Archive for October, 2012

October 4, 2012

Friday, October 5th, 2012

Looks like it will be the Americans getting all the Asian LNG business:

A massive new proposal to export natural gas from Alaska brings a major competitor into the race to carry North American gas to Asia, and adds pressure on Canadian export projects to build quickly or risk losing out.

The Alaska Southcentral LNG project would include construction of a 1,300-kilometre pipeline from Alaskan North Slope gas fields to southern waters, near Valdez or Anchorage, where a new terminal would load liquefied natural gas on to tankers.

Canadian productivity, Canadian schmoductivity. We’ll sell our gas to the US at a discount so they can sell theirs at a premium. Just like oil.

Another flattish day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums off 1bp, FixedResets gaining 2bp and DeemedRetractibles up 1bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4737 % 2,445.3
FixedFloater 4.32 % 3.69 % 34,620 17.86 1 -0.0454 % 3,688.4
Floater 3.00 % 3.01 % 54,770 19.73 3 -0.4737 % 2,640.3
OpRet 4.63 % 2.88 % 60,493 0.69 4 -0.1619 % 2,568.5
SplitShare 5.44 % 5.04 % 73,150 4.54 3 -0.1190 % 2,819.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1619 % 2,348.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.28 % 2.16 % 94,650 0.39 27 -0.0086 % 2,299.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.01 % 4.92 % 54,887 15.52 4 -0.2250 % 2,582.4
FixedReset 4.98 % 2.97 % 187,507 4.01 73 0.0194 % 2,435.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.49 % 120,971 1.57 46 0.0069 % 2,378.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-04
Maturity Price : 17.60
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 105,407 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-04
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 96,900 TD crossed 85,000 at 26.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.53
Bid-YTW : 2.28 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset 77,345 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-04
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 62,150 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 51,250 National bought 40,000 from Nesbitt at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 43,446 TD crossed 15,000 at 26.18. National crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.14
Bid-YTW : 2.71 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.88 – 28.70
Spot Rate : 1.8200
Average : 1.5558

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.88
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 25.06 – 25.45
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2256

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %

BAM.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 25.20 – 25.58
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2537

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-04
Maturity Price : 23.27
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 17.60 – 17.87
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1713

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-04
Maturity Price : 17.60
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.32 – 25.58
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1802

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-04
Maturity Price : 23.44
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 2.84 %

POW.PR.C Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.66 – 25.95
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2107

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : -26.18 %

OSFI: Life Insurance Regulatory Framework

Thursday, October 4th, 2012

On September 5 the Office of the Superintendant of Financial Institutions announced:

released a Life Insurance Regulatory Framework to provide life insurance companies and industry stakeholders with an overview of regulatory initiatives that OSFI will be focusing on over the period ending 2016. It outlines how the regulatory framework will evolve to ensure Canadians continue to benefit from a strong life insurance industry.

“In laying out OSFI’s initiatives, we hope to encourage discussion and strong participation by industry stakeholders in our regulatory development process,” said Mark Zelmer, Assistant Superintendent, Regulation Sector. “Canadians have benefited from a strong life insurance industry and a flexible, effective regulatory framework. Our initiatives aim to ensure this continues.”

The Framework outlines OSFI’s priorities and addresses issues such as corporate governance and risk management, evolving regulatory capital requirements, and promoting transparent information on the financial condition of life insurance companies to support the regulatory framework.

“This framework addresses OSFI’s key regulatory objectives and its approach to refining regulatory oversight and guidance that is already robust,” continued Mr. Zelmer. “By issuing the regulatory framework at this time, OSFI hopes it will help life insurers and industry stakeholders in their planning processes.”

I missed this at the time, but it was brought to my attention by Assuiduous Reader dudsy in the comments to another thread.

The document is titled Life Insurance Regulatory Framework. Naturally, my main concern is to parse the text for any hints about the application of the NVCC rule to insurers and insurance holding companies:

OSFI recognizes that life insurance companies are in many ways significantly different than banks, particularly due to the long-term nature of traditional life insurance business. Therefore, in considering these developments, OSFI will not indiscriminately implement any of them (e.g., Basel III) into the life insurance regulatory framework.

To achieve these objectives, OSFI will introduce enhancements to the regulatory framework for life insurance companies through:…Revised regulatory capital requirements guidance that:…Links risk measures to the quality of capital
available to absorb losses

OSFI is approaching the review of the regulatory capital requirements with the belief that, in aggregate, the industry currently has adequate financial resources (total assets) for its current risks.

Capital will improve in terms of its ability to absorb losses, from the perspective of both a “going concern” and a “gone concern” basis.

The last seems quite encouraging, as far as NVCC is concerned. More important to OSFI, however is plausible justification for mission creep and increased employment at OSFI:

OSFI may need more specialized resources as these initiatives are incorporated into our regulatory and supervisory frameworks.

They’re going to introduce something called ORSA, which does not, surprisingly, stand for OSFI Retirees Superannuation Arrangement, but Own Risk and Solvency Assessment:

The minimum capital requirements set in OSFI’s regulatory framework may not be adequate to address this institution-specific risk-taking, as the regulatory capital requirements are based on industry averages which, at any point in time, may not fully capture new risk exposures or product developments. For this reason, institutions should have their ORSA process. Life insurance companies should not simply rely on minimum regulatory capital requirements as a proxy or as a starting point for measuring their own risk profile.

ORSA should not be seen as an OSFI compliance requirement but as a sound business practice. This will be reflected in the principles-based approach OSFI will outline in the ORSA Guideline. The ORSA Guideline will build on existing industry practice and OSFI guidance while considering international practices, in addition to seeking input and perspective from Canadian industry stakeholders.

In the section titled “Evolving Regulatory Capital Requirements”, they say:

The objective of this review is to improve our regulatory capital requirements by:…Improving Risk Measurement…Recognize the quality of capital available to absorb losses on both a “going concern” and a “gone concern” basis

The evolution of regulatory capital requirements into a more risk sensitive framework may result in more volatile regulatory capital requirements (capital available and/or capital required). OSFI will consult with industry to assess whether that volatility provides a true reflection of the evolution of the risk and is thus “appropriate” for purposes of setting regulatory capital requirements, or whether the volatility in capital requirements amplifies the variations in risk and is thus “inappropriate.”

Of great interest is their commentary on accounting standards:

Where necessary, OSFI will consider measures to address inappropriate volatility. For example, we will investigate options to moderate the impact of volatility on regulatory capital requirements, when:
1. For remaining long duration liabilities, markets for matching purposes do not exist, and
2. For solvency purposes, accounting/actuarial rules do not appropriately reflect the long-term characteristics of these portfolios.

That might be code for “Don’t worry about the IFRS Insurance Contracts Exposure Draft, guys!” The Insurance Contracts issue is actually mentioned explicitly in the concluding section of the paper:

The IASB insurance contracts project (IFRS 4 Phase II) will have a significant impact. While the extent of the impact is not fully known (and will not be until the final standard is set), OSFI is committed to consulting with industry stakeholders on how the final standard should be incorporated into the regulatory framework. Ideally, our initiatives would incorporate a final IFRS 4 Phase II standard. However, should a significant delay occur in the IASB work, OSFI will continue to move its work forward using current international financial reporting standards.

The section titled “Capital and Risk Measurement”:

The level of protection being tested by OSFI in QIS 3 is for each risk separately to cover a 1-in-200 year event (a rare, but plausible scenario) over a one-year time horizon. OSFI believes this level of protection would be equivalent to the low end of the investment grade range. An adequate provision after one year is defined as the amount of assets required for the insurer to either fulfil its policyholders’ and senior creditors’ obligations over the remaining lifetime of the obligations or to transfer them to another company.

Of great importance is their admission that:

The current approach to determining liability and regulatory capital requirements for financial guarantees embedded in segregated fund products has the following drawbacks:
• It can produce values that are materially lower than the cost of hedging.

The closes that they get to addressing the NVCC issue with respect to preferred shares is:

OSFI believes that high quality capital instruments should form a substantial part of the capital resources of an insurer when times are good. This provides the company, and OSFI, with the flexibility to respond in a constructive way in times of stress.

OSFI will consider these elements in developing guidance for the level and quality of available capital in the revised regulatory capital requirements.

The review of the definition of capital component is necessary to incorporate lessons learned during the recent financial crisis. These relate to the quality of certain capital instruments during periods of stress, the appropriateness of deductions and adjustments made to regulatory capital. The review provides an opportunity to consider each available capital element and assess its contribution to two goals: financial strength and protection of policyholders and creditors.

Revisions will provide increased transparency with respect to the meaning and purpose of both total (protection of policyholders and senior creditors) and tier 1 (financial strength) capital elements.

OSFI believes going concern capital (tier 1) should be largely comprised of equity (common and perpetual preferred shares). Items not considered to be readily available to absorb losses in a stress scenario (i.e., not fungible, not permanent, introduce an element of double-counting) should be deducted from it. Going concern capital is important to support ongoing insurer viability over the longer term given the longer-term nature of the life insurance business.

Gone concern capital (total) helps ensure that policyholders and senior creditors can be paid when the insurer is in winding-up mode. Gone concern capital may include forms of lower-quality “additional” capital components, such as hybrids and subordinated debt instruments that meet minimum quality criteria.

OSFI plans to issue a draft Definition of Capital paper for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013.

The phrase “lessons learned during the recent financial crisis” might – might! – be taken as a reference to hybrid capital not defaulting when financial institutions were bailed out, which is the justification for the NVCC rule.

However, the last sentence quoted implies that we’ll start getting some meat in the sandwich sometime around year-end … roughly TWO FREAKING YEARS after the NVCC rule was applied to banks.

The timeline section at the back gives the following estimates for “Definition of Capital”:
Project Initiation: 2011Q1
Quantitative Impact Study: 2013Q3
Public Consultation: 2013Q4
Final Guideline issued: 2014
Implementation Milestone: 2015

At this point, I see no reason to change my views regarding the potential for the eventual imposition of the NVCC rules on insurers and insurance holding companies in a similar manner to banks. The draft consultation to be issued around year-end may help firm up the matter; readers and investors should be aware that I may well change the “Deemed Maturity” date for insurers and insurance holding companies.

October 3, 2012

Wednesday, October 3rd, 2012

These are great times for American mortgage borrowers, as long as they have jobs and aren’t underwater:

Mortgage prepayment rates have soared to the highest in seven years as homeowners take advantage of the lowest borrowing costs on record to refinance.

Home loans were repaid in August at a pace that would erase 25 percent of the debt in a year, according to Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS), a Jacksonville, Florida-based data provider that tracks 40 million mortgages.

The cost of 30-year loans dropped to 3.4 percent last week, helping push refinancing applications to a three-year high, after the Federal Reserve said it will buy $40 billion of mortgage securities per month to stimulate the economy. That followed government efforts to increase refinancing with new rules designed to expand eligibility and reduce costs.

If the feds insist on coddling an expensive flag-carrier, Canadians know what to do:

The Conference Board of Canada report says about five million Canadians now cross the U.S. border by land every year to fly out of American airports.

It says higher airfares and fees and taxes in Canada, as well as differences in wages, aircraft prices and industry productivity makes it 30 per cent cheaper to fly out of the U.S.

We want unilateral open-skies, now!

It was a dull day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 2bp, FixedResets gaining 1bp and DeemedRetractibles down 4bp. Volatility was average. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts (all four of them! from both issuers!) now yield 4.87%, equivalent to 6.33% interest at the standard conversion factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield 4.2% (!) so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread is now about 215bp, unchanged from the September 26 report.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0948 % 2,457.0
FixedFloater 4.31 % 3.69 % 35,838 17.86 1 0.0454 % 3,690.1
Floater 2.98 % 3.01 % 55,160 19.74 3 0.0948 % 2,652.9
OpRet 4.62 % 0.16 % 60,159 0.65 4 0.4399 % 2,572.7
SplitShare 5.44 % 5.00 % 73,465 4.54 3 0.1589 % 2,822.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4399 % 2,352.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.28 % 2.20 % 94,872 0.39 27 0.0194 % 2,299.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.00 % 4.87 % 103,831 15.72 4 0.0409 % 2,588.2
FixedReset 4.97 % 2.97 % 183,535 4.24 73 0.0064 % 2,435.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.42 % 121,611 1.20 46 -0.0390 % 2,377.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.44
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 334,187 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.45. National crossed five blocks: 49,400 shares, 50,000 shares, 25,000 and two of 75,000 each, all at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 176,213 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 50,000 each at 26.10. National crossed 50,000 and TD crossed 16,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 110,960 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-03
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.14
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 78,131 Scotia crossed blocks of 25,000 and 50,000, both at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 1.91 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 73,979 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.95; Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 26.97.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.97
Bid-YTW : 1.84 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 61,703 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.98
Bid-YTW : 2.65 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.76 – 28.70
Spot Rate : 1.9400
Average : 1.2662

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.25 – 25.56
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1993

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 25.18 – 25.34
Spot Rate : 0.1600
Average : 0.0986

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-03
Maturity Price : 23.39
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %

RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.77 – 25.95
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1210

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.75 – 25.97
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1646

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : -5.47 %

RY.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 26.99 – 27.20
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1582

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.99
Bid-YTW : 2.32 %

New Issue: GWO Straight Perpetual, 4.80%

Wednesday, October 3rd, 2012

Great-West Lifeco Inc. has announced:

has today entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters co-led by BMO Capital Markets, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank, under which the underwriters have agreed to buy, on a bought deal basis, 6,000,000 Non-Cumulative First Preferred Shares, Series R (the “Series R Shares”) from Lifeco for sale to the public at a price of $25.00 per Series R Share, representing aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million.

Lifeco has granted the underwriters an underwriters’ option to purchase an additional 2,000,000 Series R Shares at the same offering price. Should the underwriters’ option be fully exercised, the total gross proceeds of the Series R Shares offering will be $200 million.

The Series R Shares will yield 4.80% per annum, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Company. The Series R Shares will not be redeemable prior to December 31, 2017. On and after December 31, 2017, the Company may, on not less than 30 nor more than 60 days’ notice, redeem the Series R Shares in whole or in part, at the Company’s option, by the payment in cash of $26.00 per Series R Share if redeemed prior to December 31, 2018, of $25.75 per Series R Share if redeemed on or after December 31, 2018 but prior to December 31, 2019, of $25.50 per Series R Share if redeemed on or after December 31, 2019 but prior to December 31, 2020, of $25.25 per Series R Share if redeemed on or after December 31, 2020 but prior to December 31, 2021 and of $25.00 per Series R Share if redeemed on or after December 31, 2021, in each case together with all declared and unpaid dividends up to but excluding the date fixed for redemption.

The Series R Share offering is expected to close on October 11, 2012. The net proceeds will be used for general corporate purposes and to augment Lifeco’s current liquidity position.

It’s very nice to see a Straight issued! It is my opinion that issuing straights is just another example of GWO’s superior management that has served it so well in the past five years. Their eyes aren’t getting big and round at the prospect of issuing a FixedReset at maybe 4.00% … instead they’re making a hard-nosed decision to lock in financing costs. FixedResets involve a certain amount of wrong-way risk for financial issuers.

This issue lacks a NVCC clause and will therefore be considered to be a DeemedRetractible, with a Deemed Maturity date of 2022-1-31. I wish OSFI would get off its duff about insurance regulation.

October 2, 2012

Wednesday, October 3rd, 2012

Just when you thought smart-phone malware had reached a limit…:

As smartphones become more pervasive, they are increasingly targeted by malware. At the same time, each new generation of smartphone features increasingly powerful onboard sensor suites. A new strain of `sensor malware’ has been developing that leverages these sensors to steal information from the physical environment | e.g., researchers have recently demonstrated how malware can `listen’ for spoken credit card numbers through the microphone, or `feel’ keystroke vibrations using the accelerometer. Yet the possibilities of what malware can `see’ through a camera have been understudied.

This paper introduces a novel `visual malware’ called PlaceRaider, which allows remote attackers to engage in remote reconnaissance and what we call virtual theft.” Through completely opportunistic use of the phone’s camera and other sensors, PlaceRaider constructs rich, three dimensional models of indoor environments. Remote burglars can thus `download’ the physical space, study the environment carefully, and steal virtual objects from the environment (such as financial documents, information on computer monitors, and personally identifiable information). Through two human subject studies we demonstrate the effectiveness of using mobile devices as powerful surveillance and virtual theft platforms, and we suggest several possible defenses against visual malware.

This is the source of all concern about high frequency trading:

Wall Street banks’ equities-trading units aren’t getting much relief from the strongest stock rally since 2009, as sinking volume and already thin margins threaten to make their annual performance the worst in six years.

Third-quarter equities-trading revenue probably fell 14 percent from the same period in 2011, the fifth straight drop of more than 8 percent, according to estimates by Kian Abouhossein, a JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) analyst. Full-year revenue at the five largest U.S. investment banks may be the lowest since 2006, UBS (UBSN) AG’s Brennan Hawken wrote in a Sept. 19 note to clients.

Equities trading, which generated $40 billion for the nine largest global investment banks last year, has been an attractive business because capital requirements aren’t as strict as those threatening fixed-income returns. Lower volumes have damped that optimism as investors remain skeptical about the global economy, which may lead to job cuts.

Banks’ revenue also is reduced by the continued move to electronic trading, which accounts for as much as 70 percent of transactions on the Nasdaq Stock Market and generates lower margins than voice orders. Institutions pay an average of 2.05 cents per share for orders that require handling compared with 1.08 cents for those entered through algorithms, according to Tabb Group LLC.

It sounds like an oxymoron, but there’s excitment in the indexing world:

MSCI Inc. (MSCI) fell the most on record after being dropped as benchmark provider for 22 index funds by Vanguard Group Inc., the largest U.S. mutual-fund company.

MSCI declined 27 percent to close at $26.21 in New York, the most since it went public in November of 2007, after Vanguard said funds with about $537 billion in assets will replace New York-based MSCI to cut costs for fund shareholders.

Vanguard will adopt benchmarks from FTSE Group for six international stock index funds, and benchmarks developed by the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices for 16 U.S. equity and balanced funds. The defection puts pressure on MSCI to lower the licensing fees it charges to BlackRock’s IShares unit, the biggest ETF provider, according to David Nadig, director of research at San Francisco-based ETF research firm IndexUniverse LLC.

Separately, MSCI disclosed in a regulatory filing today that it received a so-called “Wells Notice” from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, informing the company it will recommend public administrative proceedings for violations of the Investment Advisers Act. A Wells Notice typically gives recipients a chance to dissuade investigators from recommending the agency authorize enforcement action.

The company said in March that an employee had provided information about clients’ proxy voting to a proxy solicitor in violation of its policies, according to the filing.

BlackRock uses MSCI indexes to guide 197 ETFs with $162 billion in assets, Melissa Garville, a spokeswoman, said in an e-mail.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 3bp, FixedResets down 8bp and DeemedRetractibles up 2bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2281 % 2,454.7
FixedFloater 4.32 % 3.69 % 37,277 17.86 1 1.8981 % 3,688.4
Floater 2.99 % 3.01 % 56,968 19.73 3 0.2281 % 2,650.4
OpRet 4.64 % 2.64 % 57,298 0.70 4 0.2781 % 2,561.4
SplitShare 5.44 % 4.95 % 72,786 4.55 3 0.0132 % 2,817.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2781 % 2,342.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.28 % 2.43 % 90,220 0.39 27 0.0258 % 2,299.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.00 % 4.87 % 104,717 15.72 4 -0.2144 % 2,587.2
FixedReset 4.97 % 2.99 % 178,754 4.24 73 -0.0788 % 2,435.2
Deemed-Retractible 4.93 % 3.38 % 120,921 0.63 46 0.0212 % 2,378.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.I FixedReset -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.58
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 211,305 RBC bought blocks of 32,600 and 66,900 from Nesbitt at 25.15, then crossed 51,400 at the same price. National crossed 50,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-02
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.14
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 160,115 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 26.10. RBC crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 123,965 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-02
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 101,300 RBC crossed 98,700 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset 59,460 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-02
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 56,975 Scotia crossed blocks of 23,400 and 29,500, both at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 1.77 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.50 – 25.85
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2418

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-02
Maturity Price : 23.69
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %

TD.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 27.03 – 27.26
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1487

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.03
Bid-YTW : 2.31 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 51.90 – 52.25
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2727

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.90
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %

RY.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.10 – 26.33
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1569

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.82 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.30 – 26.90
Spot Rate : 0.6000
Average : 0.5273

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %

NA.PR.O FixedReset Quote: 27.05 – 27.25
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1378

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.05
Bid-YTW : 1.20 %

YLO Default Now Official: DBRS

Tuesday, October 2nd, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

has today downgraded Yellow Media Inc.’s (Yellow Media or the Company) Issuer Rating to D from C (high). DBRS has also downgraded the Company’s Medium-Term Notes rating to D from C (high) and is discontinuing its recovery rating of RR4; the Company’s Exchangeable Subordinated Debentures rating to D from C (low) and is discontinuing its recovery rating of RR6; and the Company’s Cumulative Preferred Shares rating to D from Pfd-5 (low).

On July 23, 2012, DBRS noted that Yellow Media’s ratings were placed Under Review with Negative Implications pending the final approval of its proposed recapitalization. The recapitalisation was approved by debtholders and shareholders on September 6, 2012, and was intended to close by the end of September 2012, subject to a number of conditions, including the receipt of the Court’s final approval. On September 10, 2012, Yellow Media announced that the hearing for the final approval by the Québec Superior Court had been postponed and is set by the Court to begin on October 15, 2012.

On September 14, 2012, the Québec Superior Court granted the Company a safeguard order suspending its obligation to pay accrued and unpaid interest in respect of Yellow Media’s convertible debentures, including the October 1, 2012, interest payment or pay any principal or interest or any similar payment accruing on or after September 30, 2012, under its existing credit facilities and medium-term notes. The safeguard order is effective until ten days following the judgment of the Québec Superior Court on the final orders sought at the hearing for the final approval of its proposed recapitalization, subject to any further order of the Court.

Accordingly, Yellow Media did not pay its October 1, 2012, interest payment on its convertible debentures nor did the Company pay the $25 million principal repayment due October 1, 2012, under its existing credit facilities. As such, Yellow Media’s issuer and securities ratings have been downgraded to D in accordance with DBRS policy.

The company has four series of preferred shares outstanding, YLO.PR.A, YLO.PR.B, YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D. The recapitalization plan has won shareholder and creditor approval and, if approved by the Quebec Superior Court, will more-or-less wipe out common and preferred shareholders who will now hold a combined stake in the reorganized company of a little under 16%.

October 1, 2012

Tuesday, October 2nd, 2012

Here’s a good example of why government agencies should not regulate Credit Rating Agencies:

Now, incredibly, Egan-Jones is the sole rater that the SEC has decided to attack. The trouble for the firm started on July 16, 2011, when Egan-Jones downgraded the U.S.’s sovereign debt by one notch, to AA+ from AAA. Egan-Jones cited “the relatively high level of debt and the difficulty in significantly cutting spending.” Two days later, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations contacted the firm seeking information about its rating decision. (The next month, S&P also downgraded the U.S.’s sovereign debt, but neither Moody’s nor Fitch did.)

Then, on Oct. 12, Egan-Jones received a call from the SEC notifying the firm of a Wells Notice, an indication that it was being investigated. On April 5 of this year, Egan-Jones again downgraded the U.S. sovereign debt, to AA from AA+. On April 19, leaks started emanating from the SEC that it had voted to start an “administrative law proceeding” against the firm. And on April 24, the SEC filed its complaint.

Just what does the SEC object to so vehemently about Egan- Jones? The commission claims that on its 2008 supplemental application to be a “nationally recognized” ratings firm, Egan- Jones “falsely stated” that it had already rated the credit of 150 asset-backed securities and of 50 sovereign-debt issues. The SEC claims Egan-Jones “willfully made these misstatements and omissions to conceal the fact that it had no experience issuing ratings on ABS or government issuers.” The SEC intends to fine Egan-Jones and to possibly censure Sean Egan — neither move would be good for business.

His lawyer, Alan S. Futerfas, told the Wall Street Journal that the SEC knows that Egan did rate the securities in question but it is “saying he didn’t disseminate it publicly.” Futerfas continued: “It’s a very technical argument the SEC is using; it’s not substantive. There’s nothing in this complaint that suggests or alleges that any rating was without integrity or was not accurate or was not predictive.”

If he is right, that raises a question: Is the SEC retaliating against Egan and his firm for downgrading the U.S. sovereign debt?

Regulation of CRAs inevitably leads to a very tiresome discussion of conspiracy theories. There are certainly problems with “Issuer pays”; “Issuer regulates” is worse.

Is QE3 inflationary? Who cares?

Investors initially increased their inflation expectations on the Fed’s plan. The gap between yields on 10-year notes and same-maturity Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, or TIPS, widened to 2.73 percentage points on Sept. 17, the highest level since May 2006. The so-called break-even rate, which measures how much traders anticipate consumer prices will rise over the life of the debt, narrowed last week to 2.42 percentage points.

In a startling new development, the SEC has hired somebody with a clue:

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, stung by criticism that it lacks the knowledge to analyze the computerized trading that has come to dominate American stock markets, is planning to catch up.

Initiatives to increase the breadth of data received from exchanges and to record orders from origination to execution are at the center of the effort. Gregg Berman, who holds a doctorate in physics from Princeton University, will head the commission’s planned office of analytics and research.

Berman, who studied experimental and nuclear physics, developed trading strategies in commodities and stocks at a hedge fund and became a founding member of RiskMetrics Group Inc. in 1998 when JPMorgan Chase & Co. spun off the company. He writes programming code and did some of the flash-crash modeling when the SEC examined how trade requests were withdrawn from exchange order books that day.

The analytics and research office plans to hire traders from banks and hedge funds as well as financial engineers and individuals with quantitative and analytical skills. It’s looking for programmers in the C++ computer language and “UNIX gurus who really know how to get under the hood and in former lives may have written trading programs and now are going to write analytical programs,” Berman said.

Traditionalists will be relieved to learn that the new Office of Analytics and Research comes under the Division of Trading and Markets, which is headed by a lawyer.

He also served as counsel to Chairman Schapiro on issues involving the Division of Trading and Markets, including the agency’s analysis and response to the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010, and numerous other market structure and Dodd-Frank related rulemakings, studies, and programs.

Readers will remember that the agency’s response to the Flash Crash was a highly politicized put-up job.

Moody’s believes that the Spanish stress test was insufficiently conservative:

Spain’s banks face a capital shortfall that could climb to 105 billion euros ($135 billion), almost double the estimate the government provided last week, according to Moody’s Investors Service.

The nation’s lenders may need infusions of 70 billion euros to 105 billion euros to absorb losses and still keep capital ratios above thresholds outlined in legislation last year, Moody’s analysts wrote yesterday in a report. That compares with the 53.7 billion euro shortfall found last week after officials commissioned a stress test designed to lift doubts about the financial industry’s ability to withstand losses.

“The recapitalization amounts published by Spain are below what we estimate are needed for Spanish banks to maintain stability in our adverse and highly adverse scenarios,” the analysts, Maria Jose Mori and Alberto Postigo, said in the report. “If market participants are skeptical about the stress test, negative sentiment could undercut the government’s efforts to fully restore confidence in the solvency of Spanish banks.”

While many assumptions in the stress test were conservative, some may be questioned, Moody’s said. The test used a 6 percent core capital ratio under a stressed scenario, while the ratings firm assumed capital ratios of 8 percent to 10 percent, according to the report. The rate used by Ireland for its test, including a buffer, was 9 percent.

What makes this interesting is that it continues to reflect one of the big problems of the Credit Crunch: bank capital is supposed to ensure that unexpected losses will bankrupt the company only once in 1,000 years (insert jokes about recent experience here).

The confidence level is fixed at 99.9%, i.e. an institution is expected to suffer losses that exceed its level of tier 1 and tier 2 capital on average once in a thousand years. This confidence level might seem rather high. However, Tier 2 does not have the loss absorbing capacity of Tier 1. The high confidence level was also chosen to protect against estimation errors, that might inevitably occur from banks’ internal PD, LGD and EAD estimation, as well as other model uncertainties.

But! In demanding that the banks maintain capital above the regulatory minimum even after experiencing these 1,000-year losses, we are demanding that they remain solvent even after experiencing 1,000 year losses in successive years (which is probably not a million-year two-year-loss; it will depend on the correlation between successive years). I don’t think anybody knows how to deal with this. The concept of a buffer is helpful, but it remains to be seen what will happen to a bank in times of great stress when it has used up its buffer.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 4bp, FixedResets gaining 2bp and DeemedRetractibles up 11bp. There weren’t many volatile issues, but they made up in energy what they lacked in numbers. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0190 % 2,449.1
FixedFloater 4.40 % 3.78 % 35,425 17.71 1 0.5119 % 3,619.7
Floater 2.99 % 3.02 % 57,351 19.71 3 -0.0190 % 2,644.3
OpRet 4.65 % 2.77 % 35,186 0.73 4 0.1549 % 2,554.3
SplitShare 5.45 % 4.93 % 70,809 4.55 3 -0.1586 % 2,817.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1549 % 2,335.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.28 % 2.11 % 90,829 0.39 27 -0.0423 % 2,298.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.99 % 4.85 % 105,942 15.77 4 0.5440 % 2,592.7
FixedReset 4.97 % 2.98 % 176,061 4.02 73 0.0175 % 2,437.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.94 % 3.52 % 122,108 1.11 46 0.1138 % 2,378.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium -2.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-01
Maturity Price : 24.21
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 2.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 212,857 Nesbitt crossed 201,400 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 105,667 Nesbitt crossed 48,900 at 26.10; RBC crossed 51,500 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 41,357 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 34,715 TD crossed 16,300 at 25.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 32,437 Scotia crossed 29,200 at 26.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.52
Bid-YTW : 1.95 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 32,000 RBC crossed 26,000 at 26.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.44
Bid-YTW : 2.65 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.15 – 26.90
Spot Rate : 0.7500
Average : 0.4477

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 51.90 – 52.21
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1878

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.90
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.20 – 26.48
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1587

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %

BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.51 – 26.87
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2553

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-26
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 1.08 %

POW.PR.C Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.62 – 25.92
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2111

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : -25.03 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 25.15 – 25.39
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1584

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %

New Issue: BRF FixedReset 4.40%+294

Monday, October 1st, 2012

Brookfield Renewable Energy Partners has announced:

that it has agreed to issue a total of 8,000,000 Class A Preference Shares, Series 3 (the “Series 3 Preferred Shares”) on a bought deal basis to a syndicate of underwriters in Canada led by TD Securities Inc., CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank. The Series 3 Preferred Shares will be issued at a price of CDN$25.00 per share, for aggregate gross proceeds of CDN$200,000,000. The Series 3 Preferred Shares are being issued through a wholly-owned subsidiary of, and are guaranteed by, Brookfield Renewable.

Holders of the Series 3 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed cumulative dividends at an annual rate of CDN$1.10 per share, payable quarterly. The Series 3 Preferred Shares will yield 4.4% annually at the issue price, for an initial period ending July 31, 2019 with the first dividend payment date scheduled for January 31, 2013, based on an anticipated closing date of October 11, 2012. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a rate equal to the then five-year Government of Canada Bond yield plus 2.94%. The Series 3 Preferred Shares are redeemable on or after July 31, 2019.

The holders of Series 3 Preferred Shares will have the right to convert their shares into Class A Preference Shares, Series 4 (the “Series 4 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on July 31, 2019 and on July 31 of every fifth year thereafter. The holders of Series 4 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating rate cumulative dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors, at a rate equal to the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.94%.

Brookfield Renewable has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part anytime up to two business days prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 2,000,000 Series 3 Preferred Shares at the issue price on the same terms, for additional gross proceeds of up to CDN$50,000,000.

Brookfield Renewable intends to use the net proceeds of the issue of Preferred Shares to repay outstanding indebtedness and for general corporate purposes. The offering of Series 3 Preferred Shares is expected to close on October 11, 2012.

The Series 3 Preferred Shares will be offered to the public in Canada pursuant to a supplement to Brookfield Renewable’s existing short form base shelf prospectus dated January 23, 2012, that will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in each of the provinces and territories of Canada.

This will join BRF.PR.A, a FixedReset, 5.25%+262, currently trading slightly below $26.00.

MAPF Performance: September 2012

Monday, October 1st, 2012

The fund outperformed in September, due largely to stellar performance by insurer-issued DeemedRetractibles and BNA.PR.C. … all this for the third straight month! However, there was a change in overall performance in that DeemedRetractibles in general and FixedResets in general underperformed, returning 26bp and 27bp respectively while PerpetualPremiums won 92bp and Floaters excelled with a stellar +1.86% total return.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close September 28, 2012, was 10.6703 after a dividend distribution of 0.131430.

Returns to September 28, 2012
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD
according to
Blackrock
One Month +1.03% +0.38% +0.43% +0.44%
Three Months +5.74% +1.64% +1.86% +1.62%
One Year +12.66% +6.45% +6.51% +6.03%
Two Years (annualized) +7.62% +7.19% +5.88% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +10.18% +8.09% +6.90% +6.16%
Four Years (annualized) +21.31% +8.62% +7.44% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +15.83% +5.38% +4.15% +3.51%
Six Years (annualized) +13.25% +4.11%    
Seven Years (annualized) +12.18% +4.10%    
Eight Years (annualized) +11.53% +4.24%    
Nine Years (annualized) +11.96% +4.33%    
Ten Years (annualized) +13.81% +4.61%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +11.98% +4.49%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.53%, +1.67% and +6.35%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +7.00%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.26%, +0.91% and +3.31% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +4.22%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.27%, +1.72% & +5.29%, respectively. Three Year performance is +5.16%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.43%, +2.01% & +6.67%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past year has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund has done well by trading between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons, but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains.

SLF DeemedRetractibles may be compared with PWF and GWO:


Click for Big

It is quite apparent that that the market continues to treat regulated insurance issues (SLF, GWO) no differently from unregulated issues (PWF) – despite the fact that the PWF issues are much more subject to unfavourable calls in the near term and should, logically, be deprecated on those grounds alone without any fancy-pants arguments about imposition of the NVCC rule!

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. The relationship is still far too large to be explained by Implied Volatility – the numbers still indicate an overwhelming degree of directionality in the market’s price expectations.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September, 2012 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. Commencing February, 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on September 28; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I will no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as there are currently only four such issues of investment grade, from only two issuer groups. Additionally, the fund has no holdings of these issues.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Thus, the decline in the MAPF Sustainable Income from $0.5500 per unit in June to $0.4934 per unit in September should be looked at as a simple consequence of the funds holdings; virtually all of which have their yields calculated in a manner closer to bonds than to Perpetual Annuities.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.