Archive for July, 2013

TXPR & TXPL Quarterly Revision

Friday, July 12th, 2013

S&P Dow Jones Indices Canadian Index Operations has announced:

the following index changes as a result of the quarterly S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index and S&P/TSX Venture Select Index Reviews. These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, July 22, 2013

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index

ADDITIONS

Symbol Issue Name

CUSIP
BAM.PF.D BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMNT INC CL A PR SER 37 112585 56 7
BAM.PR.J BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMNT INC CL A PR SER 12 112585 88 0
BAM.PR.M BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMNT INC CL A PR SER 17 112585 83 1
BAM.PR.R BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMNT INC CL A PR SER 24 112585 74 0
BCE.PR.G BCE INC. 1ST PR SERIES ‘AG’ 05534B 73 7
BNS.PR.A BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA (THE) PR SERIES ’19’ 064149 73 5
BRF.PR.A BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PWR PREF EQTY INC A PR 1 11283Q 20 6
BRF.PR.F BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PWR PREF EQTY INC A PR 6 11283Q 70 1
CM.PR.M CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK SERIES ’37’ PR 136069 46 5
CU.PR.G CANADIAN UTILITIES LIMITED 2ND PR SER ‘DD’ 136717 64 2
EMA.PR.E EMERA INC. PR SERIES ‘E’ 290876 70 5
ENB.PR.Y ENBRIDGE INC. PR SER ‘3’ 29250N 68 3
GWO.PR.G GREAT-WEST LIFECO INC. 5.20% 1ST PR SERIES G 39138C 88 2
GWO.PR.M GREAT-WEST LIFECO INC. 5.80% 1ST PR SERIES M 39138C 81 7
MFC.PR.K MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORP. CL 1 PR SER ’13’ 56501R 74 2
NPI.PR.A NORTHLAND POWER INC. SERIES 1 PR 666511 30 8
PWF.PR.O POWER FINANCIAL CORP. 5.80% SERIES ‘O’ 1ST PR 73927C 78 7
RY.PR.D ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 1ST PR NON-CUM SER ‘AD’ 780102 84 4
TD.PR.P TORONTO-DOMINION BANK (THE) CL ‘A’ 1ST PR P 891145 20 3
TD.PR.Q TORONTO-DOMINION BANK (THE) CL ‘A’ 1ST PR Q 891145 30 2

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Laddered Index

ADDITIONS

Symbol Issue Name

CUSIP
MFC.PR.K MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORP. CL 1 PR SER ’13’ 56501R 74 2

July 11, 2013

Friday, July 12th, 2013

Sorry this is so late, folks! Summertime and the living is easy!

More Fed-watching!

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke called for maintaining accommodation even as the minutes of policy makers’ June meeting showed them debating whether to stop bond buying by the Fed in 2013.

“Highly accommodative monetary policy for the foreseeable future is what’s needed in the U.S. economy,” Bernanke said yesterday in response to a question after a speech in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The Fed chairman spoke just three hours after the central bank released minutes of the June 18-19 gathering showing that about half of the 19 participants in the Federal Open Market Committee wanted to halt $85 billion in monthly bond purchases by year end. At the same time, the minutes showed many Fed officials wanted to see more signs employment is improving before backing a trim to bond purchases known as quantitative easing.

The debate underscores Bernanke’s challenge in affirming that, even after starting to reduce monthly bond buying, policy makers plan to maintain unprecedented stimulus with a record-high balance sheet and near-zero target interest rate.

The persecution of Fabulous Fab for doing his job is entering a new stage:

After the allegations, he kept his head down. He testified succinctly before Congress, left his job to enroll in a doctoral program, and popped up in Africa doing charity work.

This is the new Fabrice Tourre who will walk into Manhattan federal court July 15.

In 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued New York-based Goldman Sachs and Tourre for fraud for concealing the role of the hedge fund Paulson & Co., founded by billionaire John Paulson, in selecting the assets inside the Abacus portfolio — assets Paulson wanted to fail.

Goldman Sachs paid a then-record $550 million fine to settle the allegations. Tourre chose to fight them. U.S. District Judge Katherine Forrest, who will oversee the trial, summed up the SEC’s case like this: “Tourre handed Little Red Riding Hood an invitation to grandmother’s house while concealing the fact that it was written by the Big Bad Wolf.”

Tourre’s court date threatens to undo some of the progress Goldman Sachs has made in rehabilitating its image. In the lead-up to his trial, the bank and its former employee have exhibited an awkward arm’s-length relationship. Goldman Sachs is paying for Tourre’s defense and for the use of a sophisticated public-relations team from Sard Verbinnen & Co., but the bank is limited by the terms of its SEC settlement in what it can say publicly about the Abacus deal.

“This is so clearly a case of scapegoating,” said Dennis Kelleher, CEO of Better Markets, an advocacy group that has lobbied for the overhaul of financial regulations. “It’s one of the most egregious misuses of SEC power I’ve ever seen.”

If he loses – and he could go to jail over this – one lesson must be learned by all fund sponsors: it must be stated in the offering materials, in big bright red letters, that all the assets of the fund were bought from somebody else. Somebody who will not, presumably, be too upset if they subsequently decline in value.

As an aside, the HR departments are taking over:

Valerie Thompson went from a childhood hawking fish, fruit and vegetables in London’s run-down East End to a Eurobond star at Salomon Brothers Inc. when it was the world’s biggest trading firm. Like the successful trader she was, she got out at the top.

Eurobonds, international securities with untaxed interest payments, were only a decade old in 1973 when Thompson, who left school at age 15, landed a clerical job typing orders into a telex machine. She prospered as the market surged and was running new-issue strategy and managing the risk generated on London’s biggest bond trading floor when she left, just before the 1987 stock crash and as market returns began to diminish.

For all her acumen, Thompson, 57, says someone with her background couldn’t get a job in today’s financial industry.
“They closed the door,” she said in a lunchtime interview at Coya, the Peruvian restaurant on London’s Piccadilly, last month. “And they said, ‘You know what? To work in the City now you need three degrees.’ I find it downright wrong.”

When I got into this industry in 1986, I was working for Merrill Lynch as a temp; I applied for one of the posted jobs. HR told me they weren’t hiring … a chemistry degree? Why would we hire somebody with a chemistry degree? I don’t see any beakers around here, do you, Edna? My manager kicked ass and I got a new call offering me my pick of all the jobs in operations.

Tim Kiladze of the Globe has a very good article on the Canadian implications of the Basel 3 leverage ratio, titled How Canada’s banks benefit from OSFI’s leverage ratio:

While that might be a problem outside Canada, the Big Six argue that they already comply with OSFI’s asset-to-capital multiple, which limits a bank’s assets to 20 times their capital. Reverse that equation, and you get a 5-per-cent leverage ratio.

In other words, they should already exceed the coming 3-per-cent minimum, and even would be close to the 5- and 6-per-cent levels the U.S. just proposed for its own banks, depending on their size.

But it isn’t that easy. The way OSFI calculates leverage and capital differs from the new Basel standards. If you update OSFI’s model to abide by the new rules, our banks aren’t as well off.

The key difference, according to analyst Brad Smith at Stonecap Securities, is rooted in how you classify capital. Under OSFI’s model, Tier 1 and Tier 11 capital are included, whereas the Basel model has much stricter definitions. (Explaining these nuances gets incredibly wonky, but the main message is that OSFI is more lenient.)

By including Tier 2 capital, OSFI offers the Big Six a 26-per-cent leverage benefit – meaning their total capital jumps to $178-billion from just $141-billion of straightforward Tier 1 capital.

Mr. Smith also noted that OSFI’s calculation strips $167-billion of estimated securitized mortgages out of the Big Six’s asset exposure, lowering their asset total.

Removes these benefits and Mr. Smith calculates that Canadian banks would still meet the new Basel leverage requirements, but “fall well below” the proposed U.S. measure.

In order to meet a 5-per-cent minimum, “domestic banks would either have to reduce on-balance sheet exposure by over $700-billion (20 per cent) or add additional Tier 1 capital of approximately $35-billion even before considering the impact of off-balance sheet exposure levels,” Mr. Smith noted.

It may actually be worse than that. As I frequently complain, OSFI can boost the allowable leverage to 23x, and neither OSFI nor the bank benefitting has to give any explanation at all for the increased ceiling. I suspect it’s all just arranged over a friendly lunch.

A very nice day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 59bp, FixedResets gaining 9bp and DeemedRetractibles up 19bp. The Performance Highlights table is comprised entirely of winners, dominated by PerpetualDiscounts and PerpetualPremiums. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1044 % 2,564.6
FixedFloater 4.27 % 3.55 % 41,853 18.31 1 0.2117 % 3,889.1
Floater 2.74 % 2.92 % 86,387 19.94 4 0.1044 % 2,769.1
OpRet 4.61 % 2.04 % 74,273 0.71 3 0.0335 % 2,617.1
SplitShare 4.67 % 4.33 % 69,829 3.95 6 0.0042 % 2,969.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0335 % 2,393.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.62 % 4.30 % 101,098 0.79 12 0.2721 % 2,283.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.36 % 5.35 % 140,889 14.77 26 0.5984 % 2,403.2
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.48 % 236,060 3.57 83 0.0929 % 2,483.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.05 % 4.52 % 187,306 7.03 43 0.1937 % 2,389.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 23.54
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 22.64
Evaluated at bid price : 22.96
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 115,298 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 107,266 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 84,844 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 79,654 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 73,840 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 22.89
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
BNS.PR.A FixedReset 64,326 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-10
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : -20.20 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 24.90 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4098

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 25.34 – 25.69
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2021

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.62 – 25.97
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2559

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 24.25 – 24.47
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1301

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 22.97
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %

PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.75 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1594

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 24.50
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %

MFC.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.81 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2154

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

July 10, 2013

Thursday, July 11th, 2013

It’s a Fed-Watching Frenzy!

“The minutes largely reiterated what the chairman said in June,” Ryan Larson, the Chicago-based head of U.S. equity trading at RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.) Inc., said by e-mail. His firm oversees $290 billion. “Tapering, whether it will be this year or next, is inevitable. The market was initially encouraged that the Fed is waiting on additional data, but possibly taken aback by the fact that about half the participants indicated that asset purchases should end later this year.”

Minutes from the central bank’s June 18-19 meeting, released today in Washington, showed that while several members judged that a reduction in asset purchases “would likely soon be warranted,” many officials want to see more signs employment is picking up before they’ll begin slowing the pace of $85 billion in monthly bond purchases.

The Globe was a bit more colourful:

The minutes show there was an intense debate about how to communicate the Fed’s intentions. A minority of policy makers are worried that the Fed’s policies are too aggressive, risking inflation and asset-price bubbles, and should be reversed as soon as possible. And among the supporters of more QE, there was a feeling that the central bank should nonetheless send the message that economic conditions were improving, heralding an eventual end to the bond-buying program.

It was decided that Mr. Bernanke should attempt to lay out a path for QE at the press conference that followed the meeting. That’s when he told reporters that if the economic outlook held, the Fed likely would slow its bond purchases later in 2014 and end the program in the middle of 2015, when the unemployment rate likely will have fallen to about 7 per cent.

Stock markets plunged immediately, as traders the world over largely disregarded Mr. Bernanke’s insistence that the Fed also could boost asset purchases if the economy failed to unfold as expected.

BIS has published a paper titled Analysis of risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book:

The bottom-up portfolio benchmarking exercise (the hypothetical portfolio exercise, or HPE), under which banks were asked to evaluate the risk of a common set of (largely low-default) wholesale obligors and exposures, revealed notable dispersion in the estimates of PD and LGD assigned to the same exposures. The three wholesale asset classes covered by the HPE analysis (sovereign, bank, and corporate) account on average for about 40% of participating banks’ total credit RWAs. A rough translation of the implied risk weight variations into potential impact on banks’ capital ratios suggests that the impact could be material; at the extremes, capital ratios could vary by as much as 1.5 to 2 percentage points (or 15 to 20% in relative terms) in either direction around the 10% benchmark used for this study. However, most of the banks (22 of the 32 participating banks) lie within one percentage point of that benchmark (see Chart 1 below).


Click for Big
Change from 10% capital ratio if individual bank risk weights from the HPE are adjusted to the median from the sample. Each bar represents one bank. The chart is based on the assumption that variations observed at each bank for the hypothetical portfolios are representative for the entire sovereign, bank, and corporate portfolios of the bank and are adjusted accordingly. No other adjustments are made to RWA or capital.

A reader brings to my attention a debunking of green disinformation:

  • The “Gas Town Steam Clock” is not powered by steam
  • The iconic wind turbine at Grouse Mountain is an energy sink
  • BC Hydro’s emissions reporting is highly misleading
  • Vancouver is nowhere as near as green as it likes to thing it is

I left this one out yesterday: DBRS confirmed RY at Pfd-1(low), although its NVCC-compliant RY.PR.W is still under Review-Negative:

RBC’s diversified business model and geographic profile have provided the Bank with consistently strong profitability and return on equity throughout various business and credit cycles. RBC is the largest retail bank in Canada and currently holds first or second-ranking positions in each business it participates in domestically, with an objective to become the leader in every business. The Bank continues to build on its leading market positions within Canada and is expanding its presence globally, particularly in wealth management and capital markets, where the Bank has been increasing its market share among the top global banks.

Despite strong performance in recent years, continued long-term domestic growth within Canada is expected to be a challenge given the Bank’s significant market share positions, the mature Canadian banking industry and the competitive landscape. Domestically, RBC and its large competitors have little room to grow beyond market growth rates, which have been strong in recent years. Additionally, foreign banks that previously exited the domestic market during the crisis have re-emerged as competitors.

DBRS does not expect potential house price depreciation in Canada to result in material losses from the Bank’s real estate secured lending portfolio, notwithstanding the high indebtedness of the average Canadian consumer and significant increases in housing prices in certain sectors of the Canadian real estate market.

The rating on the Non-Cumulative First Preferred Shares, Series W remains Under Review with Negative Implications. DBRS hopes to resolve this rating in the near future after the publication of the results from DBRS’s recent Request for Comments on Rating Subordinated, Hybrids and Preferred Bank Capital Securities

It was another day of retreat for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 24bp, FixedResets off 8bp and DeemedRetractibles down 13bp. The Performance Highlights table was at average length – it hasn’t been average for a while!

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.41%, equivalent to 7.03% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.65%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the Seniority Spread) is now about 240bp, unchanged from the figure reported July 3.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5062 % 2,561.9
FixedFloater 4.23 % 3.57 % 41,662 18.12 1 -0.1779 % 3,880.9
Floater 2.74 % 2.94 % 84,173 19.90 4 -0.5062 % 2,766.2
OpRet 4.81 % 2.08 % 77,228 0.71 4 0.0097 % 2,616.2
SplitShare 4.67 % 4.28 % 70,619 3.95 6 -0.1368 % 2,969.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0097 % 2,392.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % 4.60 % 102,398 0.79 12 -0.0928 % 2,277.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.39 % 5.41 % 142,637 14.77 26 -0.2398 % 2,389.0
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.50 % 237,865 3.38 83 -0.0814 % 2,481.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 4.53 % 178,192 7.03 43 -0.1258 % 2,385.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 23.05
Evaluated at bid price : 23.46
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 24.05
Evaluated at bid price : 24.44
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 17.94
Evaluated at bid price : 17.94
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.46
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 305,615 TD crossed blocks of 250,000 and 48,600, both at 23.80. Nice tickets!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.72
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 160,395 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 100,000, both at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 143,422 Desjardins crossed blocks of 50,000 and 83,300, both at 21.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 21.24
Evaluated at bid price : 21.24
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 139,715 RBC crossed 40,000 and 59,600, both at 26.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 2.49 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 137,785 Reset rate announced.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 56,221 National crossed 24,700 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
There were 64 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.30 – 25.59
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1902

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : -6.57 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount Quote: 49.70 – 50.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 49.24
Evaluated at bid price : 49.70
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.45 – 25.78
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2453

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 25.70 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2182

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %

SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.13 – 23.39
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1798

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.13
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 24.16 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.3101

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %

BPO Downgraded to P-3 by S&P

Tuesday, July 9th, 2013

Standard and Poor’s has announced:

  • While the company recently repaid debt to bolster its balance sheet before a large lease expiry, we expect fixed-charge coverage measures to remain low and debt-to-EBITDA to remain high for the next two years.
  • As a result, we lowered our corporate credit rating on the company to ‘BBB-‘ from ‘BBB’, the senior unsecured issue-level rating to ‘BB+’ from ‘BBB-‘, and the preferred stock rating to ‘BB/P-3’ from ‘BB+/P-3(High)’.
  • The stable outlook reflects our view that the pending vacancy in Brookfield Place New York will eventually be re-tenanted, which will support a recovery in portfolio operating cash flow and fixed charge coverage by 2016.


“The downgrade reflects our view that the company’s financial profile will remain weak over the next two years due to the pending large vacancy at Brookfield Place New York and uncertainty regarding the company’s commitment to strengthening fixed-charge coverage and debt-to-EBITDA metrics longer term, given the potential for meaningful development pursuits and/or other largely debt-financed growth,” said credit analyst Elizabeth Campbell.

We don’t see any potential for upgrade despite Brookfield Office’s “strong” business risk profile, unless the company meaningfully deleverages its balance sheet to strengthen its currently “significant” financial risk profile, such that fixed-charge coverage rises to the high 1x area and debt-to-EBITDA declines below 9.0x.

We don’t expect further downside pressure to the rating over the next two years. However, our credit perspective could change if BAM’s or BPY’s strategic evolution materially alters the operating platform or legal structure of Brookfield Office or fixed-charge coverage falls below 1.3x.

BPO has the following preferred share issues outstanding: BPO.PR.H, BPO.PR.J, BPO.PR.K, BPO.PR.L, BPO.PR.N, BPO.PR.P, BPO.PR.R, BPO.PR.T, BPO.PR.W, BPO.PR.X and BPO.PR.Y.

Of greater concern is the potential for knock-on effects from BPO’s parent, Brookfield Asset Management (BAM), which has the following preferreds outstanding: BAM.PF.A, BAM.PF.B, BAM.PF.C, BAM.PF.D, BAM.PR.B, BAM.PR.C, BAM.PR.E, BAM.PR.G, BAM.PR.J, BAM.PR.K, BAM.PR.M, BAM.PR.N, BAM.PR.P, BAM.PR.R, BAM.PR.T, BAM.PR.X and BAM.PR.Z.

July 9, 2013

Tuesday, July 9th, 2013

The US is taking effective action on bank capital ratios:

Capital standards at the biggest U.S. lenders would rise to 5 percent of assets for parent companies and 6 percent for their banking units under a plan proposed today by federal regulators.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency proposed a leverage ratio that’s 2 percentage points more than the 3 percent international minimum for holding companies, the agency said in a statement. Capital at U.S.-backed deposit and lending units must be twice the global standard at 6 percent, according to the OCC. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. is set to vote on the proposal later today.

The changes would affect the eight U.S. institutions already tagged as globally important, according to the Federal Reserve. The Financial Stability Board, a group of international central bankers that coordinates financial rules, identified them as JPMorgan (JPM) Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc. (C), Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Bank of America Corp. (BAC), Morgan Stanley (MS), State Street Corp. (STT) and Bank of New York Mellon Corp.

Based on the largest banks’ September data, the holding companies fell short of the new leverage requirement by $63 billion, FDIC staff said in a meeting with reporters today. The insured lending units would need $89 billion more in capital.

Banks would have until Jan. 1, 2018 to comply, according to today’s statement. The proposal faces a 60-day public comment period and needs final approvals from the three agencies.

The NYSE is taking over LIBOR:

NYSE Euronext (NYX) will replace the British Bankers’ Association as Libor’s administrator in early 2014, the London-based lobby group that started the benchmark more than two decades ago said in a statement today. The U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority began regulating Libor, the benchmark for more than $300 trillion of securities, in April as part of the overhaul.

The New York-based purchaser already operates Liffe, Europe’s second-largest derivatives exchange, which offers derivatives based on Libor. A government review recommended last year that the BBA should be stripped of responsibility for Libor after regulators found banks had tried to manipulate it to profit from bets on derivatives.

“The fact they are handing this to a derivatives exchange is a surprise,” Peter Lenardos, a financials and exchange analyst at RBC Capital Markets in London, said by telephone today. “It just doesn’t seem independent enough. They are taking the setting of Libor from the banks and giving it to an exchange not known as a benchmark provider.”

Americans, unlike everybody else on earth, are well known for meticulous attention to routine government bullshit:

Anthony J. Domico, a former contractor hired to check the backgrounds of U.S. government workers, filed a 2006 report with the results of an investigation.

There was just one snag: A person he claimed to have interviewed had been dead for more than a decade. Domico, who had worked for contractors CACI International Inc. (CACI) and Systems Application & Technologies Inc., found himself the subject of a federal probe.

Domico is among 20 investigators who have pleaded guilty or have been convicted of falsifying such reports since 2006. Half of them worked for companies such as Altegrity Inc., which performed a background check on national-security contractor Edward Snowden. The cases may represent a fraction of the fabrications in a government vetting process with little oversight, according to lawmakers and U.S. watchdog officials.

Hats off to the NYSE for its eagerness to feast at the government trough!

The IMF is full of cheer:

World economic growth will struggle to accelerate this year as a U.S. expansion weakens, China’s economy levels off and Europe’s recession deepens, the International Monetary Fund said.

Global growth will be 3.1 percent this year, unchanged from the 2012 rate, and less than the 3.3 percent forecast in April, the Washington-based fund said today, trimming its prediction for this year a fifth consecutive time. The IMF reduced its 2013 projection for the U.S. to 1.7 percent growth from 1.9 percent in April, while next year’s outlook was trimmed to 2.7 percent from 3 percent initially reported in April.

So there continues to be a tug of war in the Fixed Income markets between the presumed tapering of Quantitative Easing and a really lousy global economy.

BNS was confirmed at Pfd-1(low) by DBRS:

Scotiabank continues to expand its footprint, both geographically and within business lines, by leveraging organic growth opportunities while still favouring an acquisition-oriented strategy. The Bank has made over 30 acquisitions since 2007, including sizable acquisitions, most notably the acquisition of ING Bank of Canada (ING) in August 2012 and the addition of a 51% stake in Colombian-based Banco Colpatria in January 2012. As a result of the aforementioned acquisitions, as well as organic growth, Scotiabank has grown in size at a more rapid pace than its Canadian banking peers. While offering greater growth opportunities and potentially higher returns, Scotiabank’s investments in the Caribbean, Central America, South America and Asia have inherently higher risk profiles relative to developed markets, resulting in additional political, economic, currency and operational risks.

The asset quality profile of the Bank remains good with particular strength in the Canadian market, although provisions in Latin America increased, in line with portfolio growth and a shift in portfolio mix. In May 2013, Scotiabank announced an upcoming leadership change: Rick Waugh will retire as CEO on November 1, 2013, and Brian Porter, the Bank’s current president, will assume the CEO role. Mr. Porter has extensive experience with the Bank and has held a number of high-level roles across several of its operating units; a smooth transition is expected, with no shift in strategic direction anticipated as a result of the change.

DBRS does not expect potential house price depreciation in Canada to result in material losses from the Bank’s real estate secured lending portfolio, notwithstanding the high indebtedness of the average Canadian consumer and significant increases in housing prices in certain sectors of the Canadian real estate market.

DBRS confirmed CM at Pfd-1(low), with the NVCC-compliant issues still under review-negative:

CIBC has one of the larger multi-pronged distribution networks in Canada to service its retail customers. The Bank also has one of the largest wealth management platforms in Canada relative to its large Canadian peers, positioning CIBC to benefit from longer-term demographic shifts as the domestic population ages. DBRS believes that CIBC’s Canadian retail markets strategy – to increase product penetration using a relationship-based approach – will be challenging given the Bank’s below-average customer satisfaction scores. CIBC continues to have the lowest customer satisfaction index ranking among the five largest Canadian banks, according to J.D. Power and Associates’ 2012 Canadian Retail Banking Customer Satisfaction Study.

It has been almost a year since CIBC ceased mortgage originations from its FirstLine broker channel on July 31, 2012. CIBC has focused its efforts on transitioning FirstLine customers to branch-based mortgages where the Bank benefits from higher margins and deeper client relationships, offering cross-sell opportunities. Thus far, the Bank has successfully executed on its retention of FirstLine clients, exceeding the initial 25% customer retention target.

CIBC remains engaged in discussions with Aimia Inc. (Aimia), the parent company of Aeroplan, regarding negotiations over the contract renewal of Aeroplan co-branded credit cards. It remains unclear whether CIBC will choose to renew its contract with Aimia, as The Toronto-Dominion Bank has put forth a competitive bid for the contract, which CIBC has the right of first refusal to match. CIBC has been extensively evaluating the prospect of developing its own loyalty travel card, which it is prepared to invest heavily in. The Bank’s ability to create an in-house credit card offering as compelling as the Aeroplan co-branded card remains unclear, although its intention is to leverage customer information to provide an industry-leading travel rewards card.

DBRS does not expect potential house price depreciation in Canada to result in material losses from the Bank’s real estate secured lending portfolio, notwithstanding the high indebtedness of the average Canadian consumer and significant increases in housing prices in certain sectors of the Canadian real estate market.

The ratings on the Non-Cumulative Class A Preferred Shares, Series 26, 27 and 29 remain Under Review with Negative Implications. DBRS hopes to resolve this rating in the near future after the publication of the results from DBRS’s recent Request for Comments on Rating Subordinated, Hybrids and Preferred Bank Capital Securities.

DBRS confirmed BMO at Pfd-1(low):

BMO’s integration of its 2011 acquisition of Marshall and Ilsley Corporation (M&I) has thus far proved successful, with the Bank achieving a large portion of the forecasted synergies. The strong credit performance of the acquired portfolio has led to substantial recoveries over the past two years. DBRS notes that while the acquisition of M&I materially increased the scale of BMO’s U.S. operation, it further exposes the Bank to the U.S. economy, real estate market, and interest rate and regulatory environments.

In the current environment of high consumer leverage, BMO has chosen to key in on products that, in management’s opinion, offer good risk-return tradeoffs, and reduced exposure in areas with less attractive risk-adjusted returns. As a result, BMO actively promoted a specific residential mortgage product – a five-year term 25-year amortization fixed-rate mortgage – that it believes has attractive fundamentals and low credit risk. At the same time, the Bank pulled back slightly on unsecured lending, which would likely be the first product to suffer delinquencies if consumer leverage stresses were to materialize, as well as on commercial real estate lending, where BMO has continued to limit the amount of its exposure in this highly competitive market.

DBRS does not expect potential house price depreciation in Canada to result in material losses from the Bank’s real estate secured lending portfolio, notwithstanding the high indebtedness of the average Canadian consumer and significant increases in housing prices in certain sectors of the Canadian real estate market.

DBRS confirmed NA at Pfd-2:

National continues to maintain its strong regional franchise in Québec, with particular emphasis on its retail, small business and commercial banking units as well as its wealth management business and national financial markets franchise. While strong market shares in the home province remain a key strength of the Bank, the ratings reflect the Bank’s regional concentration in Québec.

National delivered strong earnings growth in its Wealth Management and Financial Markets units in the first six months of 2013, as the Bank has begun to reap the benefits of a greater national presence outside of its core Québec market. National is leveraging the interprovincial acquisitions it has made over the past few years to establish a broader domestic presence in Wealth Management and Financial Markets.

National’s efficiency ratio (operating expenses over operating revenue) continues to sit above the average of its peer group, partly as a result of the high cost structure in the Bank’s Wealth Management segment. Given the number of acquisitions undertaken in Wealth Management over the past five years, most recently the acquisitions in 2012 of HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc. and Wellington West Holdings Inc., the Bank will now have to focus on aligning the different pieces of the business unit. The broader domestic presence of the Wealth Management segment and the alignment of the different pieces of the business should create the potential for the Bank to lower the expense base of the operating segment.

DBRS does not expect potential house price depreciation in Canada to result in material losses from the Bank’s real estate secured lending portfolio, notwithstanding the high indebtedness of the average Canadian consumer and significant increases in housing prices in certain sectors of the Canadian real estate market.

DBRS confirmed TD at Pfd-1(low):

Given revenue headwinds posed by the low interest rate environment and global uncertainty, TD, like its Canadian banking peers, has looked to expense management as a core focus of earnings growth. Contributions from Canadian personal banking will likely moderate as revenue growth slows, with households limiting new borrowing, and as the federal government’s tightening of mortgage rules continues to weigh on residential mortgage activity. TD continues to see earnings growth from its U.S. Personal and Commercial Banking (P&C) unit in 2013, supported by strong organic loan growth in personal and business lending relative to the prior year period (excluding the acquisition of Target Corporation’s U.S. credit card portfolio).

TD has created a retail banking north-south corridor in the eastern United States as a result of acquisitions and organic growth across its expanding network, providing the Bank with scale advantages. However, the U.S. P&C unit will be challenged by regulatory headwinds, margin pressures and the still-recovering economy within the United States.

In April of 2013, TD announced that its long-standing CEO, Ed Clark, will be stepping down in late 2014 and that Bharat Masrani, who leads the Bank’s U.S. P&C group, will assume the role of CEO. The long transition period for Masrani provides ample time for a smooth transition; no change in strategy or culture is anticipated. Additionally, TD closed two transactions in the second quarter of 2013, Target Corporation’s U.S. credit card portfolio and Epoch Holding Corporation, and entered into an agreement to acquire HSBC Retail Services Limited’s private label credit card portfolio. All transactions are consistent with the Bank’s strategy to grow assets within the United States.

DBRS does not expect potential house price depreciation in Canada to result in material losses from the Bank’s real estate secured lending portfolio, notwithstanding the high indebtedness of the average Canadian consumer and significant increases in housing prices in certain sectors of the Canadian real estate market.

It was a poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 40bp, FixedResets off 10bp and DeemedRetractibles down 18bp. The larger-than-average Performance Highlights table is, unsurprisingly enough, dominated by PerpetualDiscount losers. Volume was quite high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0519 % 2,575.0
FixedFloater 4.23 % 3.56 % 43,424 18.13 1 0.2229 % 3,887.8
Floater 2.73 % 2.91 % 77,941 19.99 4 -0.0519 % 2,780.2
OpRet 4.81 % 2.02 % 75,264 0.71 4 -0.1355 % 2,615.9
SplitShare 4.66 % 4.21 % 65,402 3.96 6 0.0614 % 2,973.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1355 % 2,392.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % 4.58 % 102,312 0.79 12 -0.0795 % 2,279.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.38 % 5.37 % 139,102 14.81 26 -0.3956 % 2,394.7
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.40 % 239,511 3.39 83 -0.0966 % 2,483.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.05 % 4.51 % 175,564 6.92 43 -0.1790 % 2,388.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -3.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 22.84
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.11
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.34
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.31
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 132,112 Nesbitt crossed 125,000 at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 24.16
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 96,846 Nesbitt crossed 85,000 at 25.93.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 61,395 RBC crossed 48,700 at 25.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 61,235 RBC crossed 49,000 at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.69
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount 60,601 TD crossed 25,000 at 23.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.01
Evaluated at bid price : 23.42
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 52,246 Reset rate recently reported.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
There were 52 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 24.11 – 24.62
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3687

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.11
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.45 – 25.95
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3913

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 22.48 – 22.86
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2752

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 22.79
Evaluated at bid price : 22.48
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.55 – 23.91
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2647

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.92 – 24.34
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.3394

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 23.92
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %

BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.18 – 26.44
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1884

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.18
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %

New Issue: FTS FixedReset, 4.00%+205

Tuesday, July 9th, 2013

Fortis Inc. has announced:

that it has entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc., CIBC and Scotiabank, (collectively, the “Underwriters”), pursuant to which the Underwriters have agreed to purchase, on a bought deal basis, from Fortis and sell to the public 10,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Fixed Rate Reset First Preference Shares, Series K of the Corporation (the “Series K First Preference Shares”). The purchase price of $25.00 per Series K First Preference Share will result in gross proceeds for Fortis of $250 million.

Fortis has granted the Underwriters the option to purchase up to an additional 2,000,000 Series K First Preference Shares at the same offering price (the “Underwriters’ Option”). Should the Underwriters’ Option be fully exercised, the total gross proceeds of the offering will be $300 million.

The net proceeds of the offering will be used to repay a portion of borrowings under the Corporation’s $1 billion committed corporate credit facility, including amounts borrowed in connection with the redemption of the Corporation’s First Preference Shares, Series C, the construction of the Waneta Expansion and equity injections into certain of the Corporation’s subsidiaries, and for general corporate purposes.

The holders of Series K First Preference Shares will be entitled to receive fixed, cumulative, preferential cash dividends, if, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Corporation (the “Board of Directors”), for the initial period commencing on the date of issue and ending on but excluding March 1, 2019 (the “Initial Period”) at a rate of 4.0%, in an amount equal to $1.00 per share per annum paid in equal quarterly instalments. The first of such dividends, if declared, will be payable on September 1, 2013 for the period commencing on the date of issue in the amount of $0.1233 per Series K First Preference Share, based on the anticipated closing of the offering on July 18, 2013. The dividend rate will be reset on March 1, 2019 and thereafter every five years at a level of 2.05% above the five-year Government of Canada Bond yield.

At the end of the Initial Period and every five years thereafter, the holders of Series K First Preference Shares will, subject to certain conditions and the right of the Corporation to redeem those shares, have the option to convert any or all of their Series K First Preference Shares into an equal number of Cumulative Redeemable Floating Rate First Preference Shares, Series L of the Corporation (the “Series L First Preference Shares”). The holders of Series L First Preference Shares will be entitled to receive floating rate cumulative preferential cash dividends, if, as and when declared by the Board of Directors, at the rate of the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill average yield plus 2.05%, reset on a quarterly basis.

The offering is subject to the receipt of all necessary regulatory and stock exchange approvals.

The Break Even Rate Shock for this issue is 147bp – somewhat on the high side – given a Current Yield of 5.03% for the FTS PerpetualDiscounts (FTS.PR.J and FTS.PR.F), a yield spread of -1.03% and a term of 5.625 years.

July 8, 2013

Tuesday, July 9th, 2013

You think you’ve had a bad time in the markets for the past year? Here’s a guy who’s had a bad time in the markets for the past year:

Brazilian billionaire Eike Batista lost more than a quarter of his net worth after the state development bank said he offered personal guarantees for 2.3 billion reais ($1 billion) in loans and a rout of his publicly traded companies deepened.

Batista is now worth $2.9 billion, down from $4.1 billion at the close of trading July 2, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index. The loans are part of the 10.4 billion reais that Batista’s companies contracted with the state-run lender, known as BNDES, since 2007. BNDES provided the tally of the loans and their respective guarantees in response to a request by Bloomberg under Brazil’s freedom of information law. The bank didn’t say how much is outstanding.

Batista’s fortune has plunged from a peak of $34.5 billion last year after he repeatedly failed to meet targets he had set for his startup companies. The latest disappointment came when his flagship OGX Petroleo & Gas Participacoes SA (OGXP3) said July 1 that it may shut down its only producing oil field, prompting a selloff that’s since erased $1 billion in market value from his six publicly traded units.

The information provided by BNDES follows a July 1 report from Bank of America Corp. that estimated that the Rio de Janeiro-based lender was the most exposed of Brazil’s banks to Batista’s companies, having lent 4.9 billion reais, or 5.8 percent of the bank’s regulatory capital.

The best thing about bond ETFs is that they provide liquidity. The worst thing about them is that they provide liquidity:

Investors who sought exchange-traded funds as a faster way to trade corporate bonds are finding that they can be as expensive to trade as the underlying debt.

As trading in the three-biggest credit ETFs surged to unprecedented levels last month amid the market’s biggest losses since 2008, the funds’ shares dropped as much as 1.1 percentage points more than the net value of the less-traded securities they hold. The two largest high-yield bond ETFs have lost about 6 percent since reaching a five-year high May 8. That’s about 2 percentage points more than the loss for the Bank of America Merrill Lynch U.S. High Yield Index.

The gap reflects the extra charge investors paid for a speedier exit in a declining market by using ETFs that trade like stocks rather than buying and selling the less-liquid debt. Investors yanked about $1.83 billion of shares from the two-biggest junk ETFs last month, forcing sales of their holdings at a time when demand was evaporating.

Shares of BlackRock Inc.’s $13.7 billion iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF, the biggest of its kind, plummeted 4.3 percent in the six days ended June 24, while the net value of its assets dropped 3 percent, data compiled by Bloomberg show. The fund’s share price fell to the lowest level in 12 months on June 24, to $89.04. The lowest value last month for the underlying assets was $89.66, the data show.

“The price reflects where you can exchange risk,” said Matt Tucker, head of iShares fixed-income strategy at BlackRock, the biggest ETF provider. “It’s the correct price. The reality is the majority of the high-yield market doesn’t trade every day.”

Nature abhors a vacuum:

Blackstone Group LP (BX), the private-equity firm that has spent $5 billion on more than 30,000 distressed houses, is preparing to expand its bet on the housing recovery by lending to other landlords.

The firm, which already owns more rental homes than any other investor, has set up B2R Finance LP to offer loans starting at $10 million, according to four people who reviewed the terms. B2R is reaching out to landlords with portfolios of properties seeking to grow in the burgeoning industry for single-family homes to rent, said the people, who asked not to be identified because the discussions are private.

The world’s largest private-equity firm said last month that it was entering the later stages of its buying spree after leading a group of institutional investors who’ve spent at least $17 billion on more than 100,000 homes over two years, helping fuel the fastest price gains since 2006. By increasing its stake in the rebound through lending, New York-based Blackstone could benefit from smaller landlords already investing in what Goldman Sachs Group Inc. estimates to be a $2.8 trillion market.

Live by market-timing, die by market timing:

John Paulson, the billionaire hedge-fund manager seeking to rebound from losses tied to bullion, posted a 23 percent decline in his PFR Gold Fund last month, according to a letter to investors.

The drop brings losses in the strategy, formerly known as the Paulson Gold Fund, to 65 percent since the start of the year, the firm said in the July 3 letter, a copy of which was obtained by Bloomberg News.

This report was delayed due to the incompetence of Toronto Hydro.

It was a day of modest recovery for the Canadian preferred share market; more modest than many recent days, but still a recovery! PerpetualDiscounts and DeemedRetractibles were both up 8bp, while FixedResets won 12bp. Volatility was more than one could generally expect on such a day; volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3645 % 2,576.3
FixedFloater 4.24 % 3.57 % 43,975 18.12 1 -0.3554 % 3,879.2
Floater 2.72 % 2.90 % 78,760 20.00 4 0.3645 % 2,781.7
OpRet 4.84 % 3.37 % 61,750 0.15 5 0.0156 % 2,619.5
SplitShare 4.66 % 4.28 % 66,464 3.96 6 0.1618 % 2,971.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0156 % 2,395.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.62 % 3.99 % 102,674 0.08 12 0.1306 % 2,281.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.36 % 5.33 % 138,830 14.76 26 0.0849 % 2,404.2
FixedReset 4.95 % 3.41 % 239,169 3.59 83 0.1166 % 2,485.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.05 % 4.49 % 177,810 6.90 44 0.0760 % 2,392.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.69
Evaluated at bid price : 24.04
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
GCS.PR.A SplitShare 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.98
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.71
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-08
Maturity Price : 17.83
Evaluated at bid price : 17.83
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 59,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 51,917 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-07
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 44,100 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-07
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 2.36 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount 43,343 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 50.01
Bid-YTW : 5.00 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 34,966 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.84
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 34,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ENB.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 24.40 – 24.79
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2611

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.93
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %

GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.40 – 25.79
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2721

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 5.51 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.72 – 26.09
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2688

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.72
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 24.60 – 24.97
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2689

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %

CM.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 25.58 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2267

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.57 – 24.84
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1881

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-08
Maturity Price : 24.27
Evaluated at bid price : 24.57
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %

July 5, 2013

Sunday, July 7th, 2013

Nice article on pension derisking:

Such pension “derisking” approaches include lump-sum payouts to vested, terminated employees; liability-driven investment (LDI) strategies that match up plan assets with pension liabilities by moving from equities to long-term bonds; and the one currently making headlines — annuitization, the transfer of a sizable percentage of pension obligations to an insurance company for a paid premium. These tactics join more-traditional approaches, such as freezing and closing pension plans. Taken together, they constitute a sea change in pension-plan treatment.

A good US jobs number had the market in a tizzy:

Employment roared ahead in June, indicating the U.S. economy is poised for faster growth as it shakes off the impact of tax increases and budget cuts.

Payrolls rose by 195,000 workers for a second month, the Labor Department reported today in Washington, exceeding the 165,000 gain projected by economists in a Bloomberg survey. The jobless rate stayed at 7.6 percent, close to a four-year low.

Hourly earnings in the year ended in June advanced by the most since July 2011, giving Americans already buoyed by higher home prices more reason to boost household spending, which accounts for 70 percent of the economy. Stocks climbed, while the yield on 10-year Treasuries rose to the highest in almost two years on expectations the Federal Reserve will start trimming $85 billion in monthly bond purchases in September.

The Canadian preferred share market got knocked back, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 51bp, FixedResets off 20bp and DeemedRetractibles down 35bp. The Performance Highlights table was suitably dismal: very lengthy with only one winner; Brookfield issues led the way downwards. Interestingly, the Volume Highlights table is comprised entirely of Royal Bank issues, led by DeemedRetractibles; volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.7751 % 2,566.9
FixedFloater 4.22 % 3.56 % 44,070 18.15 1 -2.1304 % 3,893.0
Floater 2.73 % 2.90 % 79,674 20.02 4 -0.7751 % 2,771.6
OpRet 4.84 % 3.30 % 63,983 0.15 5 0.1483 % 2,619.1
SplitShare 4.67 % 4.27 % 69,221 3.96 6 -0.2030 % 2,966.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1483 % 2,394.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.60 % 4.12 % 102,524 0.09 12 -0.2568 % 2,278.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.35 % 5.38 % 141,102 14.74 26 -0.5064 % 2,402.2
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.44 % 241,676 3.60 83 -0.2027 % 2,482.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 4.49 % 178,207 4.87 44 -0.3485 % 2,390.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 22.82
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 21.29
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 21.27
Evaluated at bid price : 21.27
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 23.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount -1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 22.20
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 2.24 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 22.04
Evaluated at bid price : 22.35
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 17.57
Evaluated at bid price : 17.57
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.08
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
IFC.PR.C FixedReset -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.72
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.26
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 22.45
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 24.51
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 167,769 Nesbitt crossed 150,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 162,337 Nesbitt crossed 155,000 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 138,040 Nesbitt crossed 130,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 137,600 Nesbitt crossed 130,000 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 104,233 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.30; RBC crossed 48,900 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 2.43 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 67,566 RBC crossed blocks of 12,500 and 50,000, both at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.38
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
There were 38 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.80 – 24.19
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2633

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 23.53
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.71 – 25.05
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2366

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 24.47
Evaluated at bid price : 24.71
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 17.57 – 17.90
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2270

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-05
Maturity Price : 17.57
Evaluated at bid price : 17.57
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %

BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.30 – 25.59
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1923

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.08 – 26.51
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3346

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-04
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.08
Bid-YTW : -5.33 %

RY.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 25.60 – 25.85
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1638

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %

AZP.PR.A, AZP.PR.B Downgraded to P-5 by S&P

Sunday, July 7th, 2013

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • U.S. electric power developer Atlantic Power Corp.’s key credit measures have deteriorated due to the sale of a number of assets, the timing and return of investment capital, slower growth assumptions, and lower expectations for EBITDA contributions at a number of the company’s power plants. We expect that the 2013 debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) will be about 1.3x to 1.4x.
  • We are lowering the corporate credit rating on Atlantic Power to ‘B’ from ‘BB-‘. We are also lowering our issue ratings for the debt and preferred stock of the company and its various subsidiaries and revising the recovery ratings.. We are removing the ratings from CreditWatch, where we placed them with negative implications on May 16, 2013.
  • The stable outlook reflects our belief that Atlantic Power will obtain a waiver to potential covenant violations by amending the credit facility. The company has cash-on-hand to manage its operations for about a year even under a hypothetical termination of its revolving credit facility. It also reflects Atlantic Power’s mostly contracted portfolio, and our expectations that cash available for debt service (CFADs) to debt and CFADs to interest coverage will be about 10% to 12% and 1.5x, respectively, and liquidity will be adequate.


The financial risk profile has increased to “highly leveraged” from “significant” to reflect an increase in consolidated leverage per kilowatt, lower expected project economics at a number of Atlantic Power’s plants and credit measures in line with the ‘B’ rating.

The stable outlook reflects our belief that Atlantic Power will resolve its financial covenant issue in a reasonable manner in the coming weeks. It also reflects Atlantic Power’s mostly contracted portfolio, and our expectations that CFADs to debt and CFADs to interest coverage will be about 10% to 12% and 1.5x, respectively, and liquidity will be adequate. We could raise the rating if growth projects increase EBITDA significantly or CFADS to debt and CFADS to interest ratios improve to around 15% and 2.0 to 2.2x. We could lower the rating if generation is lower than expected, maintenance costs are higher, or if growth targets are not met. We could also lower the rating if we determine that there is risk in the refinancing of Atlantic Power’s Curtis Palmer notes.

PrefBlog previously reported the S&P CreditWatch Negative. The company is also under Review-Negative by DBRS, which has not yet been resolved.

July 4, 2013

Thursday, July 4th, 2013

There are rumours that European rates will continue low:

The European Central Bank will keep interest rates at record lows for an extended period and could yet cut them further, the bank’s chief, Mario Draghi, said on Thursday.

Less than two hours after the Bank of England gave a steer about future interest rate moves at Mark Carney’s debut policy meeting as governor, the ECB president adopted the same tactic.

“The Governing Council expects the key ECB rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time,” Draghi told a news conference after the ECB left interest rates at 0.5 per cent, emphasizing that this was the first time that the ECB had done so.

Mind you, European leadership demonstrated during the crisis that they were willing to compromise their personal integrity when this was considered expedient; as for the BoE, Lapdog Carney will do what he’s told and read whatever speech he’s handed. That’s why he was hired. And, I’m afraid, with Parakeet Poloz now in charge of the Bank of Canada, we’re left only with Bernanke as a trustworthy central banker.

There are more jolly bond fund statistics:

Investors have pulled about $60 billion from U.S. bond funds since Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke rattled markets by outlining his plan to end the central bank’s unprecedented asset purchases.
The redemptions foreshadow what’s in store for asset managers when the central bank eventually scales back the $85 billion in monthly purchases of bonds and mortgage securities that investors have come to rely on. Bond funds had $28.1 billion in net redemptions in the week ended June 26, the Washington-based Investment Company Institute said yesterday.

But to put that in perspective:

Overall bond redemptions were less than 2 per cent of total assets.

Here’s another object lesson in regulatory competence and honesty:

[Vincent] Tchenguiz has launched an unprecedented legal assault on the Serious Fraud Office, one of the top agencies for prosecuting white-collar crime in the U.K. After the SFO’s investigation of Tchenguiz’s dealings with an Icelandic bank fell apart last year, he accused the office of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment in a lawsuit filed in the High Court in London in December.

Tchenguiz, who was arrested on suspicion of fraud in 2011, is seeking damages of 200 million pounds ($313 million). And his younger brother, Robert, 52, who was also arrested, filed a similar suit, asking for 100 million pounds.

n July 2012, the High Court ruled that the SFO, under former director Richard Alderman, had misrepresented key facts in the case and directed the SFO to pay Vincent’s 3 million pound legal bill. The agency isn’t appealing the decision.

The SFO also erred when it alleged Vincent had failed to inform Kaupthing that other banks had prior claims on his real estate; the loan agreement stated that fact more than 100 times.

The SFO’s key mistake was in taking on somebody with the resources to pay a £3-million legal bill. But the rest isn’t surprising.

DBRS confirmed RON.PR.A at Pfd-4(high) [Trend Negative]:

Same-store sales were flat in 2012, yet net sales increased approximately 1.7% to nearly $4.9 billion versus the previous year based on higher sales in the Commercial and Professional Market segment, new store openings, new dealer-owners and improved same-store distribution sales to affiliate dealers. EBITDA margins were negatively affected by weaker gross margins due to promotional activity in a highly competitive environment and higher selling, general and administrative costs. As such, EBITDA declined by approximately 40% to $171 million, marking the third consecutive year of declining EBITDA.

Balance-sheet debt increased notably in F2012 to approximately $328 million, which combined with weakness in operating income to result in further deterioration of credit metrics. Lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR increased to approximately 3.77 times (x) in 2012 versus 2.54x in 2011 and 2.80x in 2010 (improvement in 2011 was primarily attributable to the early voluntary repurchase of debentures) and lease-adjusted EBIT coverage declined to 1.51x in 2012 versus 2.26x in 2011 and nearly 3.7x in 2010.

Going forward, DBRS believes meaningful recovery in Rona’s earnings profile will remain challenging as the Company is expected to continue to face intense competition and a highly promotional environment while Canadian consumers may remain prudent in the uncertain housing and interest rate environment. On June 27, 2013, the Company announced the next phase of its Transformational Plan, which includes the closure of 11 non-profitable stores in Ontario and British Columbia, as well as additional administrative headcount reduction and other cost-cutting initiatives. DBRS expects that a significant improvement in operating performance will be difficult to realize over the near term but EBITDA could benefit from the successful implementation of the Company’s Transformational Plan over the medium term.

Capstone Infrastructure, proud issuer of CSE.PR.A, is making an acquisition by share exchange:

Capstone Infrastructure Corporation (TSX: CSE; CSE.PR.A; CSE.DB.A – “Capstone”) and Renewable Energy Developers Inc. (formerly Sprott Power Corp.) (TSX: RDZ; RDZ.DB – “ReD”) have entered into a definitive agreement (the “Agreement”) whereby Capstone will acquire all the outstanding shares of ReD (the “Transaction”) by way of a share exchange, which will result in a larger infrastructure company with power generation facilities across Canada totalling approximately net 465 megawatts (“MW”) of installed capacity, an attractive pipeline of contracted development opportunities in Canada representing net 79 MW of capacity, and international investments in regulated water and district heating businesses. The Board of Directors of each company has unanimously approved the Transaction.

Under the terms of the Transaction, shareholders of ReD will receive 0.26 of a Capstone common share and $0.001 in cash, which, combined, is currently the equivalent of $1.01, for each common share of ReD. The consideration payable to ReD’s shareholders represents a premium of 10.8% based on the 20-day volume weighted average price (“VWAP”) of ReD’s common shares and Capstone’s common shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) as at July 2, 2013 of $0.91 and $3.88, respectively. Upon completion of the Transaction, which is valued at approximately $70 million, existing Capstone shareholders and ReD shareholders will own approximately 80% and approximately 20% of the common shares of the combined company, respectively.

  • • Expands Capstone’s renewable power footprint in Canada by adding net 95 MW in operating wind power facilities in Nova Scotia and Ontario.
  • • Enables Capstone to access a net 35 MW pipeline of wind power projects with 20-year power purchase agreements (“PPAs”) under development in Nova Scotia, Ontario, Saskatchewan and Quebec, and the option to acquire an additional net 44 MW in wind power projects with PPAs in Ontario. These projects will require equity funding from Capstone in the amount of approximately $60 million over the next two years, with the balance of the projects’ financing requirement to be satisfied with project-level debt.
  • • Brings additional proven development and project management personnel with a record of completing renewable power projects on time and on budget.
  • • Delivery of the development projects in ReD’s pipeline is expected to be accretive to cash flow over the long term.

Tomorrow’s report will be late, by which I mean Sunday.

It was another day of strong recovery for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 56bp, FixedResets gaining 12bp and DeemedRetractibles up 19bp. The performance highlights table is comprised entirely of winners. Volume was on the low side of average, but not bad for a US holiday.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2071 % 2,587.0
FixedFloater 4.13 % 3.47 % 42,881 18.33 1 0.0000 % 3,977.8
Floater 2.71 % 2.90 % 79,694 20.01 4 0.2071 % 2,793.2
OpRet 4.85 % 3.42 % 66,628 0.16 5 0.1016 % 2,615.2
SplitShare 4.66 % 4.18 % 71,959 3.97 6 -0.0463 % 2,973.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1016 % 2,391.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.59 % -0.92 % 103,839 0.09 12 0.1979 % 2,284.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.32 % 5.36 % 142,248 14.69 26 0.5636 % 2,414.4
FixedReset 4.95 % 3.38 % 242,610 3.59 83 0.1157 % 2,487.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 4.45 % 178,345 4.85 44 0.1900 % 2,398.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-04
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : -0.92 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.54
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
NA.PR.Q FixedReset 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-11-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-04
Maturity Price : 24.60
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-04
Maturity Price : 24.28
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 79,300 RBC crossed 35,000 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 47,670 RBC crossed 35,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 38,424 Reset rate announced.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.87
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 37,300 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 36,168 RBC crossed 15,000 at 26.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.48
Bid-YTW : 2.27 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 27,749 RBC crossed 12,200 at 24.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.43 – 24.98
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3965

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-04
Maturity Price : 24.17
Evaluated at bid price : 24.43
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 24.49 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2281

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-04
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 24.49
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.53 – 23.20
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.5508

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-04
Maturity Price : 22.14
Evaluated at bid price : 22.53
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %

BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.18 – 25.67
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3770

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %

TD.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.20 – 25.57
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2611

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.70 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1975

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-04
Maturity Price : 22.40
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 5.00 %