Archive for October, 2013

October 8, 2013

Tuesday, October 8th, 2013

Geez, maybe I should open a managed future fund:

Brokers have an incentive to keep clients in managed-futures funds because they receive commissions annually of up to 4 percent of assets invested, prospectuses show. Investors pay as much as 9 percent in total fees each year, including charges by general partners and fund managers.

Amazing – somebody actually took a quantitative look at the spread between downtown and suburban house prices:

No question, you’ll find house prices are cheaper outside big cities. Toronto Real Estate Board numbers suggest a spread of almost $250,000 between city homes and those in the neighbouring suburbs. But as shown in a spreadsheet created by Mr. Hughes, suburban living loses its cost advantage if you have two adults commuting by car each day. Add the effect of stress and time spent in gridlock, and suburbia looks even more costly.

It was another negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 28bp, FixedResets down 9bp and DeemedRetractibles off 6bp. There was a surprisingly lengthy list of losers in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0612 % 2,521.9
FixedFloater 4.33 % 3.65 % 31,143 17.99 1 -0.2272 % 3,838.4
Floater 2.68 % 2.92 % 65,162 19.96 5 -0.0612 % 2,723.0
OpRet 4.62 % 2.67 % 61,816 0.63 3 0.2576 % 2,639.5
SplitShare 4.76 % 5.05 % 62,160 3.73 6 0.0602 % 2,946.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2576 % 2,413.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.79 % 1.04 % 106,098 0.10 8 -0.0219 % 2,280.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.58 % 5.56 % 158,413 14.51 30 -0.2845 % 2,335.1
FixedReset 4.95 % 3.69 % 235,148 3.61 85 -0.0862 % 2,452.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.14 % 4.45 % 189,415 6.87 43 -0.0554 % 2,376.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -4.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 19.66
Evaluated at bid price : 19.66
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.11
Evaluated at bid price : 20.11
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.78
Evaluated at bid price : 20.78
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.76
Evaluated at bid price : 20.76
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.04
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.08
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.13
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 19.45
Evaluated at bid price : 19.45
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 98,437 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 40,775 National crossed 23,800 at 22.38.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 21.96
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 40,526 Will reset at 3.5595%.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 35,310 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 34,068 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.76
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount 26,030 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 21.99
Evaluated at bid price : 22.28
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 19.66 – 20.66
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.7071

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 19.66
Evaluated at bid price : 19.66
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.42 – 21.03
Spot Rate : 0.6100
Average : 0.3766

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.42
Evaluated at bid price : 20.42
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.62 – 22.98
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2535

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.62
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %

TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.85 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1520

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 23.03 – 23.54
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.4336

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.03
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.45 – 23.68
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1589

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-08
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %

October 7, 2013

Monday, October 7th, 2013

Lawrence Schembri, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada is assiduously sucking up to the politicians:

From my perspective, the FSB is a unique international organization that has certain qualities that many associate with Canadians, qualities I believe will help ensure its success in making the global financial system more resilient. A resilient global financial system is not an end in itself, but a necessary foundation for strong, sustainable and balanced global economic growth, leading to higher employment and improved living standards.

The FSB was born of necessity in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Its raison d’être stems from one overarching fact: the global financial system is highly integrated.2 Financial institutions and markets are interconnected and interdependent within and across various sectors, including banking, insurance, and pension and investment funds, and, increasingly, across national jurisdictions.

Thus, to achieve a comprehensive and coherent approach to the financial regulation and oversight necessary to attain the global public good of financial stability, coordination is essential across countries, across all of the elements of the reforms, and across many different regulators and supervisors. Failure to coordinate would lead to the fragmentation of the financial system, which would impede the global recovery. This need for effective coordination is why the G-20 established the FSB in 2009.

Can’t blame him, really – it worked for Lapdog Carney!

There’s some apocalyptic commentary on the potential for a US default:

Anyone who remembers the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. little more than five years ago knows what a global financial disaster is. A U.S. government default, just weeks away if Congress fails to raise the debt ceiling as it now threatens to do, will be an economic calamity like none the world has ever seen.
Failure by the world’s largest borrower to pay its debt — unprecedented in modern history — will devastate stock markets from Brazil to Zurich, halt a $5 trillion lending mechanism for investors who rely on Treasuries, blow up borrowing costs for billions of people and companies, ravage the dollar and throw the U.S. and world economies into a recession that probably would become a depression. Among the dozens of money managers, economists, bankers, traders and former government officials interviewed for this story, few view a U.S. default as anything but a financial apocalypse.

While none of the people interviewed for this story expect the world’s largest economy to default this time either, most say the chances of it happening now are higher than in the past.
“It would be insane to default, but it’s no longer a zero-percent probability,” said Simon Johnson, a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund who teaches economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is a columnist for Bloomberg View.

I consider it all a little hysterical – but hey! In the financial markets, the hysterics are sometimes right!

I’ve lost a lot of business over the years by admitting there are things I don’t understand – financial guys are supposed to know just precisely how the price of eggs in Spain relates to Brazilian interest rates. But I’m in good company:

Ben S. Bernanke, the world’s most-powerful central banker, says he doesn’t understand gold prices. If his peers had paid attention, they might have stopped expanding reserves that lost $545 billion in value since bullion peaked in 2011.

Bernanke, who holds economics degrees from Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and led the Federal Reserve through the biggest financial disaster since the Great Depression, told the Senate Banking Committee in July that “nobody really understands gold prices and I don’t pretend to really understand them either.”

I generally have a lot of respect for the OTPP. Not this time:

The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan is urging the province’s securities regulator to require all public companies have at least three women on their boards, or else risk being delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange.

Teachers outlines the proposal in a letter submitted to the Ontario Securities Commission in response to its call for comments on a possible new “comply or explain” disclosure rule to boost the number of women on boards. The OSC proposal would require companies to report annually on their efforts to improve board diversity or else explain why they have opted not to make the disclosure.

This is just political nonsense. If Teachers’ really believed that more diverse boards produced better results than less diverse boards and if they were truly interested in outperforming on behalf of their beneficiaries – they would promote a laissez faire in which there were all sorts of boards and they invested in those with more diverse boards on the grounds that these companies would kick the asses of those that were less diverse. You know, in the marketplace. I am very disappointed that Teachers’ is pursuing a political agenda.

Now that Ontario has bought up all the expensive solar panels Mexico is getting the cheap ones:

Mexico, poised to allow foreign oil extraction for the first time in 75 years, is finding its abundant natural resources also appeal to investors in a much cleaner energy: sunshine.

First Solar Inc. (FSLR) of the U.S. has bought its first projects in Mexico, while more than a dozen other developers including Germany’s Saferay GmbH and Spain’s Grupotec Tecnologia Solar SL own licenses there. Local investor Gauss Energia opened Latin America’s largest photovoltaic plant in the country last month.

Gauss and Portugal’s Martifer SGPS SA opened a 30-megawatt plant in La Paz, Baja California, on Sept. 12 with funding from International Finance Corp. and Nacional Financiera SNC bank. While Mexico doesn’t subsidize large solar, the $100 million project offered an economic alternative to fossil-fueled power in the area, where solar radiation exceeds the national average.

No subsidies and lots of investments! Gee, Mexico must have one of those ‘competitive advantage’ thingamajigs over Ontario when it comes to sunshine! Whoever woulda thunk it?

It was a poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 12bp, FixedResets off 6bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 19bp. The Performance Highlights table was surprisingly short – below average even by long-term standards. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2045 % 2,523.5
FixedFloater 4.32 % 3.64 % 32,450 18.01 1 0.0455 % 3,847.2
Floater 2.68 % 2.92 % 64,982 19.96 5 0.2045 % 2,724.6
OpRet 4.64 % 3.14 % 60,639 0.64 3 -0.0901 % 2,632.7
SplitShare 4.77 % 5.23 % 60,019 4.02 6 -0.2293 % 2,944.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0901 % 2,407.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 4.04 % 109,207 0.11 8 0.1883 % 2,281.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.55 % 5.56 % 157,971 14.44 30 -0.1192 % 2,341.8
FixedReset 4.95 % 3.68 % 233,882 3.61 85 -0.0580 % 2,454.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.14 % 4.49 % 191,697 6.74 43 -0.1934 % 2,377.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 23.53
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 74,616 Nesbitt crossed 28,500 at 24.83; TD crossed 20,000 at 24.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 68,605 Desjardins crossed 57,800 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 37,805 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 34,977 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.79
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 32,200 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 23.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 27,134 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.60 – 26.18
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.3626

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 22.67 – 23.13
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3053

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 22.29
Evaluated at bid price : 22.67
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 24.29 – 24.75
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3104

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.29
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 23.50 – 23.89
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2677

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %

CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.15 – 21.58
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3086

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-07
Maturity Price : 21.15
Evaluated at bid price : 21.15
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 25.45 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1788

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %

MAPF Performance, September 2013

Sunday, October 6th, 2013

The fund outperformed in September, due to its low weighting in junk FixedResets, which underperformed (as indicated by the performance difference between TXPR (+0.48%) and TXPL (-0.10%)).

There was a modest recovery in the Canadian preferred share market in September, but there was a sharp turnaround commencing with seven consecutive gains commencing August 22 and still continuing, as shown in the following charts:


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To a certain extent, the (modest, so far) recovery may reflect an acceptance of my belief that the decline in the preferred share market has been overdone; the following table shows the increase in yields since May 22 of some fixed income sectors:

Yield Changes
May 22, 2013
to
September 30, 2013
Sector Yield
May 22
Yield
October 2
Change
Five-Year Canadas 1.38% 1.86% +48bp
Long Canadas 2.57% 3.09% +52bp
Long Corporates 4.15% 4.8% +65bp
FixedResets
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
3.51% 4.78% +127bp
Perpetual-Discounts
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
6.34% 7.23% +89bp
The change in yield of PerpetualDiscounts is understated due a massive influx of issues from the PerpetualPremium sub-index over the period, which improved credit quality. When the four issues that comprised the PerpetualDiscount sub-index as of May 22 are evaluated as of September 30, the interest-equivalent yield is 7.66% and thus the change is +132bp.

ZPR, is a relatively new ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues, with a very high proportion of junk issues, which returned -0.29% for the month, and -2.46% over the past three months (according to my calculations from the fund’s NAV data and distribution data; our regulators are hard at work protecting you from performance data since the fund has been extant for less than a year), versus returns for the TXPL index of -0.10% and -2.30%, respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $825.9-million in the ten and a half months since inception; a gain of $3.0-million in September despite losing approximately $0.8-million due to performance. This indicates that a (very modest!) inflow of funds occurred in September – perhaps implying a (very modest!) return of confidence among retail investors. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents.

TXPR had returns over one- and three-months of +0.48% and -1.57%, respectively

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for September were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to September 30, 2013
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat -1.61% -2.35%
Floater -3.11% -2.00%
OpRet +0.49% +0.90%
SplitShare -0.57% -0.64%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium +1.11% 0.00%
PerpetualDiscount +2.50% -1.26%
FixedReset +0.23% -0.89%
DeemedRetractible +1.73% -0.16%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close September 30, 2013, was 10.0296 after a distribution of 0.137064 per unit.

Returns to September 30, 2013
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +0.87% +0.52% +0.48% +0.43%
Three Months -1.54% -0.82% -1.57% -1.61%
One Year -1.17% +0.51% -0.96% -1.43%
Two Years (annualized) +5.52% +3.44% +2.70% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +4.61% +4.92% +3.55% +3.01%
Four Years (annualized) +7.23% +6.15% +4.88% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +16.44% +6.95% +5.70% +5.04%
Six Years (annualized) +12.80% +4.55% +3.28%  
Seven Years (annualized) +11.06% +3.59%    
Eight Years (annualized) +10.41% +3.64%    
Nine Years (annualized) +10.04% +3.82%    
Ten Years (annualized) +10.57% +3.94%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +12.36% +4.23%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +10.82% +4.15%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.73%, -0.52% and +0.12%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +3.88%; five year is +5.89%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.02%, -1.85% and -1.80% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +1.28%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.21%, -2.76% & -3.70%, respectively. Three Year performance is +1.77%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.77%, -0.53% & +0.43%, respectively.
Figures for Altamira Preferred Equity Fund are +0.25% and -1.99% for one- and three- months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is -0.29% and -2.46% for one- and three-months. [calculation by JH]

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past two years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund occasionally finds an attractive opportunity to trade between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons (but in which trading is now hampered by the fact that the low-coupon issues are trading near par and are callable at par in the near term), but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index!

DeemedRetractibles had relatively uncorrelated performances in September:

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Oddly, Straight Perpetuals did a little better than DeemedRetractibles in September.


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A side effect of the downdraft has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility:


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Implied Volatility of
Three Series of Straight Perpetuals
September, 2013
Issuer Pure Yield Implied Volatility
GWO 4.12% (-0.58) 27% (+4)
PWF 4.78% (-0.44) 20% (+2)
BNS 0.01% (0) 40% (0)
Bracketted figures are changes since August month-end

In the September, 2013, edition of PrefLetter, I extended the theory of Implied Volatility to FixedResets – relating the option feature of the Issue Reset Spreads to a theoretical non-callable Market Spread.


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Implied Volatility of
Two Series of FixedResets
September, 2013
Issuer Market Reset Spread
(Non-Callable)
Implied Volatility
BPO 188bp 18%
FFH 295bp 16%

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. As has been previously noted, very high levels of Implied Volatility (in the 40% range) imply a very strong expectation of directionality in future prices – i.e, an expectation that all issues will be redeemed at par. The decline in Implied Volatility – which is still at elevated levels – implies more uncertainty regarding this prediction.

It is significant that the preferred share market knows no moderation. I suggest that a good baseline estimate for Volatility over a three year period is 15% but the observed figure is generally higher in a rising market and lower in a declining one … with, of course, a period of adjustment in between, which I suspect we are currently experiencing.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September, 2013 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and FixedReset issues on July 31; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies). This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds positions in various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a very small position in these issues.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas (set at 1.87% for the September 30 calculation) to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Portfolio Yield” of 4.49% as of September 30, 2013 and notes:

Portfolio yield is calculated as the most recent income received by the ETF in the form of dividends interest and other income annualized based on the payment frequently divided by the current market value of ETFs investments.

In other words – it’s the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF is 5.17% as of September 30, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to accord it any prominence in portfolio reporting is misleading.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

October 4, 2013

Friday, October 4th, 2013

No jobs number today!

The absence of jobs data leaves economists and their investor clients without the month’s most important numbers on which to place bets, ranging from friendly office pools to million-dollar wagers on the health of the world’s largest economy. The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which typically issues the report on the first Friday of each month at 8:30 a.m. in Washington, yesterday said a government shutdown now in its fourth day means the latest data aren’t ready.

Shades of Enron! Investment analysis isn’t the only field where fraud flourishes in a lazy culture:

A Bangladeshi factory that produces garments for The Gap and Old Navy kept two sets of books to conceal how it is coercing employees to perform 17-hour shifts every day of the week, a new report says, underlining the inability of clothing retailers to improve working conditions among their suppliers.

“It is easy, because auditors and buyers never come around late at night to check these things,” the factory manager said in an interview. “Sometimes, it is the only way to meet the orders on time.”

The report said it was easy to fool retailers visiting the factory, which is located outside the capital, Dhaka, and employs 3,750 people.

Earlier this summer, the report said, “white foreigners” – buyers from Gap and Old Navy – visited the factory late in the morning of June 22.

A loudspeaker alerted the workers ahead of the visit. They were instructed to respond to questions by claiming that conditions were good and that they needed to do “just two hours of overtime a day.”

There was an interesting wrinkle in the GM bankruptcy:

In 2005, GM lost $10 billion. Researching Nova Scotia notes that year, Truong, the Fortress analyst, called the treasurer of GM Canada and learned that GM Nova Scotia Finance had made intercompany loans to its parent, Truong testified.

Such knowledge would prove useful. Under the 1900 Nova Scotia Companies Act, a company’s owner is obligated to pay the debts of all subsidiaries. Such unlimited liability companies, or ULCs, confer tax advantages on their parents.

Truong believed that GM Nova Scotia Finance’s ULC status would allow creditors to reach up to its parents to collect repayment in the event of a bankruptcy, he wrote in a Dec. 10, 2008, e-mail presented at the trial.

I find it rather odd that an oil-linked currency is a reserve currency, but perhaps that’s the whole point:

Canada now boasts the world’s fifth-largest reserve currency.

According to an International Monetary Fund report this week, central banks boosted their holdings of Canadian money to $108.9-billion in the second quarter of this year, up from $94.9-billion in the first three months of the year and $90.1-billion in the final quarter of 2012.

It was a negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 10bp, FixedResets off 8bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. Losing FixedResets were notable in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2855 % 2,518.3
FixedFloater 4.32 % 3.64 % 31,736 18.01 1 1.8047 % 3,845.4
Floater 2.68 % 2.92 % 65,689 19.96 5 -0.2855 % 2,719.1
OpRet 4.63 % 2.90 % 60,110 0.48 3 0.0901 % 2,635.1
SplitShare 4.75 % 5.02 % 60,706 4.03 6 0.1500 % 2,951.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0901 % 2,409.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 2.77 % 107,655 0.11 8 0.0000 % 2,276.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.54 % 5.56 % 146,264 14.39 30 -0.1003 % 2,344.5
FixedReset 4.94 % 3.66 % 236,746 3.62 85 -0.0845 % 2,455.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.13 % 4.41 % 192,233 6.89 43 0.0011 % 2,381.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.77
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 22.60
Evaluated at bid price : 23.11
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 21.26
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 5.36 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 20.52
Evaluated at bid price : 20.52
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 22.42
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.L FixedReset 103,537 RBC crossed blocks of 49,500 and 50,000, both at 25.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 2.41 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 57,593 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.97.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 2.68 %
GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 56,881 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 22.50; TD crossed 16,900 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 54,980 Desjardins crossed 49,500 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 51,965 Desjardins crossed blocks of 30,000 and 15,000, both at 25.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 51,232 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 22.50 – 23.39
Spot Rate : 0.8900
Average : 0.5794

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %

FTS.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 24.25 – 24.74
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3169

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %

TD.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.29 – 25.59
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1770

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 19.80 – 20.08
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1871

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 18.05 – 18.32
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1799

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 18.05
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %

ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 25.10 – 25.40
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2104

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-04
Maturity Price : 24.88
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %

S&P Puts BPO on Watch-Developing

Friday, October 4th, 2013

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • Brookfield Property Partners L.P. (BPY) announced a proposal to acquire Brookfield Office Properties (BPO) by way of tender offer for any or all of the common shares it does not presently own.
  • We placed our ratings for BPO on CreditWatch with developing implications, including our ‘BBB-‘ corporate credit, ‘BB+’ unsecured debt, and ‘BB’ preferred stock ratings. The developing CreditWatch listing means the ratings could be raised, lowered, or affirmed.
  • We do not currently rate BPY, a large, diversified, recently listed and globally focused real estate company, which is majority owned and externally managed by Brookfield Asset Management (BAM).
  • To resolve the CreditWatch, we will seek to meet with BPY management in the coming month to ascertain the impact, if any, of the proposed acquisition on BPO’s credit profile.


BPY’s proposal has stated that BPO’s rated unsecured debt securities would remain in place, but that some convertible preferred shares could be exchanged for equivalent shares of a BPY subsidiary. It is not clear to us whether the debt securities would be guaranteed by BPY and the extent to which BPO’s current operating and financial strategies as well as its legal structure could change once absorbed into the BPY platform.

We currently see downside risk to ratings as somewhat less likely, given the potential benefits of BPY’s larger, more diverse platform. However, the expected growth and financing strategies for BPY’s other operating platforms is at this time unknown to us. We will seek to meet with management of BPY in the coming month to gain clarity on these issues, so as to ascertain the impact, if any, of the proposed acquisition on BPO’s credit profile.

The bid was previously reported on PrefBlog.

BPO was downgraded to P-3 by S&P in July, 2013. I remain concerned about the knock-on effects on BAM’s credit rating if the flow of dividends from the subsidiaries to the parent should be considered less reliable as a result of increased leverage at the subsidiary level.

The ultimate parent, Brookfield Asset Management, has the following preferred shares outstanding:
FixedResets BAM.PF.A, BAM.PF.B, BAM.PR.P, BAM.PR.R, BAM.PR.T, BAM.PR.X, BAM.PR.Z
Floaters BAM.PR.B, BAM.PR.C, BAM.PR.K
RatchetRate BAM.PR.E
FixedFloater BAM.PR.G
OperatingRetractible BAM.PR.J
Straight Perpetual BAM.PR.M, BAM.PR.N, BAM.PF.C

BPO has the following preferred share issues outstanding:
OperatingRetractible BPO.PR.H, BPO.PR.J, BPO.PR.K,
FixedReset BPO.PR.L, BPO.PR.N, BPO.PR.P, BPO.PR.R, BPO.PR.T,
Floaters BPO.PR.W, BPO.PR.X, BPO.PR.Y

In the event of a successful bid, the BPO Operating Retractibles might be the object of an exchange offer.

LBS.PR.A to Reset at 4.75%

Friday, October 4th, 2013

Reset? Well, I couldn’t think of another word to use!

Brompton Funds announced in April that the term would be extended and the dividend changed on November 29; they announced the new rate on August 14:

At a special meeting held on April 11, 2013, shareholders of Life & Banc Split Corp. (“LBS” or the “Fund”) approved a special resolution to allow the Board of Directors to extend the term of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares for up to 5 years and to determine the distribution ratesfor the extended term. The Board of Directors is pleased to announce that it has approved a 5 year extension to the term of the Class A Shares and Preferred Shares to November 29, 2018. The Fund was originally scheduledto terminate on November 29, 2013. The distribution rate for the Fund’s Preferred Shares for this new 5 year term which commences on November 30, 2013 will be $0.475 per annum paid in equal quarterly amounts. The new Preferred Share distribution rate is based on current market rates for preferred shares with similar terms. The Preferred Share distribution for the quarter ended December 31, 2013 is expected to be $0.12690 per Preferred Share which takes into account the new distribution rate for December and the previous distribution rate for October and November. In addition, the Fund intends to maintain the targeted monthly Class A Share distribution at $0.10 per Class A Share.

LBS invests in a portfolio, on an approximately equal weight basis, of common shares of 6 Canadian Banks: Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, The Bank of Nova Scotia and The Toronto-Dominion Bank and 4 Canadian life insurance companies: Great-West Lifeco Inc., Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc., Manulife Financial Corporation and Sun Life Financial Inc. The extension of the term of the Fund is not a taxable event and enables shareholders to defer potential capital gains tax liability that would have otherwise been realized on the redemption of the Class A Shares or Preferred Shares until such time as such shares are disposed of by shareholders.

In connection with the extension, those shareholders who do not wish to continue their investment in the Fund and do not wish to sell their shares through the TSX, may retract their Preferred Shares or Class A Shares on November 29, 2013 pursuant to a special retraction right and receive a retraction price that is calculated in the same way that such price would be calculated if the Fund were to terminate on November 29, 2013. Such retraction price will be approximately equal to the net asset value per share less certain costs including trading commissions. The notice expiry for the special retraction is October 31, 2013 at 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time). Shareholders are reminded that Class A Shares and Preferred Shares have traded at an average premium to net asset value of 8.7% and 1.2%,respectively, over the past 12 months to July 31.

The new rate of 4.75% represents a modest decline from the previous rate of 5.25%.

LBS.PR.A currently has asset coverage of 1.8-:1 and income coverage of 100%. The reduced dividend on the preferreds will move income coverage over the 100% mark.

I recommend that holders retain their shares.

October 3, 2013

Thursday, October 3rd, 2013

There is increasing awareness that the economy is not all that great:

Bank of Nova Scotia economists are now raising the possibility of no move in the Bank of Canada’s benchmark interest rate until 2016.

Other observers have speculated on late next year or early in 2015 for the first rate hike by the central bank.

But Scotiabank’s Derek Holt, Mary Webb and Dov Zigler say the Bank of Canada is now signalling a hold of more than two years, citing signs in a recent speech by senior deputy governor Tiff Macklem, among other things.

“The BoC probably now envisages spare capacity remaining into 2016,” the Scotiabank economists said, adding the central bank now projects hitting its 2-per-cent target for annual inflation in mid-2015.

They believe the Bank of Canada may change that forecast, to an even later date, when meets later this month and also issues its monetary policy report.

But that’s OK! We’ll all retire on the CPP:

A proposal to boost the retirement benefits for the middle class from the Canada Pension Plan through increases in contributions is rekindling momentum for pension reform ahead of a key December meeting with Finance Minister Jim Flaherty.

Prince Edward Island Finance Minister Wes Sheridan is trying to rally his colleagues around changes that would see the maximum CPP contribution rise to $4,681.20 a year from $2,356.20 starting in 2016, and the maximum annual benefit would increase to $23,400 from $12,150.

Qualifying for the maximum benefit would take an income of $102,000, up sharply from the current maximum insurable earnings cutoff of $51,000. The overall goal is to boost the savings rates of middle-income Canadians who earn less than six figures.

And – surprise! – middle-class jobs are scarce:

The top-10 list suggests there are really two sets of expanding job opportunities, at either end of the income spectrum – and not much in the middle.

If you’re entering the labour market – say you’re young, or you’re a newcomer to Canada – there are lots of points of entry at the low end of the scale. But they are not generally the types of jobs that lead you down a career path to something better, nor do these jobs fully employ many workers’ skill sets. If you are lucky enough to find full-time, full-year work in these types of jobs, paying $13 an hour or less, you would be making $26,000 a year before taxes, or less.

There is another cluster of job opportunities that pay median wages of $35 an hour or more, which translates to $70,000 a year before taxes, or more.

There are fewer opportunities in the middle, jobs that pay in the $20-something per hour range.

However, a bright note is that European distressed assets seem to have found a level:

Blackstone Group LP (BX) raised more than $4 billion in 2009 to buy European property assets anticipating that cash-strapped banks would be forced to sell as the region’s debt crisis worsened. Almost all of it sat idle for two years.

Today, the inaction has given way to a surge of deals, as lenders from Lloyds Banking Group Plc (LLOY) to Commerzbank AG (CBK) cut loose soured real estate, corporate and consumer loans. Sales of loan portfolios and other unwanted assets by European Union banks could reach 60 billion euros ($82 billion) in face value this year, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, the most since the firm began tracking data in 2010.

Apollo is among the most active investors, amassing loans with a face value of about 12 billion euros, including 11,000 mortgages in the U.K. Blackstone, the world’s largest alternative-asset manager, last year put $3.5 billion into distressed European mortgages and properties, the most its real estate group has plowed into the region in one year.
Investors also are buying European properties from real estate developers and taking over troubled companies or lending directly to them where banks have scaled back.
EU banks unloaded 29 billion euros of portfolio loans and assets such as mortgage-servicing units and branches in the first half of 2013, according to Richard Thompson, a partner at PwC in London. That compares with sales of 46 billion euros for all of last year, 36 billion euros in 2011 and 11 billion euros in 2010. The majority of sales have been distressed loans, Thompson said.

The arbitrary nature of corporate bond pricing (and hence the opportunity for profit) is well illustrated by this tale of woe:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) mistakenly added about $1.5 million of interest costs to a Ford Motor Co. (F) bond sale last week by using the wrong Treasury note as a benchmark for the security, according to two people with knowledge of the transaction.

Typically, banks set the price of new corporate securities by using Treasury bonds with similar maturities. If the U.S. government issues notes in the middle of the week, underwriters don’t use that security as a benchmark until the following Monday.

For Dearborn, Michigan-based Ford’s Sept. 26 offering, Goldman Sachs added a 1.45 percentage-point spread to the 1.375 percent Treasury note due September 2018 that was auctioned on Sept. 25, Bloomberg data show. Instead, the bonds should have been based off the 1.5 percent security that matures in August 2018.

Matthew Klein of Bloomberg offers an excellent perspective on endowment investing:

The modern style of institutional investing can be traced to Yale University’s David Swensen, who literally wrote the book on the subject. … Three core ideas inform his thinking.

1. Savers are paid to take risk. If you want to generate big returns you have to be willing to endure large losses at any point.

2. Universities and other institutional investors have long time horizons because they expect to exist forever. This makes them different from regular people who save for retirement.

3. Contrary to standard academic theory, which suggests that savers should invest in broad indexes and avoid fees, market imperfections create opportunities for talented money managers. They can improve a portfolio’s performance through a combination of high returns and diversification benefits.

The potential for a mismatch between assets and liabilities is one big problem with the Yale model. Another is the focus on hunting for the best hedge funds, private-equity managers and stock pickers. This is where most of the money is made (and lost) in the endowment business. According to the Yale endowment’s most recent report, “nearly 80 percent of Yale’s outperformance relative to the average Cambridge Associates endowment was attributable to the value added by Yale’s active managers, while only 20 percent was the result of Yale’s asset allocation.” That’s great for Yale, but it’s impossible for every institution to have the best managers.

In general, I think Mr. Klein overstates the need for liquidity – it’s important, but my views are closer to precept 2 than that which he espouses.

I don’t think there’s anything wrong with the Yale model, but there are definitely problems with the implementation – as I told one guy recently, just because I believe the “Warren Buffet style” of investment CAN work, doesn’t mean I think YOU can do it.

The field is filled with ignoramuses and charlatans and institutional boards aren’t any better at picking winners than any other retail investor who handles his investments as a part-time job. Hiring a small group of specialists to farm out the work to third party firms just makes matters worse, because then allocations are made on the basis of two salesmen talking to each other.

For an institution to outperform, I believe that you have to have most, if not all, of the investment expertise in-house. ‘You don’t need to sell anything, guys, you just have to outperform on a rolling four year basis or you’re fired.’ This is the Teachers/OMERS model – and it works.

Canajans, eh? The Bank of Canada has published a working paper by Mikael Khan, Louis Morel and Patrick Sabourin titled The Common Component of CPI:An Alternative Measure of Underlying Inflation for Canada, in which the authors use factor analysis to find a common factor among 54 different components of the Consumer Price Index.


Click for Big

But, you ask, which of these 54 series was best correlated with this single underlying factor? Well, I’m glad you asked that question:

Table 2. Relationship between common component and individual components of the CPI

CPI components (y/y) Correlation % of explained variance
Alcoholic beverages served in licensed establishments 0.86 0.74

This suggests a new currency ….

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts getting whacked for 40bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 4bp. Predictably, the Performance Highlights table is heavily populated by losing PerpetualDiscounts. Volume was slightly above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3151 % 2,525.5
FixedFloater 4.40 % 3.70 % 31,995 17.86 1 -1.3692 % 3,777.3
Floater 2.68 % 2.91 % 65,975 19.98 5 -0.3151 % 2,726.9
OpRet 4.64 % 2.96 % 60,751 0.48 3 -0.0901 % 2,632.7
SplitShare 4.76 % 5.07 % 60,910 4.03 6 -0.0622 % 2,946.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0901 % 2,407.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 1.77 % 111,776 0.12 8 -0.0644 % 2,276.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.53 % 5.56 % 147,151 14.38 30 -0.4041 % 2,346.9
FixedReset 4.93 % 3.68 % 238,684 3.62 85 -0.0261 % 2,457.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.12 % 4.43 % 197,492 6.89 43 0.0438 % 2,381.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -3.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 20.74
Evaluated at bid price : 20.74
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 20.71
Evaluated at bid price : 20.71
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 21.93
Evaluated at bid price : 21.61
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 21.37
Evaluated at bid price : 21.37
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.49
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 91,600 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 24.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 23.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 68,305 To reset 10/31 at 3.5595%.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.14
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
TD.PR.T FixedReset 63,782 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 25.31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 2.28 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 63,200 Scotia sold 21,600 to RBC at 24.55 and another 10,000 to Anonymous at the same price. RBC crossed 19,700 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 39,904 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 39,592 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.29 – 25.77
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3265

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount Quote: 50.00 – 50.40
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2505

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 50.00
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %

MFC.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.53 – 25.86
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2089

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

TRP.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 20.13 – 20.50
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2530

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-03
Maturity Price : 20.13
Evaluated at bid price : 20.13
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.90 – 25.34
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3314

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %

GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.61 – 23.87
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1627

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %

October 2, 2013

Wednesday, October 2nd, 2013

SEC Chair Mary Jo White gave a speech titled Focusing on Fundamentals: The Path to Address Equity Market Structure. All the usual blather, but there was one point of interest:

So, today, I am pleased to announce a new initiative we are launching that is designed to promote a fuller empirical understanding of the equity markets. SEC staff has prepared and assembled resources and data on the SEC’s web site focusing exclusively on equity market structure. The new web site should be available as early as next week and will serve as a central location for us to publicly share evolving data, research, and analysis.

Part of this initiative will be to disseminate data and related observations drawn from MIDAS that address the nature and quality of displayed liquidity across the full range of U.S.-listed equities –from the life-time of quotes, to the speed of the market, to the nature of order cancellations.

The new web site will also feature staff research papers based on a variety of data sources and staff reviews that identify and assemble information from the expanding economic literature on market structure topics. One paper, using order audit trail data on off-exchange trading, provides key metrics describing the underlying nature of off-exchange trading by the 44 alternative trading systems that trade equity securities. The staff’s primary observation is that ATS trading looks very similar in many respects to exchange trading.[20] Another paper summarizes current studies that address market fragmentation – both visible and dark. Additional research papers and reviews are already planned.

Maneuvering over the US debt limit continues:

Lew and President Barack Obama have said they won’t negotiate on the limit, which is tied to obligations the U.S. has already incurred. Boehner, an Ohio Republican, has issued a list of demands before he’ll support raising the ceiling. His conditions include approval of TransCanada Corp. (TRP)’s Keystone XL pipeline, major revisions to the tax code and a one-year delay of the insurance mandate in the Obama health-care law.

The U.S. government is already limited in action after Republicans and Democrats in Congress failed to agree on funding for the new fiscal year that began yesterday. That led to a partial shutdown of the government at midnight, forcing about 800,000 federal workers off the job. The shutdown could cost the economy as much as $10 billion a week, the White House said on its website.

DS is having a good year with US junk:

Royal Bank of Canada is on pace to join the ranks of the 10 largest underwriters of high-yield debt in the U.S. for the first time as the largest Canadian lender seeks profits abroad with issuance slowing at home.

Royal Bank’s RBC Capital Markets ranks 10th among arrangers of speculative-grade bonds at the end of the third quarter after luring bankers from firms including Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) and Credit Suisse Group AG. (CSGN) The Toronto-based firm has never been a top-10 underwriter for non-investment-grade debt in the U.S. on any given year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

While RBC expects total sales of junk bonds in the U.S. market to surpass last year’s record $353 billion, on Sept. 4 it cut its annual forecast for Canadian issuance to as little as C$4 billion ($3.9 billion) from about C$6 billion. The firm boosted the headcount in its U.S. credit team by 15 percent in the past two years, hiring almost 20 people, including 10 sales staff and eight traders. Last month Neil Yaris, who has held jobs at Credit Suisse and Bank of America Corp., joined as co-head of high-yield debt trading.

Royal Bank’s long-standing goal to be a Top 10 investment bank in the U.S. contrasts with retrenchment in other areas of banking. The company sold its unprofitable U.S. lender RBC Bank to PNC Financial Services Group Inc. in March 2012, ending an unsuccessful decade-long foray into U.S. retail banking.

In Canada, RBC slipped to the third spot among underwriters of high-yield debt, from No. 1 in 2012. Still, the firm has led arrangers of investment-grade company bonds in Canada for at least 14 years.

I’m in the wrong business:

Carnegie Hall employs five full-time stagehands and uses part-timers as needed, a spokeswoman, Synneve Carlino, said in an e-mail.

The full-timers earned an average of $420,000 in 2011, according to the tax return. They move equipment in and out of the building and prepare three stages for performances, while operating audiovisual and other equipment. They work on holidays and weekends.

Oh, they work on holidays and weekends. Well, I’m glad that’s cleared up.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 15bp, FixedResets gaining 7bp and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. The Performance Highlights table is average sized – by standards of the last few months – with BAM issues notable on the downside. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts yield 5.56%, equivalent to 7.23% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 4.8%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 245bp, a significant increase from the 235bp reported September 25, as long corporate yields have declined about 10bp on the week, while PerpetualDiscounts haven’t done much of anything.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0508 % 2,533.5
FixedFloater 4.34 % 3.65 % 32,045 17.99 1 -1.0835 % 3,829.7
Floater 2.67 % 2.89 % 65,657 20.03 5 -0.0508 % 2,735.5
OpRet 4.63 % 2.78 % 61,624 0.49 3 -0.1028 % 2,635.1
SplitShare 4.76 % 4.97 % 60,900 4.03 6 0.1024 % 2,948.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1028 % 2,409.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 3.04 % 112,395 0.12 8 -0.0520 % 2,278.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.51 % 5.56 % 145,987 14.44 30 -0.1529 % 2,356.4
FixedReset 4.93 % 3.68 % 235,270 3.65 85 0.0736 % 2,458.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.12 % 4.42 % 198,981 6.75 43 -0.0171 % 2,380.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.36
Evaluated at bid price : 21.91
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 21.04
Evaluated at bid price : 21.04
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 18.21
Evaluated at bid price : 18.21
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.45
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.58
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 87,816 TD crossed 25,000 at 24.10; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.75
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 4.40 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 73,493 RBC crossed 56,500 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset 58,449 Scotia crossed 45,000 at 24.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 58,356 Desjardins crossed 45,000 at 23.28.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 52,125 Will reset 2013-10-31 at 3.5595%.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 43,235 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 23.33.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.21
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 25.31 – 26.59
Spot Rate : 1.2800
Average : 0.7157

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 2.29 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.91 – 23.12
Spot Rate : 1.2100
Average : 0.8050

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.36
Evaluated at bid price : 21.91
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 23.21 – 23.64
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3076

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.21
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

ENB.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 23.90 – 24.19
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1833

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.69
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.66 – 22.99
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2275

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.24
Evaluated at bid price : 22.66
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.91 – 21.28
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2922

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 20.91
Evaluated at bid price : 20.91
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %

PPL.PR.C Weak On Reasonable Volume

Wednesday, October 2nd, 2013

Pembina Pipeline Corporation has announced:

that it has closed its previously announced public offering of 6,000,000 cumulative redeemable rate reset class A preferred shares, series 3 (the “Series 3 Preferred Shares”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million (the “Offering”).

The Offering was first announced on September 23, 2013 when Pembina entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters led by RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank.

Proceeds from the Offering will be used to partially fund capital projects, to reduce short-term indebtedness and for other general corporate purposes of the Company and its affiliates.

The Series 3 Preferred Shares will begin trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the symbol PPL.PR.C.

PPL.PR.C is a FixedReset, 4.70%+260 announced September 23. It will be tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

The issue traded 232,472 shares today in a range of 24.44-54 before closing at 24.45-50, 16×22. Vital statistics are:

PPL.PR.C FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.94
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %

MAPF Portfolio Composition: September 2013

Wednesday, October 2nd, 2013

Turnover remained reasonable in September, at about 9%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped was the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) earlier in the year – many of the PerpetualPremiums had negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! This effect has caused the first of the three segments noted above to be untradeable for most practical purposes. The recent downdraft has reversed the trend and resulted in a large pool of PerpetualDiscounts, but due to their long term they are still, as a class, inferior to DeemedRetractibles.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to its peers, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This has obviously had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues are either trading near par or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past two months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on September 30 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2013-9-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 18.4% (-0.6) 4.91% 6.21
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 9.6% (+5.4) 5.30% 14.98
Fixed-Reset 8.1% (-4.8) 3.75% 5.56
Deemed-Retractible 54.1% (+0.7) 6.09% 8.54
Scraps (Various) 9.3% (-0.5) 6.51% 12.79
Cash +0.4% (-0.2) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.62% 8.85
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2013-9-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 36.0% (+0.9)
Pfd-2(high) 42.2% (+6.2)
Pfd-2 2.2% (-6.3)
Pfd-2(low) 9.9% (-0.2)
Pfd-3(high) 1.0% (0)
Pfd-3 4.7% (-0.1)
Pfd-3(low) 1.6% (-0.2)
Pfd-4(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-4 0% (0)
Pfd-4(low) 0.8% (0)
Pfd-5(high) 1.2% (-0.1)
Cash 0.4% (-0.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end.
A position held in NPI.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3.

Changes in sectoral distribution and credit quality were driven largely by the swap of most of the position held in HSB.PR.E (FixedReset, Pfd-2) to purchase CU.PR.F and CU.PR.G (PerpetualDiscount, Pfd-2(high).

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2013-9-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.6% (+0.6)
$50,000 – $100,000 16.7% (-0.6)
$100,000 – $200,000 28.4% (-3.3)
$200,000 – $300,000 42.7% (+7.2)
>$300,000 11.1% (-3.9)
Cash 0.4% (-0.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower