Assiduous Reader prefhound commented:
May I be baffled at the relative prices/yields of the two Yellow Pages Prefs?:
YPG.PR.A closing $19.80; Dividend $1.0625; Retractible Dec 31, 2012 for a YTM = 11.1%.
YPG.PR.B closing $11.75; Dividend $1.25; Retractible Jun 30, 2017 for a YTM = 17.1%
We are used to flaky pref prices when the lower priced issue has a smaller dividend, but here the Pref A has a lower dividend and lower current yield than the Pref B (5.4 vs 10.7%) — and that is before its lower capital gains potential!
If it is a yield curve difference (due to the extra 4.5 years for the pref B), then YPG.PR.B yields 11.1% through Dec 31, 2012 and 26.5% for the period 2013-retraction. Should we conclude that the company will be fine for 3 years and then fall apart in the subsequent five?
BAM and BPO retractible prefs of different maturity dates often have very similar yields to maturity, but not YPG. The YPG.PR.B yield is often more than PR.A, but the current 6 points seems absurd. If both Pref A and Pref B had the same yields to retraction, the Pref B should be $16.82 — more than 40% higher!
I smell arbitrage potential here, but am not sure how long it would take to sort out. Do you have any special insight into this pair?
… and I responded …
I think it all comes down to mortgages.
There is a very real preferred habitat amongst retail investors for short-term bonds, which are usually defined as bonds with five years or less to maturity, which just happens to be the term of most Canadian mortgages.
When you add in the fact that the number of watchers is reduced dramatically by the Pfd-3(high) rating, I think you have an explanation.
You are quite right that BPO retractibles all yield in the same ballpark – but that ballpark is the “penalty yield” ballpark … it is, perhaps, best thought of as a company that is not getting the benefit of the five-year cliff.
And BAM’s just plain wierd.
I suspect that any rationalization of the YPG.PR.B yield will have to wait until 2011-12, when retail will start thinking of it as something with a maturity instead of one of them never get yer money back things.
As I have previously disclosed, the fund holds a position in YPG.PR.B, taken as an optimization trade after the downgrade of BCE.PR.I made me uncomfortable with the fund’s weighting in that name. It’s a relatively small position, with a portfolio weight within the bounds I consider prudent. Barring an increase in credit concern, I’ll hold the damn thing to maturity at a yield of 17+%!
Yellow Pages recently announced that:
it has extended the term of the $500 million tranche of its core revolving credit facility by an additional year to May 2012. Combined with the $200 million revolving tranche, the full amount of the $700 million core revolving credit facility now matures in May 2012. This facility can be used for general corporate purposes and serves as back-up to the commercial paper program.
With the combination of the core revolving credit facility and the $450 million credit facility established in 2008, Yellow Pages Income Fund has access to $1.150 billion in long term committed bank lines, providing ample liquidity to fund its operations and to refinance the Series 1 Medium Term Notes maturing in April 2009.
I note from their most recent Management Discussion and Analysis:
In April 2009, YPG will be repaying at maturity the series 1 medium term notes issued in April 2004 ($450 million) and currently intends to draw under the New Revolving Facility to refinance these notes. We will also continue to monitor conditions in the fixed income market.
…
YPG Holdings Inc. has a total of $300 million of Exchangeable Unsecured Subordinated Debentures outstanding (the Exchangeable Debentures). The Exchangeable Debentures have a maturity date of August 1, 2011 and are exchangeable at any time, at the option of the holder, for units of the Fund at an exchange price of $20.00 per unit.
So the exchangeable-ha-ha debs mature in 2011 – prior to retraction for YPG.PR.A, so fears regarding these two refinancings is not the issue.
The supplemental disclosures provide a breakdown of the maturities:
Yellow Pages Debt Term Structure |
Date |
Amount |
Market Yield |
2009-4-21 |
$450-million |
|
2011-2-28 |
$150-million |
|
2011-8-1 |
$300-million |
|
2012-12-31 Retraction YPG.PR.A |
$300-million |
11.21% (Dividend) |
2014-4-21 |
$300-million |
8.36% |
2016-2-25 |
$550-million |
8.57% |
2017-6-30 Retraction YPG.PR.B |
$200-million |
17.67% (Dividend) |
2019-11-18 |
$250-million |
9.25% |
2036-2-15 |
$350-million |
|
The revolving credit line (of which $359-million is drawn) has maturities:
Yellow Pages Credit Line Maturities |
Date |
Amount |
2011-5-8 |
$450-million |
2012-5-25 |
$200-million |
2011-5-21 |
$500-million |
There is a significant refunding due between the two pref series … but it’s not as if the entire debt matures between the two issues’ maturities, at least! If they can refinance the April maturity (currently being refunded via the credit line) with a ten-year term, that will remove at least a little uncertainty.
I should note that a significant proportion of the YPG.PR.B yield is back-end-loaded; that is, dependent upon maturity at par. It’s only yield if you actually get the money!
Finally, I will note the DBRS Press Release of 2008-11-6:
The rating remains underpinned by the Company’s dominance as the incumbent directories publisher in Canada, a market which continues to maintain high usage rates in traditional print directories, and supports a meaningful and growing online directories and vertical media platform.
The rating is further supported by YPG’s industry leading EBITDA margins of roughly 55% and the Company’s strong liquidity position, as evidenced by good free cash flow generation (approximately $130 million for the latest twelve months ending September 30, 2008), over $600 million of undrawn availability under its $950 million committed bank facilities at the end of the third quarter of 2008, and capability and flexibility to refinance upcoming maturities (including $450 million in notes which mature in April 2009).
…
YPG’s free cash flow is expected to continue to demonstrate solid growth through 2010 as a result of the Company’s limited capital requirements and a gradual reduction in the distribution payout ratio as YPG prepares to become fully taxable on January 1, 2011.
Through the end of 2008, DBRS expects YPG’s credit metrics to remain stable on a year-over-year basis, with DBRS-adjusted gross debt-to-EBITDA ranging between 2.90 times and 3.00 times. This is also expected to continue through 2009.
YPG is expected to continue to manage its balance sheet in a conservative manner, balancing strategic acquisitions and unit repurchases in line with its long-term unadjusted leverage targets, maintaining net debt-to-EBITDA between 2.80 times and 3.20 times (at September 30, 2008, this metric stood at roughly 2.90 times). These targets remain within the context of a strong investment grade rating when considering the Company’s favourable business risk profile and free cash flow capacity.
Both issues are tracked by HIMIPref™ and both are incorporated in the “Scraps” index due to credit concerns. The last mention of YPG.PR.A discussed its issue price and the last mention of YPG.PR.B commented on its hostile reception on its opening day in June 2007.
Potential for Buy-Backs and Unscheduled Exchanges
Tuesday, October 20th, 2009Preferred Share buybacks are a perennial topic of interest on PrefBlog and were most recently discussed on the post Split-Share Buy-Backs? WFS.PR.A & FIG.PR.A Examined.
Now, Assiduous Reader PL writes in and says:
There are two items of interest in the prospectus for SLF.PR.A, which may be found on SEDAR, with an issue date of February 17, 2005:
So the short answer to AR PL’s question is “yes”.
But under what circumstances would they do this? The funds represent cheap money – cheap Tier 1 money at that. In the ordinary course of business, there would be no reason for them to buy these things back: even if they didn’t need the money now, they’re going to figure that it’s really nice to have it anyway, since it’s cheap and replacing it a few years down the road will not only entail a probably higher coupon, but issuance costs as well.
However, there is the occasional redemption announcement that takes place when the issues are trading below par. The most famous of these announcement was the abortive Teachers’ bid for BCE, in which the preferreds were planned to be redeemed since the take-over was intended to proceed by Plan of Arrangement, to which the Preferred Shareholders voting as a class were allowed veto power under the Corporations Act, which they certainly would have exercised if they hadn’t been given a sweetener under the deal, even considering the dim-bulb nature of many of these holders.
There were a few scattered redemptions of floaters that traded below par in the 1990s (notably TD.PR.D and BNS.PR.A) but these were nowhere near the $20 level at the time of the announcement. While I’m sure holders did not object to the redemption, they didn’t make out like bandits either.
The other extract from the prospectus that I have highlighted is the potential for exchange into a new series of shares … a client asked me about this in connection with TD.PR.O just last week and that prospectus has similar language.
The first thing to note is that the exchange is optional for both parties. SLF doesn’t have to create the new series; holders don’t have to exchange. All I can imagine to justify the clause is a potential smoothing of the way for a redemption and new issue to be done simultaneously.
Say, for instance, straight perpetuals suddenly trade to yield 4% and SLF.PR.A trades at $26 (not the $29.69 implied by the $1.1875 dividend due to the potential for call). What Sun Life could do – for instance – is send preferred shareholders an envelope with two notices in it: the first advises that the issue will be called at par on November 1 and the second advises that they can exchange into a new issue of SLF preferreds paying $1.05 (a nickel in excess of market rates), provided that they do it on October 31.
Presto, SLF achieves its desire of reducing their cost of funds and don’t have to pay $0.75 per share issuance expenses either. I would not consider this a coercive exchange offer, because it has always been understood that the issue could be called at par; it’s not like other offers we’ve seen lately where the company says something like: do this, because we’re going to cancel the dividend.
Having the exchange clause in the prospectus might make this process simpler and less costly should SLF ever wish to do this … but I’m not a securities lawyer. Those among you who ARE securities lawyers – or fancy their legal skills – are invited to come up with better explanations in the comments.
Update: See also Repurchase of Preferred Shares by Issuer, which references the GWO.PR.E / GWO.PR.X Normal Course Issuer Bid.
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