Archive for April, 2013

FSV.PR.U: Some To Be Redeemed, The Rest Converted

Thursday, April 4th, 2013

FirstService Corporation has announced:

plans to simplify its capital structure by eliminating all of its 7% Cumulative Preference Shares, Series 1 (the “Preferred Shares”) and to pay a dividend on its Subordinate Voting Shares and Multiple Voting Shares (together, the “Common Shares”). All amounts are in US dollars.

Currently, there are 5,230,634 Preferred Shares outstanding. The Preferred Shares will be eliminated on May 3, 2013 (the “Redemption Date”) in a two-step process. First, there will be a partial redemption for cash of 1,569,190 Preferred Shares (representing 30% of the outstanding Preferred Shares) on a pro rata basis for $25.00 per share plus accrued and unpaid dividends of $0.1582 per share, net of any tax required to be deducted or withheld by FirstService. Second, immediately following the partial redemption, the balance of 3,661,444 Preferred Shares (representing 70% of the initially outstanding Preferred Shares) will be converted by FirstService into Subordinate Voting Shares. A Notice of Redemption and Conversion has been mailed to holders of Preferred Shares in accordance with the terms of Preferred Shares.

Partial Redemption of Preferred Shares

On May 3, 2013, 1,569,190 Preferred Shares will be redeemed by FirstService for $25.00 per share plus accrued and unpaid dividends of $0.1582 per share, net of any tax required to be deducted or withheld by FirstService (the “Redemption Price”), for expected total redemption consideration of $39.5 million. The accrued and unpaid dividends reflect the period of March 31, 2013 to the day prior to the redemption date. The Preferred Shares to be redeemed will be selected on a pro rata basis (disregarding fractions).

Conversion of Preferred Shares Remaining after Partial Redemption

On May 3, 2013, immediately after the partial redemption of the Preferred Shares, the remaining 3,661,444 Preferred Shares will be converted into fully paid, non-assessable and freely tradable Subordinate Voting Shares of FirstService. The number of Subordinate Voting Shares to be received for each Preferred Share converted is determined in accordance with a formula set out in the terms of the Preferred Shares, wherein the Redemption Price of each Preferred Share is divided by 95% of the weighted average trading price of the Subordinate Voting Shares traded on NASDAQ for the twenty consecutive trading days ending on the fourth day prior to the conversion date. No fractional Subordinate Voting Shares will be issued. FirstService will satisfy any such fractional interest with a payment based on the market price of such fractional interest. FirstService expects that, based on current trading prices, approximately 3.0 million Subordinate Voting Shares will be issued on the conversion, resulting in a total of approximately 31.8 million Subordinate Voting Shares outstanding following the conversion. The Preferred Shares will be de-listed from trading on the TSX at the close of trading on the Redemption Date.

The formal notice of redemption and conversion is also available on FirstService’s website.

FSV.PR.U was last mentioned on PrefBlog when DBRS put the rating on Review-Developing in 2008. DBRS discontinued the rating in 2010.

The common stock, FSV, is now trading in the range of $34.00, implying that preferred shareholders will receive approximately 0.75 subordinate voting shares per preferred – not bad, since the preferreds were distributed as a stock dividend on the basis of one preferred for every five SVS in 2007.

FSV.PR.U has not been tracked by HIMIPref™.

April 3, 2013

Thursday, April 4th, 2013

Europeans are encountering Money Market angst:

Investors in Europe risk losing a haven as Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Morgan Stanley break a taboo that’s stopped 88 billion euros ($113 billion) of money-market funds from ever losing principal.

The banks are preparing to abandon the policy that investors get one euro back for every one they put in as government bond yields near record lows make it harder for the funds to generate returns.

A money-market fund failing to repay investors in full is said to “break the buck” and is forced to shut down. To avoid this, banks propose to change rules governing the investment vehicles so they can pass on losses to investors by reducing the number of shares outstanding in a fund, without closing.

Benchmark German bond yields are close to record lows, with the rate on Germany’s two-year bond at minus 0.001 percent, up from minus 0.023 on March 28, data compiled by Bloomberg show. France’s two-year security is yielding 0.145 percent, up from a record-low 0.03 percent in December.

Since the ECB cut the deposit rate to zero in July, money- market funds that are restricted to buying short-term debt generated almost no extra cash, putting pressure on their goal to provide a sanctuary for investors. The seven-day yield on funds that buy euro government securities was zero percent for the week ended March 22, according to research firm iMoneyNet Inc.

Prime funds, which take more risk and can also invest in bonds issued by the highest-rated banks and companies, made 0.02 percent. Since Jan. 4, euro money funds have seen assets under management fall by 7.1 billion euros to 87.9 billion euros, Westborough, Massachusetts-based iMoneyNet data show.

Here’s some good energy business news, amidst all the unhappy headlines:

Canada is pulling ahead of the U.S. in a contest to be the first exporter of liquefied natural gas from the North American shale bonanza to Asia’s $150 billion LNG market.

An LNG terminal being built at a cove north of Vancouver financed by a Houston private-equity firm is scheduled to begin shipping the fuel across the Pacific Ocean in mid-2015, eight months before the first continental U.S. plant is slated to start. Canada’s government has approved twice as much LNG export capacity as its southerly neighbor, evincing a friendlier attitude toward selling domestic gas to the highest bidder and positioning the nation as the go-to source of gas in North America for overseas buyers.

After issuing the first permit to export continental U.S. gas to nations without free-trade agreements almost two years ago, the federal government suspended reviews of all other applications so it could study the potential impacts of overseas sales on domestic energy prices. There are now 19 proposed U.S. LNG projects awaiting export permits, with the longest on hold for 28 months.

In contrast, Canada, which has seen a similar surge in gas production, issued its third LNG export license in February for a project led by Royal Dutch Shell Plc (RDSA) in British Columbia. All together, the trio of approved Canadian projects will have the capacity to ship 4.66 billion cubic feet of gas a day, more than double the 2.2 billion cubic feet of capacity that has been permitted in the U.S., according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

This is better than the usual story:

Canada stands to lose out on more than $50-billion over a three-year period because of oil pipeline constraints, one of the country’s major banks projected today as it urged President Barack Obama to approve the controversial Keystone XL project.

That figure from CIBC World Markets represents lost opportunities, in terms of producer revenues and government royalties.

Economist Peter Buchanan forecasts that this “money left on the table” will be about $20-billion this year, $15.2-billion in 2014 and $16.5-billion a year later.

DBRS updated its report on Husky, proud issuer of HSE.PR.A:

DBRS has today updated its report on Husky Energy Inc. (Husky or the Company). Husky’s credit quality is supported by its: (1) conservative financial profile, (2) integrated operations and (3) medium- to long-term exploration and production (E&P) growth potential.

Husky’s financial profile remained stable in 2012. Husky maintains debt-to-capital and debt-to-cash flow ratios below its targets of 25% and 1.5 times (x), respectively. Integrated operations provided a partial natural hedge against pricing volatility in North American upstream operations. A modest free cash flow deficit in 2012 was largely a result of increased capex spending. Similar free cash flow deficits are anticipated until 2014, when cash flow contributions from growth pillars – namely, the oil sands, Atlantic Canada and Asia-Pacific – commence. DBRS believes the Company’s current liquidity is sufficient to fund cash flow shortfalls over the near term, with minimal impact on credit metrics.

DBRS also notes that the Company has updated its financial and operational targets from those initially set out in December 2010. DBRS believes that these targets are largely achievable, contingent upon Husky’s ability to execute its medium- to longer-term growth projects. DBRS expects that the Company will continue to manage its financial profile conservatively, in order to achieve the stated targets.

It was a slow drift upwards for the Canadian preferred share market, with both PerpetualPremiums and FixedResets gaining 3bp and DeemedRetractibles up 4bp. Volatility was low. Volume was a hair below average, with low-Issue Reset Spread BNS FixedResets seeing a fair bit of shuffling.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 4.86%, equivalent to 6.32% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield a bit below 4.2%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 210bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) increase from the 205bp reported March 27.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2652 % 2,617.6
FixedFloater 4.13 % 3.48 % 28,618 18.29 1 0.0435 % 3,939.2
Floater 2.66 % 2.85 % 77,940 20.13 4 -0.2652 % 2,826.3
OpRet 4.80 % 0.81 % 53,775 0.21 5 0.2399 % 2,612.3
SplitShare 4.81 % 4.00 % 134,508 4.16 5 0.0079 % 2,954.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2399 % 2,388.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.18 % 1.63 % 86,091 0.57 32 0.0272 % 2,373.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.88 % 4.86 % 169,505 15.72 4 -0.2852 % 2,667.1
FixedReset 4.89 % 2.62 % 288,788 3.26 80 0.0307 % 2,517.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.85 % 2.69 % 128,183 0.39 44 0.0387 % 2,456.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 2.65 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 146,697 Nesbitt crossed 34,600 at 24.35. TD crossed blocks of 10,000 shares, 17,000 shares, 18,000 and 12,000, all at 24.29.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.28
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 118,567 National bought 16,100 from TD at 24.85, then another 14,700 at 24.97 and crossed 25,000 at 24.86. TD crossed 16,600 at 24.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 66,500 Nesbitt crossed 57,500 at 26.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.17
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 56,870 Nesbitt crossed 45,200 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 53,430 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.07.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 1.97 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Premium 51,296 TD crossed 11,700 at 25.29.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
There were 28 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 27.03 – 27.93
Spot Rate : 0.9000
Average : 0.6574

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.03
Bid-YTW : 2.67 %

ABK.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 32.10 – 32.34
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1506

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-10
Maturity Price : 31.64
Evaluated at bid price : 32.10
Bid-YTW : 2.70 %

SLF.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 26.27 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1404

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.27
Bid-YTW : 1.88 %

PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.87 – 26.16
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2134

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.87
Bid-YTW : -23.07 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.14 – 25.44
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2294

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.14
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %

RY.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 26.73 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1998

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.73
Bid-YTW : 2.22 %

April 2, 2013

Tuesday, April 2nd, 2013

This may sound like a joke, but it’s actually a big deal:

The Securities and Exchange Commission today issued a report that makes clear that companies can use social media outlets like Facebook and Twitter to announce key information in compliance with Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) so long as investors have been alerted about which social media will be used to disseminate such information.

Regulation FD requires companies to distribute material information in a manner reasonably designed to get that information out to the general public broadly and non-exclusively. It is intended to ensure that all investors have the ability to gain access to material information at the same time.

Previously, you had to issue a press release; in Canada, that generally (maybe always?) means you have to go through MarketWire or NewsWire, the two major agencies that distribute press releases.

Those two companies – the list is probably a little longer in the States! – have a history: if you issue through these places, you know you’re not going to get in trouble with the regulators for selective disclosure, whereas if you go to Honest Jimmy’s Press Release Distribution Service … you might. So what the established companies are really selling is safe harbor …. and boy-oh-boy, do they ever charge through the nose for it!

Now there are more safe harbours … FREE safe harbours! In the great scheme of things, potential savings from reduced press release costs probably won’t boost Royal Bank’s stock price much … but for smaller companies, every penny counts!

The feds have clarified the budget’s bail-in musings that were mentioned here yesterday:

“The bail-in scenario described in the Budget has nothing to do with depositors’ accounts and they will in no way be used here,” Finance Minister Jim Flaherty’s press secretary Kathleen Perchaluk said in a statement Tuesday. “Those accounts will continue to remain insured through the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, as always.”

“The [Canadian] bail-in regime is to protect both taxpayers from having to bail out banks and depositors from having to take a financial hit like we’ve seen in Cyprus,” Ms. Perchaluk said. “If a bank is having severe difficulties, the bail-in regime would force certain debt instruments to be converted into equity to recapitalize the bank.”

It’s a pity that the Globe’s reporter, Grant Robertson, has no idea of what bank regulation is all about and didn’t speak to anybody who does – he perpetuates the following confusion:

Under the proposed Canadian plan, banks would set aside contingent capital, such as shares, which could be quickly converted to cash to provide liquidity and stabilize their operations should a crisis hit.

However, it is charming that Spend-Every-Penny’s mouthpiece, Kathleen Perchaluk, has such faith in the CDIC. As mentioned on March 27 (and on other occasions!) the CDIC’s reserves are far too small to even begin to cope with the collapse of a major bank.

John Greenwood of the Financial Post not only knows more about bank regulation, but actually talked to people who knew more than him:

According to one senior fixed-income analyst, Ottawa has its eye on senior unsecured debt issued by banks. Popular with institutional fixed-income investors, the product is widely traded and makes up a big chunk of the domestic bond market.

So far it’s only a proposal in the budget and a vaguely worded one at that, but “everyone is taking the government at their word and hence the market is coming to terms with whether or not to buy it and at what price,” said the analyst, who asked not to be named.

Critics worried that investors may not buy it at a price that the banks consider affordable and the banks themselves have said they have reservations. In any case, the banks haven’t issued any yet. One interpretation of the budget is that Ottawa is looking to nudge the process forward.

The last one probably won’t be a big worry. The bank-owned TMX will be “encouraged” by the bank regulator to include the so-called bonds in the index which will virtually guarantee a market.

It was a day of modest losses for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums losing 5bp, FixedResets off 1bp and DeemedRetractibles down 3bp. There was no volatility – none. Volume was below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1011 % 2,624.5
FixedFloater 4.13 % 3.48 % 29,607 18.29 1 0.0000 % 3,937.4
Floater 2.65 % 2.85 % 78,828 20.15 4 0.1011 % 2,833.8
OpRet 4.81 % 1.98 % 54,621 0.21 5 0.0387 % 2,606.0
SplitShare 4.81 % 3.98 % 136,196 4.17 5 0.1182 % 2,954.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0387 % 2,382.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.18 % 1.81 % 89,615 0.57 32 -0.0514 % 2,373.3
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.84 % 170,212 15.74 4 -0.0611 % 2,674.7
FixedReset 4.89 % 2.59 % 290,470 3.43 80 -0.0149 % 2,516.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 1.87 % 128,465 0.24 44 -0.0334 % 2,455.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 148,779 National crossed 50,000 at 24.70, then bought 20,000 from Scotia at the same price. RBC crossed 49,300 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-02
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 24.69
Bid-YTW : 2.55 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 110,224 National crossed 25,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : -3.38 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 74,440 TD crossed 10,000 at 24.77; Desjardins crossed 16,500 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Premium 73,123 Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 25.27.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 58,268 TD crossed 15,000 at 24.30, then sold 13,300 to anonymous at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.31
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 40,627 RBC crossed 31,800 at 26.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 2.10 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 26.93 – 27.55
Spot Rate : 0.6200
Average : 0.3913

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.93
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %

TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 23.90 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4605

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-02
Maturity Price : 23.63
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 2.18 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.30 – 26.57
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1873

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %

BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.75 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1209

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : -10.04 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.82 – 26.04
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1433

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %

RY.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 26.74 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1339

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.74
Bid-YTW : 2.19 %

April 1, 2013

Monday, April 1st, 2013

Assiduous Reader KL was intrigued by my note on OSFI’s target for depositor recovery on March 27 and passed along a few links.

A US stockbroker pointed out (with assistance from a goldbug) that the federal budget contained (pages 154-155 of the PDF) the following:

The Government also recognizes the need to manage the risks associated with systemically important banks—those banks whose distress or failure could cause a disruption to the financial system and, in turn, negative impacts on the economy. This requires strong prudential oversight and a robust set of options for resolving these institutions without the use of taxpayer funds, in the unlikely event that one becomes non-viable.

The Government intends to implement a comprehensive risk management framework for Canada’s systemically important banks. This framework will be consistent with reforms in other countries and key international standards, such as the Financial Stability Board’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, and will work alongside the existing Canadian regulatory capital regime. The risk management framework will include the following elements:

  • Systemically important banks will face a higher capital requirement, as determined by the Superintendent of Financial Institutions.
  • The Government proposes to implement a ―bail-in‖ regime for systemically important banks. This regime will be designed to ensure that, in the unlikely event that a systemically important bank depletes its capital, the bank can be recapitalized and returned to viability through the very rapid conversion of certain bank liabilities into regulatory capital. This will reduce risks for taxpayers. The Government will consult stakeholders on how best to implement a bail-in regime in Canada. Implementation timelines will allow for a smooth transition for affected institutions, investors and other market participants.
  • Systemically important banks will continue to be subject to existing risk management requirements, including enhanced supervision and recovery and resolution plans.

This risk management framework will limit the unfair advantage that could be gained by Canada’s systemically important banks through the mistaken belief by investors and other market participants that these institutions are “too big to fail”.

Both commentators assumed that the word “liabilities” in the second point means “deposits”, which could ultimately be the case, of course (particularly for uninsured deposits), but for now can be taken to mean “contingent capital” – Garth Turner has it right, just as a change of pace.

While there is no clarity yet, the budget announcement is probably a signal that the feds have bought into the Ban the Bond Movement and that soon all bank bonds will be contingent capital; hey, who needs bankruptcy law anyway?

The first and third points of the three-part process refers to OSFI’s inadequate provision for D-SIBs.

Speaking of totally inadequate government agencies, the Toronto Transit Commission’s CEO Report for 12Q4 just came to my attention, with the following commentary regarding streetcar service:

The last two weeks of Period 12 (December Board) saw high levels of insufficient workforce due to vacation, resulting in numerous cancellations due to no Operator. The resulting cancelled service contributed to delays, longer trip times, and ragged headways.

Is there any doubt but that the TTC is grossly mismanaged? Is there anybody employed at the TTC who could run a three-house paper route?

DBRS confirmed CU at Pfd-2(high) [Stable]:

DBRS has today confirmed the Issuer Rating and the ratings of the Unsecured Debentures, Cum. Preferred Shares and Commercial Paper of Canadian Utilities Limited (CU or the Company) at “A,” “A,” Pfd-2 (high) and R-1 (low), respectively, all with Stable trends. The confirmations reflect CU’s relatively stable business risk profile, strong financial profile and the credit quality of its primary subsidiary, CU Inc. (CUI; rated A (high)). The one-notch differential in the ratings of CU and CUI reflects structural subordination at CU.

DBRS assesses CU’s financial profile based on a non-consolidated basis. CU is expected to continue to support the significant capital expenditure program at CUI (approximately $2 billion annually from 2013 to 2015) with debt and preferred shares issuances over the medium term. As of March 25, 2013, the Company has approximately $900 million of preferred shares outstanding (including a $175 million issuance in March 2013). Pro forma the $175 million issuance, $145 million of CU’s outstanding preferred shares are treated as debt by DBRS in the adjusted debt-to-capital calculation (with a pro forma adjusted debt-to-capital ratio of approximately 9%). In the adjusted debt-to-capital calculation, the amount of preferred shares over the 20% preferred shares-to-equity threshold (defined as the percentage of preferred shares outstanding divided by total equity, excluding preferred) is treated as debt. DBRS expects the Company to continue to maintain its non-consolidated adjusted debt-to-capital ratio in line with the 20% threshold on a non-consolidated basis. Should CU exceed the 20% threshold, this could result in negative rating implications

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 9bp, FixedResets down 23bp and DeemedRetractibles off 1bp. Volatility was average. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4905 % 2,621.9
FixedFloater 4.13 % 3.48 % 27,411 18.30 1 -0.6479 % 3,937.4
Floater 2.65 % 2.83 % 79,460 20.15 4 -0.4905 % 2,830.9
OpRet 4.81 % 1.94 % 55,431 0.22 5 -0.1546 % 2,605.0
SplitShare 4.82 % 3.99 % 137,684 4.17 5 -0.1338 % 2,950.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1546 % 2,382.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.18 % 1.02 % 93,032 0.54 32 0.0932 % 2,374.5
Perpetual-Discount 4.86 % 4.84 % 167,550 15.74 4 -0.0407 % 2,676.4
FixedReset 4.89 % 2.53 % 293,394 3.27 80 -0.2305 % 2,516.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.85 % 2.07 % 126,238 0.24 44 -0.0105 % 2,456.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset -3.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.17
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset -2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 2.84 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-01
Maturity Price : 18.30
Evaluated at bid price : 18.30
Bid-YTW : 2.86 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 219,052 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.97
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 200,314 TD sold 16,800 at 25.15 and 10,500 at 25.10 to Nesbitt; then sold 20,000 to RBC at 24.99; then crossed three blocks, 14,400 shares, 31,000 and 49,500 at 24.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 150,390 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.19; Nesbitt crossed 20,400 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : -2.53 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 128,258 Anonymous bought blocks of 10,500 and 18,700 from CIBC at 24.70; then bought 30,500 at 24.61 and 24,200 at 24.60 from TD.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.17
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 92,428 Scotia crossed blocks of 32,100 and 50,000 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 71,297 Scotia crossed 55,000 at 25.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.89 – 27.48
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4227

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.89
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.06 – 25.42
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2419

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %

BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 24.17 – 24.50
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2372

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.17
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 18.38 – 18.68
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2085

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-01
Maturity Price : 18.38
Evaluated at bid price : 18.38
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 23.00 – 23.45
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3682

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-04-01
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.89 – 26.09
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1223

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.89
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %

SLF: S&P Affirms Rating, Sets Outlook To Stable

Monday, April 1st, 2013

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • •Sun Life Financial Inc.’s (SLF) operating performance improved in 2012. Fixed-charge coverage is now at levels we expect for the ratings.
  • •We are affirming all ratings and revising the outlook on SLF to stable from negative. The outlook on core operations remains stable.
  • •The stable outlook reflects our view that SLF is well positioned to weather a wide range of potential adverse economic environments.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services said today that it revised its outlook on Sun Life Financial Inc. (SLF) to stable from negative. We also affirmed all our ratings on SLF, including the ‘A/A-1’ counterparty credit rating.

“The change to a stable outlook on SLF is driven primarily by the improvement in Sun Life’s after-tax net operating income to $1.679 billion in 2012,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Robert Hafner. Operating results now support a fixed-charge coverage ratio of more than 5x. As of year-end 2012, SLF’s fixed-charge coverage ratio was 5.7x and its total financial leverage ratio was 29.4%. Sun Life continues to reduce its earnings and capital sensitivity to equity market and interest rate changes, thereby improving earnings stability. When completed, the pending sale of SLFUS will further reduce earnings and capital sensitivity.

The stable outlook on SLF and its core subsidiaries reflects our view that Sun Life is well positioned to weather a wide range of potential adverse economic environments. We expect Sun Life’s consolidated pretax operating earnings to continue to improve in the intermediate term and to exceed $1.5 billion in 2013, which is necessary to support expected coverage levels of more than 5x at SLF. We believe that Sun Life’s competitive advantages will enable it to continue to expand its market share profitably in many of its chosen markets.
We expect asset-quality issues to be less severe than for many North American peers. If the proportion of nonprotection business increases, the quality of earnings would decline, even while the quantity of earnings increases.

This follows the S&P announcement in February, 2012, that:

» The negative outlook on holding company Sun Life Financial Inc. reflects that fixed charge coverage may not rebound to the levels we expect in 2012.

SLF has the following preferred shares outstanding: SLF.PR.A, SLF.PR.B, SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E (DeemedRetractible) and SLF.PR.F, SLF.PR.G, SLF.PR.H and SLF.PR.I (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and assigned to their respective indices.

S&P rates all the preferreds as P-2(high). DBRS downgraded SLF to Pfd-2(high) in February 2013. Moody’s has them at Baa3(hyb), Review Positive.

MAPF 2012 Financials Released

Monday, April 1st, 2013

I am please to announce that the fund’s 2012 Audited Financial Statements and the 2012 Portfolio Transaction Record have been released and are available for download via the Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund web page.

MAPF Performance: March 2013

Monday, April 1st, 2013

The fund underperformed in March, due again to strong performance from FixedReset, Floating Rate and junk issues held by ZPR.

For example, of the sixteen BCE issues tracked by HIMIPref™ (which are heavily weighted in the indices, but which are not held at all by the fund):

Performance of BCE Issues
March, 2013
Performance
Range
Number of
Issues
>4% 1
3% – 4% 1
2% – 3% 4
1% – 2% 5
0% – 1% 5
<0% 0

By way of illustration, BCE issues comprise 10.62% of the February 28 BMO-CM 50 Index.

ZPR, is a relatively new ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues, with a very high proportion of junk issues, which returned a stunning +1.34% for the month, and +3.22% over the past three months (according to my calculations from the fund’s NAV data), versus gains for the TXPL index of +1.39% and +3.34%, respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $518.7-million in four and a half months, $240-million of this in March alone, and I feel that has had a great effect on the prices of its targetted preferreds and their close relations.

At time of writing (March 31), the Total Return Index Values for the two S&P/TSX preferred share indices are not available, but TXPR was +0.93% on the month to March 27, while TXPL was +1.22%; there was a jump of as-yet undetermined magnitude on the last day of the month. Approximately 62.4% of TXPR is included in TXPL; a little algebra results in the estimation that the components of TXPR not included in TXPL returned a mere +0.45% in the month to March 27 – a stark illustration of the effect of ZPR and its massive secondary market requirements.

Investment-grade FixedResets as a group continued their unsustainable price appreciation in March, rising 1.18% – quite a feat when the median Yield-to-Worst (YTW) for this segment was 2.86% p.a. at February month-end! The median YTW declined to a mere 2.51% by the end of March. PerpetualPremiums also recorded an unsustainable +0.83% over the month while DeemedRetractibles were the worst performing of the three groups, returning +0.61% – which is also above their YTW expectations, but not by as much!

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close March 28, 2013, was 10.9033 after a dividend distribution of 0.130357.

Returns to March 28, 2013
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +0.78% +0.84% +1.09% +1.08%
Three Months +1.87% +1.80% +2.37% +2.25%
One Year +10.19% +6.02% +6.71% +6.03%
Two Years (annualized) +6.07% +5.99% +5.62% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +11.42% +8.31% +7.50% +6.82%
Four Years (annualized) +19.16% +12.57% +11.01% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +16.77% +6.70% +5.53% +4.86%
Six Years (annualized) +13.49% +4.27%    
Seven Years (annualized) +12.31% +4.27%    
Eight Years (annualized) +11.73% +4.39%    
Nine Years (annualized) +11.08% +4.13%    
Ten Years (annualized) +13.69% +4.79%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +12.01% +4.74%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +12.34% +4.44%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.73%, +1.86% and +5.61%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +7.18%; five year is +5.62%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.65%, +1.57% and +3.47% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +4.23%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.21%, +2.66% & +6.25%, respectively. Three Year performance is +5.68%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.87%, +1.95% & +6.34%, respectively.
Figures for Altamira Preferred Equity Fund are +0.99% and +2.30% for one- and three- months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is +0.99% and +2.13% for one- and three-months. [calculation by JH]

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past year has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund has done well by trading between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons (but in which trading is now hampered by the fact that the low-coupon issues are trading near par and are callable at par in the near term), but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains.

SLF DeemedRetractibles may be compared with PWF and GWO:


Click for Big

It is quite apparent that that the market continues to treat regulated insurance issues (SLF, GWO) no differently from unregulated issues (PWF) – despite the fact that the PWF issues are much more subject to unfavourable calls in the near term and should, logically, be deprecated on those grounds alone without any fancy-pants arguments about imposition of the NVCC rule!

In fact, one can make an argument that the SLF issues are doing better than they should be now, as they were recently downgraded by DBRS, which no longer considers them credit-equivalent to GWO and PWF.

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. The relationship is still far too large to be explained by Implied Volatility – the numbers still indicate an overwhelming degree of directionality in the market’s price expectations.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on March 28; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I will no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as there are currently only four such issues of investment grade, from only two issuers. Additionally, the fund has no holdings of these issues.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas (set at 1.23% for the March 28 calculation) to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Portfolio Yield” of 4.68% as of March 22, 2013 and notes:

Portfolio yield is calculated as the most recent income received by the ETF in the form of dividends interest and other income annualized based on the payment frequently divided by the current market value of ETFs investments.

In other words – it’s the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF is 5.06%, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to accord it any prominence in portfolio reporting is misleading.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Thus, the decline in the MAPF Sustainable Income from $0.5500 per unit in June, 2012, to $0.4237 per unit in March should be looked at as a simple consequence of the fund’s holdings; virtually all of which have their yields calculated in a manner closer to bonds than to Perpetual Annuities.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.