TXPR & TXPL Index Revision, 14Q4

October 3rd, 2014

S&P Dow Jones Indices Canadian Index Operations has announced:

the following index changes as a result of the quarterly S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index and S&P/TSX Preferred Share Laddered Index Reviews. These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, October 20, 2014.

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index [TXPR]
ADDITIONS
Symbol Issue Name CUSIP
ALA.PR.G ALTAGAS LTD. 5YR RESET SERIES ‘G’ PR 021361 88 6
AQN.PR.D ALGONQUIN POWER & UTILITIES CORP. SER ‘D’ PR 015857 50 1
BMO.PR.W BANK OF MONTREAL 5-YR RESET CL ‘B’ PR SER 31 063679 88 0
ENB.PF.E ENBRIDGE INC. PR SER ’13’ 29250N 57 6
ENB.PF.G ENBRIDGE INC. PR SER ’15’ 29250N 55 0
FTS.PR.M FORTIS INC. 1ST PR SERIES ‘M’ 349553 76 8
MFC.PR.M MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORP. CL 1 PR SER ’17’ 56501R 69 2
PPL.PR.G PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION CL ‘A’ PR SER 7 706327 60 8
PWF.PR.H POWER FINANCIAL CORP. 5.75% SERIES ‘H’ 1ST PR 73927C 86 0
TA.PR.J TRANSALTA CORPORATION 1ST PR SER ‘G’
89346D 67 7
TD.PF.B TORONTO-DOMINION BANK(THE) CL ‘A’1ST PR SER 3 891145 67 4
DELETIONS
Symbol Issue Name CUSIP
BCE.PR.Y BCE INC. 1ST PR SERIES ‘Y’ 05534B 85 1
BPO.PR.H BROOKFIELD OFFICE PROP INC. CL AAA PR SER ‘H’ 112900 80 8
CCS.PR.C CO-OPERATORS GENERAL INSURANCE CO CL E PR ‘C’ 189906 40 7
CU.PR.D CANADIAN UTILITIES LIMITED 2ND PR SER ‘AA’ 136717 67 5
EMA.PR.E EMERA INCORPORATED PR SERIES ‘E’ 290876 70 5
NPI.PR.C NORTHLAND POWER INC. CUMLTV RST SERIES 3 PR 666511 60 5
REI.PR.C RIOCAN REAL ESTATE INVEST TR PR UNITS SER ‘C’ 766910 12 9
TD.PR.S TORONTO-DOMINION BANK (THE) 5-YR RESET PR S 891145 60 9

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Laddered Index [TXPL]
ADDITIONS
Symbol Issue Name CUSIP
ALA.PR.G ALTAGAS LTD. 5YR RESET SERIES ‘G’ PR 021361 88 6
AQN.PR.D ALGONQUIN POWER & UTILITIES CORP. SER ‘D’ PR 015857 50 1
BMO.PR.W BANK OF MONTREAL 5-YR RESET CL ‘B’ PR SER 31 063679 88 0
FTS.PR.M FORTIS INC. 1ST PR SERIES ‘M’ 349553 76 8
MFC.PR.M MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORP. CL 1 PR SER ’17’ 56501R 69 2
PPL.PR.G PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION CL ‘A’ PR SER 7 706327 60 8
TA.PR.J TRANSALTA CORPORATION 1ST PR SER ‘G’ 89346D 67 7
TD.PF.B TORONTO-DOMINION BANK(THE) CL ‘A’1ST PR SER 3 891145 67 4

October 3, 2014

October 3rd, 2014

Jobs, jobs, jobs!

A surprisingly powerful surge in hiring pushed unemployment to a six-year low of 5.9 percent in September as the U.S. labor market showed renewed vigor.

The 248,000 gain in payrolls followed a 180,000 increase in August that was bigger than previously estimated, the Labor Department reported in Washington. Revisions boosted the job count by 69,000 over the previous two months. The jobless rate fell from 6.1 percent to the lowest level since July 2008.

Another report today showed the U.S. trade deficit shrank in August to the lowest level in seven months as exports edged up to a record. The gap decreased 0.5 percent to $40.1 billion, the smallest since January, from $40.3 billion in July, the Commerce Department reported.

The narrowing deficit prompted economists at Barclays PLC in New York to boost their tracking estimate of third-quarter gross domestic product to a 3.3 percent gain at an annualized rate from 2.7 percent.

Also today, another report showed service industries grew in September to cap the strongest quarter of expansion in more than 10 years. While the Institute for Supply Management’s non-manufacturing index fell to 58.6 from the prior month’s 59.6, the third-quarter average was the highest since the first three months of 2004, the Tempe, Arizona-based group said.

The quarterly average for the group’s factory index was the highest since early 2011, a report showed earlier this week.

Meanwhile, in Canada:

Canada swung to an unexpected merchandise trade deficit in August as imports surged to a record and exports fell for the first time in four months.

The C$610 million ($543 million) deficit followed a July surplus that was pared to C$2.20 billion from the initial C$2.58 billion estimate. None of the 14 economists in a Bloomberg survey predicted that Ottawa-based Statistics Canada would report a trade deficit today, and the median estimate was for a C$1.6 billion surplus.

The report is another setback in a week that saw Statistics Canada report the world’s 11th-largest economy stalled in July after a second-quarter expansion that was led by a jump in exports. Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz said last month he saw early signs of a needed rotation toward growth led by exports and business investment.

And problems in moving exportable goods don’t seem to be getting any better:

Even with a grain harvest falling below last year’s record, Western Canadian farmers can’t find enough rail cars in the right places to move their crops.

Wet, cool weather across parts of the Canadian prairies has reduced the amount of high quality grain available, helping to fuel another showdown between shippers and the nation’s largest railways. While the crop is 20 percent smaller than last year’s, it will be harder to find and move the right grades to match export sales.

Grain shippers said railways haven’t been supplying enough cars, and about 24,000 orders for transport on the prairies haven’t been filled. Canadian National Railway Co. (CNR), facing a fine for failing to meet its minimum weekly grain shipping target, said farmers haven’t been delivering enough grain to country elevators to comply with the government order.

People are borrowing for more than just houses:

If stock investors are any guide, the $1.3 trillion U.S. junk-bond market is being inflated by a growing amount of leverage being used by buyers.

Both stock and junk-bond managers tend to deploy more leverage when markets are booming, and more than ever is being used to purchase U.S. equities, based on levels of margin debt on the New York Stock Exchange, according to UBS AG (UBSN) analysts. That suggests junk-debt buyers are engaging in similar financing activities.

As investors use more borrowed cash, they increase the potential for bigger losses in a downturn. This trend adds to concern that six years of unprecedented Federal Reserve stimulus has produced a bubble in the junk-bond market — and one that will be all the more painful when it eventually pops.

Margin debt has surged to more than 2.5 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, about the highest level in data going back to the early 1990s, the UBS analysts [Stephen Caprio and Matthew Mish] wrote. The measure of leverage tends to be a leading indicator of relative yields on speculative-grade bonds, with a rising level of margin debt increasing the odds of future spread widening.

Investors are demanding 4.42 percentage points more than benchmark rates to own dollar-denominated high-yield bonds, compared with 5.9 percentage points on average over the past decade, Bank of America Merrill Lynch index data show.

… and Rob Carrick writes about Corporate bond ETFs: More than meets the eye:

Determined to avoid future catastrophes, the world’s regulators, central banks, investment strategists and money managers are asking questions and raising concerns about all kinds of investment trends and products. One of the latest to be scrutinized is a useful and seemingly innocuous category of exchange-traded fund that holds corporate bonds.

The concern starts with a lack of liquidity in the corporate bond market today. A liquid asset can be easily traded, without concern that you’ll have to pay a premium to acquire it or accept a discount when selling. Corporate bond liquidity has been negatively affected by a combination of a changing regulatory environment for the banks that dominate trading of these securities, and strong demand for these bonds from investors.

Today, the lack of liquidity means investors have to pay up to buy corporate bonds. When interest rates rise, it could mean they’ll take a hit if they sell. ETFs, which hold baskets of corporate bonds, complicate things. If investors dumped corporate bonds en masse, would these ETFs be able to efficiently sell their holdings as needed?

He then spoils this excellent question by allowing disingenuous salesmen to slip off the hook really easily:

If you did submit a sell order for your corporate bond ETF, it would be matched with a buy order from another investor. Even if corporate bonds turn toxic, there are investment dealers designated to maintain an orderly market in ETF trading. They’re supposed to put in a bid for the ETF units you’re selling, even if the price would reflect prevailing market conditions.

These dealers would have the option of exchanging the ETF units they’ve accumulated for the underlying securities. At BlackRock Canada, they say that’s not a problem. “You can’t make an ETF if you don’t have liquid underlying [investments],” said Noel Archard, the company’s head and managing director.

Alfred Lee, vice-president and portfolio manager at BMO Mutual Funds, said corporate bond ETFs give investors more liquidity than if they tried to sell an individual bond. “Given a liquidity event, liquidity is not going to be as good as in a normal environment. But we’re going to be owning the most liquid bonds out there.”

To sum up, problems in the corporate bond market will be reflected in the price of bond ETFs. However, ETF industry people say their funds will not exacerbate things.

(The article is also spoilt by the inclusion of the old nonsense about how risk and return are magically changed by putting the raw materials into a box.[ETF] Disadvantages: No maturity date, which means prices subject to interest rate trends. See Bond ETFs demystified for an explanation of what is really going on.)

Anyway, I hope that Noel Archard was misquoted, or quoted out of context, or severely shortened, or something, because his statement is nonsense. Synthetic ETFs can be a threat to financial stability; I’ll agree that there aren’t many of these in Canada, but we do have some, we could have more, and the underlying investments can be illiquid.

Alfred Lee also evades the question, by claiming that his firm (? Does this mean BMO ETFs? BMO Mutual Funds? BMO as principal?) will ‘be owning the most liquid bonds out there’. Who cares, in a crisis (and, I might ask, does he have a mandate to focus on liquidity?)? The issue is the price sensitivity of these bonds.

There are three main problems that I see:

  • Firstly, in a crisis, people are going to want to get out faster than they got in; i.e., we could see one month’s redemptions equal to X month’s current purchases. This will pressure dealer inventories and hence prices.
  • Secondly, we can expect risk aversion to increase in a crisis, which will increase the price sensitivity to this picked up selling, and
  • Thirdly, there is the structural issue … ETFs are meant to increase the liquidity of an investment in their underlying. That’s their whole point! The implication is that you have investors in a particular asset class (e.g., the corporate bonds currently being discussed) whose holdings would be reduced, or non-existent, if they had to invest directly in the underlying (i.e., the liquidity provided by the ETF is a critical contributor to their decision to invest in the asset class). Therefore, on top of the increase in risk aversion due to the crisis, you’ve also got a structural increase in risk aversion.

It could be ugly, by which I mean a beautiful time to be trading.

There’s a strange story on US employment law:

On Oct. 8 the Supreme Court will hear arguments about whether that time counts as work. In 2010 two former employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, a temp agency that supplies workers at many of Amazon’s U.S. warehouses, sued the company demanding back pay for the time they spent in security lines after clocking out at Amazon warehouses in Nevada. The security checks, the plaintiffs argued, were required by Integrity and therefore part of the job. (Amazon-employed workers go through the same checks.)

At issue is the scope of a 1947 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act that says employers don’t have to pay for time spent on work-related activities like getting to or from the office. Nine years later, the Supreme Court established in a pair of rulings that the key is whether the activity in question is “integral and indispensable” to the principal activities workers are paid to do. Butchers at a meatpacking plant, the court found, had to be paid for time spent sharpening their knives, and workers at a battery plant deserved compensation for time spent showering after work to wash off traces of sulfuric acid and lead.

The question in the Integrity case is whether security checks are more like those showers or more like commuting. With screenings increasingly common, the case could have implications for a wide range of workplaces….

Integrity says it doesn’t owe the workers money because the screenings weren’t directly related to their jobs. “No court has ever held that ‘not breaking the law’ is a principal job activity for which compensation must be paid,” the company’s lawyers wrote in a brief last May.

To me, this is open and shut. Of course time spent going through a security check should be compensated, if the employer insists you do it. I can reduce my commute by living in a tent at the warehouse’s front door, but reducing the time spent proving I’m not a crook is beyond my power (unless I quit my job, which I would). But not only has this case made it to the Supreme Court, but the Comrade Peace Prize administration is supporting the employers!

The Departments of Justice and Labor also submitted on Integrity’s behalf. There is, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli Jr. wrote, “no clear-cut distinction—either in terms of purpose or effect—between petitioner’s screenings and those that are routine at countless government and private-sector buildings.”

Crazy world. The forces of fear have won.

As an aside, I went to hotair.com to see what this week’s official Republican talking points on the issue are, but couldn’t find a mention of the SCOTUS Integrity case. I did find this complaint about a subtraction algorithm in the Common Core, though; as I often am when reading HotAir, I was perplexed by the level of annoyance shown. I use this algorithm all the time when doing mental subtraction. What’s the big deal?

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 5bp, FixedResets off 1bp and DeemedRetractibles down 4bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.12 % 3.11 % 24,215 19.46 1 -0.6617 % 2,673.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0413 % 4,123.4
Floater 2.89 % 3.04 % 59,780 19.67 4 0.0413 % 2,768.7
OpRet 4.05 % 2.58 % 108,040 0.08 1 0.0000 % 2,729.3
SplitShare 4.30 % 4.03 % 93,948 3.87 5 -0.2147 % 3,145.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,495.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.47 % 1.62 % 74,462 0.08 18 0.0393 % 2,446.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.33 % 5.18 % 97,840 15.11 18 0.0455 % 2,584.4
FixedReset 4.21 % 3.75 % 176,558 8.53 73 -0.0112 % 2,553.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.01 % 2.48 % 102,022 0.39 42 -0.0437 % 2,561.9
FloatingReset 2.56 % -6.56 % 64,696 0.09 6 0.4549 % 2,552.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.41
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IFC.PR.C FixedReset 73,270 RBC crossed 70,000 at 25.54.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 69,827 National bought blocks of 10,000 shares, 25,000 and 10,700 from TD, all at 24.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 67,800 Scotia crossed 60,000 at 25.33.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 63,600 TD crossed 25,000 at 22.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-03
Maturity Price : 21.91
Evaluated at bid price : 22.42
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 53,200 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.02.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-03
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 35,321 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.12.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-03
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.A FloatingReset Quote: 25.80 – 26.32
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3172

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-02
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : -13.74 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 22.41 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4035

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.41
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %

RY.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.26 – 26.56
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1810

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %

IAG.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.05 – 26.33
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1728

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 2.73 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.35 – 22.72
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2778

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.35
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %

CGI.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 25.04 – 25.34
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2093

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.04
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

MAPF Portfolio Composition: September, 2014

October 3rd, 2014

Turnover remained steady in September, at about 10%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped was the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) in early 2013 – many of the PerpetualPremiums had negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! While market weakness since the peak of the PerpetualDiscount subindex in May, 2013, has mitigated the situation somewhat, the population of PerpetualDiscounts is still exceeded by that of PerpetualPremiums – most of which are trading at a negative Yield-to-Worst.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on September 30 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2014-09-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 5.1% (-3.0) 3.63% 7.40
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 16.4% (+4.0) 5.44% 14.78
Fixed-Reset 23.4% (-0.9) 4.45% 9.93
Deemed-Retractible 44.5% (+1.0) 5.76% 8.07
Scraps (Various) 10.2% (+0.2) 5.86% 11.00
Cash 0.3% (-1.3) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.28% 9.84
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

There was a shift during the month from SplitShares (selling PVS.PR.B, which is backed by BAM.A) at an average price in the range of 25.25-30) into PerpetualDiscounts (BAM.PR.M & BAM.PR.N, at an average post-dividend-equivalent price of about 21.25. Those wonderful PVS.PR.B (formerly BNA.PR.C) are probably around the top of their price range (closing the month at 25.05 bid, for a yield of 4.39%) and the PerpetualDiscounts, with BAM.PR.M closing the month at 21.10 bid for a yield of 5.67%) look like a better way to use my exposure limit for BAM. This continues a series of opportunistic swaps that commenced in August.

One trade that has afforded many hours of nervous contemplation over the past few months has been the June trade of the low-coupon DeemedRetractible GWO.PR.I into the low-spread FixedReset GWO.PR.N at a take-out of about $1.00. The graph of the bid difference shows why:

GWOPRI_GWOPRN_bidDiff_140930
Click for Big

It is easy to see – in a qualitative sense – why HIMIPref™ wanted to execute the swap in mid-June, but it turned out to be too soon and I wasn’t feeling very happy when the take-out was around $1.75 in August! However, readers will appreciate that I am now feeling a bit happier about the trade!

A similar swap was from SLF.PR.C into SLF.PR.G in August, with a take-out of about $0.35. That chart of bid differences is:

SLFPRC_SLFPRG_bidDiff_140930
Click for Big

So, regrettably, that second trade is still underwater, but at least it didn’t start losing big money instantly the way the GWO swap did!

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2014-9-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 28.0% (+1.3)
Pfd-2(high) 48.1% (+0.1)
Pfd-2 0%
Pfd-2(low) 13.4% (-0.3)
Pfd-3(high) 0.7% (+0.7)
Pfd-3 3.7% (-0.7)
Pfd-3(low) 3.6% (+0.5)
Pfd-4(high) 0.7% (0)
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0.9% (+0.1)
Pfd-5(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-5 0.6% (-0.5)
Cash 0.3% (-1.3)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.B, which is rated P-5 by S&P and is unrated by DBRS

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2014-9-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 16.3% (+5.7)
$50,000 – $100,000 4.8% (-5.4)
$100,000 – $200,000 63.2% (+13.8)
$200,000 – $300,000 14.3% (-11.9)
>$300,000 1.1% (-1.0)
Cash 0.3% (-1.3)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

October 2, 2014

October 2nd, 2014

Treasury trading is going electronic:

While investors traditionally negotiated prices for U.S. Treasuries by telephone, they’re increasingly turning to computer-based marketplaces for a range of price quotes from different dealers. A record 48 percent of trades in U.S. government debt have occurred on electronic platforms this year, up from 31 percent in 2012, according to a Greenwich Associates study released yesterday.

There’s a new pseudo-scandal:

A high-frequency trader was indicted for “spoofing,” the placing and immediate canceling of orders to manipulate commodities markets, in what the U.S. Justice Department says is the first criminal case of its kind.

Michael Coscia, 52, of Rumson, New Jersey, the principal of Panther Energy Trading LLC, was indicted by a federal grand jury in Chicago and charged with six counts of commodities fraud and six of spoofing. He’s accused of illegally reaping nearly $1.6 million as a result of orders placed through CME Group Inc. (CME) and European futures markets in 2011.

Matt Levine of Bloomberg is a superb journalist. He not only explains the allegations better than the news story did, he also adds some wise words of his own:

Basically, spoofing doesn’t hurt fundamental investors directly.11 Fundamental investors trade based on fundamental views of value, not order-book information, so they shouldn’t be thrown off by fake bids and offers. Also they probably trade too slowly to even notice this sort of spoofing. Spoofing only directly hurts market-makers, whose job is to buy and sell in reaction to changes in supply and demand. In most modern markets, that means primarily high-frequency traders. If the FBI is going after spoofing, that’s good for other high-frequency traders. The reason to crack down on spoofing is that high-frequency traders are socially valuable and need to be protected.

I wouldn’t object to exchange-initiated rules about order cancellation – say, a black-out period of one second, so an order can’t be cancelled until it has been live for a second. But anti-spoofing laws – with criminal penalties, yet! – aren’t just silly, they’re extremely difficult to enforce.

Canadian Utilities, proud issuer of , has been confirmed at Pfd-2(high) by DBRS:

DBRS has today confirmed the ratings of the Unsecured Debentures and Issuer Rating of Canadian Utilities Limited (CU or the Company) at “A,” along with confirming the Commercial Paper and Cum. Preferred Shares at R-1 (low) and Pfd-2 (high), respectively, all with Stable trends. The confirmation reflects (a) the low-risk regulated electric and gas business of its wholly owned subsidiary, CU Inc. (CUI; rated A (high) by DBRS), which accounts for approximately 65% of consolidated earnings, (b) the self-sustaining and minimal funding requirements for its non-regulated operations, and (c) the low level of debt at the holding company level ($200 million). The one-notch differential in the ratings of CU and CUI primarily reflects structural subordination at CU.

It was a poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 10bp, FixedResets down 8bp and DeemedRetractibles off 1bp. Volatility, while modest, was comprised entirely of losing FixedResets. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.10 % 3.08 % 25,038 19.51 1 0.3320 % 2,691.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2334 % 4,121.7
Floater 2.89 % 3.04 % 60,571 19.67 4 -0.2334 % 2,767.6
OpRet 4.05 % 2.45 % 100,049 0.08 1 0.0395 % 2,729.3
SplitShare 4.29 % 3.86 % 95,393 3.87 5 0.0557 % 3,152.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0395 % 2,495.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.47 % 2.78 % 73,032 0.08 18 0.0109 % 2,445.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.33 % 5.17 % 101,710 15.08 18 -0.0981 % 2,583.3
FixedReset 4.21 % 3.75 % 179,084 8.64 73 -0.0752 % 2,554.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.00 % 2.50 % 102,204 0.39 42 -0.0067 % 2,563.0
FloatingReset 2.56 % 0.18 % 79,785 0.25 6 -0.0326 % 2,540.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-02
Maturity Price : 21.08
Evaluated at bid price : 21.08
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-02
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 64,553 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-02
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Premium 56,082 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 38,000 TD crossed 35,000 at 24.02.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.79
Evaluated at bid price : 23.94
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 37,429 TD crossed 35,000 at 25.96.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-25
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : -3.10 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 31,887 Called for redemption October 31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 2.79 %
GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible 27,500 Scotia crossed 23,300 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 5.00 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 21.50 – 21.90
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2590

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 21.08 – 21.40
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1933

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-02
Maturity Price : 21.08
Evaluated at bid price : 21.08
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %

SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.29 – 22.45
Spot Rate : 0.1600
Average : 0.1018

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.29
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.03 – 24.22
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1356

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-02
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 24.03
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.02 – 21.15
Spot Rate : 0.1300
Average : 0.0817

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-02
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %

ENB.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 24.22 – 24.40
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1322

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-02
Maturity Price : 22.99
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %

October 1, 2014

October 2nd, 2014

PIMCo doesn’t love us any more:

Pacific Investment Management Co.’s Total Return ETF slashed its holdings of Canadian debt to 2.1 percent from 9.2 percent in the five days ending yesterday, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The $3 billion exchange-traded fund, which follows a similar investment strategy as Newport Beach, California-based Pimco’s flagship $222 billion mutual fund, was run by co-founder Bill Gross before his sudden departure on Sept. 26.

Pimco has less invested in Canada than benchmarks recommend, said Ed Devlin, who oversees $17 billion, including the Canadian portfolios, for Pimco. He said he prefers markets such as Mexico.

“We still think Canada is a relatively unattractive market when we look at rates around the world,” Devlin said at the Bloomberg Canadian Fixed-Income Conference in New York yesterday. “Other markets are much more attractive.”

Devlin noted the yield on the Canadian 10-year bond, at about 2.1 percent, is in line with inflation. “What’s fun about that? Not much,” he said.

Equities started the quarter on the wrong foot:

The Standard & Poor’s/TSX Composite Index (SPTSX) fell 155.07 points, or 1 percent, to 14,805.44 at 4 p.m. in Toronto, retreating for a third straight day. The index lost 4.3 percent in September, the most since May 2012, and fell 1.2 percent in the third quarter.

U.S. stocks tumbled today amid concern over economic growth in Europe and geopolitical turmoil as the Federal Reserve prepares to end its bond-buying program. The Russell 2000 Index (RTY) dropped more than 10 percent from a record reached in March, meeting the common definition of a correction.

Equities fell as Italy cut its growth forecast, German manufacturing shrank and euro-area factories lowered prices in September by the most in more than a year. The weakness underlined the mounting challenge facing policy makers before the European Central Bank meets tomorrow.

… but bonds were on fire!

Treasuries gained the most in more than eight months as yields higher relative to most Group of Seven nations increased demand from investors worldwide concerned global growth is stalling.

Benchmark 10-year notes yielded almost the most versus their German counterparts since 1999 after the dollar touched a two-year high versus the euro yesterday. The European Central Bank may detail its plan to buy asset-backed securities tomorrow amid slowdowns in Germany in France. Stocks tumbled, pushing the Russell 2000 Index into a correction, and bolstering the haven appeal of U.S. government securities.

The U.S. 10-year yield fell 10 basis points, or 0.10 percentage point, to 2.39 percent as of 5 p.m. in New York, according to Bloomberg Bond Trader data. It’s the biggest drop since Jan. 23. The 2.375 percent security rose 29/32, or $9.06 per $1,000 face amount, to 99 28/32.

U.S. 10-year notes yielded 1.48 percentage points more than their German counterparts after reaching 1.57 on Sept. 17, the most since June 1999. They were 1.85 percentage points higher than those of Japanese peers, up from 0.63 percentage point in May 2012.

Meanwhile, for you brokers out there worrying about clients leaving you after a not very exciting quarter … PIMCo feels your pain:

Pimco CEO Douglas Hodge said this week during a conference call that the firm is expecting and is ready for client redemptions. Pimco could see withdrawals of 10 percent to 30 percent, Sanford Bernstein said in a report. Pimco has not disclosed how much money has left the firm since Gross’s departure.

Investors yanked a record $446.5 million from Pimco’s $2.9 billion Total Return ETF after Gross’ departure from the firm on Sept. 26., before slowing redemptions to $98 million on Sept. 29 and $87 million yesterday. The exchange-traded fund follows a similar investment strategy as the Pimco Total Return mutual fund.

Pimco’s largest competitors had already been benefiting this year as investors have moved away from the firm’s Total Return into top-performing rivals as well as flexible funds that can protect from rising interest rates. Pimco’s Total Return Fund has lagged behind competitors this year, trailing 62 percent of its peers, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 16bp, FixedResets gaining 1bp and DeemedRetractibles up 6bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 1 0.0962 % 2,682.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0962 % 4,131.3
Floater 2.88 % 3.02 % 61,331 19.71 4 0.0962 % 2,774.0
OpRet 4.05 % 2.80 % 101,337 0.08 1 -0.0395 % 2,728.2
SplitShare 4.30 % 3.85 % 96,747 3.87 5 -0.3496 % 3,150.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0395 % 2,494.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.47 % 1.25 % 73,032 0.08 18 0.0656 % 2,445.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.33 % 5.17 % 101,991 15.10 18 -0.1552 % 2,585.8
FixedReset 4.21 % 3.75 % 179,926 8.62 73 0.0134 % 2,556.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.00 % 2.21 % 103,894 0.25 42 0.0647 % 2,563.2
FloatingReset 2.56 % -7.01 % 79,076 0.08 6 0.0260 % 2,541.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PF.B FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-01
Maturity Price : 21.63
Evaluated at bid price : 21.63
Bid-YTW : 5.51 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 115,350 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.30 and crossed 20,200 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.27
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
BMO.PR.W FixedReset 108,300 Scotia crossed 16,200 at 25.07 and 50,000 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 97,641 Called for redemption October 31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 1.71 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 95,523 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 85,610 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 30,000, both at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.27
Bid-YTW : -7.64 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 71,036 Scotia crossed two blocks of 30,000 each, both at 25.12.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 20.79 – 21.24
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3169

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-01
Maturity Price : 20.79
Evaluated at bid price : 20.79
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %

NA.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 25.91 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2261

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-11-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %

BAM.PR.E Quote: 24.10 – 24.48
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2710

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.80
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 22.45 – 22.68
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1436

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-10-01
Maturity Price : 21.93
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.33 – 26.59
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1745

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %

CGI.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 25.06 – 25.30
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1645

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %

Massive S&P Downgrade of Bank Preferreds

October 2nd, 2014

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • •On Sept. 18, 2014, we published our global criteria for rating bank hybrid capital instruments (see “Bank Hybrid Capital And Nondeferrable Subordinated Debt Methodology And Assumptions”).
  • •Following the criteria publication, we are lowering our issue credit ratings on 68 Canadian bank hybrid capital instruments and removing the “Under Criteria Observation” designation from the ratings.
  • •We believe that banking regulators are adopting a tougher “bail-in” stance (where investors share in the cost of a government’s rescue of a failing bank) toward hybrid capital instruments compared with our expectations in late 2011.
  • •This increases the possibility that banks might have to use hybrid capital instruments to a greater extent to absorb losses, and that regulators would be prepared to see such instruments absorb losses as a response to a bank stress.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services today said it lowered its issue credit ratings on 68 bank hybrid capital instruments issued by Canadian banks, and affirmed the ratings on 60 instruments. In addition, we removed the “Under Criteria Observation” (UCO) designation from the ratings, which we had labeled as UCO following the release of our new bank hybrid criteria on Sept. 18 (for more information, see “Bank Hybrid Capital And Nondeferrable Subordinated Debt Methodology And Assumptions” published Sept. 18, 2014, on RatingsDirect).

We have lowered the ratings one notch on Tier 1 preferred shares issued by Bank of Montreal, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Laurentian Bank of Canada, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, and The Toronto-Dominion Bank. We have affirmed the ratings on subordinated debt issues of the same issuers that had been placed under criteria observation. We have lowered the ratings on HSBC Bank Canada’s preferred shares and subordinated debt by two and one notches, respectively, based on our group rating methodology and the parent-level ratings on HSBC.

The downgrades reflect our view that regulators in Canada and elsewhere are adopting a tougher “bail-in” stance (where investors share in the cost of a government’s rescue of a failing bank) toward hybrid capital instruments compared with our expectations in late 2011. This increases the possibility that banks might have to use hybrid capital instruments to a greater extent to absorb losses, for example, through coupon nonpayment or conversion to common equity. We believe new regulations position regulators to stop banks from making their payments to hybrid capital investors at what we consider to be earlier-than-before points in the deterioration of a bank’s financial strength. (For details, see “Increasing Bail-In Risks For Bank Hybrid Capital Instruments Are Behind Our Proposed Criteria Change,” published Feb. 6, 2014.

In our view, the risks for hybrid capital instruments are higher in jurisdictions such as Canada that are adopting the Basel III framework. The updated criteria provide a consistent basis for applying notches to reflect heightened risks of coupon nonpayment due to the Basel III capital conservation buffer mechanism, and to reflect the risk associated with a contractual or statutory conversion or write-down mechanism. The changes to Tier 1 hybrid instrument ratings in Canada reflect the application of an additional notch for coupon nonpayment risk arising from implementation of the Basel III framework.

COMPANIES WITH AFFECTED OUTSTANDING ISSUES (PARENTS ONLY LISTED)
Bank of Montreal
The Bank of Nova Scotia
Caisse centrale Desjardins
Central 1 Credit Union
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
HSBC Bank Canada
Laurentian Bank of Canada
National Bank of Canada
Royal Bank of Canada
Toronto-Dominion Bank (The)

Affected issues are:

New Ratings From S&P 2014-09-29
Issuer Basel III Status
NVCC
Issues New Rating
BMO Non-compliant BMO.PR.J, BMO.PR.K, BMO.PR.L, BMO.PR.M, BMO.PR.P, BMO.PR.Q, BMO.PR.R P-2(low)
Compliant BMO.PR.S, BMO.PR.T, BMO.PR.W P-3(high)
BNS Non-compliant BNS.PR.A, BNS.PR.B, BNS.PR.C, BNS.PR.L, BNS.PR.M, BNS.PR.N, BNS.PR.O, BNS.PR.P, BNS.PR.Q, BNS.PR.R, BNS.PR.Y, BNS.PR.Z P-2
Compliant None extant. Shelf prospectus rating is preliminary P-2(low)
CM Non-compliant None  
Compliant CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G*, CM.PR.O P-3(high)
HSB Non-compliant HBS.PR.C, HSB.PR.D P-2
Compliant None  
LB Non-compliant LB.PR.F P-3
Compliant LB.PR.H P-3(low)
NA Non-compliant NA.PR.L, NA.PR.M, NA.PR.Q P-2(low)
Compliant NA.PR.S P-3(high)
RY Non-compliant RY.PR.A***, RY.PR.B***, RY.PR.C***, RY.PR.D***, RY.PR.E***, RY.PR.F, RY.PR.G***, RY.PR.I, RY.PR.K***, RY.PR.L, RY.PR.Y P-2(high)
Compliant RY.PR.H, RY.PR.Z, RY.PR.W** P-2
TD Non-compliant TD.PR.O, TD.PR.P, TD.PR.Q, TD.PR.R, TD.PR.S, TD.PR.T, TD.PR.Y, TD.PR.Z P-2(high)
Compliant TD.PF.A, TD.PF.B P-2
* CM.PR.G not listed by S&P. Group assignment made by author
** RY.PR.W not listed by S&P. Non-compliant at present, but is convertible into common at issuer’s option, therefore I have deemed it to be compliant
*** Seven RY non-compliant issues are not listed by S&P

All this follows the S&P announcement discussed on PrefBlog in the post S&P Sets Outlook-Negative on Canadian Banks.

The “tougher ‘bail-in’ stance” referred to in the S&P release was discussed on PrefBlog in the post Feds Consulting on Bank Recapitalization Regime.

DGS.PR.A Resets To 5.25%, Unchanged

October 1st, 2014

A full year ago, DGS.PR.A extended term from 2014-11-30 to 2019-11-28, but did not announce a dividend rate for the coming period – this was fine for preferred shareholders since part of the deal was a retraction at par, exercisable for the original maturity date.

Since then, DGS.PR.A has gotten bigger three times – in October 2013, January 2014 and July 2014 – as, clearly, the sponsor is prepared to put some money into marketing a Split Share Corp as long as it has a decent time to run. I haven’t been recommending it, though, pending notification of the new rate.

Brompton Group announced the new rate on September 23:

Dividend Growth Split Corp. (the “Fund”) announced today that the distribution rate for the Preferred Shares for the 5 year term from December 1, 2014 to November 28, 2019 will be $0.525 per annum (5.25% on the original issue price of $10) payable quarterly. This rate is unchanged from the rate for the previous term. The Preferred Share distribution rate is based on current market rates for preferred shares with similar terms. In addition, the Fund intends to maintain the targeted monthly Class A Share distribution at $0.10 per Class A Share.

The Fund previously announced on October 1, 2013 the extension of the term of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares to November 28, 2019 from November 30, 2014. The extension allows shareholders to continue to enjoy the benefit of the Funds’ portfolio of common shares of high quality, large capitalization companies, which have among the highest dividend growth rates of those companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index. Currently, the portfolio consists of common shares of the following 20 companies:

Great-West Lifeco Inc. The Bank of Nova Scotia AGF Management Limited Shaw Communications Inc.
Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce IGM Financial Inc. TELUS Corporation
Manulife Financial Corporation National Bank of Canada Power Corporation of Canada Canadian Utilities Limited
Sun Life Financial Inc. Royal Bank of Canada Manitoba Telecom Services Enbridge Inc.
Bank of Montreal The Toronto-Dominion Bank Rogers Communications Inc. TransCanada Corporation

In connection with the extension, shareholders who do not wish to continue their investment in the Fund, may retract their Preferred Shares or Class A Shares on November 28, 2014 pursuant to a special retraction right and receive a retraction price that is calculated in the same way that such price would be calculated if the Fund were to terminate on November 30, 2014. Notice must be given by November 14, 2014 at 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) in order to exercise this right.

I received an eMail about this:

I am one of your newsletter subscribers and I purchased DGS.PR.A on your advice last year (thank-you!).

You are probably aware that it is maturing soon with the option to extend for another five years at the same rate (see below). If you had any advice about whether I should bail out or stay in I would be very appreciative.

Also, I have never been in this situation before… do I contact Dividend Growth Split Corp directly or do I contact my stock broker and ask them to inform Dividend Growth Split Corp if I want to retract?

Flattery will get you everywhere! Well, I know nothing of this client’s financial situation or what else he has in his portfolio, but I will say that the reset of 5.25% is very good for holders; if the position made sense for him a year ago, it almost certainly makes sense for him today. Barring unusual portfolio goals and issuer concentration issues, I say hold on to it.

At today’s bid of 10.13, the issue yields 5.05% to maturity 2019-11-28, which is quite good considering that the issue has quite good credit quality, given a NAV of $18.75 as of September 25 to back up each $10 preferred share.

And if you do want to get rid of it, don’t retract! Unless you have very high transaction costs, you’ll get more money selling in the market, given the current bid of $10.13.

DGS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns; note that these credit concerns relate only to the Probability of Default and completely ignore the prospects for Recovery Given Default – and this latter figure will be quite substantial, particularly when compared with that of Operating Companies, which is expected to be zero.

DC.PR.D Commences Trading

October 1st, 2014

Assiduous Reader prefQC gently reminds me that DC.PR.D, the FloatingReset recently converted from DC.PR.B has commenced trading – and I forgot all about it!

At any rate, it has started on a strong note, closing at 24.91-15 today vs. DC.PR.B’s 24.56-68, a very nice premium for the exchange. Vital statistics are:

DC.PR.D FloatingReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %

Assiduous Readers might be a little upset that they missed this, particularly since I said:

It is difficult to formulate a recommendation regarding whether holders of DC.PR.B should convert. The two issues resulting after partial conversion will, of course, form a Strong Pair and may be analyzed with the Pairs Equivalency Calculator. Performing an analysis of all current FixedReset/FloatingReset pairs results in the following chart:

FRPairs_140902
Click for Big

This chart was created with the assumed price of the new DC FloatingReset set to 25.22, the same as the price of DC.PR.B. According to this, the DC FloatingReset looks a little bit cheap … but not much. To get to the average Breakeven 3-Month Bill Yield of 1.67%, the price would only need to increase by $0.08, to 25.30.

Mind you, I also said:

Those with a taste for speculation, however, will find the conversion to the FloatingReset attractive, since there’s not much downside and potentially quite a bit of upside.

However, look at the current chart of break-even T-bill yields:

FR_breakeven_141001
Click for Big

That’s the implied rate for the DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair way over on the right, the only member so far of the “Junk” group – I remain very interested regarding whether the implied rates for junk and investment-grade will diverge. They shouldn’t … but you never know!

Anyway, the implied break-even three-month T-bill rate until the next exchange in September 2019 for this pair is 1.95%, just a hair over the 1.88% average for investment-grade and clearly inside the range. The interesting part of this, however, is what has happened to the average break-even rate since my recommendation as of September 2: the investment-grade average has increased from 1.67% to 1.88%. That’s a big move and has resulted in the big gap between the prices of DC.PR.B and DC.PR.D. What has happened, more or less, is that FixedResets have moved down in price, while FloatingResets are largely unchanged.

I will note that, assuming the three-month bill rate increases uniformly over the five years until the next exchange, this is predicting a yield in September 2019 of about 3%. Fancier expectations should be higher, since most pundits expect policy rates to be kept on hold for the next year, maybe two.

DC.PR.D will be tracked by HIMIPref™, but relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

New Issue: BAM FixedReset, 4.50%+284

October 1st, 2014

Brookfield Asset Management has announced:

that it has agreed to issue 8,000,000 Class A Preferred Shares, Series 42 on a bought deal basis to a syndicate of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc., RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Scotiabank for distribution to the public. The Preferred Shares, Series 42 will be issued at a price of C$25.00 per share, for gross proceeds of C$200,000,000. Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series 42 will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.50% annually for the initial period ending June 30, 2020. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.84%.

Brookfield has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable until 48 hours prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 2,000,000 Preferred Shares, Series 42 which, if exercised, would increase the gross offering size to C$250,000,000. The Preferred Shares, Series 42 will be offered in all provinces of Canada by way of a supplement to Brookfield’s existing short form base shelf prospectus. The Preferred Shares, Series 42 may not be offered or sold in the United States or to U.S. persons absent registration or an applicable exemption from the registration requirements under the U.S. Securities Act.

Brookfield intends to use the net proceeds of the issue of Preferred Shares, Series 42 for general corporate purposes. The offering of Preferred Shares, Series 42 is expected to close on or about October 8, 2014.

Later, they further announced:

that as a result of strong investor demand for its previously announced offering it has agreed to increase the size of the offering to 12,000,000 Class A Preferred Shares, Series 42. The Preferred Shares, Series 42 will be issued at a price of C$25.00 per share, for gross proceeds of C$300,000,000. There will not be an underwriters’ option as was previously granted. The Preferred Shares, Series 42 are being offered on a bought deal basis by a syndicate of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc., RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Scotiabank.

This issue looks fairly priced against BAM.PF.F, a FixedReset 4.50+286, that started trading in June, but looks reasonably cheap against its lower-spread siblings, according to Implied Volatility Theory:

ImpVol_BAM_FR_141001
Click for Big

September 30, 2014

September 30th, 2014

The downside of the elimination of bankruptcy law as it relates to banks is becoming apparent:

But after studying the proposals, National Bank Financial analyst Peter Routledge found that, under the new rules, commmon shareholders should be much more concerned, because they are quickly treated as collateral damage under the new regime. Should a new crisis emerge, common shareholders could be quickly wiped out, and that could rewrite the survival playbook.

Employing standard banking assumptions about leverage ratios and balance sheet sizes, Mr. Routledge discovered that just a 6 per cent drop in asset values, possibly from writing down a loan book and securities portfolio, would deplete a bank’s common equity capital. Because the bank’s existing common shareholders would then be wiped out, the preferred shareholders and bondholders would have their securities converted into common shares – making them the bank’s new owners.

Under the old rules, governments tried their best to protect common shareholders by setting up bailout schemes such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which purchased preferred shares and took toxic debt off of bank balance sheets, but did not upend the common equity investor base.

Mr. Routledge worries too few people appreciate just how easy it is to wipe out the existing shareholders under the proposed rules. When people start to realize this, possibly during the next crisis, he fears it will have disastrous implications for troubled banks.

Speaking of banks and debt:

Debt reduction through austerity reduces spending and thus slows growth; slower growth reduces incoming revenues and thus limits the ability to reduce debt.

This is a factor in the stubborn lack of global capital investment that has been limiting economic expansion – and Canada is no exception.

Standard & Poor’s on Monday pointed a finger at consumer debt as it lowered its 2014 growth forecast for the Canadian economy to 2.3 per cent from 2.5 per cent.

“Consumers might still be postponing purchases, worried about the heavy debt burdens they built up in the past decade, and this could be short-circuiting the growth we normally see in recoveries,” said S&P global fixed income analyst Robert Palombi. Without that consumer pick-up, he said, businesses lack a key catalyst to invest in expansion, which in turn has stifled employment growth.

New OSFI honcho Jeremy Rudin gave a speech to the Economic Club of Canada but didn’t say anything of interest.

The ruble’s in trouble:

Prospects Russia is considering capital controls amid the worst performance in emerging markets for the nation’s bonds and currency sent the ruble tumbling past the level at which the central bank said it would step in.

The ruble temporarily slid beyond 44.40 against the Bank of Russia’s basket of dollars and euros after two officials said policy makers are considering temporary restrictions if net outflows rise significantly. It pared declines after the central bank said it isn’t considering limits on cross-border capital movements. The yield on 10-year bonds rose six basis points to 9.42 percent, bringing this quarter’s increase to 102 basis points. The Micex Index pared its first gain in four days.

Reimposing restrictions on the flow of money that were abandoned eight years ago threatens to worsen a selloff in Russian assets that has gained momentum as the U.S. and European Union expanded sanctions over the conflict in Ukraine. The ruble slid 14 percent versus the dollar this quarter, breaking record lows in the past three days.

“Capital outflows should sharply increase now,” Stanislav Kopylov, who helps manage 45 billion rubles ($1.14 billion) at UralSib Asset Management in Moscow, said by phone from Moscow. “When you’re threatened like that, you need to urgently pull out the cash.”

And so much for Putin’s grandiose dreams of having a reserve currency:

After proclaiming in 2007 that the ruble was poised to become a haven for global investors, the Russian leader has watched it fade, a victim of his nation’s stagnating economy since the land grab in Ukraine. Now so much money is leaving Russia that its central bank is considering temporary capital controls, according to two officials with direct knowledge of the discussions.

The ruble’s share of global trading dropped to 0.4 percent from 0.6 percent since 2012, falling five places to rank 18th most-traded in the world, while the yuan tripled to 1.5 percent, according to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT. Even as protests in Hong Kong this week challenged China’s leadership, direct trading began between the yuan and the euro, capping a year in which trade with European Union nations grew 12 percent.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 2bp, FixedResets up 8bp and DeemedRetractibles off 1bp. Volatility was low. Volume was low.

Now to figure out why PrefInfo isn’t working.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1783 % 2,680.0
FixedFloater 4.20 % 3.46 % 24,464 18.41 1 0.0000 % 4,127.3
Floater 2.89 % 3.01 % 63,851 19.70 4 -0.1783 % 2,771.4
OpRet 4.05 % 2.18 % 93,842 0.08 1 0.0000 % 2,729.2
SplitShare 4.28 % 3.63 % 100,021 3.87 5 0.1978 % 3,161.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,495.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.49 % 2.53 % 75,479 0.08 20 -0.0650 % 2,443.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.29 % 5.17 % 103,207 15.16 16 0.0190 % 2,589.8
FixedReset 4.21 % 3.75 % 177,244 8.47 74 0.0813 % 2,555.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.01 % 2.21 % 104,719 0.40 42 -0.0105 % 2,561.5
FloatingReset 2.56 % -5.17 % 79,595 0.08 6 0.1761 % 2,541.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium -1.50 % Called for redemption October 31
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 1.47 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-09-30
Maturity Price : 22.70
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.W FixedReset 117,600 Desjardins crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 25.13.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-09-30
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 63,200 TD crossed 25,000 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-09-30
Maturity Price : 23.26
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 57,899 NVCC like CM.PR.D, which has been Called for redemption October 31
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : -5.75 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 57,750 Called for redemption October 31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 1.65 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 57,290 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 54,870 TD crossed 49,300 at 24.02.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
There were 24 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.90 – 23.22
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2208

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %

BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.15 – 26.37
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1298

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : -3.38 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.20 – 24.45
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1667

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-09-30
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %

IFC.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 23.70 – 24.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2182

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %

GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.60 – 23.90
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2260

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

IFC.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.49 – 25.72
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1560

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.49
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %