Apparently there’s another “mini-tender” offer being made by TRC Capital:
TransCanada Corporation (TSX, NYSE: TRP) (TransCanada) has been notified of an unsolicited mini-tender offer by TRC Capital Corporation (TRC Capital) to purchase up to 2,500,000 common shares of TransCanada, representing approximately 0.28 per cent of TransCanada’s outstanding common shares at a price of CDN $55.35 per common share. TransCanada does not endorse this unsolicited mini-tender offer.
Shareholders are cautioned that the mini-tender offer has been made at a 4.32 per cent discount to the closing price of TransCanada’s common shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange on August 14, 2018, the last trading day before the mini-tender offer was announced.
Any person considering tendering to the offer should consult his or her financial advisor.
TransCanada does not endorse TRC Capital’s unsolicited mini-tender offer and is not associated with TRC Capital, the mini-tender offer, or the offer documentation. TRC Capital has made similar unsolicited mini-tender offers for shares of other companies.
The Financial Post did a piece on a similar offer a few years back for Enbridge stock (emphasis added):
Shareholders sometimes accept a below-market mini tender to avoid paying brokerage commissions for trading their shares and are therefore willing to accept a discount. However, a CSA advisory notes this is a very limited circumstance.
“These are bad news, I would say,” University of Calgary finance professor Ari Pandes said, calling mini-tender offers an “unscrupulous and unethical tactic.”
He said mini tenders often catch investors “off-guard” and cause them to “push the panic button so that some investors decide to sell.”
“The important thing is for the companies to get on top of it quickly,” Pandes said. He said companies should warn their shareholders not to accept the mini-tenders before retail investors, who might not do their homework, accept the offer.
…
Lorne Albaum, a Toronto securities lawyer who heads TRC Capital, did not respond to a request for comment.
The practice is discussed in CSA Staff Notice 61-301, issued in 1999.
Well, I won’t be doing any business with Lorne Albaum, I can tell you that much! Nor, I hope, with any entity that has done business with him!
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1757 % | 3,092.2 |
FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1757 % | 5,674.0 |
Floater | 3.49 % | 3.72 % | 50,197 | 17.99 | 4 | 0.1757 % | 3,270.0 |
OpRet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0866 % | 3,214.8 |
SplitShare | 4.57 % | 4.75 % | 48,396 | 4.83 | 5 | 0.0866 % | 3,839.2 |
Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0866 % | 2,995.5 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.62 % | -10.55 % | 56,809 | 0.09 | 10 | -0.0157 % | 2,913.7 |
Perpetual-Discount | 5.40 % | 5.52 % | 55,889 | 14.59 | 25 | 0.0881 % | 2,994.0 |
FixedReset | 4.30 % | 4.78 % | 118,165 | 3.91 | 107 | 0.0656 % | 2,574.1 |
Deemed-Retractible | 5.13 % | 5.93 % | 61,351 | 5.39 | 26 | -0.0951 % | 2,980.5 |
FloatingReset | 3.43 % | 3.77 % | 34,789 | 5.70 | 7 | 0.0456 % | 2,841.5 |
Performance Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
GWO.PR.R | Deemed-Retractible | -1.37 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.27 Bid-YTW : 7.10 % |
TRP.PR.J | FixedReset | -1.18 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2021-05-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 26.00 Bid-YTW : 3.91 % |
BAM.PR.K | Floater | -1.14 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-08-16 Maturity Price : 17.40 Evaluated at bid price : 17.40 Bid-YTW : 3.76 % |
EMA.PR.H | FixedReset | 1.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2023-08-15 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.43 Bid-YTW : 4.54 % |
PWF.PR.A | Floater | 1.60 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-08-16 Maturity Price : 21.28 Evaluated at bid price : 21.55 Bid-YTW : 2.99 % |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
NA.PR.E | FixedReset | 179,600 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-08-16 Maturity Price : 22.82 Evaluated at bid price : 24.06 Bid-YTW : 4.94 % |
BMO.PR.W | FixedReset | 93,600 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-08-16 Maturity Price : 22.58 Evaluated at bid price : 23.04 Bid-YTW : 4.83 % |
PWF.PR.K | Perpetual-Discount | 70,800 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-08-16 Maturity Price : 22.12 Evaluated at bid price : 22.40 Bid-YTW : 5.56 % |
NA.PR.S | FixedReset | 67,530 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2048-08-16 Maturity Price : 22.86 Evaluated at bid price : 23.50 Bid-YTW : 4.96 % |
TD.PF.H | FixedReset | 66,152 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2021-10-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 26.02 Bid-YTW : 3.58 % |
POW.PR.G | Perpetual-Premium | 56,128 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2021-04-15 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.29 Bid-YTW : 5.35 % |
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. |
Wide Spread Highlights | ||
Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
BAM.PR.X | FixedReset | Quote: 19.05 – 19.60 Spot Rate : 0.5500 Average : 0.3504 YTW SCENARIO |
TRP.PR.J | FixedReset | Quote: 26.00 – 26.39 Spot Rate : 0.3900 Average : 0.2416 YTW SCENARIO |
W.PR.M | FixedReset | Quote: 25.90 – 26.35 Spot Rate : 0.4500 Average : 0.3142 YTW SCENARIO |
GWO.PR.R | Deemed-Retractible | Quote: 22.27 – 22.65 Spot Rate : 0.3800 Average : 0.2548 YTW SCENARIO |
BAM.PR.K | Floater | Quote: 17.40 – 17.78 Spot Rate : 0.3800 Average : 0.2588 YTW SCENARIO |
IAG.PR.I | FixedReset | Quote: 25.25 – 26.25 Spot Rate : 1.0000 Average : 0.8806 YTW SCENARIO |
DC.PR.E Plunging On Accelerating Losses
Thursday, August 16th, 2018Assiduous Reader TS writes in and says:
Attaboy, TS! That’s how you get your eMails answered!
So let’s back up a little …
Dundee made an initial proposal in November 2015 to exchange its DC.PR.C shares for DC.PR.E, which would pay a little higher dividend and defer the soft-retraction privilege for three years; the proposal attracted some press coverage and an exhortation to consider exercising dissent rights. This led to reconsideration by Dundee despite a rather peculiar endorsement from a proxy advisor and led to a sweeter offer that attracted further commentary.
… and finally, the company announced a ringing endorsement from the shareholders … or perhaps it would be better to say “the shareholders’ advisors”, since the proxy solicitation fee was so high!
The proposal succeeded and DC.PR.E commenced trading on 2016-2-12. Some investors retracted on 2016-6-30, after filing the paperwork. A further 300,000-odd shares were redeemed on 2018-1-31 which comprised only about 8.4% of the total outstanding:
On August 14, the company announced some pretty awful operating results:
This news was not met with applause by holders of the Subordinate Voting Shares, DC.A:
Click for Big
… with holders of DC.PR.E being rather disapproving:
Click for Big
At today’s DC.A close of 1.23, the 12.5 DC.A shares to be received on shareholder-initiated conversion next June will be worth $15.375, and there will (maybe!) be four dividend payments in the interim totalling (maybe!) 1.875, for a total Future Value of $17.25, so the ratio is out of whack, given that the VWAP today was 20.46 on volume of 10,660.
So, basically, the company has three options:
In connection with the last option, we can review their 2017 Annual Information Form, which states in part:
So he doesn’t care. Ned Goodman will continue to control the corporation and preside over important personnel decisions, such as whether Jonathan Goodman should continue as Executive Chairman and Director, whether David Goodman should continue as Chief Executive Officer and Director, whether Mark Goodman should continue as President and, perhaps most importantly, how to convince the market that the published book value per share of the company of $8.70 is entirely reasonable.
We shall see! However, I suspect that one very important scenario is that this plays out much along the lines of the saga of Quebecor World … in which repeated heavy conversions of the preferreds into common ultimately ended with a devastating restructuring.
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