levels at the firm if those countries leave the euro, according to analysts at Espirito Santo Investment Bank.

Deutsche Bank’s loans amount to 205 percent of deposits at the Italian unit and 314 percent in Spain, according to London- based analyst Andrew Lim, who cited company filings. If those countries exit the euro and the new currencies fall 30 percent, the Frankfurt-based lender could lose as much as 4.2 billion euros of equity as the value of assets at those divisions declines while some funding remains in euros, he said.

Such cross-border funding gaps can be dangerous:

The government forced commercial banks to swallow exchange- rate losses on foreign-currency denominated mortgages by giving borrowers the option to repay their loans in a lump sum at below-market rates. Two-thirds of housing loans were denominated in foreign currencies, mostly in Swiss francs, and installments on them soared as the forint weakened.

Hungarians repaid 170,000 mortgages under the plan in a value of 1.4 trillion forint ($6.3 billion), cutting the total amount of outstanding foreign-currency mortgages by 23.3 percent, the financial market authority said in a report today.

It was a surprisingly uneventful day on the Canadian preferred share market, despite an enormous number of dividends going ex. PerpetualPremiums were off 3bp, FixedResets down 1bp and DeemedRetractibles gained 3bp. Volatility was non-existent, but volume was very high.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.04%, equivalent to 6.55% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 215 bp, a significant decline from the 225bp reported June 6.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7043 % 2,318.8
FixedFloater 4.46 % 3.84 % 24,677 17.61 1 0.9000 % 3,534.7
Floater 3.14 % 3.13 % 68,287 19.42 3 0.7043 % 2,503.7
OpRet 4.82 % 2.39 % 40,842 1.02 5 -0.1387 % 2,505.6
SplitShare 5.26 % -8.67 % 47,456 0.52 4 -0.0893 % 2,719.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1387 % 2,291.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 2.56 % 77,560 0.58 26 -0.0316 % 2,228.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.04 % 5.04 % 121,683 15.39 7 -0.0567 % 2,450.7
FixedReset 5.05 % 3.19 % 201,254 4.52 71 -0.0127 % 2,390.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.03 % 3.95 % 157,068 2.89 45 0.0266 % 2,300.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 110,515 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.19
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 78,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.69
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 76,790 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 75,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-26
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.82
Bid-YTW : 2.48 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 62,750 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.37
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 62,472 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.71
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.37 – 22.97
Spot Rate : 0.6000
Average : 0.4011

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.37
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %

MFC.PR.D FixedReset Quote: 26.19 – 26.47
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1593

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.19
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %

NA.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.52 – 26.90
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2831

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-15
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.52
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.72 – 25.06
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2478

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-13
Maturity Price : 24.41
Evaluated at bid price : 24.72
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.62 – 23.98
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2681

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-13
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 23.62
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %

CM.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 26.15 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2545

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %

June 12, 2012

Tuesday, June 12th, 2012

Play the exciting new Spanish Shell Game!

Spanish bond yields surged the most in four months in the first trading after the government in Madrid sought a bailout for its banks. Investors speculated the 100 billion euros ($125 billion) may not be enough.

The lifeline from the euro area, aimed at loosening the connection between banks and the state, risks doing the opposite as foreign investors continue to shun the nation’s bonds and Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy’s government grows increasingly dependent on domestic lenders.

“This 100 billion will be added to the public finances of Spain so it just reinforces the link between banks and the sovereign,” Olly Burrows, credit analyst at Rabobank International, said in a phone interview from London. “Spain is receiving funds to bail out its banks, which have been buying Spanish debt while everyone else has been getting out.”

Spanish banks were among the biggest beneficiaries of 1 trillion euros of three-year emergency loans from the ECB, which were recycled into sovereign bonds in a trend Economy Minister Luis de Guindos said in April “increased the correlation between sovereign risk and banking risk.” The ECB may need to offer another round of that financing to ensure local banks can fund the sovereign, [co-chief economist at Deutsche Bank AG in London Gilles] Moec said.

Meanwhile:

French securities slid with benchmark German bunds as Fitch Ratings said it may cut credit grades across Europe because policy makers are failing to demonstrate they can bring the debt crisis under control. The yield on Italian 10-year securities jumped to the most since January as the country prepared to sell bonds on June 14. Germany will offer 10-year bunds, Europe’s benchmark securities, tomorrow, after Austria and the Netherlands auctioned debt today.

Most governments do all they can to attract high-earning migrants. Not the UK:

U.K. lawyers are fielding a flood of questions from multinational firms as a government shake-up of visa rules threatens to cut short the careers of top traders and other executives transferred from overseas.

Changes in the past two years include a five-year cap on how long employees who moved to the U.K. under the Intra Company Transfer system can stay, and the removal of their right to settle permanently. The introduction of a cooling-off period between visa applications means employees have to spend at least 12 months out of the country once their permit expires.

“We’ve seen quite significant panic among a number of clients,” said Ben Sheldrick, a partner with Magrath LLP Solicitors in London. “The government wants to be seen to be tough on immigration and one of the only groups they can be seen to be reducing is the skilled migrants sponsored by multinational firms.”

Canadian banks are worrying about appraisals:

Several Canadian banks have been quietly re-evaluating their appraisal strategies amid increased worries about the accuracy of property values in a market deemed at risk of overheating.

Lenders use a variety of techniques, including full appraisals, so-called “drive-by” appraisals based on the exterior of the home, and databases of market prices, to evaluate homes. The values they arrive at help determine how much money they should lend to mortgage borrowers. They are also key for measures such as the loan-to-value ratio that are used to track the health of loan portfolios and borrowers’ debt loads.

Banks are emphasizing on-site visits to value properties, especially those above a certain price or in rural areas. They are also paying closer attention to who does the appraisal.

TD lends 80 per cent loan-to-value up to $900,000, but after that only lends 50 per cent, to protect itself against inflated values on expensive homes.

California-based First American Financial Corp. had been selling Canadian banks a “guaranteed valuation” product that guaranteed the valuation of a property was accurate on the day a mortgage was issued. If it turned out later that it wasn’t, the bank could make a claim.

But First American posted a first-quarter loss in 2011 as it took a $45-million reserve strengthening charge relating to this obscure Canadian product.

Policies that were experiencing claims had been written mostly in 2007 and 2008. Sources say the issue stemmed mainly from Alberta, where the housing market underwent a correction starting in 2007, and problems became apparent as default rates increased, leading banks to seize more homes as collateral.

If I were worried about an overheated property market, I’d convert today’s appraisal into 2008’s equivalent and lend against that – which is much the same thing as lowering the LTV ratio.

It was a positive day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 4bp, FixedResets winning 11bp and DeemedRetractibles up 7bp. Volatility was low. Volume was well below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3396 % 2,302.6
FixedFloater 4.50 % 3.87 % 25,691 17.52 1 -0.1419 % 3,503.1
Floater 3.14 % 3.17 % 69,272 19.22 3 0.3396 % 2,486.2
OpRet 4.79 % 2.20 % 37,824 1.01 5 -0.0077 % 2,509.1
SplitShare 5.26 % -6.23 % 47,375 0.52 4 0.4036 % 2,722.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0077 % 2,294.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 3.14 % 79,638 0.62 26 0.0361 % 2,229.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.02 % 5.05 % 121,297 15.29 7 -0.0177 % 2,452.1
FixedReset 5.04 % 3.16 % 195,476 7.80 71 0.1052 % 2,391.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 3.89 % 145,446 2.96 45 0.0707 % 2,300.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 2.82 %
FBS.PR.C SplitShare 1.99 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.74
Bid-YTW : -9.25 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 273,623 Scotia crossed 10,000 at 26.61; National crossed 50,000 at 26.65. RBC crossed two blocks of 100,000 each, one at 26.67, the other at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 137,158 National crossed blocks of 77,600 and 45,000, both at 26.74.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 101,144 Desjardins crossed 99,000 at 26.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.38
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 80,538 Nesbitt crossed 25,000, TD crossed 20,000 and RBC crossed 30,000, all at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 62,445 Nesbitt crossed 60,800 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 55,769 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-12
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : -2.52 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.42 – 24.98
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.3532

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-12
Maturity Price : 23.98
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.13 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2149

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.13
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %

RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.68 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1990

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.76 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2499

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.11 – 21.40
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2326

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-12
Maturity Price : 21.82
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %

IAG.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.16 – 25.38
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1638

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %

NEW.PR.C Partial Call for Redemption

Tuesday, June 12th, 2012

Scotia Managed Companies has announced:

NewGrowth Corp. (the “Company”) announced today that it has called 62,784 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on June 26, 2012 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 2.284% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 62,784 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on June 22, 2012 will have approximately 2.284% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $13.70 per share.

In addition, holders of a further 30 Capital Shares and 30 Preferred Shares have deposited such shares concurrently for retraction on June 26, 2012. As a result, a total of 62,814 Capital Shares and 62,814 Preferred Shares, or approximately 2.285% of both classes of shares currently outstanding, will be redeemed.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including June 26, 2012.

Payment of the amount due to holders of Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on June 26, 2012. From and after June 26, 2012 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any right in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

NewGrowth Corp. is a mutual fund corporation whose investment portfolio consists primarily of publicly listed securities of selected Canadian chartered banks, telecommunication, pipeline and utility issuers. The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares of NewGrowth Corp. are both listed for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols NEW.A and NEW.PR.C respectively.

NEW.PR.C was last mentioned on PrefBlog with respect to last year’s partial call for redemption. NEW.PR.C is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is assigned to the Scraps index on volume concerns.