Archive for June, 2014

POW.PR.F Sinking Fund, Part 2

Tuesday, June 3rd, 2014

Assiduous Readers with good memories will remember the Mystery of the POW.PR.F Sinking Fund; the company is “make all reasonable efforts to purchase for cancellation on the open market 20,000 shares per quarter, such number being cumulative only in the same calendar year,”, but the quota was not fulfilled in 2008 or in any of the past three calendar years.

So I wrote a letter:

In the prospectus and as summarized on your website, POW.PR.F has a sinking fund provision by which Power Corporation is required to make its best efforts to purchase 80,000 shares per annum of this issue.

I note that, as disclosed in your Annual Reports, purchases have actually been as follows:
2013 12,000 shares
2012 40,000 shares
2011 77,300 shares
2010 80,000 shares
2009 80,000 shares
2008 60,000 shares

I have two questions:
• Why has the company not purchased the full amount of 80,000 shares in each of the past three years?
• Is the purchase of shares subject to the Normal Course Issuer Bid provisions of the Toronto Stock Exchange?

I have received a reply (emphasis from original):

In response to your first question, the Corporation is not subject to a best efforts obligation to purchase 80,000 per annum of the First Preferred Shares, 1986 Series. The Corporation has fulfilled its obligation to make all reasonable efforts to purchase the specified number of shares at a price not exceeding $50,00, if and to the extent that such shares were available for purchase.

In response to your second query, the purchase of these shares, while being completed through Toronto Stock Exchange facilities, is not subject to Normal Course Issuer Bid provisions.

Well, mea culpa on the “reasonable” vs. “best” efforts question, but I’m still confused. I have examined the HIMIPref™ database and created the following histogram of the offer prices:

POWPRF_askPx
Click for Big

So: the offer price never exceeded $50.00, not even once, on any trading day in the three calendar years of interest (on six occasions, the offer was exactly $50.00). So it’s time to write another letter and try to nail down the meaning of the word “reasonable”.

June 3, 2014

Tuesday, June 3rd, 2014

Scott Barlow had a polemic in the Globe titled Debt markets’ ‘lunacy’ threatens equity investors:

U.S. credit markets are absurdly overbought and equity investors on both sides of the border will be very much in the way of the inevitable correction when it occurs.

The most common method of gauging whether corporate debt is attractive or expensive is the spread – the difference in yield between a corporate bond issue and a government bond issue of the same maturity. When the spread is low, it is more difficult for investors to generate returns and there is less margin of safety.

The accompanying chart shows that the spread on the riskiest form of corporate debt – high yield bonds – are trading at spreads very close to the pre-2007 lows. At the same time, the CBOE Volatility Index – which uses equity option prices to measure expected volatility and market risk – is hitting all time lows. In other words, debt markets are expensive, and investors are broadly complacent.

New River Investments LLC hedge fund manager Guillermo Roditi Dominguez’s exasperation with current prices was evident on Twitter last week (where insiders can be particularly blunt on this issue) after a Walt Disney Co. three-year bond was issued: “just saw the disney bond. 20 over [treasuries]. twenty. time to pack it up and go hit the pool. i aint abuyin no more bonds this year [sic].”

Well, fine. But the reference to Disney led me to do a little more digging on the deal:

The strong demand for double A rated company’s offering has allowed the deal to price inside its outstanding bonds, which is a market coup for the technology giant.

Apple’s outstanding 2.4% May 2023s are quoted at a G-spread of 75bp, suggesting the new issue concession on the 10-year is around 2bp. The 30-year bonds are offering just 4bp of concession, based on where the outstanding 3.85% May 2043 is trading at Treasuries plus 104bp, while the five-year bonds offer a roughly negative 1.5bp concession compared with the outstanding 1% May 2018s trading at a G-spread of 39bp.

Outstanding three-year bonds were quoted at a G-spread of 19bp, so the concession on the new bonds was about negative 1bp.

A negative concession is fascinating and in conjunction with yesterday‘s discussion of increased underwriting competition – as well as previous discussions of US corporate bond liquidity – lead me to suspect that liquidity is in very short supply in the States. Where else but in the new issue market can a PM buy $10-million in corporates at a reasonable – albeit historically narrow – spread?

Other Disney commentary led into a discussion of Enbridge (briefly mentioned on May 29):

Other deals Wednesday saw spreads tighten even further from IPTs to pricing, which one banker said was down to Disney beginning with little in the way of new issue concession – leaving investors unwilling to lose out on any further pick-up.

At pricing the four-part trade appeared to carry concessions between flat to 8bp compared with the company’s outstandings.

“But broadly, after the recent flurry of issuance, most other issuers may need to be a bit more conservative at the start to create momentum in the book.” [said an unnamed banker].

Canadian energy company Enbridge did just that – and was able to tighten levels on its 10- and 30-year fixed rate bonds and three-year floaters substantially.

The 10s and 30s were announced with IPTs of Treasuries plus 125bp–130bp and plus 145bp–150bp, while the floater came at Libor plus low 60s.

These levels were pushed tighter to final pricing levels of plus 110bp and plus 125bp on the fixed and plus 45bp on the floater.

At the IPT stage, compared with outstanding 4% October 2023s at a G-spread of 114bp, the 10-year seemed to carry about 11bp to 16bp in concession, while the 30-year had about 15bp to 20bp in concession versus 4.55% August 2043s at G+130bp.

These juicy concessions enticed investors to jump in with orders that subsequently allowed it to tighten levels – and end up paying concessions of negative 4bp and negative 5bp.

Low yields are not confined to the US:

Europe’s lowest government bond yields since the Napoleonic Wars are signaling investors want more action from Mario Draghi.

Instead of a vote of confidence, the most pronounced rally in 200 years suggests the European Central Bank president needs to stave off the risks of stagnation and deflation. Austria, Belgium, France (GFRN10) and Germany can borrow at lower rates than the U.S. as inflation less than half the ECB’s target stokes concern the euro zone will take many years to recover from its longest-ever recession.

Speculation the ECB will provide more stimulus pushed yields on euro-region sovereign debt to a record-low 1.43 percent on May 30, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s Euro Government Bond Index. Draghi said May 8 the Governing Council is “comfortable” taking action to boost consumer-price growth, which at 0.7 percent in April was well below the ECB’s aim of keeping it just under 2 percent.

Rates on German 10-year bonds were at 1.37 percent yesterday, less than a quarter of a percentage point away from 1.127 percent reached in June 2012, the lowest since at least 1815, according to “The History of Interest Rates” by Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla. That was the year of Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo, after which the Congress of Vienna redrew the map of Europe, leading to the creation of the German Confederation.

Germany’s current yield compares with an average of 3.03 percent in the past 10 years. The interest rate for government loans was 3.6 percent in 1944 during World War II and 12.5 percent in 1931 amid the Great Depression, according to the book.

I’m not sure I’d want to be a fixed income manager in Germany in 1944, even if I was seeing 3.6% yields!

I understand that marketing for the NEW.PR.C refunding has commenced, but a prospectus is not yet available.

It was a negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with FixedReset prices collapsing in the final hour of trading; PerpetualDiscounts were off 1bp, FixedResets got whacked for 44bp and DeemedRetractibles were flat. A lengthy Performance Highlights table is comprised almost entirely of losing FixedResets, with the solitary exception being a FixedFloater loser. Volume was very heavy.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0967 % 2,511.2
FixedFloater 4.58 % 3.83 % 33,179 17.75 1 -1.2857 % 3,746.7
Floater 2.90 % 3.01 % 47,560 19.63 4 -0.0967 % 2,711.4
OpRet 4.38 % -13.81 % 31,803 0.09 2 0.0000 % 2,710.5
SplitShare 4.82 % 4.22 % 62,357 4.16 5 -0.0318 % 3,111.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,478.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % -2.26 % 84,910 0.09 17 -0.0530 % 2,402.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.27 % 105,152 14.99 20 -0.0086 % 2,545.5
FixedReset 4.56 % 3.75 % 220,363 8.76 75 -0.4410 % 2,508.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 1.33 % 154,769 0.16 43 0.0047 % 2,519.8
FloatingReset 2.67 % 2.51 % 122,560 4.13 6 -0.0331 % 2,482.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset -2.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 21.33
Evaluated at bid price : 21.33
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 20.05
Evaluated at bid price : 20.05
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.42
Bid-YTW : 4.45 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 23.33
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 24.71
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.27
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.42
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 20.73
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.12
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.H FixedReset 1,106,001 New issue closed today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 464,641 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 1.70 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset 182,828 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 162,850 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 124,070 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 107,754 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 1.76 %
There were 60 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset Quote: 24.15 – 24.95
Spot Rate : 0.8000
Average : 0.4743

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %

TRP.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 20.05 – 20.45
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2238

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 20.05
Evaluated at bid price : 20.05
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %

CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.30 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3830

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.91
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %

BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 23.42 – 23.88
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.2962

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.42
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 21.33 – 21.79
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3093

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 21.33
Evaluated at bid price : 21.33
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %

PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.51 – 25.83
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1918

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %

RY.PR.H Closes Soft on Excellent Volume

Tuesday, June 3rd, 2014

Royal Bank of Canada has announced:

it has closed its domestic public offering of Non-Cumulative, 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares Series BB. Royal Bank of Canada issued 20 million Preferred Shares Series BB at a price of $25 per share to raise gross proceeds of $500 million.

The offering was underwritten by a syndicate led by RBC Capital Markets. The Preferred Shares Series BB will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the ticker symbol RY.PR.H.

The Preferred Shares Series BB were issued under a prospectus supplement dated May 27, 2014 to the bank’s short form base shelf prospectus dated December 20, 2013.

RY.PR.H is a FixedReset, 3.90%+226, NVCC-Compliant issue announced May 23. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the FixedReset subindex. It is regrettable that the Toronto Exchange has recycled the ticker of the previous RY.PR.H, redeemed less than a year ago.

The issue traded a healthy 1,328,901 shares today in an unusually wide range of 24.64-99 before closing at 24.86-88, 37×72. The issue was affected by a late-afternoon collapse in the market; it was trading firmly in the 90s prior to 3pm, as reflected in the Volume Weighted Average Price: 24.944985. Vital Statistics are:

RY.PR.H FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

The two NVCC-compliant issues are priced comparatively with their non-compliant cousins according to Implied Volatility Theory:

ImpVol_RY_140603
Click for Big

June 2, 2014

Monday, June 2nd, 2014

No sooner had I delivered my crushing retort to my cashless friends than I became aware of a piece in the Globe by Ian McGugan titled Why central bankers would like to trash your cash:

An end to folding money could offer many advantages, according to Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard professor and former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. The most immediate payoffs would come from cracking down on drug traffickers and tax evaders.

This could have surprisingly large benefits for government coffers. In a column in the Financial Times this week, Prof. Rogoff estimates that untaxed, underground transactions account for 7 to 8 per cent of the U.S. economy and probably even more of its European counterpart. Bringing all those cash-only transactions into the light by forcing them to be conducted through the banking system, where the taxman could track them, would provide governments with a nice revenue boost.

One option, in theory, would be to impose negative interest rates – to apply a penalty charge on bank balances to spur people to spend. One big problem with this in practice, however, is that it just won’t work because “people will start bailing out into cash,” as Prof. Rogoff writes.

But what if there was no cash? Government could then adjust rates however it wanted, even well into negative territory, to force people to stop sitting on their wealth.

A miracle has occurred! Competition is having an effect on underwriting fees … maybe!

With trading profits dwindling, more dealers than ever are fighting for assignments managing U.S. corporate-bond sales, one of the few bright spots in fixed income. Companies from the most-creditworthy to the most-indebted have been selling trillions of dollars of debt, locking in record-low borrowing costs ahead of the anticipated rise in interest rates.

A record 144 underwriters for the period have split an estimated $4.2 billion of fees on U.S. sales, the data show.

The five most-active corporate-debt underwriters this year landed 47 percent of the business, the smallest share on record. That’s down from 59 percent of the assignments for all of 2009.

Smaller firms see an opportunity to break into the business as Wall Street’s behemoths unload inventories of riskier securities in the face of higher capital requirements and limits imposed by the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act’s Volcker Rule on the amount of their own money they can use to trade.

Royal Bank of Canada has climbed to 11th most-active underwriter of corporate bonds in the U.S., from 14th place in the period four years earlier, Bloomberg data show.

Debt underwriting fees among the nine-biggest banks were 5.8 percent lower in the first three months of 2014 from the same period last year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg Industries. The slump in fees outpaced a 2.6 percent drop in the volume of global corporate bond sales.

The article isn’t all that clear on actual fees. The fee drop among the nine-biggest firms outpaces the drop in total issuance, but the market share of the five-biggest has dropped considerably. It is conceivable that prices haven’t dropped at all and that the quoted differences are due the changes in volume, market share and product mix. But we can hope!

Tobias Adrian, Richard Crump, Benjamin Mills and Emanuel Moench have been working on the Treasury term premium:

Treasury yields can be decomposed into two components: expectations of the future path of short-term Treasury yields and the Treasury term premium. The term premium is the compensation that investors require for bearing the risk that short-term Treasury yields do not evolve as they expected. Studying the term premium over a long time period allows us to investigate what has historically driven changes in Treasury yields. In this blog post, we estimate and analyze the Treasury term premium from 1961 to the present, and make these estimates available for download here.

In a previous post, we compared our estimated term premium to a number of observable variables. We showed that the term premium is a countercyclical variable which tends to move with measures of uncertainty and disagreement about the future level of yields.

The evolution of term premia has been of particular interest since the Federal Reserve began large-scale asset purchases. Over this time, short-term interest rates have been close to zero, and our estimates show that the term premium has been compressed and has at times even been negative. An advantage of our estimate is that it is available back to 1961. Hence, we can study the term premium at another time when short-term interest rates were close to zero. By comparing the ten-year ACM term premium of the past decade to that of the 1960s in the first chart, we find that the ten-year term premium was negative at times in the 1960s, but reverted back to positive. Similarly, our estimate of the term premium has risen above zero recently.

Daily estimates of the ACM term premium from 1961 to the present are now available for download from the Data & Indicators section of the New York Fed’s website. The data are updated weekly and include estimates of the term premium for yearly Treasury maturities from one to ten years, as well as fitted yields and the expected average level of short-term interest rates.

I get lots of ‘friend’ requests on LinkedIn and Facebook from people whose names I don’t recognize. If I don’t recognize the name, I don’t respond; to me, that sounds basic. Some people disagree:

In an unprecedented, three-year cyber espionage campaign, Iranian hackers created false social networking accounts and a fake news website to spy on military and political leaders in the United States, Israel and other countries, a cyber intelligence firm said on Thursday.

ISight Partners, which uncovered the operation, said the hackers’ targets include a four-star U.S. Navy admiral, U.S. lawmakers and ambassadors, members of the U.S.-Israeli lobby, and personnel from Britain, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The hackers set up false accounts on Facebook and other online social networks for these 14 personas, populated their profiles with fictitious personal content, and then tried to befriend target victims, according to iSight.

To build credibility, the hackers would approach high-value targets by first establishing ties with the victims’ friends, classmates, colleagues, relatives and other connections over social networks run by Facebook Inc., Google Inc. and its YouTube, LinkedIn Corp. and Twitter Inc.

The hackers would initially send the targets content that was not malicious, such as links to news articles on NewsOnAir.org, in a bid to establish trust. Then they would send links that infected PCs with malicious software, or direct targets to web portals that ask for network log-in credentials, iSight said.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 20bp, FixedResets up 10bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 1bp. The Performance Highlights table is of above-average length, with a preponderance of FixedReset issues on the winning side, bouncing back a bit from Friday‘s carnage. Volume was below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7656 % 2,513.7
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.77 % 32,676 17.85 1 0.0000 % 3,795.5
Floater 2.90 % 3.03 % 47,845 19.60 4 0.7656 % 2,714.1
OpRet 4.38 % -13.95 % 31,765 0.09 2 0.0195 % 2,710.5
SplitShare 4.82 % 4.10 % 62,358 4.16 5 -0.1828 % 3,112.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0195 % 2,478.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.51 % -5.26 % 85,724 0.09 17 -0.0438 % 2,403.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.26 % 104,570 15.00 20 -0.1965 % 2,545.7
FixedReset 4.55 % 3.73 % 214,927 8.77 74 0.0995 % 2,519.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 2.20 % 156,423 0.16 43 0.0149 % 2,519.7
FloatingReset 2.67 % 2.51 % 142,182 3.99 6 0.0597 % 2,482.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.30
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 24.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.69
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.88
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 20.04
Evaluated at bid price : 20.04
Bid-YTW : 2.63 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.K FixedReset 86,855 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 1.18 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 86,080 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 0.51 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 84,905 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 81,159 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 41,865 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 24.03
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 38,843 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 2.23 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 24.60 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2562

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %

TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.35 – 26.59
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1556

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-02
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : -16.00 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 24.30 – 24.60
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2186

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

MFC.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 24.60 – 24.89
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2121

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.03 – 24.54
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.4379

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 24.03
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.15 – 22.38
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1591

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %

New Issue: EFN FixedReset, 6.40%+472 (EFN.PR.E)

Monday, June 2nd, 2014

Element Financial Corporation has announced that it (emphasis added):

has entered into an agreement to sell, on a bought deal basis, 4,000,000 Series E Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per Series E Preferred Share for gross proceeds of $100 million (the “Preferred Share Offering”, and with the Subscription Receipt Offering and the Debenture Offering, the “Offerings”). Holders of the Series E Preferred Shares will be entitled, if, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Element, to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend for the initial five-year period ending September 30, 2019 of 6.4% per annum. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years to an annual dividend rate equal to the 5-Year Government of Canada Bond Yield as quoted on Bloomberg on the 30th day prior to the first day of the relevant subsequent five year fixed rate period plus 4.72%.

Holders of the Series E Preferred Shares will have the right to convert their shares into cumulative floating rate preferred shares, Series F of Element (“Series F Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions and Element’s right to redeem the Series E Preferred Shares, on September 30, 2019 and on September 30 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series F Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a quarterly floating rate dividend, if, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Element, equal to the then current three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill plus 4.72%. Holders of the Series F Preferred Shares may convert their Series F Preferred Shares into Series E Preferred Shares, subject to certain conditions and Element’s right to redeem the Series F Preferred Shares, on September 30, 2024 and on September 30 every five years thereafter. The Series E Preferred Shares will not be rated. If the Acquisition does not proceed, the net proceeds from the Preferred Share Offering will be used by Element for general corporate purposes.

The Preferred Share Offering is being led by BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. and includes CIBC World Markets Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Barclays Capital Canada Inc., National Bank Financial Inc., TD Securities Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (Canada) Inc., RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., Cormark Securities Inc. and Manulife Securities Inc. (collectively, the “Preferred Share Underwriters”).

This is part of a major capital-raising exercise:

  • Bought deal financing of $750 million subscription receipts, $250 million extendible convertible debentures and $100 million cumulative 5-year rate reset preferred shares
  • Amended and restated revolving credit facility for aggregate commitment of $1 billion
  • US$1.36 billion bridge financing commitment obtained

… which is in turn due to a major acquisition announcement:

Element Financial Corporation (TSX:EFN) (“Element” or the “Company”), one of North America’s leading equipment finance companies, today announced that it has entered into a definitive agreement to acquire the assets and operations of PHH Arval, PHH Corporation’s North American fleet management services business (the “Transaction”). Under the terms of the agreement, Element will pay approximately US$1.4 billion for the business in an all-cash transaction representing a purchase price multiple of 1.56 times the adjusted book value of the acquired business. At March 31, 2014, PHH Arval reported more than US$4.6 billion in total assets, of which US$4.0 billion represented net investment in fleet leases, and generated annual origination volumes of approximately US$1.7 billion during 2013.

The Transaction, which is expected to close on or before July 31, 2014, is subject to customary closing conditions, including regulatory approvals, and post-closing purchase price adjustments.

This issue joins EFN’s other FixedResets outstanding, EFN.PR.A, FixedReset, 6.60%+471 and EFN.PR.C, FixedReset, 6.50%+481.

As with the two previous issues, this issue will not be tracked by HIMIPref™ on the grounds that it is not rated. This is not because I can’t come to my own views regarding credit quality, or because I worship the Credit Rating Agencies, but because I feel the threat of an imminent downgrade from a major agency does an excellent job of focussing the minds of the directors and management that they have a problem that really should be addressed. A ‘Review-Negative’ by Hymas Investment Management does not have quite the same effect.

New Issue: CM FixedReset, 3.90%+232

Monday, June 2nd, 2014

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce has announced:

that it had entered into an agreement with a group of underwriters led by CIBC World Markets Inc. for an issue of 10 million Basel III-compliant non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series 39 (the “Series 39 Shares”) priced at $25.00 per Series 39 Share to raise gross proceeds of $250 million.

CIBC has granted the underwriters an option to purchase up to an additional 2 million Series 39 Shares at the same offering price, exercisable at any time up to two days prior to closing. Should the underwriters’ option be fully exercised, the total gross proceeds of the financing will be $300 million.

The Series 39 Shares will yield 3.90% per annum, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of CIBC, for an initial period ending July 31, 2019. On July 31, 2019, and on July 31 every five years thereafter, the dividend rate will reset to be equal to the then current five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.32%.

Subject to regulatory approval and certain provisions of the Series 39 Shares, on July 31, 2019, and on July 31 every five years thereafter, CIBC may, at its option, redeem all or any part of the then outstanding Series 39 Shares at par.

Subject to the right of redemption, holders of the Series 39 Shares will have the right to convert their shares into non-cumulative Floating Rate Class A Preferred Shares, Series 40 (the “Series 40 Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on July 31, 2019 and on July 31 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series 40 Shares will be entitled to receive a quarterly floating rate dividend, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of CIBC, equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.32%.

Holders of the Series 40 Shares may convert their Series 40 Shares into Series 39 Shares, subject to certain conditions, on July 31, 2024 and on July 31 every five years thereafter.

The expected closing date is June 11, 2014. CIBC will make an application to list the Series 39 Shares as of the closing date on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The net proceeds of this offering will be used for general purposes of CIBC.

They later announced:

that as a result of strong investor demand for its previously announced domestic public offering of non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series 39, the size of the offering has been increased to 16 million shares. The gross proceeds of the offering will now be $400 million. The offering will be underwritten by a syndicate led by CIBC World Markets Inc. The expected closing date is June 11, 2014.

The net proceeds from this transaction will be used for general purposes of CIBC.

Since CM.PR.K and CM.PR.M are being redeemed and the only other extant CM issues CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E and CM.PR.G are NVCC-Compliant through the back door, this means that CM will be the first bank to have all its preferred issues NVCC compliant.

Update: Provisionally rated Pfd-2 [Stable] by DBRS.

Rated P-2(low) by S&P:

The ‘BBB-‘ issue rating stands three notches below the ‘a-‘ stand-alone credit profile (SACP) assigned to CIBC, incorporating:

  • •A deduction of two notches, the minimum downward notching from the SACP under our criteria for a bank hybrid capital instrument; and
  • •The deduction of an additional notch to reflect that the preferred shares feature a contingent conversion trigger provision. Should a trigger event occur (as defined by The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions’ [OSFI] guideline for Capital Adequacy Requirements, Chapter 2), each outstanding preferred share will automatically and immediately be converted, without the holder’s consent, into a number of fully paid and freely tradable common shares of the bank determined in accordance with a conversion formula.

CM.PR.K and CM.PR.M To Be Redeemed

Monday, June 2nd, 2014

The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce has announced:

its intention to redeem all of its issued and outstanding Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares Series 33 (TSX: CM.PR.K), and Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares Series 37 (TSX: CM.PR.M), for cash. The redemptions will occur on July 31, 2014. The redemption price is $25.00 per Series 33 or Series 37 share.

The quarterly dividends of $0.334375 per Series 33 share and $0.406250 per Series 37 share, announced on May 29, 2014 will be the final dividends for these two series. These dividends will be paid on July 28, 2014 to shareholders of record on June 27, 2014.

Holders of the Series 33 and Series 37 shares should contact the financial institution, broker or other intermediary through which they hold the shares to confirm how they will receive their redemption proceeds.

CM.PR.K is a Fixed-Reset 5.35%+218bp that commenced trading 2008-9-10 after being announced 2008-8-27.

CM.PR.M is a Fixed-Reset 6.50%+433 that commenced trading 2009-3-6 after being announced 2009-2-26.

Due to the very large Issue Reset Spread, there is no surprise at the call on CM.PR.M. The other issue, CM.PR.K, is perhaps a bit more of a surprise, particularly since they also announced a new issue with a spread of 232bp. However, the new issue is NVCC compliant, and CM.PR.K isn’t.

MAPF Performance: May 2014

Sunday, June 1st, 2014

The fund outperformed the indices in May, with the help of good performance from its heavy weighting Insurance DeemedRetractibles and an underweighting in FixedResets, which did not perform very well.

relPerf_140530
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relYield_140530
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I continue to believe that the decline in the preferred share market remains overdone; the following table shows the increase in yields since May 22 of some fixed income sectors:

Yield Changes
May 22, 2013
to
May 30, 2014
Sector Yield
May 22
2013
Yield
May 30
2014
Change
Five-Year Canadas 1.38% 1.53% +15bp
Long Canadas 2.57% 2.78% +21bp
Long Corporates 4.15% 4.35% +20bp
FixedResets
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
3.51% 4.86% +135bp
Perpetual-Discounts
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
6.34% 6.96% +62bp
The change in yield of PerpetualDiscounts is understated due a massive influx of issues from the PerpetualPremium sub-index over the period, which improved credit quality. When the four issues that comprised the PerpetualDiscount sub-index as of May 22, 2013 are evaluated as of May 30, 2014, the interest-equivalent yield is 7.20% and thus the change is +86bp.

ZPR, is an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues and a very high proportion of junk issues, returned +1.99%, +3.64% and -0.98% over the past one-, three- and twelve-month periods, respectively (according to the fund’s data), versus returns for the TXPL index of -1.21%, +1.85% and -1.57% respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $1,013-million since inception in November 2012; AUM declined by $5-million in May, but given index returns a decline of $12.3-million was expected, indicating that money is still flowing into the fund. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents.

TXPR had returns over one- and three-months of -0.58% and +2.16%, respectively with CPD performance within expectations.

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for February were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to May 30, 2013
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat +1.94% +5.18%
Floater +3.77% +3.04%
OpRet +0.41% +0.60%
SplitShare +0.69% +2.29%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium +0.52% +2.61%
PerpetualDiscount +1.41% +5.83%%
FixedReset -1.34% +0.40%
DeemedRetractible +0.35% +2.84%
FloatingReset -0.49% +1.71%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close May 30, 2014, was $10.5689.

Returns to May 30, 2014
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +1.23% -0.97% -0.58% -0.60%
Three Months +4.92% +1.47% +2.16% +2.02%
One Year +2.56% +0.40% -0.24% -0.67%
Two Years (annualized) +6.15% +2.74% +2.65% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +3.88% +3.13% +2.86% +2.34%
Four Years (annualized) +9.25% +6.55% +5.61% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +11.33% +7.48% +6.16% +5.52%
Six Years (annualized) +13.79% +5.27% +4.13%  
Seven Years (annualized) +12.13% +4.21%    
Eight Years (annualized) +11.24% +3.81%    
Nine Years (annualized) +10.55% +3.72%    
Ten Years (annualized) +10.52% +4.02%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +11.46% +4.04%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +11.03% +4.35%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +11.44% +4.16%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.38%, +2.06% and +1.35%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +3.22%; five year is +6.87%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.67%, +0.92% and -1.86% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +0.98%; five-year is +3.97%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.20%, +2.78% & -4.87%, respectively. Three Year performance is +1.03%; five-year is +3.66%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.37%, +2.09% & +1.17%, respectively. Three year performance is +3.83%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are -0.49%, +1.86% and -1.88% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is -1.27%, +1.70% and -2.06% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund are not available since our wise regulators are protecting you from inappropriate knowledge.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are similarly off-limits.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past two years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund occasionally finds an attractive opportunity to trade between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons (but in which trading is now hampered by the fact that the low-coupon issues are trading near par and are callable at par in the near term), but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index, and in June, 2013, when the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles behaved like PerpetualDiscounts in a sharply negative market.

At this point, the composition of the BMO-CM “50” index should be discussed; it will be noted that it has greatly outperformed TXPR over the past year, and MAPF holders will have noticed that the fund has only just returned to a positive differential against BMO-CM “50” on a year-over-year basis. While I have not done a thorough analysis of the difference, I’ve done some approximations – note that the numbers in this section are approximations, but are close enough for government work.

I believe that BMO-CM “50” has benefitted greatly over the past year by being over-weight in bank Straight Perpetuals relative to other Straight Perpetuals:

Sampling Error in BMO-CM “50”
Class of
Straight
Perpetual
BMO-CM “50”
Weight
May 2013
Proportion of BMO-CM “50” Straights Shares
Outstanding
May 2014
Proportion
Shares
Outstanding
Performance
May 2013
to
May 2014
Bank DeemedRetractible 17.7% 59.8% 240.5-million 34.9% +4.81%
Insurance DeemedRetractible 6.5% 22.0% 183.5-million 26.6% -0.86%
Bank Straight 1.8% 6.1% 47.2-million 6.8% +4.88%
Straight 3.6% 12.2% 218.6-million 31.7% +0.51%

Thus we see that at the beginning of the downdraft, the BMO-CM “50” was highly overweighted in Bank DeemedRetractibles, which have performed quite well over the year, and highly underweighted in Straight Perpetuals, which have underperformed. Weightings in the other two sectors were about right.

It’s no wonder the fund struggled to outperform the BMO-CM “50” index, and no wonder BMO-CM “50” has outperformed TXPR! One consolation, however, is that many Bank DeemedRetractibles now have a negative Yield-to-Worst; this is a reasonably good single-measure predictor of future performance. So perhaps we’ll see a reversal of these effects over the next few years!

In May, insurance DeemedRetractibles greatly outperformed bank DeemedRetractibles:

DRRelPerf_140530
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… and were about even with Straight Perpetuals:

InsStraightRelPerf_140530
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None of the regressions shown in the above two charts are of very good quality.

A lingering effect of the downdraft of 2013 has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility (all Implied Volatility calculations use bids from May 30):

ImpVol_GWO_140530
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ImpVol_PWF_140530
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ImpVol_BNS_SP_140530
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Implied Volatility of
Three Series of Straight Perpetuals
May 30, 2014
Issuer Pure Yield Implied Volatility
GWO 4.53% (+0.11) 18% (0)
PWF 3.26% (-0.56) 28% (-4)
BNS 0.01% (0) 32% (-8)
Bracketted figures are changes since April month-end

It is disconcerting to see the difference between GWO and PWF; if anything, we would expect the implied volatility for GWO to be higher, given that the DeemedRetraction – not yet given significant credence by the market – implies a directionality in prices. The GWO data with the best fit derived for PWF is, however, not readily distinguishable from the best fit although the best fit has a noticeably lower Sum of Squared Errors (0.86 vs 1.35):

ImpVol_GWO_PWFBest_140530
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The seeming discrepancy might be sampling error – if we assume that the highest coupon GWO issue [GWO.PR.F] is “right”, and the next three highest issues [GWO.PR.M, GWO.PR.L, GWO.PR.P] are priced too high (yielding too little). This could be justified if the market is paying a premium (accepting lower yield) for issues with a relatively long term until their first par call … which would be reasonable enough, but rarely happens!

In the September, 2013, edition of PrefLetter, I extended the theory of Implied Volatility to FixedResets – relating the option feature of the Issue Reset Spreads to a theoretical non-callable Market Spread.

ImpVol_BPO_140530
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ImpVol_FFH_140530
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Implied Volatility of
Two Series of FixedResets
May 30, 2014
Issuer Market Reset Spread
(Non-Callable)
Implied Volatility
BPO 82bp (+17) 40% (0)
FFH 278bp (-3) 15% (0)
Bracketted figures are changes since April month-end

These are very interesting results: The BPO issues are trading as if calls are a certainty, while FFH issues are trading as if calls are much less likely. The FFH series continues to be perplexing, this time with the four lower-coupon issues showing virtually no implied volatility – with the highest coupon issue (FFH.PR.K) being well off the mark … all I can think of is that the market has decided that FFH.PR.K, with an Issue Reset Spread of 351bp, is sure to be called in 2017, while the other four (highest spread is FFH.PR.C, +315) are not at all likely to be called.

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. As has been previously noted, very high levels of Implied Volatility (in the 40% range, at which point the calculation may be considered virtually meaningless) imply a very strong expectation of directionality in future prices – i.e, an expectation that all issues will be redeemed at par.

It is significant that the preferred share market knows no moderation. I suggest that a good baseline estimate for Volatility over a three year period is 15% but the observed figure is generally higher in a rising market and lower in a declining one … with, of course, a period of adjustment in between, which I suspect we are currently experiencing.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles; something that dismays me, particularly given that the market does not yet agree with me regarding the insurance issues! There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
May, 2014 10.5689 5.28% 0.998 5.291% 1.0000 $0.5592
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and FixedReset issues on February 28; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares). This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds positions in various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a small position in these issues.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas (set at 1.53% for the May 30 calculation) to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Portfolio Yield” of 4.64% as of May 23, 2014 and notes:

Portfolio yield is calculated as the most recent income received by the ETF in the form of dividends interest and other income annualized based on the payment frequently divided by the current market value of ETFs investments.

In other words – it’s the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF is 4.94% as of May 30, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s a little higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to discuss it in the context of portfolio reporting is misleading.

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance has generally been due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: May 2014

Sunday, June 1st, 2014

Turnover remained slow and steady in May, at about 5%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped was the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) in early 2013 – many of the PerpetualPremiums had negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! This effect has caused the first of the three segments noted above to be untradeable for most practical purposes. Last summer’s downdraft reversed the trend and resulted in a large pool of PerpetualDiscounts, but due to their long term they are still, as a class, inferior to DeemedRetractibles.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on May 30 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2014-05-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 15.8% (+0.8) 3.94% 5.75
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 8.3% (-2.3) 5.05% 15.41
Fixed-Reset 9.5% (+2.7) 3.94% 7.48
Deemed-Retractible 55.6% (-1.2) 5.81% 8.29
Scraps (Various) 10.5% (-0.3) 6.03% 11.11
Cash 0.2% (+0.2) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.28% 8.68
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Towards the end of the month, there were some trades into FixedResets (BNS.PR.Z @ 24.305 and GWO.PR.N at 22.097) from PerpetualDiscounts (CU.PR.G @ 22.456) and DeemedRetractibles (GWO.PR.Q @ 24.459 and GWO.PR.H @ 23.36). The first of these trades (from CU.PR.G to BNS.PR.Z) is currently underwater; the second (into GWO.PR.N) is roughly flat.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2014-5-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 28.8% (+0.5)
Pfd-2(high) 51.4% (-0.5)
Pfd-2 0%
Pfd-2(low) 9.0% (0)
Pfd-3(high) 1.0% (0)
Pfd-3 4.4% (-1.0)
Pfd-3(low) 2.8% (+0.6)
Pfd-4(high) 0%
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0.8% (0)
Pfd-5(high) 1.4% (0)
Cash 0.2% (+0.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end.
A position held in NPI.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3(high)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3(high).

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2014-5-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 1.5% (+1.5)
$50,000 – $100,000 26.3% (-0.6)
$100,000 – $200,000 22.4% (-2.6)
$200,000 – $300,000 42.3% (-0.6)
>$300,000 7.3% (+2.1)
Cash 0.2% (+0.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower