Archive for June, 2012

June 11, 2012

Monday, June 11th, 2012

Red letter day! For the first time in a long time, somebody’s talking about the flip side of safe banking:

Mr. Flaherty boasts about Ottawa’s strict supervision and holds up the banks’ conservative lending culture as a virtue. What he fails to mention to his audiences in places such as Istanbul, London and Washington is that Canada’s entrepreneurs and smaller businesses are starved for cash.

According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the outstanding debt of Canadian small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) essentially has been unchanged since 2000. Lending to smaller companies decreased 0.1 per cent in 2008, increased 3.7 per cent in 2009 and dropped 0.9 per cent in 2010, the 34-member OECD said earlier this year in its first annual scorecard of financing for SMEs and entrepreneurs.

While there is no longer an outright ban on international lenders setting up in Canada, the rules are structured in such a way that there is little incentive to do so. No investor can hold more than 20 per cent of the voting shares in a bank with equity of more than $12-billion and a majority of the directors must be Canadians.

So the lenders that are large enough to shake the Canadian banks’ entrenched position – the Wells Fargos of the world – either stay small in Canada, or avoid the country altogether.

There are more than 7,000 banks in the United States insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Most of those institutions are small, confining their lending to a specific community. The result is a more competitive credit market. SMEs accounted for 29 per cent of all business lending in the United States in 2010, compared with 18 per cent in Canada.

Canada’s banks were left relatively unscathed by the Credit Crunch and that’s a good thing. But next time you hear a regulator boasting about how wonderful the safe Canadian system is, ask what the costs are. All the costs, all the indirect costs of a comfortable oligopoly, not the relatively trivial direct costs. A Lamborghini is a great car … but I wouldn’t pay $10-million for one.

You can talk about billions, and you can talk about percentages, but sometimes it’s most graphic to talk about the impact on the average guy:

The average American family lost 38.8 percent of its wealth from 2007 to 2010, with the biggest losses concentrated among households with the most assets tied to their homes, a Federal Reserve study shows.

Median net worth declined to $77,300 in 2010, an 18-year low, from $126,400 in 2007, the central bank said in its Survey of Consumer Finances. Mean net worth fell 14.7 percent to a nine-year low of $498,800 from $584,600, the central bank said today in Washington.

I do enjoy taking pokes at CalPERS, the $200-billion+ fund that doesn’t do its own credit analysis! Their ten-year 90bp underperformance vs. their benchmark makes it easy, as the press has noticed:

The California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the largest U.S. pension, has seen its market value decline 4.8 percent this year after stocks fell amid the brewing fiscal crisis in Europe and slowing of the U.S. economic recovery.

If the trend continues, it would mark the third time in five years that the fund has lost money, including a 23 percent decline in fiscal 2009, the worst on record. While Calpers spreads its return over 15 years to smooth taxpayers’ burden, another loss may make it hard for the fund to meet its assumption of 7.5 percent earnings annually to cover benefits to 1.6 million retired employees and their families.

It was rather a dull day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 3bp, FixedResets flat and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was quite low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4375 % 2,294.8
FixedFloater 4.49 % 3.86 % 25,788 17.53 1 0.0000 % 3,508.1
Floater 3.15 % 3.17 % 69,898 19.23 3 -0.4375 % 2,477.8
OpRet 4.79 % 1.92 % 38,288 1.02 5 0.0848 % 2,509.3
SplitShare 5.28 % -4.19 % 47,301 0.52 4 0.0449 % 2,711.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0848 % 2,294.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 3.21 % 78,274 0.58 26 -0.0256 % 2,228.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.02 % 5.06 % 122,910 15.26 7 0.1888 % 2,452.6
FixedReset 5.05 % 3.20 % 189,679 7.81 71 -0.0027 % 2,388.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.03 % 3.92 % 145,859 2.89 45 -0.0194 % 2,298.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.14
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-11
Maturity Price : 16.57
Evaluated at bid price : 16.57
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-11
Maturity Price : 24.57
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 154,340 TD crossed 150,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : -5.65 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 51,183 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-11
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 37,286 RBC crossed blocks of 29,000 and 14,900, both at 25.67.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-11
Maturity Price : 23.99
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 32,747 National crossed 31,000 at 26.33.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 31,915 TD crossed 25,000 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset 31,825 RBC crossed 30,000 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-11
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 16.57 – 17.88
Spot Rate : 1.3100
Average : 0.7444

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-11
Maturity Price : 16.57
Evaluated at bid price : 16.57
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %

BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 16.74 – 18.14
Spot Rate : 1.4000
Average : 1.0716

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-11
Maturity Price : 16.74
Evaluated at bid price : 16.74
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.14 – 22.50
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2410

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.14
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.45 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1839

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : -5.51 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.68 – 23.96
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1889

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.68
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.43 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2299

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-11
Maturity Price : 23.99
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %

June PrefLetter Released!

Monday, June 11th, 2012

The June, 2012, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The June edition does not contain an appendix; I did not have time to do justice to the intended topic of Floating Rate trends, but intend to include it in the July edition.

The font for PrefLetter has been changed to Frutiger by popular demand!

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the June, 2012, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the July, 2012, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close July 13 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on July 16.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

LBS.PR.A 2011 Annual Report

Sunday, June 10th, 2012

Brompton Life & Banc Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to December 31, 2011.

LBS / LBS.PR.A Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Five
Years
Whole Unit -11.1% +12.3% -2.5%
LBS -32.4% +24.8% -10.7%
LBS.PR.A +5.4% +5.4% +5.4%
S&P/TSX Capped Financial Index -3.8% +15.0% -0.6%

Note that according to the implementation by iShares, the capped financial index is about 76% banks and 19% insurance, so the fund is by design overweight insurers relative to this benchmark – and insurers have underperformed.

Figures of interest are:

MER: 1.02% of the whole unit value, “excluding the cost of leverage and issuance costs.”

Average Net Assets: We need this to calculate portfolio yield. The Total Assets of the fund at year end was $204.4-million, compared to $190.8-million a year prior (there was an increase in shares outstanding due to a warrant offering), so call it an average of $198-million. This can be checked by examining distributions on preferred shares of $7.164-million, which at $0.525 / share implies an average of 13.6-million units outstanding, which at an average value of $16.75 implies average net assets of 227.8-million. Since the warrants were exercised in late March, 2011, the latter figure seems more appropriate.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Investment income of $9.232-million received divided by average net assets of $227.8-million is 4.05%.

Income Coverage: Net investment income after expenses of $6.942-million received plus $0.048-million issuance costs added back is $6.990-million, to cover preferred dividends of 7.164-million is about 98%.

LBS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when their 12H1 Semi-annual report was discussed.

June PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

Friday, June 8th, 2012

The markets have closed and the June edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The June edition will contain an appendix dealing with the behaviour of Floaters over time.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is now available to all residents of Canada.

The May issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the June issue.

June 8, 2012

Friday, June 8th, 2012

Strains in Greek banking are becoming more obvious:

Credit Agricole SA, the foreign bank with the biggest risks in Greece, reached an accord with Greek authorities that will let its unit in the country access emergency funding should the need arise, two people with knowledge of the matter said.

Emporiki Bank, the Greek unit of Credit Agricole, will be able to tap so-called Emergency Liquidity Assistance from Greece’s central bank under certain conditions, the people said, declining to be identified because the matter is private. Access will probably be restricted to situations where deposits are declining, the people said. Greek banks without a foreign parent already use the facility.

Jean-Paul Chifflet, Credit Agricole’s chief executive officer, said on May 22 that his bank renewed a request for access to ELA funding with Bank of Greece’s governor. France’s third-largest bank “can’t increase significantly” exposures to Greece, Chifflet told investors last month at the company’s annual general meeting. Emporiki’s loans exceed deposits, requiring Credit Agricole to provide cross-border funding to help fill the gap.

Credit Agricole reduced that funding to Athens-based Emporiki to 4.6 billion euros at the end of March from 5.5 billion euros in December, partly as deposits rose, the bank said May 11. Credit Agricole also tapped 1.6 billion euros of ECB funding for Emporiki at the end of March.

The problem in Europe is that highly indebted countries owe money in currency they can’t print, right? It’s a good thing we’re smarter than that in Canada:

  • New Brunswick’s tax-supported debt as a percent of consolidated operating
    revenues has risen rapidly in the past five years.

  • We are lowering our issuer credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on
    the Province of New Brunswick to ‘A+’ from ‘AA-‘.

  • The stable outlook reflects our expectation that New Brunswick’s program
    review initiative will be successful at achieving cost efficiencies and that the province will achieve fiscal balance in the next two fiscal
    years as per its budget plan.


The ratings on New Brunswick reflect Standard & Poor’s opinion of the
following credit strengths:

  • The province’s relatively resilient economic performance since the global economic and financial crisis began in 2008 compared with peers’.
  • The province’s sound liquidity support of more than C$700 million in cash and marketable securities available to address potential fiscal pressures. As well, the province has a pool of sinking funds, which
    totaled over C$4.0 billion as at the end of fiscal 2012 that can be used for debt repayment if needed.

Credit concerns include our view of the following:

  • New Brunswick’s very high tax-supported debt burden (net of sinking funds), which rose further in fiscal 2012 to 149% of consolidated operating revenues or about 38% of GDP. We expect its tax-supported debt
    burden to peak at 155% of operating revenues in 2014.

  • Challenges stemming from long-term demographic trends that are likely to
    affect health care demand and revenue growth.

Fortunately, 38% of GDP is still a lot smaller than 120% of GDP.

There was a modest upward move in the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualPremiums up 9bp, FixedResets gaining 2bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 10bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was quite low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2183 % 2,304.9
FixedFloater 4.49 % 3.86 % 26,187 17.54 1 -0.0945 % 3,508.1
Floater 3.13 % 3.17 % 72,730 19.24 3 -0.2183 % 2,488.6
OpRet 4.79 % 2.48 % 36,066 1.02 5 0.3714 % 2,507.2
SplitShare 5.28 % -4.87 % 47,517 0.52 4 -0.2833 % 2,710.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3714 % 2,292.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 3.19 % 76,004 0.63 26 0.0874 % 2,229.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.03 % 5.05 % 123,185 15.28 7 0.0177 % 2,447.9
FixedReset 5.05 % 3.23 % 190,551 7.82 71 0.0202 % 2,388.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.03 % 3.86 % 146,980 2.90 45 0.0973 % 2,298.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.74
Bid-YTW : 0.92 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.L FixedReset 246,838 Scotia crossed 75,000 at 26.80; Nesbitt crossed blocks of 109,700 and 60,000 at 26.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 156,081 Scotia crossed 149,300 at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.73
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 122,600 Desjardins crossed 119,800 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 88,450 Desjardins crossed 70,000 at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 61,580 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 26.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.92
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 51,978 RBC crossed 50,000 at 26.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
There were 18 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 16.75 – 18.00
Spot Rate : 1.2500
Average : 0.7115

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-08
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.00 – 52.49
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.2933

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.00
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 51.90 – 52.44
Spot Rate : 0.5400
Average : 0.4137

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.90
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %

NA.PR.O FixedReset Quote: 26.90 – 27.25
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2455

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.90
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 26.22 – 26.60
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.3065

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-08
Maturity Price : 23.60
Evaluated at bid price : 26.22
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.24 – 26.47
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1591

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %

June 7, 2012

Friday, June 8th, 2012

Bernanke had some cheerful commentary:

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said the economy is at risk from Europe’s debt crisis and the prospect of fiscal tightening in the U.S., while refraining from discussing steps the central bank might take to protect the expansion.

Bernanke also warned lawmakers that “a severe tightening of fiscal policy at the beginning of next year that is built into current law — the so-called fiscal cliff — would, if allowed to occur, pose a significant threat to the recovery.”

Spain gets more interesting daily:

Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy said he’s talking to his European peers about how to shore up the country’s banks as Fitch Ratings cut Spain’s credit grade to within two steps of junk.

Rajoy spoke minutes before Fitch downgraded Spain by three levels to BBB, within two steps of non-investment grade. Fitch said the cost to the state of shoring up banks may amount to as much as 100 billion euros ($126 billion) in the worst case, compared with its previous estimate of 30 billion euros, as Spain will remain in recession next year.

Spain’s 10-year bond yield fell to 6.088 percent yesterday from 6.282 percent on June 6, retreating from the 7 percent threshold that triggered bailouts in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The Treasury met its issuance goal at a bond auction, selling 2.07 billion euros of Spanish securities, surpassing the maximum target of 2 billion euros.

It was a day of solid recovery for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 6bp, FixedResets up 10bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 23bp. Of great interest is the observation that the Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) has returned to negative territory. Volatility was minor.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4347 % 2,309.9
FixedFloater 4.49 % 3.87 % 27,095 17.57 1 -0.8899 % 3,511.4
Floater 3.13 % 3.16 % 73,632 19.25 3 -0.4347 % 2,494.1
OpRet 4.81 % 2.61 % 36,708 1.03 5 0.0077 % 2,497.9
SplitShare 5.27 % -5.10 % 49,313 0.53 4 0.9686 % 2,717.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0077 % 2,284.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 3.18 % 78,887 0.63 26 0.0595 % 2,227.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.03 % 5.05 % 127,535 15.28 7 0.5221 % 2,447.5
FixedReset 5.05 % 3.14 % 194,111 7.83 71 0.0994 % 2,388.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.03 % 3.88 % 147,931 3.16 45 0.2376 % 2,296.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
FBS.PR.C SplitShare 3.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.63
Bid-YTW : -7.11 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 6.28 % Simply a recovery from the ridiculous behaviour yesterday, but not without odd goings-on today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.86
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 156,601 Desjardins crossed 75,000 at 25.40; Nesbitt crossed 80,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.44
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 88,099 GMP bought 25,900 from RBC at 25.00; TD crossed 39,800 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 78,134 TD crossed 75,000 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 2.86 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 52,716 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 52,607 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 33,751 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.63
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.16 – 25.38
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1349

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 24.76
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.90 – 26.18
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.2077

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.15 – 25.40
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1888

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 24.83
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %

RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.62 – 26.85
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1739

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.62
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %

GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.50 – 25.69
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1345

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %

SLF.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 24.45 – 24.66
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1611

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %

LFE.PR.A: Recirculating?

Friday, June 8th, 2012

Yesterday, in the post LFE.PR.A Tight-Lipped Regarding Special Retraction Results I expressed my irritation that results of the Special Retraction for LFE.PR.A had not been reported by the company immediately following the effective date of the Special Retraction.

I eMailed the company:

Knowledge of the consolidation ratio is critical to evaluation of the credit quality of LFE.PR.A and the option value of LFE.

What purpose is served by the delay?

Sincerely,

… and received a reply …

In the best interest of the shareholders, the Company has an obligation to attempt to recirculate the shares submitted for the special retraction, prior to the payment date. Therefore it does not mean that all shares submitted for the special retraction will be cancelled. Any cancellations will not occur until after the June 19th payment date.

Well, fair enough, although I consider it rather odd that the company is holding the position as treasury shares for almost three weeks.

Say that: (i) they have not yet raised the cash, and (ii) the underlying portfolio value plummets. Then they’re screwed, because they have, effectively, levered up the portfolio in a down market.

So to avoid this possibility, one might assume that a prudent person would have raised the cash as of the NAV calculation date (May 31).

So say that: (i) they have raised the cash, and (ii) the underlying portfolio value skyrockets. This gets a little complex, so say there were two units outstanding May 30, of which one was retracted May 31 at a price of $11. They raise the cash, so that their assets on May 31 are $11 securities and $11 cash, against two units outstanding, one of which is a treasury unit.

Then the underlying doubles, so on June 17 their assets are $22 securities and $11 cash, with two units outstanding, one of which started the period as a treasury. The unitholders will be happy or sad to the extent to which the company was able to sell units at prices reflecting their ability to invest the cash in the underlying portfolio. It gets a little hairy, especially when there are two classes of shares to worry about.

Attempting to recirculate units after the calculation of the cash payment obligation seems like a risky enterprise to me. But, of course, the numbers have been chose to make understanding simpler – the underlying portfolio is unlikely to either double or halve in the three week holding period.

In fact, they might well get away with it, given that the Capital Units are trading at a fat premium to the intrinsic value reported on May 31, which was $11.32. Despite this, the low price for the entire period for the capital units by the Toronto Stock Exchange was $1.70.

Those who have seen my seminar on SplitShares will know there is nothing automatically wrong with capital units trading at a premium – they can, to a certain extent, be modelled as options and may have time value that can be quite considerable. There’s more discussion of this nuance (for free, you cheap bastards) in the post Split Share Capital Unit Debate. But – and it’s a big but, as the Bishop said to the Actress – there will be a considerable cash drag on the portfolio following the reorganization and any attempt to model the capital units as options have to include this effect. I’m sure a lot of models don’t.

One way or another, however, I suspect that the company will be successful in flogging any Capital Units retracted for a price in excess of their redemption price of $1.32. Just what might happen to the preferred shares is much less clear. We shall see!

IAG.PR.A Market-Maker Falls Asleep!

Friday, June 8th, 2012

Assiduous Reader KB writes in and says:

I’m confused about something that happens once in a while and maybe you can clear it up.

There are lots of illiquid preferred shares, and they often have wide spreads. That’s fine as long as everyone is behaving.

If I want to purchase some shares and there isn’t available size at the ask, I have found the shares usually appear if you meet the ask price. I assume the market maker offers up the shares that are required. Same situation on the sell side.

But once in a while like today, I was watching one of my preferred’s (IAG.PR.A) since yesterday it took a rather strange drop in value that you had commented on in the PrefBlog.

Today at 1:13 PM 34 shares changed hands at a reasonable $23.65. Then at 2:56 PM 700 shares traded at $21.71 and 50 shares at $21.66. That’s ridiculous.

My questions is: Where do these shares come from? National Bank bought and sold the 700 and Desjardins sold the remaining 50 to National Bank.

Do these shares come from the market maker or were there people actually willing to sell at that price? You’ve not touched on this subject in PrefLetter or in PrefBlog and the internet doesn’t reveal much, so I decided to ask you directly. Maybe you’re
just as confused as I am.

Actually, I’ve discussed it earlier in the post Fed Up with Shoddy Market-Making!. It was as a result of my frustration with the system that I started publishing the “Wide Spread Highlights” table every day and it was due to my complaints on the topic that I discovered the TMX Close != Last pricing data fiasco.

At vast expense, I have purchased the day’s “Trades and Quotes” file for IAG.PR.A from the TSX. From 9:30 until 4:00 there were 1,023 quotes and three trades.

Easy part first: National was the seller of an odd lot at the offering price and the buyer of an odd lot at the bid price. This almost certainly means that National is the Market Maker. As discussed in the post linked above, Market Makers are required to, among other things, service odd-lot orders at the quote, in exchange for which they receive certain privileges.

The action from 2:55:31 until 2:57:49 is of great interest:

IAG.PR.A
Time Quote Trade
2:55:31 21.66-23.65, 1×2  
2:56:19 21.66-94, 1×2  
2:56:19   700 @ 21.71 (National Bank Cross)
2:56:20 21.66-23.65, 1×2  
2:56:20   50 @ 21.66 (National Bank purchase from Desjardins)
2:57:49 22.00-23.65, 4×2  

All day long the offer was at 23.65, with the exception of less than one second (time-stamping on the file available to me is precise only as to the second), at 2:56:19, when the offer suddenly declined to 21.94, making the spread 0.28. In the same second the trade of 700 shares occured, and in the next second the offer moved back to the 23.65 level, where it was for 6:29:59 of the trading day which lasted 6:30:00.

I must admit that I am very curious about this sequence of events and it does not seem credible that the sudden sharp decline of the offer price was entirely unrelated to the trade of 700 shares that occured during the same single second that the offer was so low. However, I am insufficiently knowledgable regarding the rules to know whether it is legal to front-run an incoming order by changing quote to make the fill seem more reasonable – certainly, if the quote had been 21.66-94 all day long, then a fill of a market order at 21.71 by an internal trade-matching algorithm would be quite reasonable and greatly appreciated.

It is unclear as to whether any front-running occurred at all, even if the change in quote and trade were related. It would be entirely rational for someone to place a limit order inside the quote (well inside the quote, in this case!) and then convert the order to a market order if not immediately filled – although the identity of the broker showing the 21.94 offer for one second is not available in the data I have, and the size was only 200 shares. It would be somewhat more normal for the offer to be allowed to stand for more than a second, as well. However, as became glaringly apparent during the Flash Crash, individual decisions made in the design of protocols and trading algorithms can start looking rather silly when conditions are different from those envisaged at design-time.

I will also point out that the data available to me reflect only the TMX data – I do not have a consolidated tape that would include quotations from Alpha, Pure, etc.

And finally, I will point out that I don’t really understand the relative identities of the buyers and sellers. It strains credulity to imagine that National’s cross of 700 shares was completely unrelated to the sale of 50 shares by Desjardins to National that occurred one second later; but definitive information regarding the precise order flow (back to the actual beneficial owner) is not available to me.

So I will leave it to those more familiar with the intricacies of UMIR and with more access to consolidated tapes to determine whether any jiggery-pokery occured.

All one can do is ask questions – the following eMail has been sent to the Exchange:

On 2012-6-7, the offer price reported by the TMX for IAG.PR.A was 23.65 for the entire day, except for one second commencing 14:56:19. In that second the offer price changed to 21.94 and a cross was executed at 21.71, which was down 1.87 from the closing price on 2012-6-6.

The time-weighted average spread for the full trading session was, according to my calculations using data supplied by the Toronto Stock Exchange, $1.47. The quoted spread exceeded this figure for over four hours in the course of the trading day (to be precise, 4:13:53) and was between $1.95 and $2.00 for nearly all this time (4:10:09).

Can you tell me:
i) Who is the market maker for this security?
ii) What commitments has the market maker made to the exchange regarding the bid-offer spread to be maintained for this security?
iii) When was the last review of the market-maker’s success in meeting the commitments made with respect to bid-offer spread?
iv) What were the results of the last review specified by (iii)?

Sincerely,

EMA.PR.C Soft on Good Volume

Thursday, June 7th, 2012

Emera has announced:

that it has completed its public offering of ten million Cumulative Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series C for aggregate gross proceeds of $250 million. The offering was first announced on May 29, 2012 when Emera entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters in Canada led by Scotiabank, RBC Capital Markets and TD Securities Inc.

The net proceeds of the offering will be used for general corporate purposes.

EMA.PR.C is a FixedReset, 4.10%+265, announced May 29. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™, but assigned to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

EMA.PR.C traded 503,021 shares today in a range of 24.75-87 before closing at 24.81-84, 25×2. Vital statistics are:

EMA.PR.C FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

June 6, 2012

Wednesday, June 6th, 2012

OSFI has released an outline of the new paperwork rules for bank mortgages:

Re-qualification at Renewal – Current practice regarding residential mortgage renewals has served FRFIs well. OSFI agrees, for example, that having a good payment record is one of the best indicators of credit worthiness. OSFI, therefore, expects that FRFIs themselves will remain responsible for deciding what level of review to place on borrowers’ qualifications at the time of renewal. FRFI renewal practices should be articulated in internal policies governing their underwriting of residential mortgage loans. FRFIs, however, will be expected to refresh the borrowers’ credit metrics periodically (not necessarily at renewal) so that FRFIs can effectively evaluate their credit risk.

2. Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs) – OSFI is maintaining its position that the HELOC component of a mortgage be restricted to a maximum loan-to-value ratio of 65 per cent. HELOCs are inherently riskier products, given their revolving nature, persistence of debt balances and their ineligibility for mortgage insurance. However, HELOCs at or below an LTV ratio of 65 per cent will not be required to be amortized, as the revolving aspect of a HELOC is a fundamental feature of the product.

The BoC has released a discussion paper by Francisco Rivadeneyra titled The U.S.-Dollar Supranational Zero-Coupon Curve:

The author describes the construction of the U.S.-dollar-denominated zero-coupon curve for the supranational asset class from 1995 to 2010. He uses yield data from a cross-section of bonds issued by AAA-rated supranational entities to fit the Svensson (1995) term-structure model. Results show the expected pattern of interest rates over the U.S. business cycle. The author computes the spreads relative to the U.S. Treasury zero-coupon yields data of Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007). The average spread for this period is equal to 44 basis points; it increases during recessions and narrows during expansions. Also, the slope of the term structure of spreads shows a countercyclical pattern.

The Toronto Water Department has confirmed that it was their gross incompetence that dumped sewage into Union Station and PATH last week:

On the morning of June 1, a brief, but intense rainfall event caused a rapid surge of storm water flow within the City’s sewer collection system and wastewater treatment plants. (The downtown area experienced rainfall ranging from 27mm to 37mm.) The heavy rainfall event did not exceed the capacity of the entire sewer collection system.

As part of the contract for the TTC’s Union Station New Platform Project in the subway, the TTC’s contractor is also reconstructing a large sewer on behalf of the City for the Union Station Revitalization Project. To enable construction of the new lowered sewer, a section of the existing sewer was removed and pumps put in place in order to install maintenance holes at one of the future connection points. During the heavy rainstorm, sanitary and storm water overflowed from the open section of sewer at this location (flooding was localized to this area of the City).

The contractor and the project management team are working to put in place measures to avoid a recurrence during construction. One such measure includes the installation of two additional pumps on site as contingency. As well, the pipe that was temporarily exposed to perform this work will be capped by Friday.

In other words, they placed a bet that full capacity of the sewage line would not be needed during repair. They lost the bet and Toronto paid. Thanks a lot, guys! Fortunately for the guys who should be fired, council’s got other things on its mind:

Plastic shopping bags will be banned in Toronto as of Jan.1, 2013 after city council, in a surprise move, voted to make Toronto the first major city in Canada to forbid retailers from providing plastic single-use carryout bags.

It’s not clear if the city even has the jurisdiction to pass such a ban.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 2bp, FixedResets winning 13bp and DeemedRetractibles down 4bp. Volatility was minor. Volume was very low.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.09%, equivalent to 6.62% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.4% (OK, just a hair under) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 225bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) decline from the 230bp reported May 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0987 % 2,320.0
FixedFloater 4.45 % 3.83 % 27,240 17.64 1 0.7075 % 3,543.0
Floater 3.11 % 3.14 % 73,444 19.31 3 -0.0987 % 2,505.0
OpRet 4.81 % 2.59 % 37,201 1.03 5 0.0232 % 2,497.7
SplitShare 5.32 % -0.43 % 49,328 0.52 4 0.5095 % 2,691.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0232 % 2,283.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 3.40 % 79,771 0.64 26 0.0158 % 2,225.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.06 % 5.09 % 131,821 15.23 7 0.1010 % 2,434.8
FixedReset 5.05 % 3.18 % 195,080 7.80 71 0.1325 % 2,385.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 3.89 % 148,533 3.16 45 -0.0381 % 2,291.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -9.09 % Not a real decline. The issue traded 1900 shares in a range of 23.58-71 before the bid disappeared. It will be recalled that the Exchange refuses to sell Closing Quotes, so the actual close might have looked a little better. These numbers reflect the Last Quotes.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
FBS.PR.C SplitShare 2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.26
Bid-YTW : -0.43 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 383,687 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 207,488 Desjardins bought blocks of 23,100 and 14,000 from Nesbitt and blocks of 10,000 and 25,000 from anonymous, all at 25.40. Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 56,200 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.40
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 81,716 Desjardins crossed 49,000 at 25.50; RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.61.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 61,267 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 54,401 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 21.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 6.41 %
BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 43,586 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 25.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %
There were 15 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 21.51 – 23.65
Spot Rate : 2.1400
Average : 1.1751

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 16.90 – 18.14
Spot Rate : 1.2400
Average : 0.7184

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-06
Maturity Price : 16.90
Evaluated at bid price : 16.90
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %

MFC.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 25.89 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2289

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.89
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.60 – 22.85
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1893

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %

CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.89 – 26.08
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1370

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.89
Bid-YTW : -27.70 %

BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.50 – 26.69
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1374

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-29
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 2.87 %