Archive for April, 2013

Why Were Canadian Banks So Resilient? Other Views

Friday, April 12th, 2013

An article in the Globe and Mail by Grant Bishop titled Canadian Banks: Bigger is better highlighted views regarding Canadian banking regulation that differ from my own:

A recently published paper by Columbia University’s Charles Calomiris argues that banking crises have political foundations. He contends that anti-populist political structures guard against the capture of the banking system by voters seeking easy credit. But parts of Mr. Calomiris’ thesis have raised eyebrows: he implies that the British aim of oppressing French Canada is the indirect root of Canada’s long-term banking stability.

What policy-makers should take away from Calomiris’ account is the importance of keeping politics away from banking regulation. As Anita Anand and Andrew Green of the University of Toronto also argue in a recent paper, the independence of financial regulation from politics in Canada is a cornerstone of the integrity of our system.

It is, of course, my argument that both OSFI and the Bank of Canada have become intensely politicized in over the recent past, with both Carney and Dickson acting as stalking horses for politically inspired regulatory ideas (mostly to do with contingent capital and the Ban The Bond movement).

In another recent paper, UBC’s Angela Redish and her colleagues ask “Why didn’t Canada have a banking crisis in 2008 (or in 1930, or 1907, or…)?” They conclude that, in contrast with the fragmented U.S. system, Canadian banking stability owed to the single overarching regulator and the high concentration of the sector.

A cross-country study by World Bank researchers reaches a similar conclusion: more concentrated banking systems appear to be more stable.

The paper by Anita Anand & Andrew Green titled REGULATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: THE VALUE OF OPACITY has the abstract:

In this article, we explore a question of institutional design: What characteristics make a regulatory agency effective? We build on the growing body of administrative law literature that rigorously examines the impacts of transparency, insulation, and related administrative processes. We argue that there are certain benefits associated with an opaque and insulated structure, including the ability to regulate unfettered by partisan politics and majoritarian preferences. We examine Canada’s financial institution regulator, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), whose efficacy in part explains the resilience of Canada’s banking sector throughout the financial crisis of 2008. In particular, OSFI operates in a “black box”, keeping information about the formation of policy and its enforcement of this policy confidential. With its informational advantage, it is able to undermine the possibility that banks will collude or rent-seek. Our conclusions regarding the value of opacity cut against generally held views about the benefits of transparency in regulatory bodies.

Huh. I wonder if they’re also in favour of re-establishing the Star Chamber, which worked very well until it didn’t.

The body of this paper commences with the startling claim:

Canada’s financial institutions weathered the crisis well relative to their international peers, an outcome that has been attributed at least in part to the presence of an effective regulator.[Footnote]

Footnote reads: See Canadian Securities Institute, Canadian Best Practices Take Centre Stage at Financial Conference in China (25 February 2009), online: Focus Communications Inc ; Financial Services Authority, Bank of England & Treasury, Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: Further Consultation (London: HM Treasury, 2008), online: HM Treasury

The Canadian Securities Institute is not something I consider an authoritative, or even credible, source, so I looked for the paper HM Treasury: Financial stability and depositor protection: further consultation, July 2008 which contains four instances of the word Canada (in each case, grouped with other countries as a participant or example), no instances of “OSFI”, one instance of “Superintendent” (the “Superintendents’ Association of Northern Ireland”, which responded to an earlier consultation), and two instances of “effective regulat”, both of which referred to the UK bodies aspirations.

Ratnovski and Huang, for example, examine the performance of the seventy-two largest commercial banks in OECD countries during the financial crisis, analyzing the factors behind Canadian banks’ relative resilience at this time.[Footnote 4] They identify two main causes, one of which is regulatory factors that reduced banks’ incentives to take excessive risks.[Footnote 5]

Footnote 4 reads: Lev Ratnovski & Rocco Huang, “Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient?” (2009) IMF Working Paper No 152, online: Social Science Research Network .

Footnote 5 reads: Ibid. Other factors included a higher degree of retail depository funding, and to a lesser extent, sufficient capital and liquidity.

The Ratnovski & Huang paper was reviewed in my post Why Have Canadian Banks Been More Resilient?. The paper is available from the IMF

Specifically, Ratnovski & Huang say:

The second part of this paper (Section 3) reviews regulatory and structural factors that may have reduced Canadian banks’ incentives to take risks and contributed to their relative resilience during the turmoil. We identify a number of them: stringent capital regulation with higher-than-Basel minimal requirements, limited involvement of Canadian banks in foreign and wholesale activities, valuable franchises, and a conservative mortgage product market.

Returning to the Anand & Green paper, the guts of the argument is:

OSFI’s efficacy may at first be surprising. It is the primary regulator of Canada’s five big banks (which account for approximately 85 percent of Canada’s banking sector).10 Its power to overcome the possibility for rent seeking or capture by these institutions depends on its rule making and enforcement processes, and forms of accountability for its actions. That is, if not sufficiently independent, regulated institutions might seek rules that favour their profitability at the expense of consumers. Yet on many important issues, including capital adequacy requirements, OSFI relies on guidelines rather than regulations. OSFI creates these guidelines through a largely opaque process in which the regulated parties have early input. Other parties (such as consumers) not only face considerable collective action problems but are limited to a stunted notice and comment process. The comment process thereby potentially privileges the views of regulated institutions. Further, in addressing compliance with regulations or guidelines, OSFI attempts to work informally with regulated parties, ultimately rendering it unnecessary for it to take formal enforcement action. This structure seems to point more towards capture by the large (albeit regulated) players. To aid in the discussion of the appropriate institutional structure for banks, we examine whether Canada’s financial institutions—and banks in particular—have been successful because of, or despite, the presence of OSFI.

Later comes a real howler:

Despite its insulation and opacity, however, OSFI is almost universally viewed to be an effective regulator.[Footnote 17]

[Footnote 17 reads] The Strategic Counsel, Qualitative Research: Deposit-Taking Institutions Sector Consultation,
(Toronto: 2010) at 2-6, online: OSFI < http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/ 1/eng/reports/osfi/DTISC_e.pdf >

So lets have a look at the OSFI document that says OSFI is doing a great job. It’s a survey. Who is surveyed, you may ask. So I will tell you:

A total of 49 one-on-one interviews were conducted among Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), Chief Risk Officers (CROs), Chief Compliance Officers (CCOs), other senior executives, auditors and lawyers of deposit-taking institutions regulated by OSFI.

The use of the phrase “almost universally” seems … a little strained.

The paper’s arguments are founded upon the premise that OSFI is doing a great job, therefore the way it does it must also be great. Unfortunately, the premises do not support the conclusions.

April 11, 2013

Friday, April 12th, 2013

There has been a lot of yammering about income inequality in the past few years, as I mentioned on March 15. I’ve found some more source data:

In the next calculation, the world Gini index is recalculated by weighting countries by their population size. This means that countries with large populations have a larger impact on the Gini index than do countries with smaller populations. The population-weighted Gini index was calculated by Branko Milanovic and published in his book Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality.13 The chart below compares the population-weighted Gini index (red line) with the unweighted Gini index shown in the previous chart (black line).

This weighted world Gini index declines almost consistently from 1962 onward. This is mainly due to the phenomenal economic growth in China and India relative to richer countries. Because China and India together account for over one-third of the world’s population, these two countries have a very strong impact on the population-weighted Gini results. But if China and India are removed from the calculation, the population-weighted Gini index trends upward after 1982 (as does the unweighted Gini index), meaning that overall income inequality is increasing in the rest of the world.

There’s a great graph, but it’s Flash (Wow! Way cool!), so go look for yourself. I like the last sentence from the quoted verbiage – ‘if we remove enough data, we can prove our point!’

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 15bp, FixedResets down 9bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 8bp. Volatility was average. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3598 % 2,588.4
FixedFloater 4.09 % 3.40 % 33,949 18.60 1 0.9802 % 4,012.3
Floater 2.69 % 2.91 % 92,824 19.98 4 0.3598 % 2,794.8
OpRet 4.78 % 1.33 % 54,133 0.19 5 0.0385 % 2,619.7
SplitShare 4.80 % 4.01 % 134,965 4.14 5 0.0241 % 2,960.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0385 % 2,395.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.18 % 1.41 % 86,725 0.51 32 0.1508 % 2,382.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.83 % 4.82 % 180,886 15.76 4 0.2843 % 2,691.6
FixedReset 4.91 % 2.67 % 260,857 3.44 80 -0.0930 % 2,512.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 2.42 % 124,595 0.46 44 0.0757 % 2,459.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-11
Maturity Price : 23.77
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : -27.69 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 108,303 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 26.65; TD crossed 51,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.63
Bid-YTW : 2.61 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 68,663 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 26.02; National crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 54,824 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.96.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 48,902 RBC crossed 37,200 at 24.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 35,853 RBC crossed 16,300 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 35,044 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 0.18 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.70 – 26.22
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3224

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : -29.24 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.55 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2510

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.65 – 25.97
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2101

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-11
Maturity Price : 23.77
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %

CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.71 – 25.92
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1186

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : -29.61 %

ENB.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 25.88 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1532

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %

BNS.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 25.01 – 25.20
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1260

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %

April 10, 2013

Thursday, April 11th, 2013

Hurray for Rick Waugh!

“I understand why the finance minister is concerned about the Canadian economy, but I just philosophically don’t think” government should be setting product pricing, Waugh said yesterday in an interview in Halifax, Nova Scotia, where the bank held its annual shareholders meeting. “Despite the difficulties of central banks to use interest rates, the alternative of trying to manage specific products or prices, to me, is fraught with difficulty.”

The article did not address Mr. Waugh’s views on auctioning off CMHC mortgage insurance, rather than allocating it from an enormous supply at a cheap price.

Toron Investment Management has hooked up with AMI Partners:

Toron Investment Management and AMI Partners have agreed to combine to create a pre-eminent, privately-owned Canadian investment management firm with unique expertise and top-tier track records in global and domestic investing. The firm, once unified, will serve clients who have entrusted more than $3.5 billion of assets in Canadian and global mandates.

The combined firm will operate as Toron Asset Management International (Toron AMI), will be based in Toronto, and will continue to serve clients in Canada and abroad. Toron AMI’s professionals will be shareholders and the firm will operate as a partnership.

Founded more than 50 years ago, AMI specializes in Canadian equity, fixed-income and balanced mandates for institutional clients. Toron Investment Management began operating 25 years ago as a risk management consultancy; for the past 15 years it has focused on global investment management, serving a growing client base of private clients and select institutions.

Today’s report will be delayed. Why? I’ll tell you why! Later.

Update, 2013-4-12

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1158 % 2,579.1
FixedFloater 4.09 % 3.45 % 33,775 18.35 1 0.4762 % 3,973.4
Floater 2.70 % 2.92 % 85,978 19.95 4 0.1158 % 2,784.8
OpRet 4.78 % -0.19 % 53,745 0.19 5 0.2006 % 2,618.7
SplitShare 4.80 % 4.00 % 136,266 4.15 5 0.1873 % 2,959.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2006 % 2,394.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.19 % 3.02 % 86,957 0.55 32 -0.0599 % 2,378.4
Perpetual-Discount 4.85 % 4.83 % 182,427 15.74 4 0.0508 % 2,684.0
FixedReset 4.91 % 2.62 % 258,016 3.24 80 -0.0419 % 2,515.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 2.39 % 123,396 0.55 44 -0.0793 % 2,457.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 2.14 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 117,290 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 104,150 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.08 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 101,550 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-10
Maturity Price : 23.38
Evaluated at bid price : 23.21
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 86,199 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 73,468 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-10
Maturity Price : 24.51
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 70,858 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-10
Maturity Price : 24.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
There were 24 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
W.PR.J Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.30 – 25.83
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3290

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : -9.63 %

TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 23.99 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.4243

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-10
Maturity Price : 23.69
Evaluated at bid price : 23.99
Bid-YTW : 2.17 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.31 – 25.72
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.3112

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : -12.83 %

TD.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.06 – 26.27
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1331

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : 1.84 %

PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.40 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1249

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %

HSB.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 26.27 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1533

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.27
Bid-YTW : 2.51 %

April 9, 2013

Tuesday, April 9th, 2013

Nothing happened today.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 7bp, FixedResets off 2bp and DeemedRetractibles up 13bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.9808 % 2,576.2
FixedFloater 4.11 % 3.47 % 31,264 18.31 1 -0.6879 % 3,954.6
Floater 2.70 % 2.92 % 85,676 19.95 4 -0.9808 % 2,781.6
OpRet 4.79 % -0.19 % 52,267 0.19 5 0.0695 % 2,613.5
SplitShare 4.81 % 4.00 % 134,760 4.15 5 0.0394 % 2,953.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0695 % 2,389.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.18 % 2.77 % 87,879 0.63 32 0.0672 % 2,379.8
Perpetual-Discount 4.85 % 4.84 % 168,891 15.74 4 0.2138 % 2,682.6
FixedReset 4.90 % 2.64 % 282,182 3.24 80 -0.0188 % 2,516.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.85 % 2.81 % 130,667 0.37 44 0.1311 % 2,459.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.64
Evaluated at bid price : 23.91
Bid-YTW : 2.18 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 2.70 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 90,923 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : -1.09 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 90,277 RBC crossed 79,100 at 18.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-09
Maturity Price : 18.05
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 83,950 Desjardins crossed 47,500 at 26.01; Scotia crossed 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 60,506 RBC crossed 37,900 at 24.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.45
Evaluated at bid price : 24.78
Bid-YTW : 2.52 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 50,492 Nesbitt crossed 46,600 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.99
Bid-YTW : 2.04 %
GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 30,200 National crossed 25,000 at 26.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.43
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 25.45 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.9500
Average : 0.5648

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.38 – 25.69
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2028

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.38
Bid-YTW : -16.11 %

BAM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.65 – 26.87
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1403

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : 2.55 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.41 – 25.67
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1837

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.88 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2678

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %

CM.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 25.81 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1380

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 2.60 %

April 8, 2013

Monday, April 8th, 2013

The times, they are a changin’:

Primary dealers, the select group of banks and brokers that have held a seat at the center of the U.S. government debt market since 1960, are losing influence.

More than 20 percent of the $538 billion of Treasury notes auctioned this year have been awarded to bidders who bypassed the dealers by using a website to place their orders, according to U.S. Treasury Department data compiled by Bloomberg. That’s almost double the 2011 level and up from 5.6 percent in 2009.

In the same way technology eroded the middleman role once played by travel agents and stock-market specialists, increased use of the direct-bidding system threatens government-bond traders at firms ranging from Bank of America Corp. to UBS AG. (UBSN). It also has eaten into profits from a business that’s among the least affected by the regulatory changes and new capital requirements reshaping the industry.

Traders at primary dealers have complained to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York about direct bidding, which they say is reducing their profitability, according to seven government-bond traders who requested anonymity because they weren’t authorized to comment publicly. Their job is becoming more frustrating, and sometimes money-losing, now that they’re competing in auctions against anonymous investors who can show up at any time and at any price, the traders said.

I’m sure we’ll all shed a tear for the poor traders who are finding that being the guy who answers a particular telephone isn’t as good a job as it used to be.

Here in Canada, the bond business is pretty good:

Royal Bank of Canada (RY), the top underwriter of Canadian corporate bonds for the past decade, is predicting record issuance this year led by a surge in high- yield debt.

Bond sales in Canadian dollars will reach C$95 billion ($94 billion) this year, on pace to shatter 2006’s record C$93 billion, said Altaf Nanji, senior credit-research analyst at RBC Capital Markets in Toronto. Issuance in the first quarter, typically the busiest of the year, was C$30 billion, according to RBC data. The firm’s forecast in December was for C$92 billion, including about C$5 billion of junk sales.

“The revised forecast puts issuance on pace to surpass our 2006 record year, based on the health of the high-yield sector, an increase in mortgage securitization and a more-active-than- expected first quarter for Maple issuance,” Nanji said in a phone interview.

Investors are snapping up the riskiest debt to meet annual return targets as central banks hold down borrowing costs to stave off recession. Sun Life Financial Inc. (SLF) altered its investment mandate to add high-yield bonds to the C$115 billion of assets it oversees to offset falling interest rates.

Issuance of high-yield bonds climbed 32 percent to C$1.14 billion in the first quarter, compared with an increase of 11 percent to $109 billion in the U.S. speculative market, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. RBC expects the junk market to grow to C$35 billion of bonds outstanding by 2016, up from C$11 billion currently.

The Bank of Canada has released a paper by Carlos de Resende, Ali Dib, René Lalonde and Nikita Perevalov titled Countercyclical Bank Capital Requirement and Optimized Monetary Policy Rules:

Using BoC-GEM-Fin, a large-scale DSGE model with real, nominal and financial frictions featuring a banking sector, we explore the macroeconomic implications of various types of countercyclical bank capital regulations. Results suggest that countercyclical capital requirements have a significant stabilizing effect on key macroeconomic variables, but mostly after financial shocks. Moreover, the bank capital regulatory policy and monetary policy interact, and this interaction is contingent on the type of shocks that drive the economic cycle.

Finally, we analyze loss functions based on macroeconomic and financial variables to arrive at an optimal countercyclical regulatory policy in a class of simple implementable Taylor-type rules. Compared to bank capital regulatory policy, monetary policy is able to stabilize the economy more efficiently after real shocks. On the other hand, financial shocks require the regulator to be more aggressive in loosening/tightening capital requirements for banks, even as monetary policy works to counter the deviations of inflation from the target.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 14bp, FixedResets down 14bp and DeemedRetractibles off 4bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0636 % 2,601.7
FixedFloater 4.08 % 3.44 % 30,762 18.37 1 0.4752 % 3,982.0
Floater 2.67 % 2.90 % 79,346 20.02 4 -0.0636 % 2,809.1
OpRet 4.80 % -0.18 % 51,403 0.20 5 0.0232 % 2,611.6
SplitShare 4.81 % 3.99 % 135,402 4.15 5 -0.0394 % 2,952.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0232 % 2,388.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.19 % 1.87 % 88,707 0.63 32 0.1358 % 2,378.2
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.85 % 168,980 15.71 4 0.0815 % 2,676.9
FixedReset 4.90 % 2.55 % 286,000 3.24 80 -0.1413 % 2,516.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 2.93 % 129,856 0.55 44 -0.0369 % 2,456.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IFC.PR.C FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 2.43 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Premium 123,000 Nesbitt crossed 120,000 at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.74
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 112,293 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : -2.90 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Premium 82,650 Desjardins crossed blocks of 10,000 and 36,000 at 25.90, then bought blocks of 10,500 and 10,000 from RBC at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 33,587 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 32,725 National crossed 25,000 at 26.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 29,450 TD crossed 25,000 at 25.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 2.33 %
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.11 – 25.37
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1629

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-08
Maturity Price : 24.60
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.86 – 25.10
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1455

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 4.64 %

GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.30 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1316

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 25.78 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1447

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 1.68 %

GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.33 – 26.52
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1249

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : 4.64 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.86 – 26.05
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1295

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %

LFE.WT.A Warrant Exercise Result

Sunday, April 7th, 2013

Quadravest has announced:

Canadian Life Companies Split Corp. (the “Company”) announces a total of 7,129,099 LFE.WT.A 2013 Warrants were exercised at $12.00 each for total gross proceeds of $85,549,188 bringing the Company’s net assets to approximately $190 million.

For every Warrant exercised, holders received one Preferred Share and one Class A Share of the Company. The Warrants expired on March 27, 2013. The net asset value per unit after giving effect to the warrant exercise was $13.03 as at March 28, 2013.

The proceeds from the Warrant exercise are being used by the Company to invest in common shares of four Canadian Life Insurance Companies as follows: Great-West Life, Industrial Alliance, Manulife Financial and Sun Life Financial.

According to their Annual Report to November 30, 2012:

A total of 7,776,613 2013 warrants and 7,776,613 2014 warrants were issued. During 2012, 104,000 2013 warrants were exercised. As at November 30, 2012, there were 7,672,613 2013 warrants and 7,776,613 2014 warrants outstanding.

Additionally, as noted in the post LFE.WT.A Exercise Date Changed, some warrants were exercised prior to the expiry date, but this number has not been released. So the exercise ratio was somewhere between 92% and 100%.

One way or another, the liquidity of LFE.PR.B just got a whole lot better!

Contingent Capital: The Case for COERCs

Saturday, April 6th, 2013

A question in the comments to my old post A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital led me to look up what Prof. George Pennacchi has been doing lately; together with Theo Vermaelen and Christian C. P. Wolff he has written a paper titled Contingent Capital: The Case for COERCs:

In this paper we propose a new security, the Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertible (COERC). The security is a form of contingent capital, i.e. a bond that converts to equity when the market value of equity or capital falls below a certain trigger. The conversion price is set significantly below the trigger price and, at the same time, equity holders have the option to buy back the shares from the bondholders at the conversion price. Compared to other forms of contingent capital proposed in the literature, the COERC is less risky in a world where bank assets can experience sudden, large declines in value. Moreover, the structure eliminates concerns of an equity price “death spiral” as a result of manipulation or panic. A bank that issues COERCs also has a smaller incentive to choose investments that are subject to large losses. Furthermore, COERCs reduce the problem of “debt overhang,” the disincentive to replenish shareholders’ equity following a decline.

The basic justification for the COERCs is:

In contrast to the Credit Suisse coco bond [with accounting and regulatory triggers], the trigger is based on market value based leverage ratios, which are forward looking, rather than backward looking, measures of financial distress. It also means that at the time of the triggering event the stock price is known, unlike in the case of coco bonds with accounting based capital ratio triggers. As the trigger is driven by the market and not by regulators, regulatory risk is avoided. The conversion price is set at a large discount from the market price at the time of conversion, which means that conversion would generate massive shareholder dilution. However, in order to prevent this dilution, shareholders have an option to buy back the shares from the bondholders at the conversion price. In practice, what will happen is that when the trigger is reached, the company will announce a rights issue with an issue price equal to the conversion price and use the proceeds to repay the debt. As a result, the debt will be (almost) risk-free. In our simulations, we show that it is possible to design a COERC in such a way that the fair credit spread is 20 basis points above the risk-free rate. So although the shareholders are coerced to repay the debt, the benefit from this coercion is reflected in the low cost of debt as well as the elimination of all direct and indirect costs of financial distress. Although at the time of the trigger, the company will announce an equity issue, there is no negative signal associated with the issuance as the issue is the automatic result of reaching a pre-defined trigger.

Market based triggers are generally criticised because they create instability: bond holders have an incentive to short the stock and trigger conversion. Moreover, the fear of dilution may encourage shareholders to sell their shares so that the company ends up in a self-fulfilling death spiral. However, because in a COERC shareholders have pre-emptive rights in buying the shares from the bondholders, they can undo any conversion that is result of manipulation or unjustified panic. Moreover, because bondholders will generally be repaid, they have no incentive to hedge their investment by shorting the stock when the leverage ratio approaches the trigger, unlike the case of coco bonds where bondholders will become shareholders after the triggering event. The design of the contract also discourages manipulation by other bondholders. Bolton and Samama (2010) argue that other bond-holders may want to short the stock to trigger conversion, in order to improve their seniority. However, because the COERCs will be repaid in these circumstances such activity will not improve other bondholder’s seniority.

Further justification is given as:

Our objective is to propose an alternative, an instrument that a value maximizing manager would like to issue, without being forced by regulators. Companies are coerced to issue equity and repay debt by fear of dilution, not by the decision of a regulator. Imposing regulation against the interest of the bank’s shareholders will encourage regulatory arbitrage and may also reduce economic growth.6 If bankers, on the other hand, can be convinced that issuing contingent capital increases shareholder value, then any regulatory “encouragement” to issue these securities will be welcomed. Our proposal is therefore more consistent with a free market solution to the general problem that debt overhang discourages firms from recapitalizing when they are in financial distress. Hence the COERC should be of interest to any corporation where costs of financial distress are potentially important.

It seems like a very good idea. One factor not considered in the paper is the impact on equity investors.

Say you have an equity holding in a bank that has a stock price (and the fair value of the stock price) slightly in excess of the trigger price for its COERCs. At that point, buyers of the stock (and continuing holders!) must account for the probability that the conversion will be triggered and their will be a rights issue. Therefore, in order to avoid dilution, they must not only pay the fair market value for the stock, but they must also have cash on hand (or credit lines) available that will allow them to subscribe to the rights offering; the necessity of having this excess cash will make the common less attractive at its fair market value. This may serve to accelerate declines in the bank’s stock price.

It is also by no means assured that shareholders will be able to sell the rights anything close to their fair value.

A Goldman Sachs research report titled Contingent capital Possibilities, problems and opportunities is also of interest. Canadians panic-stricken by the recent musings in the federal budget (see discussion on April 1, April 2 and April 5) will be fascinated by:

Bail-in is a potential resolution tool designed to protect taxpayer funds by converting unsecured debt into equity at the point of insolvency. Most bail-in proposals would give regulators discretion to decide whether and when to convert the debt, as well as how much.

There is an active discussion under way as to whether bail-in should be a tool broadly applicable to all forms of unsecured credit (including senior debt) or whether it should be a specific security with an embedded write-down feature.

Naturally, this discussion is not being held in Canada; we’re too stupid to be allowed to participate in intelligent discussions.

As might be expected, GS is in favour of market-based solutions and consequent ‘high-trigger’ contingent capital:

Going-concern contingent capital differs substantially from the gone-concern kind. It is designed to operate well before resolution mechanisms come into play, and thus to contain financial distress at an early stage. The recapitalization occurs at a time when there is still significant enterprise value, and is “triggered” through a more objective process with far less scope for regulatory discretion. For investors to view objective triggers as credible, however, better and more-standardized bank disclosures will be needed on a regular basis. Because this type of contingent capital triggers early, when losses are still limited, it can be issued in smaller tranches. This, in turn, allows for greater flexibility in
structuring its terms.

When the early recapitalization occurs, control of the firm can shift from existing shareholders to the contingent capital holders, and a change in management may occur. The threat of the loss of control helps to strengthen market discipline by spurring the firm to de-risk and de-leverage as problems begin to emerge. As such, going-concern contingent capital can be an effective risk-mitigating tool.

GS further emphasizes the need to appeal to fixed income investors:

Contingent capital will only be viable as a large market if it is treated as debt

Whether “going” or “gone,” contingent capital will only be viable as a large market if it is treated as debt. This is not just a question of technical issues like ratings, inclusion in indices, fixed income fund mandates and tax-deductibility, though these issues are important. More fundamentally, contingent capital must be debt in order to appeal to traditional fixed income investors, the one market large enough to absorb at least $925 billion in potential issuance over the next decade.

Surprisingly, GS is in favour of capital-based triggers despite the problems:

A capital-based trigger would force mandatory conversion if and when Tier 1 (core) capital fell below a threshold specified either by regulators (in advance) or in the contractual terms of the contingent bonds. We think this would likely be the most effective trigger, because it is transparent and objective. Investors would be able to assess and model the likelihood of conversion if banks’ disclosure and transparency are enhanced. Critically, a capital-based trigger removes the uncertainty around regulatory discretion and the vulnerability to market manipulation that the other options entail.

Capital-based triggers are also vulnerable to financial reporting that fails to accurately reflect the underlying health of the firm. Lehman Brothers, for example, reported a Tier 1 capital ratio of 11% in the period before its demise – well above the regulatory minimum and a level most would have considered healthy. The same was true for Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual before they were acquired under distress. We think this issue must be resolved for investors to embrace capital-based triggers.

Fortunately there are several ways to make capital ratios more robust, whether by “stressing” them through regulator-led stress tests or by enforcing more rigorous and standardized disclosure requirements that would allow investors to better assess the health of the bank. Such standardized disclosures could relieve regulators of the burden of conducting regular stress tests, and would significantly enhance transparency. The value of stress testing and greater disclosures is one lesson from the financial crisis. The US Treasury’s 2009 stress test illustrates this point vividly. While not perfect, it offered greater
transparency and comparability of bank balance sheets than investors were able to derive from public filings. With this reassurance, investors were willing to step forward and commit capital. The European stress test proves the point as well: it did not significantly improve transparency and thus failed to reassure investors or attract capital.

That is the crux of the matter and I do not believe that the Gordian Knot can be cut in the real world. The US Treasury made their stress test strict and credible because it knew in advance that its banks would pass. The Europeans made their stress test ridiculous and incredible because they knew in advance that their banks would fail.

I liked their succinct dismissal of regulatory triggers:

While flexibility can be helpful, particularly given that no two crises are alike, recent experience shows that some regulators may be hesitant to publicly pronounce that a financial firm is unhealthy, especially during the early stages of distress. There is, after all, always the hope that the firm’s problems will be short-lived, or that an alternative solution to the triggering of contingent capital can be found. Thus a regulator may be unlikely to pull the trigger – affecting not only the firm and all of its stakeholders, but also likely raising alarm about the health of other financial firms – unless it is certain of a high degree of distress. By then, losses may have already risen to untenable levels, which is why this type of trigger is associated with gone-concern contingent capital.

GS emphasizes the importance of the indices:

The inclusion of contingent capital securities in credit indices will also be an important factor, perhaps even more important than achieving a rating. This is because the inclusion itself would attract investors, who otherwise might risk underperforming benchmarks by being underweight a significant component of the index. Credit indices currently do not include mandatorily convertible equity securities, although they can include instruments that allow for loss absorption through a write-down feature. This again contributes to the appeal of the write-down feature (rather than the simple conversion to equity) to most fixed income investors. If contingent capital securities were included in credit indices, this addition would be likely to drive a substantially deeper contingent capital market.

Here in Canada, of course, the usual benchmark is prepared by the TMX, which the regulators allowed to become bank-owned on condition that it improved the employment prospects for regulators. It’s a thoroughly disgraceful system which will blow up in all our faces some days and then everybody will pretend to be surprised.

GS is dismissive of regulatory triggers and NVCC:

A discretionary, “point of non-viability” trigger would likely be attractive to many regulators as it helps them to preserve maximum flexibility in the event of a financial crisis. This can be useful given that no two crises are exactly alike. It could also allow regulators to consider multiple factors – including the state of the overall financial system – when making the decision to pull the trigger. Discretion also gives regulators the opportunity to exercise regulatory forbearance away from the public spotlight.

Yet we believe this preference for discretion and flexibility makes it difficult for regulators to meet one of their most important – yet mostly unspoken – goals, which is to develop a viable contingent capital market. Regulators have certainly solicited feedback from investors, but some seem to believe that simply making contingent capital mandatory for issuers means that investors will buy them. However, from conversations with many investors, we believe that regulators may need to move toward a more objective trigger; if not, the price of these instruments may be prohibitive.

There is another set of participants in a potential contingent capital market: taxpayers. Regulators represent taxpayers’ interests by promoting systemic stability and requiring robust loss-absorption capabilities at individual banks. But the interests of regulators and taxpayers may not always be fully aligned. If taxpayers’ principal goal is to avoid socializing private-sector losses, and to prevent the dislocation of a systemic crisis even in its early stages, then they should want a stringent version of contingent capital – one that converts to equity at a highly dilutive rate, based on an early and objective trigger. The discretion and flexibility inherent in regulatory-triggered gone-concern contingent capital may have less appeal to taxpayers. From their standpoint, gone-concern contingent capital might well have allowed a major financial firm to fail, causing job losses and other disruptions across the financial system. Taxpayers may find the potential risk-reducing incentives created by going-concern contingent capital to be a more robust answer to the problem of too big to fail.

Goldman’s musings on investor preference can be taken as an argument in favour of COERCs:

Traditional fixed-income investors will likely want contingent capital to have a very low probability of triggering, which leads them to prefer an objective, capital-based and disclosure-enhanced trigger. Many investors have indicated their concerns about the challenges of modeling a discretionary trigger: it is very difficult to model the probability of default, the potential loss given default or even the appropriate price to pay for a security that converts under a discretionary and opaque process. Greater transparency is a prerequisite for a capital-based trigger to be seen as credible by investors, because they will need to have greater confidence that banks’ balance sheets reflect reality. We also believe that investors would be more likely to embrace a capital-based trigger if the terms were quite stringent, thereby lowering the probability of conversion.

April 5, 2013

Friday, April 5th, 2013

The US jobs number was disappointing:

Payrolls grew by 88,000 workers last month, the smallest in nine months, after a revised 268,000 gain in February that was higher than first estimated, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The median forecast of 87 economists surveyed by Bloomberg projected an advance of 190,000. The jobless rate fell to 7.6 percent from 7.7 percent.

The US is looking serious on Too-Big-To-Fail:

The largest U.S. banks, including JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Bank of America Corp., would have to hold capital in excess of Basel III standards under a proposal being drafted by Senate Democrats and Republicans to curb the size of too-big-to-fail banks.

The current draft of the legislation would require U.S. regulators to replace Basel III requirements with a higher capital standard: 10 percent for all banks and an additional surcharge of 5 percent for institutions with more than $400 billion in assets. Senators Sherrod Brown, a Democrat from Ohio, and David Vitter, a Republican from Louisiana, have said they intend to introduce the bill this month.

Some US politicians are trying to ban hedging:

State Senator Mike Folmer, a Republican, in February introduced a bill that would bar publicly funded entities from engaging in the derivatives, which can be used to protect against swings in interest rates. The ban would deny Philadelphia, which had entered into $3.5 billion of swaps, access to a useful tool, said Rob Dubow, finance director of the fifth-most populous U.S. city.

The Pennsylvania State Association of Boroughs supports a ban on swaps, said Christopher Cap, executive vice president. Elam Herr, assistant executive director of Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors, said it may back Folmer’s bill.

The best known example is Oakland’s attempt to effectively default on what was effectively a loan:

Between debating the location of a proposed dog park and discussing taxi permit fees one night last month, the city council in Oakland, California, turned to severing ties with Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS)

The vote for the city administrator to begin the process of firing the fifth-biggest U.S. bank by assets came during an eight-hour meeting Dec. 18. It culminated months of efforts by the city to exit a 1998 interest-rate swap without paying a $14.8 million termination fee. Goldman, which underwrote $83 million of Oakland debt last year, has denied the request.

Oakland entered into a so-called synthetic fixed-rate swap with the bank in 1998. It issued bonds to help finance pension obligations and used variable-rate instead of fixed-rate securities, according to reports filed with the city council.

The city was lured by the prospect of upfront cash, said Zennie Abraham, economic adviser to then-Mayor Elihu Harris. California voters had just approved Proposition 218, which limited cities’ ability to raise taxes, said Abraham.

“A lot of the city staff got enamored with the city getting a huge check,” Abraham said. “That was dangled in our face.”

The city realized a $15 million windfall from entering the contract. Oakland agreed to pay a fixed 5.6775 percent until 2021, while the bank was on the hook for a variable rate equal to the Bond Markets Association Index — 3.09 percent at the time the bonds were issued in 1998.

Nothing wrong with swaps or any other derivatives. But when they’re used to cover up borrowing, a la Greece … well, somebody should get fired.

The feds are continuing to explain bail-in bonds:

While the term “bail-in” has been used in both cases, Canadian officials are now scrambling to distance their plan from any that would use consumer deposits for capital. Amid questions about the plan, a spokeswoman for Finance Minister Jim Flaherty said in a statement that no consumer bank deposits – of any kind – would be drawn upon in the Canadian bail-in scenario.

“The ‘bail-in’ scenario described in the budget has nothing to do with consumer deposits and they are not part of the ‘bail-in’ regime,” Department of Finance spokeswoman Kathleen Perchaluk said.

Sources familiar with the plans say the Canadian bail-in scenario will rely on a specific class of new investments: subordinate bonds and deposit notes. The latter acts similar to bonds, where a large depositor such as an institutional investor or corporate customer with several hundred thousand dollars or more to deposit, buys a deposit note in order to get a slightly better return. It is similar to a contractual arrangement.

Analysts, however, say it would take extreme circumstances for the concept of a bail-in to ever come into play.

These deposit notes and bonds are not financial products available to the average investor or depositor, and do not include funds held in consumer deposits.

This may turn out very well for the preferred share market; it is impossible for the bar to be set any lower for deposit notes and bonds than it is for preferred shares, so what’s the difference? I mean really? An announcement of intention from OSFI that it will seek to convert preferred shares first in the event of non-viability?

This simply shows up the moronic nature of OSFI’s decision to go for a “low trigger” on preferred share contingent capital conversion … if they were high trigger, then the bonds could be low trigger (preferably lower trigger, rather than non-viability trigger) and then the bonds would be clearly senior and there would be a clear hierarchy. However, this would lower the importance of OSFI’s discretion when the next crisis occurs, and hence lower the importance of OSFI officialdom.

I have long argued, for instance, that all contingent capital should convert upon the common stock price breaching a certain level (taken as a VWAP over a period of time). For instance, let us assume RY’s common share price is $50. Then preferred shares should convert when the common trades below $25, at a conversion price of $25. The bonds could convert with a trigger price = conversion price = $10-15. This would be a much better system than the current mess.

With excellent timing, DBRS Requests Comments on Rating Subordinated, Hybrids and Preferred Bank Capital Securities:

DBRS is requesting comments on a proposed methodology released today that would be used in the rating of capital securities issued by banks that are either subordinated or that have unique convertibility terms (including contingent capital features). Market participants are asked to submit comments on the proposal to DBRS_Bank_Methodology_Comments@DBRS.com on or before May 10, 2013. Following the review and evaluation of all submissions, DBRS will publish a final version of this methodology.

Note that the proposed criteria as titled represents a merger of three outstanding DBRS banking criteria: (i) Rating Bank Subordinated Debt & Hybrid Instruments with Discretionary Payments; (ii) Rating Bank Subordinated Debt & Hybrid Instruments with Contingent Risks; and (iii) Rating Bank Preferred Shares & Equivalent Hybrids.

While we are open to any comments, we draw attention to three major areas, two of which are written as changes in the proposed document and one consideration for change, which has not been included in the document at this time:

(1) Present criteria dictate that bank preferred shares are typically rated three to five notches below the issuer’s intrinsic assessment. Based on further assessing the impact of notching versus POD (“probability of default”) levels, the request for comment document changes this to a standard three notches. We are also asking for comments on whether DBRS should retain the flexibility to have certain bank preferred ratings notched up by one notch versus the standard notching where there are unique positive characteristics for individual banks, or if this ability should be removed. The wording in the proposed criteria as released still provides this ability.

(2) A second change relates to the notching process that DBRS would use for contingent capital instruments. The proposed criteria within this April 5th, 2013 document provide more detail relative to the current DBRS criteria.

(3) As is the case with the present criteria, the request for comment document continues to present that normal subordinate debt instruments issued by banks that are defined by DBRS as systemically important would generally receive the identical notching benefit of typically a one-notch uplift due to external / government support that is given to deposits and senior unsecured debt. In recent times, there appears to be growing skepticism regarding governments’ willingness to support subordinated debt when dealing with systemically important banks. Our final decision on this issue could maintain the status quo; or it could result in all subordinate debt being notched from the intrinsic assessment level; or there could be a combination of the above based on the relevant legal framework, resolution schemes, and government policies for each country and banks involved.

BBO.PR.A was placed on Review-Negative by DBRS last September; the rating has now been affirmed at Pfd-2(low) and the Review removed:

DBRS has today confirmed the rating of the Class A, Preferred Shares (the Preferred Shares) issued by Big Bank Big Oil Split Corp. (the Company) at Pfd-2 (low) and has removed the rating from Under Review with Negative Implications.

On September 6, 2012, DBRS placed the rating of the Preferred Shares Under Review with Negative Implications, primarily due to the drop in downside protection below required levels in the prior months. However, since then, downside protection has recovered and stabilized, fluctuating between 49% and 51%, and the dividend coverage ratio has improved. As a result, the Preferred Shares have been confirmed at Pfd-2 (low) and removed from Under Review with Negative Implications.

Complicating matters is the fact that BBO reports its NAV per Capital Share, rather than per Unit, which is made clear by their January Fact Sheet.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums off 3bp, FixedResets down 9bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 2bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4309 % 2,603.3
FixedFloater 4.10 % 3.46 % 31,830 18.34 1 0.0000 % 3,963.1
Floater 2.67 % 2.88 % 79,744 20.07 4 -0.4309 % 2,810.9
OpRet 4.80 % 0.33 % 53,527 0.21 5 -0.0772 % 2,611.0
SplitShare 4.81 % 3.99 % 137,333 4.16 5 0.0332 % 2,953.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0772 % 2,387.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.19 % 2.03 % 88,849 0.90 32 -0.0260 % 2,375.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.85 % 167,918 15.73 4 -0.1221 % 2,674.7
FixedReset 4.89 % 2.59 % 284,181 3.25 80 -0.0944 % 2,520.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 2.08 % 130,845 0.48 44 0.0176 % 2,457.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-05
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : -9.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 261,217 TD crossed 24,000 at 25.20; National crossed 40,000 at the same price. Then Jacob Securities, seen for the first time yesterday, crossed 75,000 at the same price again.

I think Jacob Securities has got either a new client or a new trader, possibly both.

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : -3.30 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 206,430 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 100,000 each, both at 23.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-05
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 163,445 Desjardins crossed blocks of 50,000 shares, 77,200 and 30,000, all at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-05
Maturity Price : 23.88
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 105,079 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 53,600 and 20,000, both at 26.00. RBC crossed 10,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 1.95 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 75,260 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 62,050 TD crossed 49,900 at 25.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 2.86 %
There were 38 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.23 – 26.65
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2359

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-05
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : -9.64 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.58 – 25.93
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2331

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %

ABK.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 32.10 – 32.42
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2241

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-10
Maturity Price : 31.64
Evaluated at bid price : 32.10
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %

TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 24.01 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.5400
Average : 0.4451

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-05
Maturity Price : 23.70
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 2.16 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.66 – 26.90
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1488

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.82 – 27.09
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1941

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.82
Bid-YTW : 2.00 %

April 4, 2013

Thursday, April 4th, 2013

Enbridge Inc., proud issuer of many preferred shares, is issuing equity:

Enbridge Inc. (TSX:ENB) (NYSE:ENB) today announced that it has entered into an agreement with RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank (“the Underwriters”) to sell 10,850,000 treasury common shares, on a bought deal basis, at $46.11 per common share for distribution to the public. Closing of the offering is expected on or about April 16, 2013.

Enbridge has granted the Underwriters an option, exercisable at any time up to 48 hours prior to closing of the offering, to purchase up to an additional 2,170,000 treasury common shares at $46.11 per common share.

“Since the long-term funding plan discussed at our investor conference last fall we have achieved greater than expected progress in the development of attractive new growth opportunities, including those already announced and those yet to be” said J. Richard Bird, Enbridge Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer & Corporate Development. “An update to our funding plan now indicates an incremental equity requirement over the 2012-2016 period. The common share offering today continues our practice of maintaining a very manageable forward funding requirement. After the common share offering, and our recent preferred share issue, our net forward equity requirement stands at $1.9 billion through 2016, which we expect to accommodate through additional preferred share issues and asset monetizations. The additional growth investments will contribute to sustaining Enbridge’s industry-leading EPS growth rate through 2016 and well beyond.”

Today’s prize for precious handwringing goes to The Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment:

Thousands of financial sector workers risk being frozen out of the industry unless they pass mandatory tests measuring their personal ethics and integrity.

The Chartered Institute for Securities & Investment (CISI), a London-based professional body for individuals working, or seeking careers in wealth management and capital markets around the world, wants all of its members to undergo integrity screening or face losing their membership, as it battles to restore public faith in finance.

Until now, only individuals offering financial advice had to take such a test as a condition of their CISI status and to comply with U.K. rules on how investment funds are sold to savers.

Bankers working in areas like corporate finance and mergers and acquisitions, and traders in bonds, shares and derivatives have no such regulatory requirements imposed upon them.

But CISI said on Tuesday that systematic checks on the ethics and integrity of workers across the entire financial services industry were long overdue.

Sadly, it is impossible to determine integrity through a test. Ten percent of any population will cheat as soon as they think they can get away with it. Ten percent will not cheat, no matter what happens. The rest might cheat, given the right combination and severity of circumstances. And you cannot tell in advance who is who. The instigators of this paperwork exercise recognize this, but are doing it anyway:

Martin Wheatley, head of Britain’s Financial Conduct Authority, welcomed the CISI initiative but skeptics said the test would only prove that bankers know how they should act, not whether they actually would apply those ethics on a daily basis.

“No test can guarantee how someone will behave subsequently. But our aim is to make people aware of how they should behave when faced with difficult situations,” Mr. Culhane said.

There was a wide disparity among type in the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualPremiums up 7bp, FixedResets winning 20bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. Volatility was on the low side, but comprised entirely of winning FixedResets. Volume was high and all top-six places were held by FixedResets.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1139 % 2,614.6
FixedFloater 4.10 % 3.46 % 29,464 18.34 1 0.6084 % 3,963.1
Floater 2.66 % 2.87 % 77,120 20.10 4 -0.1139 % 2,823.1
OpRet 4.79 % 0.58 % 53,080 0.21 5 0.0309 % 2,613.1
SplitShare 4.81 % 4.00 % 135,570 4.16 5 -0.0646 % 2,952.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0309 % 2,389.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.17 % 1.64 % 89,197 0.56 32 0.0707 % 2,375.6
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.83 % 168,422 15.75 4 0.4087 % 2,678.0
FixedReset 4.89 % 2.49 % 287,936 3.26 80 0.2039 % 2,522.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 2.30 % 127,151 0.38 44 0.0010 % 2,456.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.92
Bid-YTW : 2.49 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 2.23 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 2.39 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 169,343 Jacob Securities (who?) crossed 100,000 at 25.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : -4.07 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 118,636 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.99
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 94,566 TD crossed 12,400 at 24.90. National crossed 59,900 at 24.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 60,357 National crossed 30,000 at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-04
Maturity Price : 23.88
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 47,216 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 26.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 45,950 National crossed 33,700 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 2.80 %
There were 45 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 26.61 – 27.61
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.6226

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 2.23 %

GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.59 – 25.87
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1856

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-04
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : -20.77 %

BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 26.21 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2156

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 25.55 – 25.89
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2712

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 51.60 – 51.90
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2313

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.60
Bid-YTW : 1.59 %

TD.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 26.06 – 26.24
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1153

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : 1.81 %

LBS.PR.A To Vote On Term Extension

Thursday, April 4th, 2013

Brompton Group has announced:

Life & Banc Split Corp. (“LBS” or the “Fund”) is pleased to announce that its board of directors (the “Board”) has approved granting shareholders an additional option to allow them to continue their investment in the Fund beyond its currently scheduled termination date of November 29, 2013. The proposed extension will not result in any changes to shareholder redemption rights.

Over the last three years, the Class A shares and Preferred shares have traded at an average combined premium to net asset value per share of approximately 4.2%. By approving the extension of the Fund, shareholders will have the opportunity to benefit from potential future trading premiums. In the event that the proposed extension is not approved by shareholders, the Fund will terminate and Class A and Preferred shareholders will receive the net asset value per Class A and Preferred share which are currently less than their trading prices.

LBS invests in a portfolio, on an approximately equal weight basis, of common shares of 6 Canadian Banks: Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, The Bank of Nova Scotia and The Toronto-Dominion Bank and 4 Canadian life insurance companies: Great-West Lifeco Inc., Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc., Manulife Financial Corporation and Sun Life Financial Inc. In 2012, the Class A shares and Preferred shares of the Fund had total returns of 46.8% and 5.4%, respectively, as the 6 Canadian banks and 4 Canadian life insurance companies had strong performance over the year.

Under the proposal:

  • • The term of LBS may be extended for an additional term of up to 5 years, as determined by the Board. In addition, the termination date may be extended further for successive terms of up to 5 years thereafter, as determined by the Board;
  • • Current retraction rights of the Class A shareholders and Preferred shareholders will remain unchanged and shareholders will be provided with an additional special retraction right providing an option to retract either Preferred shares or Class A shares at the end of the term (and each successive term thereafter) and receive a retraction price that is calculated in the same way that such price would be calculated if the Fund were to terminate on November 29, 2013; and
  • • The distribution rates on the Preferred shares and Class A shares for the new term will be announced prior to the extension of the term.

LBS will hold a special meeting of holders of Preferred shares and Class A shares on April 11, 2013 to consider and vote upon the proposal. Shareholders of record at the close of business on March 1, 2013 will be provided with the notice of meeting and management information circular in respect of the meeting and will be entitled to vote at the meeting. The proposal is also subject to any required regulatory approvals.

Further details regarding the proposal will be contained in the management information circular. The circular will also be available on www.sedar.com and posted at www.bromptongroup.com.

LBS.PR.A currently has Asset Coverage of 1.7-:1 and Income Coverage of 107% in 2012, so it is of very good credit quality compared to many of its peers. It was downgraded to Pfd-3(low) by DBRS in September 2012.

The Information Circular contains the vital provision:

provide Shareholders who do not wish to continue their investment in LBS with a special retraction right (the “Special Retraction Right”) to enable such holders to retract their shares at the end of the initial term and each extension of the term thereafter (each, a “Special Retraction Date”) on the same terms that would have applied had LBS redeemed all Class A Shares and Preferred Shares as originally contemplated and provide that Shareholders who wish to exercise such Special Retraction Right must give notice that they wish to exercise such right on or prior to October 31, 2013 and for subsequent Special Retraction Rights no later than the last business day of the month prior to the Special Retraction Date of the year of any extension;

… which makes voting in favour of this an extremely low risk proposition, although it should be noted that management has a blank cheque as far as resetting the dividend on LBS.PR.A is concerned:

The Board may change the distribution rate on the Preferred Shares and the distribution target on the Class A Shares at the time of any extension to the redemption date as described above. Any such change will be announced by way of news release issued at least 60 days prior to such extension of the term.

I recommend that LBS.PR.A holders vote in favour of the proposal although it might be prudent to sell prior to the dividend reset.

Thanks to Assiduous Reader AC for bringing this to my attention.