CIT has confirmed its $3-billion line from bondholders and announced a very curious tender offer:
CIT Group Inc. (NYSE: CIT), a leading provider of financing to small businesses and middle market companies, today announced that it entered into a $3 billion loan facility provided by a group of the Company’s major bondholders. CIT further announced that it intends to commence a comprehensive restructuring of its liabilities to provide additional liquidity and further strengthen its capital position.
Today’s actions, including a $3 billion secured term loan with a 2.5 year maturity (the “Term Loan Financing”), are intended to provide CIT with liquidity necessary to ensure that its important base of small and middle market customers continues to have access to credit. Term loan proceeds of $2 billion are committed and available today, with an additional $1 billion expected to be committed and available within 10 days.
…
As the first step in a broader recapitalization plan, CIT has commenced a cash tender offer for its outstanding Floating Rate Senior Notes due August 17, 2009 (the “August 17 Notes”) for $825 for each $1,000 principal amount of notes tendered on or before July 31, 2009. Lenders in the Term Loan Financing have agreed to tender all of their August 17 notes.
…
The Company and the Term Loan Financing steering committee will work together on the balance of the recapitalization plan, which is expected to include a comprehensive series of exchange offers designed to further enhance CIT’s liquidity and capital.
…
Pursuant to the Offer, CIT is offering to purchase any and all of its August 17 Notes for $800 for each $1,000 principal amount of outstanding August 17 Notes tendered and not validly withdrawn prior to 12:00 midnight, New York City time, at the end of August 14, 2009 (unless extended by CIT). Holders who validly tender their August 17 Notes prior to 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on July 31, 2009 (unless extended by CIT, the “early delivery time”), and who do not validly withdraw their tenders, will be paid an additional $25 cash for each $1,000 principal amount of outstanding August 17 Notes tendered by the early delivery time.
…
The Offer is conditioned upon, among other things, holders of August 17 Notes tendering and not withdrawing an amount of August 17 Notes equal to at least 90% of the aggregate principal amount of August 17 Notes outstanding (the “Minimum Condition”). The Minimum Condition may be waived by CIT and the Term Loan Financing steering committee. If the Minimum Condition is satisfied or waived, CIT intends to use the proceeds of the Term Loan Financing to complete the Offer and make payment for the August 17 Notes. There can be no assurances that the restructuring plan or the Offer can be completed successfully.
A price of $82.50 is a lot more than the notes were trading for last week:
CIT’s floating-rate notes maturing Aug. 17 jumped about 17.1 cents to 87.6 cents on the dollar as of 4:32 p.m. in New York, according to Trace, the bond-price reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
Credit-default swaps that allow investors to hedge against a CIT default for five years dropped 5.5 percentage points to 39 percent upfront, according to broker Phoenix Partners Group.
… but I must say, I still don’t get it. They are expecting major losses:
CIT Group Inc., the 101-year old commercial lender seeking to avoid collapse, said it expects to report a loss of more than $1.5 billion for the second quarter and may need to file for bankruptcy if it’s unable to tender for notes maturing next month.
CIT’s “existing liquidity” isn’t enough to repay the $1 billion of floating-rate notes maturing on Aug. 17, the New York-based lender said today in a regulatory filing. CIT, which announced a $3 billion rescue financing from its bondholders yesterday, has asked holders of the August notes to swap their claims for 82.5 cents on the dollar.
California claims to have balanced the budget:
California lawmakers reached an agreement with Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger over how to close a $26 billion budget deficit that pushed the most-populous U.S. state to the brink of insolvency.
The deal, reached by legislative leaders after two months of frequently acrimonious negotiations, would slash spending for schools, public works and welfare programs amid the longest recession since the 1930s. If approved by the full Senate and Assembly, the agreement will also siphon money from municipalities, force companies and individuals to pay income taxes sooner and make it more difficult to receive state aid.
The WSJ points out:
Under the plan, state lawmakers would cut $15 billion in spending. The rest of the gap would be filled by taking funds from local governments and through one-time fixes and accounting maneuvers. The deal must still be approved by rank-and-file legislators, who are expected to vote on it Thursday.
No surprises in today’s BoC statement:
Some of the early strength in domestic demand represents a bringing forward of household expenditures, which modestly alters the profile of growth over the projection period relative to the April MPR. The Bank projects that the economy will contract by 2.3 per cent in 2009 and then grow by 3.0 per cent in 2010 and 3.5 per cent in 2011, reaching production capacity in the middle of 2011.
Total CPI inflation declined to -0.3 per cent in June and should trough in the third quarter of this year before returning to the 2 per cent target in the second quarter of 2011 as aggregate supply and demand return to balance. Core inflation held up at 1.9 per cent in the second quarter of 2009. The Bank still expects core inflation to diminish in the second half of this year before gradually returning to 2 per cent in the second quarter of 2011.
…
Conditional on the outlook for inflation, the target overnight rate can be expected to remain at its current level until the end of the second quarter of 2010 in order to achieve the inflation target.
Boris Johnson, the mayor of London, has warned that Hedge Funds are mobile:
The Mayor and shadow chancellor told Business Secretary Lord Mandelson that the tighter regulation proposed for hedge funds would drive London investors to cities such as New York, Singapore, Hong Kong and Geneva.
…
They said the new supervision regime for hedge funds, private equity and venture capital would be stricter than the rest of the world and weaken Europe’s competitive position. London would be worst hit because it was home to 80 per cent of European hedge funds.They argued tough regulation was needed to prevent another financial crisis, but it had to be set at a global level to ensure a level playing field.
They did not, however, let us in on any hints about why tough regulation of hedge funds is needed to prevent another financial crisis. It’s just political posturing, unfortunately. I’m disappointed, however, that they did not mention Dubai as a possible destination.
S&P has raised eyebrows regarding volatile CMBS ratings:
Standard & Poor’s raised the ratings on commercial mortgage-backed debt from three bonds sold in 2007, restoring the top-ranked status of the securities.
The debt had been cut as recently as last week, rendering the securities ineligible for the Federal Reserve’s Term Asset- Backed Securities Loan Facility to jumpstart lending.
S&P lowered the ratings on a class of a commercial mortgage-backed bond offering from AAA to BBB-, the lowest investment-grade ranking, on July 14. The New York-based rating company reversed the cut today, S&P said in a statement.
One of the affected issues is a Credit Suisse deal:
Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services today raised its ratings on the class A-2 and A-3 commercial mortgage pass-through certificates from Credit Suisse Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-C3 to ‘AAA’ from ‘BBB+’ (see list).
The raised ratings follow the implementation of our recently updated criteria for the application of ‘AAA’ losses on U.S. conduit and fusion commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS).
… which seems somewhat terse. The supporting publication U.S. CMBS ‘AAA’ Scenario Loss And Recovery Application doesn’t help a lot; it’s simply a review of the methodological changes, including:
Refining the methodology we use to assess the impact of losses and recoveries resulting from our ‘AAA’ rating scenario for super-senior classes in U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS.
Further differentiating the timing of the losses resulting from our ‘AAA’ term and maturity default tests when cash flow modeling transactions. See section VII-D of “U.S. CMBS Rating Methodology And Assumptions for Conduit/Fusion Pools” for our term and maturity default tests.
Spreading out losses that are applied to a transaction’s certificates over a longer period of time.
… but the “Impact on Outstanding Rating” sections notes:
We will use these criteria for rating all U.S. conduit/fusion CMBS transactions with super-senior classes. There are currently 336 deals with 1,436 certificates in this category. Our testing of the methodology suggests that applying losses and defaults under our ‘AAA’ scenario will account more fully for the benefits of time tranching. The application of these criteria will likely result in upgrades to seven super-senior tranches from three transactions that we recently downgraded.
“Time Tranching” refers to sequential pay structures. According to Nomura’s ABS primer:
“Time tranching” refers to dividing cash flows from securitized assets among different classes of securities so that some receive repayment of principal before others. In the simplest cases, a deal might offer several classes of serially maturing securities. Some investors might prefer the securities with shorter maturities while others might favor the ones with longer maturities. Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) are the most ubiquitous examples of time tranching.
The trouble with structured securities is that small changes in assumptions can cause huge changes in ratings – especially considering that a percentage point or two takes you out of investment grade completely, never mind the AAA category. This is exacerbated by the philosophy of ratings: a default with a recovery of 99.9999% is the same thing as a total loss. Nevertheless, this story is going to earn S&P some mockery – particularly due to the implications with TALF.
Earnings calls are usually pretty boring affairs, with sell-side bozos lobbing softball questions at their lunch buddies, but the Western Union call today was different:
— Western Union Co. apologized to Piper Jaffray Cos.’ Robert Napoli after a man posing as the analyst infiltrated the money-transfer firm’s conference call and cursed at Chief Executive Officer Christina Gold.
Today’s call discussing Western Union’s second-quarter earnings had been under way for almost 52 minutes when a man identified as Napoli came on the line and delivered an expletive-laden tirade spanning about 40 seconds.
…
[Western Union spokesman Tom] Fitzgerald said the call stems from a “long-running harassment case” involving the man that dates back to when Western Union was owned by Greenwood Village, Colorado-based First Data Corp. “It’s been going on for quite a while.”
…
A pause of about 40 seconds followed the tirade before SunTrust Robinson Humphrey Inc. analyst Andrew Jeffrey asked about Western Union’s long-term earnings potential. No one answered. “So much for that,” he said about 20 seconds later and hung up.Gary Kohn, a vice president for investor relations, came on the line two minutes later to apologize “for that rude interruption” and turned over the call to Gold for a minute- long closing comment.
Dealbreaker has the transcript:
Operator: Your next question comes from the line of Robert Napoli from Piper Jaffray. Please proceed.
(Q – Robert Napoli): Hi, Christina, you are going to jail — you really — you [indiscernible] now, and you are going to pay for the corruption. You buy judges [ph] — you buy everybody. You deserve [indiscernible] just to pull information on people, and I am going to name you and shame you, you bitch, and all of the people surrounding you, especially David Schlapbach, and you know all [indiscernible] with you. So get ready; you both in-charge [indiscernible]. You [indiscernible] a profit user, you bought the case [ph], but I am going to fuck you legally…
I like the parts about (a) the guy not being cut off after the first ten seconds, and (b) the Western Union guys running away and hiding for about three minutes.
A rip-roaring day for preferreds, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining nearly 80bp amidst good price volatility and relatively heavy volume.
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.5032 % | 1,159.3 |
| FixedFloater | 7.25 % | 5.44 % | 37,644 | 16.71 | 1 | -0.5960 % | 2,119.7 |
| Floater | 3.29 % | 3.89 % | 79,364 | 17.67 | 3 | 0.5032 % | 1,448.3 |
| OpRet | 4.98 % | -0.16 % | 137,966 | 0.09 | 15 | 0.1545 % | 2,215.8 |
| SplitShare | 6.06 % | 4.06 % | 93,068 | 4.14 | 4 | -0.1290 % | 1,935.4 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1545 % | 2,026.1 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.7947 % | 1,801.0 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 6.15 % | 6.20 % | 157,530 | 13.63 | 71 | 0.7947 % | 1,658.7 |
| FixedReset | 5.51 % | 4.16 % | 573,084 | 4.22 | 40 | 0.1512 % | 2,083.8 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| BNA.PR.C | SplitShare | -1.25 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2019-01-10 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 16.61 Bid-YTW : 10.07 % |
| BNS.PR.N | Perpetual-Discount | 1.02 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 21.79 Evaluated at bid price : 21.88 Bid-YTW : 6.03 % |
| PWF.PR.G | Perpetual-Discount | 1.04 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 22.96 Evaluated at bid price : 23.25 Bid-YTW : 6.37 % |
| POW.PR.C | Perpetual-Discount | 1.05 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 22.10 Evaluated at bid price : 22.10 Bid-YTW : 6.62 % |
| CM.PR.K | FixedReset | 1.07 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-08-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 26.50 Bid-YTW : 4.01 % |
| PWF.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | 1.13 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 21.92 Evaluated at bid price : 22.30 Bid-YTW : 6.18 % |
| PWF.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | 1.13 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 22.03 Evaluated at bid price : 22.30 Bid-YTW : 6.47 % |
| GWO.PR.I | Perpetual-Discount | 1.21 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 18.41 Evaluated at bid price : 18.41 Bid-YTW : 6.18 % |
| NA.PR.P | FixedReset | 1.25 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-03-17 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.50 Bid-YTW : 4.17 % |
| RY.PR.W | Perpetual-Discount | 1.27 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 20.81 Evaluated at bid price : 20.81 Bid-YTW : 6.00 % |
| TD.PR.R | Perpetual-Discount | 1.45 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 23.61 Evaluated at bid price : 23.80 Bid-YTW : 5.90 % |
| SLF.PR.D | Perpetual-Discount | 1.49 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 17.71 Evaluated at bid price : 17.71 Bid-YTW : 6.36 % |
| PWF.PR.L | Perpetual-Discount | 1.53 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 20.56 Evaluated at bid price : 20.56 Bid-YTW : 6.24 % |
| BNS.PR.Q | FixedReset | 1.62 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 23.44 Evaluated at bid price : 25.75 Bid-YTW : 4.16 % |
| TD.PR.Q | Perpetual-Discount | 1.67 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 23.61 Evaluated at bid price : 23.80 Bid-YTW : 5.90 % |
| SLF.PR.C | Perpetual-Discount | 1.72 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 17.76 Evaluated at bid price : 17.76 Bid-YTW : 6.34 % |
| MFC.PR.C | Perpetual-Discount | 1.85 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 17.66 Evaluated at bid price : 17.66 Bid-YTW : 6.46 % |
| TD.PR.P | Perpetual-Discount | 1.85 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 22.46 Evaluated at bid price : 22.59 Bid-YTW : 5.83 % |
| BMO.PR.K | Perpetual-Discount | 1.86 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 22.29 Evaluated at bid price : 22.41 Bid-YTW : 5.96 % |
| BAM.PR.M | Perpetual-Discount | 1.87 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 16.35 Evaluated at bid price : 16.35 Bid-YTW : 7.36 % |
| CM.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | 2.03 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 22.47 Evaluated at bid price : 22.66 Bid-YTW : 6.20 % |
| BAM.PR.O | OpRet | 2.08 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Option Certainty Maturity Date : 2013-06-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 23.53 Bid-YTW : 6.86 % |
| BMO.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | 2.20 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 22.21 Evaluated at bid price : 22.74 Bid-YTW : 5.90 % |
| SLF.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | 2.51 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 17.95 Evaluated at bid price : 17.95 Bid-YTW : 6.34 % |
| ELF.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | 2.57 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 18.76 Evaluated at bid price : 18.76 Bid-YTW : 7.13 % |
| POW.PR.D | Perpetual-Discount | 2.70 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 19.80 Evaluated at bid price : 19.80 Bid-YTW : 6.37 % |
| PWF.PR.K | Perpetual-Discount | 2.89 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 19.60 Evaluated at bid price : 19.60 Bid-YTW : 6.35 % |
| PWF.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | 3.62 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 20.89 Evaluated at bid price : 20.89 Bid-YTW : 6.32 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| BNS.PR.P | FixedReset | 94,306 | RBC crossed two blocks at 26.00, for 12,600 and 32,500 shares. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2013-05-25 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.80 Bid-YTW : 4.06 % |
| ELF.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | 87,100 | Desjardins crossed 85,000 at 19.00. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 18.76 Evaluated at bid price : 18.76 Bid-YTW : 7.13 % |
| GWO.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | 59,565 | RBC crossed 40,000 at 18.85. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 18.80 Evaluated at bid price : 18.80 Bid-YTW : 6.53 % |
| BNA.PR.D | SplitShare | 47,785 | Recent new issue. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2014-07-09 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.15 Bid-YTW : 7.20 % |
| CM.PR.J | Perpetual-Discount | 46,075 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-21 Maturity Price : 18.20 Evaluated at bid price : 18.20 Bid-YTW : 6.22 % |
| MFC.PR.D | FixedReset | 43,130 | Nesbitt sold 20,000 at 28.25 to anonymous. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-07-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 28.15 Bid-YTW : 3.98 % |
| There were 54 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||