Archive for August, 2012

August 1, 2012

Wednesday, August 1st, 2012

It was a black day for Canadian capital markets:

Maple Group Acquisition Corp. has won control of TMX Group Inc., with 91 per cent of shares tendered to its takeover offer worth about $3.8 billion.

A new Maple board of directors has already been appointed.

And along similar lines … when is a bank not a bank? When it’s a money-market mutual fund:

The 10 biggest money-fund managers and the Investment Company Institute trade group reported combined lobbying spending of $16 million in the first half of 2012 and $31.6 million last year in disclosures that reference money-market mutual funds, according to a review of documents by Bloomberg News. That compares with $16.7 million in all of 2010.

The companies are seeking to block new rules championed by Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro that are headed for a vote before a divided commission as soon as this month. The proposal would force funds to abandon their fixed $1 share price or introduce withdrawal limits and capital buffers. Schapiro can count on only one supporting vote from the other four commissioners, even as Federal Reserve officials have said that failure to enact tougher rules will leave the $2.5 trillion industry vulnerable to investor runs and threaten global credit markets.

The FOMC statement was gloomy:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June suggests that economic activity decelerated somewhat over the first half of this year. Growth in employment has been slow in recent months, and the unemployment rate remains elevated. Business fixed investment has continued to advance. Household spending has been rising at a somewhat slower pace than earlier in the year. Despite some further signs of improvement, the housing sector remains depressed. Inflation has declined since earlier this year, mainly reflecting lower prices of crude oil and gasoline, and longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and price stability. The Committee expects economic growth to remain moderate over coming quarters and then to pick up very gradually. Consequently, the Committee anticipates that the unemployment rate will decline only slowly toward levels that it judges to be consistent with its dual mandate. Furthermore, strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. The Committee anticipates that inflation over the medium term will run at or below the rate that it judges most consistent with its dual mandate.

To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee expects to maintain a highly accommodative stance for monetary policy. In particular, the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.

This libel suit amuses me:

Daniels repeatedly questioned Molo about statements from the book that are alleged to be libelous, including Lewis’s comments that Chau had worked for “sleepy” insurance companies for much of his career before managing CDOs and that CDO managers didn’t work hard.

“Most of your argument is based on the implications of certain statements, not on the actual statements,” the judge told Molo. “There’s no proof you can offer to a jury whether an insurance company is ‘sleepy.’ That is hyperbole. That is opinion.”

Chau’s firm managed about $20 billion worth of CDOs in 2007, making it the fourth largest in that category, according to court papers. Investors in Harding’s CDOs included UBS AG and Deutsche Bank AG, according court filings. CDO sales collapsed in 2007 along with the subprime-mortgage market.

There are certainly very many portfolio managers out there who are totally unqualified. Usually they just underperform. Sometimes they get hired by enormous companies with equally incompetent advisors.

It was another good, solid day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums winning 12bp, FixedResets up 5bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 9bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was pathetically low.

The PerpetualDiscount sub-index got cut in half with the July month-end rebalancing, losing CIU.PR.A to Scraps on volume concerns, while ELF.PR.F and PWF.PR.K migrated to the PerpetualPremium index. The remaining constituents are BAM.PR.M, BAM.PR.N and ELF.PR.G.

PerpetualDiscounts, all three of them, now yield 4.96%, equivalent to 6.45% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 4.25% (maybe a little more) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 220bp, unchanged from July 25.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0403 % 2,296.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0403 % 3,434.8
Floater 3.17 % 3.20 % 68,362 19.21 3 0.0403 % 2,479.2
OpRet 4.76 % 2.39 % 35,292 0.89 5 0.0690 % 2,536.7
SplitShare 5.47 % 4.91 % 66,307 4.66 3 0.0933 % 2,764.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0690 % 2,319.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.30 % 3.98 % 104,899 1.16 28 0.1177 % 2,271.3
Perpetual-Discount 4.98 % 4.96 % 105,097 15.53 3 0.0140 % 2,508.9
FixedReset 4.98 % 3.00 % 181,807 4.00 71 0.0499 % 2,424.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.96 % 3.19 % 143,423 0.80 46 0.0861 % 2,351.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-08-31
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : -11.80 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-08-01
Maturity Price : 23.63
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 101,637 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 73,840 RBC crossed blocks of 25,000 at 26.12 and 45,100 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 67,849 RBC crossed blocks of 32,500 and 28,000, both at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 53,167 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.68
Bid-YTW : 2.27 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 38,381 RBC crossed 19,500 at 26.89.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.89
Bid-YTW : 2.00 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 33,895 CIBC sold 12,100 to anonymous at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
There were 15 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.60 – 24.11
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3097

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %

RY.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.24 – 26.75
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3657

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.32 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.6300
Average : 0.4975

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.32
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.26 – 26.60
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2288

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.24 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2510

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-08-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : -6.12 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.91 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2827

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %

TA Downgraded to P-3 by S&P

Wednesday, August 1st, 2012

Standard and Poor’s has announced:

  • We are lowering our long-term corporate credit and senior unsecured debt ratings on TransAlta Corp. to ‘BBB-‘ from ‘BBB’.
  • We are also lowering our global scale preferred stock rating on the company to ‘BB’ from ‘BB+’, and our Canada scale rating to ‘P-3’ from ‘P-3(High)’.
  • The cash flow related to a recently announced contract at TransAlta’s Centralia facility largely falls outside of our rating horizon; as a result, the positive impacts of an improved business risk profile and associated cash flows have a small impact on our analysis.
  • As we said in our research update from July 23, 2012, the recent arbitration decision on Sundance Units 1 and 2 increased the probability of a downgrade because it increases the business risk related to an additional 2.5 gigawatts of capacity sold under similar power purchase agreements and it led to additional deterioration in the company’s financial risk profile.
  • The stable outlook reflects our view that adjusted funds from
    operations-to-debt will remain in the 15%-20% range, below the 20% threshold we associated with the previous ratings.

The ratings on TransAlta reflect Standard & Poor’s opinion of the company’s strong business risk profile and significant financial risk profile. In our view, the business risk profile reflects a predominance of long-term power purchase arrangements (PPAs) and a relatively diversified electricity generation portfolio. We believe that offsetting these credit strengths are high leverage; the potential for year-to-year volatility in cash flow due to revenue exposure to volume and price risk; asset concentration at Centralia, TransAlta’s largest merchant asset; and the company’s involvement in high-risk energy trading activities. An underlying level of profitability and cash flow stability comes from long-term power contracts (with a minimum of five years to maturity).

The stable outlook reflects our expectation of AFFO-to-debt remaining in the 15%-20% range and a relatively stable business risk profile. We could raise the ratings if TransAlta improves its business risk profile or if we expect the company to achieve and maintain AFFO-to-debt of more than 20%. Conversely, while we don’t expect it, a material debt-financed acquisition or capital building program, costly regulatory or environmental initiatives, or a sustained deterioration in plant operating performance leading to AFFO-to-debt falling below 15% could result in a downgrade.

TransAlta currently has two preferred share issues outstanding, TA.PR.D and TA.PR.F, both FixedResets.

DBRS recently put TA on Review-Developing:

DBRS has today placed the BBB Unsecured Debt/Medium-Term Notes and Pfd-3 Preferred Shares ratings of TransAlta Corporation (TAC or the Company) Under Review with Developing Implications. This rating action follows the announcement of the final outcome of the arbitration case regarding the force majeure and economic claim of Sundance 1 and 2 coal-fired generation units. The arbitrator concluded that, although the closure was a result of a force majeure, Sundance 1 and 2 can still be economically restored to service. As a result of this outcome, TAC will be responsible for approximately $190 million in estimated repair costs to restart Sundance 1 and 2, as well as for $150 million in accrued penalties to TransCanada PipeLines Limited (TCPL; rated “A” by DBRS), a wholly owned subsidiary of TransCanada Corporation. However, TAC will still be receiving capacity payments totaling approximately $100 million from the Balancing Pool (established by the Government of Alberta) from today to when the units are restored to service, which is expected to be in the fall of 2013. Therefore, the net cash cost for TAC is estimated to be approximately $240 million.

DBRS expects TAC to ultimately fund the majority of the aforementioned costs primarily with equity (including preferred shares and dividend re-investment proceeds) in a timely manner to maintain its current leverage level. Any further increase in leverage could cause TAC’s credit risk profile to deteriorate to a level that is no longer commensurate with the current BBB rating.