Archive for February, 2013

HSB Downgraded by DBRS

Friday, February 8th, 2013

DBRS has announced that it:

has today downgraded all the ratings of HSBC Bank Canada following the downgrade of the ratings of HSBC Holdings plc (the Parent; see DBRS’s HSBC Holdings plc press release dated February 8, 2013). The outlook on all ratings is Stable. The ratings have been removed from Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on July 20, 2012.

DBRS ratings of HSBC Bank Canada, including the Long-Term Deposits and Senior Debt (no guarantee) rated AA (low) and Subordinated Debt (no guarantee) at A (high), are based largely on the relationship HSBC Bank Canada has with the Parent, which is one of the largest global banking groups. DBRS’s Issuer Rating – Long-Term of the Parent is AA with a Stable trend.

Under DBRS’s global bank rating methodology, DBRS has assigned HSBC Bank Canada a support assessment of SA1, reflecting a strong expectation of timely support from the Parent.

Given the strategic nature of the relationship between HSBC and the Parent, but lack of an explicit guarantee, the non-guaranteed long-term deposits and senior debt rating of HSBC has been assigned a rating that is one notch lower than HSBC Holdings plc.

The press release on HSBC Holdings states:

The downgrade takes into account HSBC’s recent fines and customer redress costs (including anti money laundering in the US and Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) in the UK), which demonstrate a weaker operational risk profile than is commensurate with the prior rating level. Moreover, DBRS expects the process for HSBC to raise compliance standards across the Group to be a lengthy and costly process. DBRS notes that HSBC already made major organisational changes to its structure in 2011, whereby control has been more centralised within the global businesses and functions rather than spread across multiple geographies, and that these changes should underpin the ongoing reforms. However, in DBRS’s view it is a significant challenge to successfully reform procedures and strengthen controls in large, complex banking organisations, such as HSBC.

…the Group has increased its spending on anti-money laundering, remedial measures, and an overhaul of controls and procedures, and intends to bring all controls globally to its highest global standard. DBRS considers that it is difficult to assess the full cost and revenue impact of meeting these higher standards, but expects it to be a drag on profitability.

Hurray! They’re going to spend more on anti-money laundering! It reminds me of John Allison’s remark:

And then there was the Patriot Act, which was supposed to catch terrorists. I’ve talked to many people in government and they all do this dancing act, but the fact is there has never been a single terrorist caught and convicted because of the Patriot Act. The Act cost the banking industry more than $5 billion annually, and I would argue that no one is going to be caught. If you are dumb enough to get caught under the Patriot Act, you are going to get caught anyway. The only significant conviction of the Patriot Act was Eliot Spitzer, the governor of New York, who was convicted of soliciting prostitutes under a law designed to catch terrorists.

The DBRS announcement in July that HSB was on Review-Negative was reported on PrefBlog.

HSBC Bank Canada is the issuer of HSB.PR.C, HSB.PR.D (both DeemedRetractibles) and HSB.PR.E (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and assigned to the indicated subindices. All are now rated Pfd-2.

February 7, 2013

Thursday, February 7th, 2013

Pension underfunding is becoming socially acceptable:

Some of Ontario’s largest companies, facing massive deficits in their pension plans, are turning to their employees in a bid to help solve a deepening funding crisis.

Chrysler Canada Inc., ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc. and other companies – large and small – have asked their employees to let them take advantage of a special Ontario government rule that allows companies to stretch contributions to underfunded defined-benefit pension funds to 10 years from five.

FSCO forecast that the average fund would have assets that would cover just 72 per cent of liabilities at the end of 2011, compared with 87 per cent at the end of 2010.

ArcelorMittal Dofasco shows a typical decline. As of Dec. 31, 2011, assets in the plan for non-unionized employees of the steel maker covered 52 per cent of liabilities, versus 65 per cent a year earlier.

In 2004, Don Pether, then chief executive officer of Dofasco Inc., (before it was taken over by ArcelorMittal) pointed to its fully funded pension plan as offering “a strategic advantage.” But in recent years, record low interest rates and lower returns on investments have caused the deficit, spokeswoman Marie Verdun said Wednesday.

Members of the ArcelorMittal Dofasco plan recently turned down the steel maker’s proposal to stretch out the funding.

It’s a difficult question for workers. On the one hand, crippling the company’s ability to operate doesn’t make a lot of sense. But on the other hand, making such a concession without getting something pretty solid in return doesn’t make a lot of sense either.

And what will the lenders think? It will be most interesting to see what happens as a result of the Indalex ruling:

But insolvency lawyers say this “deemed trust” issue simply creates more headaches for companies with big defined-benefit pension plans and those who lend them money.

This part of the ruling means lenders to thousands of companies with large defined-benefit pension plans just saw themselves pushed back in the line of creditors, behind potentially massive pension shortfalls, said D.J. Miller, an insolvency lawyer with Thornton Grout Finnigan in Toronto.

“All of those lenders that have money advanced right now, thinking they are in first position on inventories and accounts receivable, are sitting behind what can be a deficit that can be in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars,” said Ms. Miller, who acted for the Insolvency Institute of Canada, which intervened in the case before the Supreme Court.

Plans that could be close to being wound up, or plans that have large shortfalls, will attract special attention, she said: “I think all of the lenders right now are doing a very careful assessment of their portfolios to determine what their potential exposure is.”

She warned that lenders might require extra guarantees and higher rates from companies with big pension plans. Other creditors might be tempted to push a company right into full-blown bankruptcy, which would nullify the pensioners’ new rights.

Jonathan Weil of Bloomberg publicizes an interesting tidbit about the S&P lawsuit:

The U.S. Justice Department made some peculiar allegations in its lawsuit this week against S&P and its parent, McGraw-Hill Cos. According to the government, Citigroup was defrauded by S&P credit ratings on subprime mortgage bonds that Citigroup itself created and sold. Bank of America, too, allegedly was defrauded by S&P in the same way.

If this doesn’t make sense, that’s the point. The notion is far-fetched. No wonder S&P wouldn’t agree to a settlement and told the government to see it in court.

Here’s the gist. Near the end of its 119-page complaint, the Justice Department listed about two-dozen collateralized- debt obligations issued in 2007 as examples where S&P allegedly defrauded banks and credit unions. It was important that the Justice Department be able to identify such lenders as investors, because it’s suing S&P under a 1989 statute that covers frauds against federally insured financial institutions.

Under the government’s theory, Citigroup and Bank of America paid S&P for ratings that convinced the banks their own CDO offal was rock-solid. And because S&P deceived them into thinking the best of their own rubbish, these banks and other lenders suffered more than $5 billion of investment losses, according to the suit.

There’s some concern that retail could stampede out of bonds:

Falling interest rates over the past decade has meant rising bond prices, delivering dazzling returns for bond mutual funds. Investors have responded by jumping in. Mutual, closed end and exchange-traded funds now own close to 20 per cent of all investment and high-yield corporate debt in the U.S.

In Canada, investors bought a net $19-billion worth of bond funds in 2012 (compared with total investment fund net sales of $30-billion), more than two and a half times larger than sales a year earlier, as they continued to trade out of equity funds. Investors in Canada now hold $132-billion worth of bond funds, according to the Investment Funds Institute of Canada – up from just $53.5-billion at the end of 2008.

The concern now is that interest rates rise too much, too fast. Rates on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds have climbed markedly in recent months after hitting an all-time low last July. The rate hit 2 per cent last week for the first time since April (remember, when rates rise, bond prices fall). If they continue to rise to 3 per cent, there would be a “disorderly rotation out of bonds – characterized by higher interest rates and wider credit spreads,” warned Bank of America Merrill Lynch credit strategist Hans Mikkelsen in a research note this week.

But for now

But a Canadian debt issue this week is a reminder that the bond market remains frothy by historical standards.

On Wednesday, Corus Entertainment Inc. priced a seven-year, $550-million bond deal at a yield of 4.25 per cent. The big news: That’s 3 percentage points lower than a similar offering in 2010 ($500-million, seven years), when its credit rating was the same BBB low from DBRS that it is today. (Its rating from Standard and Poor’s is one notch higher than it was in 2010, but still below investment grade.)

Better yet, sources in the Canadian bond market say there were 85 buyers, 50 per cent more than the 2010 offering.

There’s a term extension on Irish debt:

Ireland clinched a long-awaited deal on Thursday to ease the burden of its bank debts, sending its borrowing costs falling to pre-crisis levels and bolstering its chances of ending its reliance on EU-IMF loans this year.

After nearly 18 months of negotiation, Prime Minister Enda Kenny won European Central Bank (ECB) approval to stretch out the cost of bailing out Anglo Irish Bank, slicing billions off the country’s borrowing needs and cutting its budget deficit.

>Under the terms of the deal, first reported on Wednesday, Anglo’s promissory notes, with an average maturity of between seven and eight years, will be exchanged for government bonds with an average maturity of over 34 years. The first principal repayment will be made in 2038 and the last in 2053.

The finance spokesman for the opposition Sinn Fein party said the agreement would burden future generations.

“This week my youngest son began to crawl. He wasn’t even born at the time the promissory note was issued, yet he’ll be 40 years of age and this state will be paying back the toxic debts of Anglo Irish Bank,” Pearse Doherty told parliament.

Anglo Irish’s near-collapse in 2008 pressured the government into guaranteeing the entire financial sector, sucking it into a downward spiral and in late 2010, a €67.5-billion loan from the EU and IMF.

Don’t worry Mr. Doherty! It’s government debt – it will be refunded, not redeemed! Bloomberg points out approvingly:

At issue is an obligation the Irish government took on in 2010, during the rescue of the now-defunct Anglo Irish Bank. At the urging of the European Union, and in return for emergency loans from the European Central Bank, the government issued an IOU that allowed Anglo Irish to pay its bondholders. The IOU has since been a heavy burden on Irish taxpayers, requiring annual payments of more than $4 billion.

This week, the ECB effectively accepted an Irish proposal to reschedule the debt — a move that the country’s extraordinary efforts to fulfill its EU-mandated austerity program thoroughly justify. The government will exchange the IOU, which consists of 10-year promissory notes paying an 8 percent interest rate, for longer-term bonds paying about 3 percent.

And who owned the promissory notes? The Financial Times untangles it:

For Anglo, the only asset it had left that was really worth anything and could be used as collateral was the sovereign promise from the Dublin government: the promissory note.

However, the Irish central bank is now part of the eurosystem, which means the ECB must sign off on any ELA assistance for Anglo and its successors. Since the promissory note is, in essence, the one thing the ECB has as collateral for its loans, it has to make sure whatever replaces them is still legitimate collateral. That gives it a veto in any attempt to restructure the notes.

OK – so Europe has had its 10-year 8% proms forcibly converted into 30-year 3% bonds. There’s a good deal!

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 8bp, FixedResets up 10bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. Volatility picked up a little, with Straights on the low side. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3939 % 2,581.1
FixedFloater 4.19 % 3.51 % 26,063 18.31 1 0.0441 % 3,881.0
Floater 2.58 % 2.92 % 73,040 19.91 5 0.3939 % 2,786.9
OpRet 4.75 % 2.21 % 35,384 0.31 5 0.2067 % 2,608.9
SplitShare 4.56 % 4.33 % 38,129 4.27 2 -0.0991 % 2,919.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2067 % 2,385.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.24 % 0.37 % 84,604 0.23 29 -0.0779 % 2,353.3
Perpetual-Discount 4.85 % 4.89 % 140,422 15.63 4 0.0101 % 2,648.5
FixedReset 4.90 % 2.81 % 268,116 3.38 78 0.0974 % 2,491.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.87 % 2.14 % 147,668 0.30 45 -0.0026 % 2,434.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : -37.46 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-07
Maturity Price : 23.48
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 2.18 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 162,350 TD crossed 158,000 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 1.99 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 142,050 TD crossed 100,000 at 26.30; RBC crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.32
Bid-YTW : 1.92 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 77,755 National crossed 40,000 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.89
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 63,040 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 40,000 and 18,500, both at 26.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.37
Bid-YTW : 1.95 %
BNS.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 56,360 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.72
Bid-YTW : 1.39 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 53,687 National crossed 40,000 at 24.61.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 4.75 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.51 – 26.04
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3227

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %

ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.25 – 26.55
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1960

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : -37.46 %

PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.77 – 27.00
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1464

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.15 – 25.46
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2308

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.56 – 25.83
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.2075

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.40 %

CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.70 – 25.88
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1230

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : -25.03 %

February 6, 2013

Wednesday, February 6th, 2013

Bloomberg has an the regulatory realities of ratings:

The U.S. lawsuit against Standard & Poor’s raises pressure to accelerate competition in the ratings industry while the government itself has adopted rules that left the business dominated by the same companies whose flawed grades sparked the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.

Ann Rutledge, a structured finance specialist, has watched her application to become an NRSRO languish at the SEC for 20 months. Her company, R&R Consulting, has yet to be granted a license because some of the eight client letters don’t meet the requirements of a credit rating as defined by the 2006 law. The statute specifies that only written testimonials that are notarized from institutional buyers attesting to its ratings may be used. R&R’s clients include pension funds, hedge funds and governments.

Rapid Ratings International Inc., a New York-based firm that uses quantitative models to grade securities, hasn’t applied for the NRSRO designation, which would allow investors to buy securities rated by the company to meet regulatory requirements, because its costs would increase by 40 percent to hire compliance staff, James Gellert, chief executive officer, said in a Jan. 7 telephone interview.

Meredith Whitney Advisory Group LLC, headed by the former Citigroup Inc. analyst, made a presentation to the SEC in November 2010 seeking NRSRO status and has yet to be approved, according to the SEC website. A woman who answered the phone in the company’s New York office Feb. 4 declined to comment on its application.

Costs have also kept PF2 Securities Evaluations Inc., a New York company that values structured products, from applying for the designation, according to Gene Phillips, a director.

Danish banks are having regulatory problems:

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which brings together regulators from 27 nations including the U.S and China, last month expanded the range of easily sold assets banks must have on hand to weather a month of market turmoil. While policy makers approved company debt and equities, they kept limits on covered bonds, mortgage-backed securities that fund almost all Danish home purchases, and are rated higher than the sovereign debt of Japan, Italy and Spain.

Denmark, which doesn’t have a representative on the committee, has more of the securities outstanding per capita than any other nation, with its banks holding more than half of the 3.3 trillion-krone ($600 billion) market. Unless revised, lenders will have to find alternatives to fulfill the liquidity requirements at the same time Denmark is shrinking its issuance of government debt. Interest rates for Danish homeowners, the world’s most indebted, may also climb, creating reverberations throughout the economy, said Steen Bocian, chief economist for Danske Bank A/S, the country’s largest lender.

Household debt is about three times disposable income, and most of it is in mortgages financed by covered bonds, a form of bank financing backed by mortgages, creating Europe’s second- largest residential covered bond market after Spain. Danish banks held mortgage bonds valued at 1.52 trillion kroner, or 46 percent of the 3.3 trillion kroner outstanding, in December, the central bank said Jan. 25.

Basel has categorized government debt as level 1, allowing banks to fulfill 100 percent of their liquidity requirements with the assets. Mortgage-based debt is considered level 2, so there are caps on their use as liquid assets. Covered bonds will have a 40 percent ceiling, while securitizations can’t count for more than 15 percent of a lender’s liquidity buffer.

A major objective of Basel III is to force banks to own European government debt, since otherwise it might not get sold.

There’s another smoking gun in the LIBOR rigging scandal:

A Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc trader colluded with a counterpart at UBS AG to pay almost 211,000 pounds ($330,000) in bribes to brokers willing to help them manipulate global interest rates, regulators said.

Neil Danziger, a London-based derivatives specialist at RBS, helped Tom Hayes, the former UBS employee at the center of the global investigation into rate-rigging, to bribe at least two brokers into persuading other banks to submit rates in line with their own, according to transcripts released by regulators that didn’t identify the traders by name. Two people with direct knowledge of the talks confirmed the traders’ identities. The regulators didn’t identify the brokers involved.

“Can you do me a favor,” an unidentified broker asked Danziger on Sept. 19, 2008, according to a transcript of the conversation released yesterday by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. “You’re not going to get paid any bro for this and we’ll send you lunch around for the whole desk.” As the broker outlined the trade, he said “Take it from UBS, give it back to UBS. He wants to pay some bro,” referring to fees.

“Yeah, yeah,” Danziger replied.

Later that day, the broker asked Danziger if he could “do another 100 yards” or 100 billion, increasing the size of the transaction. “Flat switch,” the broker said. “I know I’m pushing my luck.”

RBS then entered into a wash trade with UBS that enabled the Zurich-based lender to pay about $31,000 in fees to the broker for its help in rigging Libor, the CFTC said.

Cash Store Financial Services is fighting to retain its payday loan business:

Cash Store Financial Services Inc. says it will request a hearing before Ontario’s Licence Appeal Tribunal in response to government pressure on its lending businesses.

The company says Ontario’s registrar for payday loans wants to revoke the payday lending licences of its Cash Store Inc. and Instaloans Inc. businesses.

Cash Store Financial says Ontario’s Ministry of Consumer Affairs has attempted since September, 2011, to force it to deliver payday loans in cash, rather than the electronic methods they now use.

The company says it’s unwilling to place employees and customers at risk by having them handling cash.

I cannot for the life of me determine why the Ministry wants to force them to use cash – what business is it of the Ministry? Naturally enough, I can’t find anything on the web to answer this question, as the media does nothing but re-write press releases.

This is just another example of creeping regulation. They don’t want to pass a law forbidding X, because that would expose the politicians for what they are. Instead, they install a licensing requirement and simply refuse to issue a license to those deemed unworthy. It’s pretty sleazy.

Anyway, it resulted in a downgrade by S&P:

  • •The registrar for payday loans in Ontario issued a proposal to revoke The Cash Store Financial Services Inc.’s (CSF) payday lending licenses, and
    CSF announced that it has discontinued its payday loan product in the territory.

  • •We are lowering our ratings on CSF and its senior secured notes to ‘CCC+’ from ‘B-‘.
  • •The negative outlook reflects our view that a material portion of CSF’s business is being discontinued in Ontario and that the cash flows from its new credit product may not be able to replace those lost cash flows.

It was a fairly quiet, mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 5bp, FixedResets gaining 1bp and DeemedRetractibles off 1bp. Volatility was low. Volume continued to be quite high.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 4.89%, equivalent to 6.36% interest at the standard conversion rate of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 4.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 195bp, a significant narrowing from the 210bp reported January 23.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0493 % 2,571.0
FixedFloater 4.19 % 3.51 % 26,242 18.31 1 0.0000 % 3,879.2
Floater 2.59 % 2.92 % 72,348 19.91 5 0.0493 % 2,776.0
OpRet 4.76 % 2.21 % 35,726 0.39 5 -0.1147 % 2,603.5
SplitShare 4.56 % 4.32 % 39,687 4.27 2 0.1985 % 2,922.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1147 % 2,380.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.24 % -0.49 % 87,386 0.09 29 -0.0545 % 2,355.1
Perpetual-Discount 4.85 % 4.89 % 140,384 15.64 4 0.0508 % 2,648.2
FixedReset 4.90 % 2.87 % 270,680 3.38 78 0.0109 % 2,489.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.87 % 2.12 % 141,128 0.29 45 -0.0086 % 2,434.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-06
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-06
Maturity Price : 23.60
Evaluated at bid price : 23.87
Bid-YTW : 2.18 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 130,653 Nesbitt sold 21,300 to Scotia at 26.00 and crossed two blocks of 50,000 each at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.98
Bid-YTW : 2.27 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 108,562 RBC crossed 100,000 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.27
Bid-YTW : 2.12 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 91,997 National bought 39,500 from Nesbitt at 25.16. Scotia crossed blocks of 19,800 and 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 70,222 TD crossed 56,100 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 2.16 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 63,312 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.47
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 55,672 National crossed 50,000 at 24.32.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.21
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 23.50 – 23.95
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3205

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-06
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 24.65 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2367

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-06
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 2.87 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 24.21 – 24.39
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1059

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.21
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.85 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.1500
Average : 0.0955

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-08
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : -5.62 %

BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 24.60 – 24.75
Spot Rate : 0.1500
Average : 0.0960

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.27 – 25.44
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1162

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %

BCE.PR.C To Reset To 3.55%

Wednesday, February 6th, 2013

BCE Inc. has announced:

BCE Inc. will, on March 1, 2013, continue to have Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AC (“Series AC Preferred Shares”) outstanding if, following the end of the conversion period on February 19, 2013, BCE Inc. determines that at least 2.5 million Series AC Preferred Shares would remain outstanding. In such a case, as of March 1, 2013, the Series AC Preferred Shares will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend for the following five years that will be based on an annual fixed dividend rate equal to 3.550%.

That’s a good step downwards from its last reset in 2008 to 4.60%!

As noted earlier:

As far as deadlines for conversion go:

In order to convert your shares, you must exercise your right of conversion during the conversion period, which runs from January 15, 2013 to February 19, 2013, inclusively.

Note that brokerages will have their own deadlines for notice, which may be a few days earlier than the date on which BCE must be notified – so if you’re contemplating conversion, check well in advance!

Less than two weeks to go! So if you’re planning to convert from BCE.PR.C to or from BCE.PR.D, better start getting your ducks in a row now!

BCE.PR.D is a RatchetRate preferred, by which I mean it pays between 50% and 100% of Canada Prime on its par value of $25. The percentage paid increases when the market price of the issue is significantly less than $25, and decreases when the price is significantly above. The issue has been well below par for some time and the current percentage is 100%.

Given that Canada Prime can be estimated to be about 200bp above three-month treasury bills, this makes BCE.PR.D the rough equivalent of a FloatingReset (of which none yet exist; they will appear by conversion from FixedResets) with an Issue Reset Spread of 200bp, for as long as it trades below par. Since +200bp is a pretty skimpy spread for an issuer of BCE’s credit quality, it is reasonable to assume that it will trade below par for the next five years … while always remembering that it might not!

Given the above, we can assume that BCE.PR.D will pay 100% of Canada Prime for the next five years; thus, it will pay more dividends than BCE.PR.C if the average Canada Prime Rate over the period is more than 3.55%.

I think there’s a pretty good chance of that, and even if that turns out not to be the case, it is hard to imagine that Canada Prime will actually go down over the period, so the downside of being wrong isn’t all that terrible.

Therefore, I recommend that holders of BCE.PR.C convert to BCE.PR.D and recommend that holders of BCE.PR.D retain their holdings (at least, so far as conversion is concerned; no recommendation is made here regarding potential trades out of BCE.PR.D into any other issue).

February 5, 2013

Wednesday, February 6th, 2013

There are a few more details on the persecution of S&P:

The U.S. is seeking as much as $5 billion in penalties from McGraw-Hill Cos. (MHP) and its Standard & Poor’s unit as punishment for inflated credit ratings that Attorney General Eric Holder said were central to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.

The Justice Department probe, code-named “Alchemy,” began in November, 2009. The suit marked the culmination of a “massive, multiyear investigation” by a team of almost two dozen lawyers, Stuart Delery, principal deputy assistant attorney general said.

Over the course of the investigation, the company turned over more than 20 million pages of documents, which included e- mail between the firm’s employees, said a person familiar with the probe, who asked for anonymity to discuss details. Those e- mails, along with questions about the models used by the company to rate bonds, have become the basis for the department’s lawsuit.

According to the U.S. complaint, S&P falsely represented to investors that its credit ratings were objective, independent and uninfluenced by any conflicts of interests.

The company bent rating models to suit its business needs to the extent that one CDO analyst commented that loosening the measure of default risk for a certain security in 2006 “resulted in a loophole in S&P’s rating model big enough to drive a Mack truck through,” the U.S. said.

The Justice Department cited e-mail from S&P employees discussing the need to modify ratings criteria to win business after the company’s grades were more conservative than competitors.

“Losing one or even several deals due to criteria issues, but this is so significant that it could have an impact on future deals,” one analyst said in a May 2004 e-mail cited in the lawsuit. “There’s no way we can get back on this one but we need to address this now in preparation for future deals.”

So now the word will go out from Legal – if it hasn’t already – that any dissent or commentary running contrary to the corporate line on default models will be grounds for dismissal. This will improve credit ratings significantly!

As S&P says:

“There was robust internal debate within S&P about how a rapidly deteriorating housing market might affect the CDOs — and we applied the collective judgment of our committee-based system in good faith. The email excerpts cherry picked by DOJ have been taken out of context, are contradicted by other evidence, and do not reflect our culture, integrity or how we do business.

“The DOJ omits important context about the emails it cites. For example, the email that says deals ‘could be structured by cows’ and be rated by S&P had nothing to do with RMBS or CDO ratings or any S&P model, and the analyst had her concerns addressed with the issuer before S&P issued any rating. The DOJ also cites the fact that S&P personnel discussed proposed rating criteria with market participants as evidence of wrongdoing although under certain recent regulations, S&P is required to do just that. When the full facts are revealed in court, it will be clear the emails and anecdotes being cited do not prove any wrongdoing.

Gaz Metro secured some long term USD financing:

Gaz Métro inc. (“GMi”) announced today that it has entered into an agreement to sell to certain institutional investors in the United States on a private placement basis U.S.$200 million aggregate principal amount of 4.04% senior secured notes due 2043 and 4.19% senior secured notes due 2048 (together, the “Notes”). The Notes will be secured by a guarantee as to payment of principal and interest by Gaz Métro Limited Partnership (“Gaz Métro”), together with collateral security backed by the assets of GMi and Gaz Métro.

Not bad! and only 85-90bp over Treasuries! That’s the equivalent of financing at 3.50% in Canada!

There might be some adjustments to milkfare:

The Canadian government is prepared to knock holes in the hefty tariff walls shielding dairy producers from foreign competition and admit more European cheese into this country in return for greater access to EU markets for Canada’s beef and pork.

About 20,400 tonnes of foreign cheese currently enter Canada tariff-free annually under special arrangements with jurisdictions such as the European Union. The EU, which already has the lion’s share of this tariff-free access, is allowed to import about 13,400 tonnes of cheese annually under this deal. That’s more than 3 per cent of Canada’s current annual cheese consumption.

The EU is looking for as much as 10,000 tonnes more of annual tariff-free access for cheese, Canadian dairy industry sources say, adding they do not believe Ottawa would agree to this size of this concession. The Canadian government declined to confirm this number or how much it’s prepared to offer up as part of negotiations.

This would be wonderful news for Canadian consumers if true. Remember the 30-million consumers? They’re rather more numerous than the 30,000 (?) producers.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums winning 20bp, FixedResets gaining 9bp and DeemedRetractibles up 13bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3659 % 2,569.7
FixedFloater 4.19 % 3.51 % 27,162 18.31 1 0.1326 % 3,879.2
Floater 2.59 % 2.91 % 67,193 19.92 5 0.3659 % 2,774.6
OpRet 4.75 % 1.54 % 36,243 0.32 5 0.3221 % 2,606.5
SplitShare 4.57 % 4.41 % 41,120 4.27 2 0.0994 % 2,917.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3221 % 2,383.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.23 % -2.22 % 88,726 0.09 29 0.2034 % 2,356.4
Perpetual-Discount 4.85 % 4.89 % 142,944 15.65 4 0.1729 % 2,646.9
FixedReset 4.90 % 2.86 % 272,806 3.38 78 0.0938 % 2,488.7
Deemed-Retractible 4.87 % 1.62 % 140,257 0.29 45 0.1311 % 2,435.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.07
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet 152,075 RBC crossed 145,700 at 27.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.21
Bid-YTW : 1.54 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 109,000 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.13; National crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.14
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 90,342 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 38,000, both at 26.63.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 2.04 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 58,225 RBC crossed 49,000 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.17
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 55,382 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 26.90; TD crossed 10,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.91
Bid-YTW : 2.69 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset 52,501 National crossed 50,000 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 23.55 – 24.46
Spot Rate : 0.9100
Average : 0.7412

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-05
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 2.21 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.27 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1561

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.27
Bid-YTW : 2.69 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 25.70 – 25.95
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1777

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %

RY.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.52 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1165

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %

BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 18.05 – 19.00
Spot Rate : 0.9500
Average : 0.8998

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-05
Maturity Price : 18.05
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %

GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.86 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.1400
Average : 0.0989

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %

February 4, 2013

Tuesday, February 5th, 2013

Looks like the market rally is over:

Individual investors rushed into stocks and bonds in January, setting the stage for the biggest month on record for deposits into U.S. mutual funds.

Long-term funds, which exclude money-market vehicles, attracted $64.8 billion in the first three weeks of the month, according to the Washington-based Investment Company Institute. The previous record was $52.6 billion for all of May 2009, according to the ICI, whose data goes back to 1984.

Signs of improvement in the U.S. economy and a rising stock market that pushed the Dow Jones Industrial Average above 14,000 today for the first time since 2007 have prompted Americans to step up their investments. Equity mutual funds gathered $29.9 billion in January’s first three weeks, more than for any full month since 2006.

There’s some talk in the US of an exchange dedicated to the exempt market and restricted to accredited investors:

A panel that advises the Securities and Exchange Commission on Friday recommended an exclusive exchange be created for micro- and small-capitalization public companies that would only be available for only high-net-worth investors.

The panel, the advisory committee on small and emerging companies, voted to urge the SEC to support the setting up of an exchange for small publicly traded companies that would only be accessible for high-income individuals such as so-called accredited investors, who must have net worths, excluding their homes, of $1 million or more or income of $200,000 or more for at least two years.

Companies listing on an exchange set up for high-net-worth investors may not be required to provide costly prospectuses and other disclosures that are necessary when retail investors are involved. Backers contend that this would drive down costs associated with public offerings and could encourage private companies to take the plunge into becoming almost-public companies. However, retail investor advocates worry that small investors would be blocked from making desired investments.

This is in addition to other speculative ideas like large ticks for small caps:

Twelve years after the U.S. switched to 1-cent increments for stock trading to save investors money, regulators and broker-dealers are considering a test of larger tick sizes.

A pilot study of bigger quoting increments to improve liquidity in less-active stocks will be debated by executives from exchanges and brokers, market makers and academics at a Securities and Exchange Commission meeting tomorrow, according to an agenda posted online. The U.S. moved to minimum ticks of a penny from sixteenths of $1 in 2001. Panelists will also discuss the effect of 1-cent price moves on capital raising and trading.

Proponents say larger increments will spur market makers to supply more buying and selling volume, particularly for less- active stocks, while skeptics say it will cause people to pay more when they trade.

Other, less dramatic, ideas were reported by the SEC:

  • Rationalize the disclosure framework for small cap companies by raising the market capitalization threshold for small reporting companies (SRCs) and extending to SRCs the benefits granted to emerging growth companies under the JOBS Act.
  • Further ease the compliance burden on SRCs by exempting SRCs from other requirements that result in significant costs for SRCs without generating information necessary to making an informed investment decision

Amidst these encouraging signs for less-fettered capital markets comes a lawsuit against S&P:

Standard & Poor’s on Monday said it expects to be the target of a U.S. Department of Justice civil lawsuit over its ratings of mortgage bonds before the recent financial crisis.

The lawsuit against the McGraw-Hill Cos. unit focuses on its ratings in 2007 of various U.S. collateralized debt obligations (CDO), S&P said.

In its statement, S&P said it “deeply regrets” how its CDO ratings failed to anticipate the fast-deteriorating mortgage market conditions, and that it has since spent $400-million to help bolster the quality of its ratings.

And instead of raising capital as they’re supposed to naughty bankers are dumping assets:

The big banks can’t get rid of their riskiest assets fast enough.

Deutsche Bank is selling €16-billion ($21.6-billion) of risk-weighted assets stuffed in a credit portfolio, according to International Financing Review.

The sale is part of a €100-billion endeavour by the German bank to unload some of its riskiest assets and get capital levels up to snuff. Under Basel III, global banks must have tangible common equity that amounts to at least 7 per cent of their risk-weighted assets, and Deutsche was one of the worst capitalized banks at the height of the financial crisis.

And the European financial transaction tax is having the expected effect:

Half a century after a U.S. tax on bond purchases spawned the $3.7 trillion-a-year Eurobond market, Europe’s plan to impose a levy on financial transactions risks triggering a similar flight.

Against the objections of nations including the U.K. and Luxembourg, European Union finance ministers agreed Jan. 22 that interested member states may design a broad-based tax that would cover trades in stocks, bonds, derivatives and other securities. The EU estimates the proposal would allow France, Germany and nine other countries to raise as much as $47 billion a year.

The Eurobond market, now the largest forum for corporate fixed-income transactions, came into being after President John F. Kennedy imposed a so-called interest-equalization tax in 1963 to make investing in foreign securities less alluring to U.S. investors and ease a balance of payments deficit.

Italy’s Autostrade per l’Italia SpA issued the first Eurobond in July 1963, a $15 million issue managed by S.G. Warburg, according to “The Eurobond Diaries,” a market history published in 1994. The U.S. move drove bond trading to London, where an unregulated market arose. So-called Belgian dentists, shorthand for wealthy entrepreneurs whose customers paid in cash, bought corporate debt and rode the “coupon train” to Luxembourg to collect interest, according to Mint Partners Ltd. bond broker Bill Blain, who joined Morgan Stanley in 1985.

“It was all driven by tax,” he said. “Who would have thought Europe would be so stupid as to actually do this now?”

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 8bp, FixedResets down 7bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 2bp. Volatility was low. Volume was high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3971 % 2,560.4
FixedFloater 4.20 % 3.52 % 27,521 18.30 1 0.0000 % 3,874.1
Floater 2.60 % 2.92 % 67,268 19.91 5 0.3971 % 2,764.5
OpRet 4.76 % 2.16 % 33,567 0.39 5 -0.1608 % 2,598.1
SplitShare 4.57 % 4.41 % 41,072 4.27 2 0.0000 % 2,914.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1608 % 2,375.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.24 % -1.45 % 89,367 0.09 29 0.0840 % 2,351.6
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.91 % 144,312 15.60 4 -0.0610 % 2,642.3
FixedReset 4.91 % 2.96 % 265,386 3.38 78 -0.0677 % 2,486.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.88 % 3.14 % 139,699 0.30 45 0.0250 % 2,431.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.96 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-04
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 2.23 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
FTS.PR.C OpRet 291,159 Desjardins crossed 284,200 at 25.47.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-08-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.48
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 134,772 Desjardins crossed 65,000 at 26.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium 108,190 Desjardins crossed 99,100 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-06
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.04
Bid-YTW : 1.55 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 94,935 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 13,700, both at 23.55. TD crossed 30,000 at 23.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-04
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 2.23 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 73,599 Nesbitt crossed 66,400 at 26.71.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.68
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 73,194 Desjardins crossed 63,600 at 26.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.52
Bid-YTW : 2.58 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 18.00 – 19.00
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.8447

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-04
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %

ENB.PR.D FixedReset Quote: 25.63 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1709

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %

BAM.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 26.63 – 26.86
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1427

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.63
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %

RY.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 25.75 – 25.98
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1553

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %

BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.78 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1441

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-04-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %

BAM.PF.B FixedReset Quote: 25.55 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1432

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %

LB.PR.D To Be Redeemed

Monday, February 4th, 2013

Laurentian Bank has announced:

Laurentian Bank of Canada announces that it will redeem, on March 15, 2013, all of its Non-Cumulative Class A Preferred Shares Series 9 then outstanding. Such preferred shares will be redeemed at a redemption price of $25.00 per share, together with any declared and unpaid dividends.

Beneficial holders who are not the registered holders of these shares should contact the financial institution, broker or other intermediary through which they hold such shares to confirm how they will receive the redemption proceeds. Formal notices and instructions for the redemption will be forwarded to all registered shareholders.

LB.PR.D is a DeemedRetractible with a 6.00% coupon. It was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the LB preferreds were downgraded to P-3(high) by S&P in December, 2012. LB.PR.D has been tracked by HIMIPref™, but has been relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

MAPF Performance: January, 2013

Saturday, February 2nd, 2013

The fund underperformed in January, as DeemedRetractibles (+0.04%) were greatly outperformed by FixedResets (+0.67%) and PerpetualPremiums (+0.75%). Additionally, there was strong performance by junk issues (rated Pfd-3(high) or lower by DBRS).

For example, of the sixteen BCE issues tracked by HIMIPref™ (which are heavily weighted in the indices, but which are not held at all by the fund):

Performance of BCE Issues
January, 2013
Performance
Range
Number of
Issues
>4% 3
3% – 4% 4
2% – 3% 2
1% – 2% 4
0% – 1% 3

Another illustration of relative returns in January was provided by ZPR, an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues, with a very high proportion of junk issues, which returned a stellar +1.03% for the month.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close January 31, 2013, was 10.8931.

Returns to January 31, 2013
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – Calculations by JH Blackrock figures not available
One Month +0.58% +0.37% +0.65% +0.60%
Three Months +2.47% +1.56% +1.79% +1.64%
One Year +7.00% +4.12% +4.37% +3.91%
Two Years (annualized) +5.79% +5.98% +5.52% +4.44%
Three Years (annualized) +9.65% +7.70% +6.66% +5.92%
Four Years (annualized) +19.23% +11.83% +10.42% +10.00
Five Years (annualized) +16.21% +6.15% +5.01% +3.93%
Six Years (annualized) +13.45% +4.15%    
Seven Years (annualized) +12.29% +4.16%    
Eight Years (annualized) +11.45% +4.07%    
Nine Years (annualized) +11.47% +4.13%    
Ten Years (annualized) +12.95% +4.58%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +11.99% +4.41%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.56%, +1.30% and +3.94%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +6.51%; five year is +5.26%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.44%, +0.86% and +1.49% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +3.86%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.91%, +1.82% & +4.10%, respectively. Three Year performance is +5.22%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +%, +% & +%, respectively.
Figures for Altamira Preferred Equity Fund are +0.80% and +1.26% for one- and three- months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is +1.03% for one-month. [calculation by JH]

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past year has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund has done well by trading between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons (but in which trading is now hampered by the fact that the low-coupon issues are trading near par and are callable at par in the near term), but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains.

SLF DeemedRetractibles may be compared with PWF and GWO:


Click for Big

It is quite apparent that that the market continues to treat regulated insurance issues (SLF, GWO) no differently from unregulated issues (PWF) – despite the fact that the PWF issues are much more subject to unfavourable calls in the near term and should, logically, be deprecated on those grounds alone without any fancy-pants arguments about imposition of the NVCC rule!

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. The relationship is still far too large to be explained by Implied Volatility – the numbers still indicate an overwhelming degree of directionality in the market’s price expectations.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover. A large chunk of the month’s trading was triggered by a market participant whose poorly executed portfolio rebalancing roiled the market mid-month.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
January, 2013 10.8931 4.22% 0.998 4.228% 1.0000 $0.4606
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on January 31; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I will no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as there are currently only four such issues of investment grade, from only two issuer groups. Additionally, the fund has no holdings of these issues.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Thus, the decline in the MAPF Sustainable Income from $0.5500 per unit in June to $0.4606 per unit in January should be looked at as a simple consequence of the fund’s holdings; virtually all of which have their yields calculated in a manner closer to bonds than to Perpetual Annuities.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: January, 2013

Saturday, February 2nd, 2013

Turnover remained above 2012 averages in January, at about 11%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped has been the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) – many of the PerpetualPremiums have negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! This effect has caused the first of the three segments noted above to be untradeable for most practical purposes.

To make this more clear, since I’ve been asked the question recently, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to its peers, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

However, there have been some hopeful signs: trading picked up a little in December and has remained at this elevated level in January; there was some frenzied trading on January 14; and the low-reset FixedResets are showing good volatility. Additionally, the long promised OSFI Draft Definition of Capital for Insurers may clarify the status of the Insurer-issued DeemedRetractibles and make them homogeneous with Bank-issued DeemedRetractibles (as I expect) or with unregulated Straight Perpetuals (which would surprise me … but a lot of things happen that surprise me).

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on January 31 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2013-1-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 9.9% (+0.3) 4.80% 5.16
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
Fixed-Reset 25.5% (+3.5) 2.30% 1.45
Deemed-Retractible 57.9% (-1.5) 4.74% 7.27
Scraps (Various) 6.4% (-1.4) 6.46% 9.50
Cash 0.2% (-0.9) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 4.22% 5.70
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2013-1-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 55.6% (+2.7)
Pfd-2(high) 27.9% (-0.7)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 9.9% (+0.3)
Pfd-3(high) 1.0% (-0.4)
Pfd-3 1.7% (-0.9)
Pfd-3(low) 0.3% (0)
Pfd-4(high) 0.4% (0)
Pfd-4 1.7% (-0.1)
Pfd-4(low) 1.2% (-0.1)
Cash 0.2% (-0.9)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2013-1-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.8% (-8.5)
$50,000 – $100,000 21.7% (+7.7)
$100,000 – $200,000 34.1% (-3.4)
$200,000 – $300,000 31.7% (+10.1)
>$300,000 11.5% (-5.1)
Cash 0.2% (-0.9)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

February 1, 2013

Saturday, February 2nd, 2013

There was a decent US jobs number:

Hiring increased in January after accelerating more than previously estimated at the end of 2012, evidence the U.S. labor market was making progress even as lawmakers quarreled over the federal budget.

Payrolls rose 157,000 following a revised 196,000 advance in the prior month and a 247,000 surge in November, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The revisions added a total of 127,000 jobs to the employment count in November and December. The jobless rate increased to 7.9 percent from 7.8 percent.

The BooHooHoo brigade is in full cry, as MBIA sues Credit Suisse for facilitating MBIA’s incompetence:

Credit Suisse Group AG (CS) bundled hundreds of mortgages into a single set of securities sold to investors in 2007 even after it had found flaws with the loans and asked the lenders to repurchase the debt, bond insurer MBIA Inc. (MBI) said in a court filing.

That practice was one way Zurich-based Credit Suisse maximized profit as the U.S. mortgage market melted down, while exposing investors and guarantors to losses, MBIA said in an amended complaint filed Jan. 30 in New York State Supreme Court as part of its 2009 suit against the bank. The filing cites documents obtained through the pretrial exchange of evidence.

Even while Credit Suisse maintained a “watch list” of problem loan sellers, it never stopped including their loans in securitizations, MBIA said. More than 2,600 of the loans securitized in the transaction MBIA insured, or 15 percent, were from originators on the watch list, according to the amended complaint.

I mentioned Indalex briefly on June 23, 2011, when Moody’s expressed concern regarding an apparent shuffling of creditor priorities in bankruptcy.

Moody’s said a review of 84 Canadian industrial companies it rates found two companies — Air Canada and Essar Steel Algoma Inc. — whose debt might be vulnerable to downgrade if the Ontario court decision is upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. The report said the impact would likely be limited and would affect ratings of specific debt instruments rather than a company’s overall credit rating.

Now the Supreme Court has ruled for a much smaller shuffling:

The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that the U.S. parent of an insolvent Toronto company is entitled to the Canadian entity’s last $6.75-million, instead of a group of the firm’s retirees, whose pensions were cut after their employer went under.

The court’s ruling in the case of Indalex Ltd., which plunged into bankruptcy protection in 2009, was is expected to have broad implications for other companies and pension plans across the country.

While many cheered that Ontario ruling as a breakthrough victory for pensioners, bankruptcy law experts warned the decision would radically reorder Canada’s insolvency regime. They said it could make it more difficult for struggling companies with large defined-benefit pension plans to borrow the money they need to weather financial storms.

Normally, in the scramble for money after a company has filed for bankruptcy protection under the federal Companies’ Creditors Arrangements Act, pension plans rank far below the banks and hedge funds that lend last-ditch money to distressed companies. These “debtor-in-possession” or DIP loans usually come on the condition of a court-ordered guarantee they will be repaid first.

Indalex, an aluminum processor, had a $6.75-million pension shortfall when it entered bankruptcy protection. But all of the cash from the sale of its assets was bound for the company’s U.S. parent, Sun Indalex Finance LLC, to cover some of its costs for paying back DIP loans made to Indalex by a group of banks.

It seems entirely reasonable to me that DIP loans should have priority. Who would make DIP loans otherwise?

Although it ultimately determined that the DIP lenders rank first because the court orders that grant them priority come under a federal law, the court also surprised observers by ruling the full amount of a pension shortfall at a plan’s windup should be considered a “deemed trust” under Ontario’s pension law. That could push pensioners’ demands further ahead in the line of creditors, but still second to DIP lenders.

I got a little curious – it seems that at least one of the two plans was underfunded back in 2007:

On December 31, 2006, Indalex Limited, an aluminum extrusions manufacturer, wound up the retirement plan for its salaried employees (the “Salaried Plan”). Seven members of the Salaried Plan were members of the United Steelworkers. At the time of the plan windup, the Plan was underfunded. Indalex made special payments in 2007, 2008 and 2009 to partially pay down the deficiency, but at the end of 2008, the deficiency in the Salaried Plan was $1,795,600.

But here’s the thing that interests me: The 2004 Collective Agreement negotiated by Steelworkers only mentions the pension plan in terms of current contributions; there is no language that addresses the underfunded status of the plan (I’m not sure if it was, in fact, underfunded in 2004). Further, a 2007 Steelworkers press release trumpets the 2007 negotiations in terms of wage increases and call-out times, but again there is no mention of the underfunded status of the plan.

So I’m curious: do the unhappy pensioners have cause to be angry with their union? The Steelworkers have issued a press release calling for legislation to put pensions ahead of even DIP financers (so who would ever make a DIP loan?) but what did the union do or what could the union have done to be more proactive?

It was a day of uneven gains for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 2bp, FixedResets winning 27bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 3bp. The Performance Highlights table, though short, was suitably skewed towards winning FixedResets. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0695 % 2,550.2
FixedFloater 4.20 % 3.52 % 27,748 18.31 1 -0.5712 % 3,874.1
Floater 2.61 % 2.93 % 68,027 19.89 5 -0.0695 % 2,753.6
OpRet 4.76 % 1.28 % 33,825 0.37 5 0.0613 % 2,602.3
SplitShare 4.57 % 4.40 % 41,124 4.28 2 0.0000 % 2,914.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0613 % 2,379.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.25 % -2.14 % 87,991 0.15 29 0.0167 % 2,349.7
Perpetual-Discount 4.85 % 4.91 % 145,721 15.62 4 0.1527 % 2,643.9
FixedReset 4.90 % 2.83 % 264,248 3.39 78 0.2657 % 2,488.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.88 % 3.41 % 139,841 0.31 45 0.0293 % 2,431.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-01
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 25.89
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-01
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 2.79 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.73
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 130,265 Scotia crossed 49,600 at 26.40. Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 17,100 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.39
Bid-YTW : 1.87 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 108,400 Scotia crossed 35,000 at 25.08. National crossed 60,000 at 25.09.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 77,744 Desjardins crossed blocks of 25,000 and 50,000 at 26.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.54
Bid-YTW : 2.55 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 61,030 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-01
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 2.79 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Premium 53,719 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 4.40 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 48,011 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 2.27 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 18.00 – 19.00
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.6744

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-01
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.14 – 25.94
Spot Rate : 0.8000
Average : 0.6223

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.14
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.55 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2746

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 4.55 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 24.76 – 25.05
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1992

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-02-01
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %

RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.70 – 25.89
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1302

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.42 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.2231

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : -11.22 %