PrefBlog

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close February 28, 2020, was $7.6268.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available directly from Hymas Investment Management.

The preferred share market continues to be underpriced relative to other capital markets, leaving a lot of room for outsized gains. The Seniority Spread (the interest-equivalent yield on reasonably liquid, investment-grade PerpetualDiscounts less the yield on long term corporate bonds) is extremely elevated (chart end-date 2020-2-12):

Note that the Seniority Spread was 385bp near month-end, equal to last month’s figure. As a good practical example of the spreads between markets, consider that CIU issued a long-term bond in early September yielding 2.963%, about 411bp cheaper than the interest-equivalent figure of 7.07% for CIU.PR.A, which was then yielding about 5.44% as a dividend. Shaw Communications issued 30-year notes at 4.25% interest on December 5, 2019, when their FixedResets, SJR.PR.A, were yielding 6.59% dividends.

As has been noted, the increase in the Seniority Spread over the past one or two years has been due not to an increase in yield (drop in prices) of Straight Preferreds over the year, but because the yield of the Straight Preferreds has remained relatively constant while the yield of long-term corporate bonds has dropped dramatically.

… and the relationship between five-year Canada yields and yields on investment-grade FixedResets is also well within what I consider ‘decoupled panic’ territory (chart end-date 2020-2-12):

In addition, I feel that the yield on five-year Canadas is unsustainably low (it should be the inflation rate plus an increment of … 1%? 1.5%? 2.0%?),and a return to sustainable levels is likely over the medium term.

It seems clear that many market players are, wittingly or not, using FixedResets to speculate on future moves in the Canada 5-Year yield. This is excellent news for those who take market action based on fundamentals and the long term characteristics of the market because nobody can consistently time the markets. The speculators will, over the long run and in aggregate, lose money, handing it over to more sober investors.

It should be noted that I have been unable to explain the very strong performance of Floor issues during the 2018-19 downdraft relative to their non-Floor counterparts. See the discussions on PrefBlog at LINK, LINK and LINK.

I believe the bear-market outperformance by the Floor issues is a behavioural phenomenon with very little basis in fundamentals. When interest rates in general move, FixedReset prices should not change much (to a first approximation, for issues priced near par), since in Fixed Income investing it is spreads that are important, not absolute yields. There should be some effect on Floor issues, which should move up slightly in price as yields go down since the ‘option’ to receive the floor rate will become more valuable. Adjustments due to this effect should be fairly small, however – and over the past year issues with a floor, that started the period being expensive, have simply gotten even more expensive, relative to their non-floored counterparts.

And the tricky thing about behavioural models of investing is that they can lose their explanatory power very quickly when an investment fashion shifts, whereas fundamentals will always be effective. Just to give an example from the preferred share market – until the end of 2014, FixedResets were priced relative to each other according to their initial dividend; when the reset of TRP.PR.A shocked a lot of investors, relative pricing became much more dependent upon the Issue Reset Spread, a much more logical and fundamental property. This paradigm shift was discussed extensively in PrefLetter.

FixedReset (Discount) performance on the month was -6.10% vs. PerpetualDiscounts of -1.39% in January; the two classes finally decoupled in mid-November, 2018, after months of moving in lockstep, but it still appears to me that yields available on FixedResets are keeping the yields of PerpetualDiscounts up, even though a consistent valuation based on an expectation of declining interest rates would greatly increase the attractiveness of PerpetualDiscounts (in other words, PerpetualDiscounts are now priced off FixedResets rather than off Long-term Corporates):

Floaters had a poor month, returning -8.54% for February and the figure for the past twelve months has deteriorated to -14.12%. Look at the long-term performance:

Some Assiduous Readers will be interested to observe that the ‘Quantitative Easing’ decline was not initially as bad as the ‘Credit Crunch’ decline, which took the sector down to the point where the 15-year cumulative total return was negative. I wrote about that at the time. but it became worse in August, 2019! On August 30, 2019 the HIMI Floater Index (total return) value was calculated as 1906.6; the index first surpassed this value on 2003-8-13. Thus, cumulative total return (that is, including dividends) was negative over a period of slightly-over sixteen years.

It seems clear that Floaters are used, wittingly or otherwise, as a vehicle for speculation on the policy rate and Canada Prime, while FixedResets are being used as a vehicle for speculation on the five-year Canada rate. In support of this idea, I present an Implied Volatility analysis of the TRP series of FixedResets as of February 28, which is comprised of six issues without a Minimum Rate Guarantee and two issues which do have this feature:

The two issues with floors, TRP.PR.J (+469, minimum 5.50%) and TRP.PR.K (+385, minimum 4.90%) are $2.48 and $4.12 rich, respectively. These figures are a little higher than last month’s figures; note the fact that their floors will not become effective unless five-year Canadas dip below 0.81% and 1.05%, respectively. As we approach these levels (as of month-end) and even pierce them (as of time of writing), we would expect something of an increase in fair value as noted above; but these levels seem elevated!

It will also be noted that the spread of a notional non-callable TRP FixedReset priced at par has increased from 434bp last month to 462bp this month, while GOC-5 has declined from 1.28% to 1.07%.

Lest this be considered a fluke, I also show results for the BAM series of FixedResets, which includes three issues with dividend floors: BAM.PF.H (+417, Minimum 5.00%); BAM.PF.I (+386, Minimum 4.80%); and BAM.PF.J (+310, Minimum 4.75%); these issues are all rich compared to their non-floor siblings, being rich 2.15, 3.32 and 4.19, respectively, much more expensive than last month’s figures of 1.07, 2.59 and 3.39. Note that we would expect all issues to be somewhat expensive according to this analysis, since the guarantee rate is rapidly being approached and (as of month-end) pierced by one of the issues.

It will also be noted that the spread of a notional non-callable BAM FixedReset priced at par has increased from 424bp last month to 462bp this month, while GOC-5 has declined from 1.28% to 1.07%. This is very similar to the effect seen for TRP.

Relative performance during the month was weakly correlated with Issue Reset Spreads for the “Pfd-2 Group” (10%) and the “Pfd-3 Group” (11%) issues:

… and results over the quarter were poorly correlated (below 10%):

As for the future, of course, it’s one thing to say that ‘spreads are unsustainable and so are government yields’ and it’s quite another to forecast just how and when a more economically sustainable environment will take effect. It could be years. The same caution applies for an end to the overpricing of issues with a minimum rate guarantee. There could be a reversal, particularly if either Trump’s international trade policies or the novel coronavirus cause a severe recession or even a depression. And, of course, I could be just plain wrong about the sustainability of the current environment.

On the other hand, I will pass on my observation that international interest in the Canadian preferred share market is increasing, as other Floating Rate indices globally are doing much better. Consider, for example the Solactive Australian Bank Senior Floating Rate Bond Index, which “provides exposure to the largest and most liquid floating rate debt securities issued by selected Australian banks. The index is comprised of investment grade floating rate debt securities denominated in AUD and calculated as a Total Return Index” (LINK although the index constituents currently all have a remaining term of less than five years), and the S&P U.S. Floating Rate Preferred Stock Index.

Yields on preferred shares of all stripes are extremely high compared to those available from other investments of similar quality. As I told John Heinzl in an eMail interview in late November, 2018, the best advice I can offer investors remains Shut up and clip your coupons!

I think that a broad, sustainable rally in FixedResets will require higher five-year Canada yields (or a widespread expectation of them), since paradigm shifts generally require a trigger (a Wile E. Coyote moment, as they say!) … and although I’m sure this will happen eventually, it would be foolish to speculate on just when it will happen.

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from banks (and insurers, until November 2019), both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

Turnover came off its peak in February but remained high at 29% in January. The trading came mainly during the market’s strong period up to February 21; there was relatively little when coronavirus fears sent the market plunging.

The fund’s trading will probably be higher in the future than has been normal for the past several years, since the extreme segmentation in the marketplace that I complained about for so long is now effectively ended. Low-Reset insurance issues were considered so cheap relative to their peers that a large portion of the fund’s holdings were effectively frozen. However, this differentiating factor is no longer considered applicable.

I am no longer making any adjustments for special qualities of insurance issues but note that this policy may change again in the future – a requirement for a Principal Loss Absorbency Mechanism (PLAM), whereby any security included in Tier 1 Capital will be wiped out prior to a government bail-out, even if technical bankruptcy is avoided, remains good public policy; it is a disgrace that the IAIS has rejected this principle and even worse that OSFI argued strenuously against it. I will continue to read notifications from these two entities with great interest, but while it is within the realm of possibility that ICS 2.0 will be revised following the expiry of the current five-year testing period, I can’t say I have any great confidence in the wisdom of the bureaucrats. However, it is a positive move that the increase in the limit for preferred share issuance was increased from 10% of the capital requirement to 15%; but this increase may only be met with issues having a PLAM.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on February 28 was as follows:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

The distribution of Issue Reset Spreads is:

Distribution of Floating Rate Start Dates is shown in the table below. This is the date of the next adjustment to the dividend rate, if the issue is currently paying a fixed rate for a limited time; which in practice is successive terms of 5 years. Issues that adjust quarterly are considered “Currently Floating”.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased directly from Hymas Investment Management. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but are not sold with a prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of July 31, 2017, and published in the August, 2017, PrefLetter. It is fair to say:

• MAPF credit quality is much better
• MAPF liquidity is lower
• MAPF Yield is higher
• Weightings
  • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals
  • Neither portfolio is exposed to Operating Retractibles (there aren’t too many of those any more!)
  • MAPF is a little more exposed to SplitShares
  • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
  • MAPF is higher weighted in FixedResets, with a greater emphasis on lower-spread issues