Market Action

June 7, 2012

Bernanke had some cheerful commentary:

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said the economy is at risk from Europe’s debt crisis and the prospect of fiscal tightening in the U.S., while refraining from discussing steps the central bank might take to protect the expansion.

Bernanke also warned lawmakers that “a severe tightening of fiscal policy at the beginning of next year that is built into current law — the so-called fiscal cliff — would, if allowed to occur, pose a significant threat to the recovery.”

Spain gets more interesting daily:

Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy said he’s talking to his European peers about how to shore up the country’s banks as Fitch Ratings cut Spain’s credit grade to within two steps of junk.

Rajoy spoke minutes before Fitch downgraded Spain by three levels to BBB, within two steps of non-investment grade. Fitch said the cost to the state of shoring up banks may amount to as much as 100 billion euros ($126 billion) in the worst case, compared with its previous estimate of 30 billion euros, as Spain will remain in recession next year.

Spain’s 10-year bond yield fell to 6.088 percent yesterday from 6.282 percent on June 6, retreating from the 7 percent threshold that triggered bailouts in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The Treasury met its issuance goal at a bond auction, selling 2.07 billion euros of Spanish securities, surpassing the maximum target of 2 billion euros.

It was a day of solid recovery for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 6bp, FixedResets up 10bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 23bp. Of great interest is the observation that the Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) has returned to negative territory. Volatility was minor.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4347 % 2,309.9
FixedFloater 4.49 % 3.87 % 27,095 17.57 1 -0.8899 % 3,511.4
Floater 3.13 % 3.16 % 73,632 19.25 3 -0.4347 % 2,494.1
OpRet 4.81 % 2.61 % 36,708 1.03 5 0.0077 % 2,497.9
SplitShare 5.27 % -5.10 % 49,313 0.53 4 0.9686 % 2,717.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0077 % 2,284.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 3.18 % 78,887 0.63 26 0.0595 % 2,227.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.03 % 5.05 % 127,535 15.28 7 0.5221 % 2,447.5
FixedReset 5.05 % 3.14 % 194,111 7.83 71 0.0994 % 2,388.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.03 % 3.88 % 147,931 3.16 45 0.2376 % 2,296.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
FBS.PR.C SplitShare 3.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.63
Bid-YTW : -7.11 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 6.28 % Simply a recovery from the ridiculous behaviour yesterday, but not without odd goings-on today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.86
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 156,601 Desjardins crossed 75,000 at 25.40; Nesbitt crossed 80,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.44
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 88,099 GMP bought 25,900 from RBC at 25.00; TD crossed 39,800 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 78,134 TD crossed 75,000 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 2.86 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 52,716 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 52,607 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 33,751 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.63
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.16 – 25.38
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1349

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 24.76
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.90 – 26.18
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.2077

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.15 – 25.40
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1888

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 24.83
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %

RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.62 – 26.85
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1739

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.62
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %

GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.50 – 25.69
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1345

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %

SLF.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 24.45 – 24.66
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1611

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %

Issue Comments

LFE.PR.A: Recirculating?

Yesterday, in the post LFE.PR.A Tight-Lipped Regarding Special Retraction Results I expressed my irritation that results of the Special Retraction for LFE.PR.A had not been reported by the company immediately following the effective date of the Special Retraction.

I eMailed the company:

Knowledge of the consolidation ratio is critical to evaluation of the credit quality of LFE.PR.A and the option value of LFE.

What purpose is served by the delay?

Sincerely,

… and received a reply …

In the best interest of the shareholders, the Company has an obligation to attempt to recirculate the shares submitted for the special retraction, prior to the payment date. Therefore it does not mean that all shares submitted for the special retraction will be cancelled. Any cancellations will not occur until after the June 19th payment date.

Well, fair enough, although I consider it rather odd that the company is holding the position as treasury shares for almost three weeks.

Say that: (i) they have not yet raised the cash, and (ii) the underlying portfolio value plummets. Then they’re screwed, because they have, effectively, levered up the portfolio in a down market.

So to avoid this possibility, one might assume that a prudent person would have raised the cash as of the NAV calculation date (May 31).

So say that: (i) they have raised the cash, and (ii) the underlying portfolio value skyrockets. This gets a little complex, so say there were two units outstanding May 30, of which one was retracted May 31 at a price of $11. They raise the cash, so that their assets on May 31 are $11 securities and $11 cash, against two units outstanding, one of which is a treasury unit.

Then the underlying doubles, so on June 17 their assets are $22 securities and $11 cash, with two units outstanding, one of which started the period as a treasury. The unitholders will be happy or sad to the extent to which the company was able to sell units at prices reflecting their ability to invest the cash in the underlying portfolio. It gets a little hairy, especially when there are two classes of shares to worry about.

Attempting to recirculate units after the calculation of the cash payment obligation seems like a risky enterprise to me. But, of course, the numbers have been chose to make understanding simpler – the underlying portfolio is unlikely to either double or halve in the three week holding period.

In fact, they might well get away with it, given that the Capital Units are trading at a fat premium to the intrinsic value reported on May 31, which was $11.32. Despite this, the low price for the entire period for the capital units by the Toronto Stock Exchange was $1.70.

Those who have seen my seminar on SplitShares will know there is nothing automatically wrong with capital units trading at a premium – they can, to a certain extent, be modelled as options and may have time value that can be quite considerable. There’s more discussion of this nuance (for free, you cheap bastards) in the post Split Share Capital Unit Debate. But – and it’s a big but, as the Bishop said to the Actress – there will be a considerable cash drag on the portfolio following the reorganization and any attempt to model the capital units as options have to include this effect. I’m sure a lot of models don’t.

One way or another, however, I suspect that the company will be successful in flogging any Capital Units retracted for a price in excess of their redemption price of $1.32. Just what might happen to the preferred shares is much less clear. We shall see!

Issue Comments

IAG.PR.A Market-Maker Falls Asleep!

Assiduous Reader KB writes in and says:

I’m confused about something that happens once in a while and maybe you can clear it up.

There are lots of illiquid preferred shares, and they often have wide spreads. That’s fine as long as everyone is behaving.

If I want to purchase some shares and there isn’t available size at the ask, I have found the shares usually appear if you meet the ask price. I assume the market maker offers up the shares that are required. Same situation on the sell side.

But once in a while like today, I was watching one of my preferred’s (IAG.PR.A) since yesterday it took a rather strange drop in value that you had commented on in the PrefBlog.

Today at 1:13 PM 34 shares changed hands at a reasonable $23.65. Then at 2:56 PM 700 shares traded at $21.71 and 50 shares at $21.66. That’s ridiculous.

My questions is: Where do these shares come from? National Bank bought and sold the 700 and Desjardins sold the remaining 50 to National Bank.

Do these shares come from the market maker or were there people actually willing to sell at that price? You’ve not touched on this subject in PrefLetter or in PrefBlog and the internet doesn’t reveal much, so I decided to ask you directly. Maybe you’re
just as confused as I am.

Actually, I’ve discussed it earlier in the post Fed Up with Shoddy Market-Making!. It was as a result of my frustration with the system that I started publishing the “Wide Spread Highlights” table every day and it was due to my complaints on the topic that I discovered the TMX Close != Last pricing data fiasco.

At vast expense, I have purchased the day’s “Trades and Quotes” file for IAG.PR.A from the TSX. From 9:30 until 4:00 there were 1,023 quotes and three trades.

Easy part first: National was the seller of an odd lot at the offering price and the buyer of an odd lot at the bid price. This almost certainly means that National is the Market Maker. As discussed in the post linked above, Market Makers are required to, among other things, service odd-lot orders at the quote, in exchange for which they receive certain privileges.

The action from 2:55:31 until 2:57:49 is of great interest:

IAG.PR.A
Time Quote Trade
2:55:31 21.66-23.65, 1×2  
2:56:19 21.66-94, 1×2  
2:56:19   700 @ 21.71 (National Bank Cross)
2:56:20 21.66-23.65, 1×2  
2:56:20   50 @ 21.66 (National Bank purchase from Desjardins)
2:57:49 22.00-23.65, 4×2  

All day long the offer was at 23.65, with the exception of less than one second (time-stamping on the file available to me is precise only as to the second), at 2:56:19, when the offer suddenly declined to 21.94, making the spread 0.28. In the same second the trade of 700 shares occured, and in the next second the offer moved back to the 23.65 level, where it was for 6:29:59 of the trading day which lasted 6:30:00.

I must admit that I am very curious about this sequence of events and it does not seem credible that the sudden sharp decline of the offer price was entirely unrelated to the trade of 700 shares that occured during the same single second that the offer was so low. However, I am insufficiently knowledgable regarding the rules to know whether it is legal to front-run an incoming order by changing quote to make the fill seem more reasonable – certainly, if the quote had been 21.66-94 all day long, then a fill of a market order at 21.71 by an internal trade-matching algorithm would be quite reasonable and greatly appreciated.

It is unclear as to whether any front-running occurred at all, even if the change in quote and trade were related. It would be entirely rational for someone to place a limit order inside the quote (well inside the quote, in this case!) and then convert the order to a market order if not immediately filled – although the identity of the broker showing the 21.94 offer for one second is not available in the data I have, and the size was only 200 shares. It would be somewhat more normal for the offer to be allowed to stand for more than a second, as well. However, as became glaringly apparent during the Flash Crash, individual decisions made in the design of protocols and trading algorithms can start looking rather silly when conditions are different from those envisaged at design-time.

I will also point out that the data available to me reflect only the TMX data – I do not have a consolidated tape that would include quotations from Alpha, Pure, etc.

And finally, I will point out that I don’t really understand the relative identities of the buyers and sellers. It strains credulity to imagine that National’s cross of 700 shares was completely unrelated to the sale of 50 shares by Desjardins to National that occurred one second later; but definitive information regarding the precise order flow (back to the actual beneficial owner) is not available to me.

So I will leave it to those more familiar with the intricacies of UMIR and with more access to consolidated tapes to determine whether any jiggery-pokery occured.

All one can do is ask questions – the following eMail has been sent to the Exchange:

On 2012-6-7, the offer price reported by the TMX for IAG.PR.A was 23.65 for the entire day, except for one second commencing 14:56:19. In that second the offer price changed to 21.94 and a cross was executed at 21.71, which was down 1.87 from the closing price on 2012-6-6.

The time-weighted average spread for the full trading session was, according to my calculations using data supplied by the Toronto Stock Exchange, $1.47. The quoted spread exceeded this figure for over four hours in the course of the trading day (to be precise, 4:13:53) and was between $1.95 and $2.00 for nearly all this time (4:10:09).

Can you tell me:
i) Who is the market maker for this security?
ii) What commitments has the market maker made to the exchange regarding the bid-offer spread to be maintained for this security?
iii) When was the last review of the market-maker’s success in meeting the commitments made with respect to bid-offer spread?
iv) What were the results of the last review specified by (iii)?

Sincerely,

Issue Comments

EMA.PR.C Soft on Good Volume

Emera has announced:

that it has completed its public offering of ten million Cumulative Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series C for aggregate gross proceeds of $250 million. The offering was first announced on May 29, 2012 when Emera entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters in Canada led by Scotiabank, RBC Capital Markets and TD Securities Inc.

The net proceeds of the offering will be used for general corporate purposes.

EMA.PR.C is a FixedReset, 4.10%+265, announced May 29. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™, but assigned to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

EMA.PR.C traded 503,021 shares today in a range of 24.75-87 before closing at 24.81-84, 25×2. Vital statistics are:

EMA.PR.C FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-07
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
Market Action

June 6, 2012

OSFI has released an outline of the new paperwork rules for bank mortgages:

Re-qualification at Renewal – Current practice regarding residential mortgage renewals has served FRFIs well. OSFI agrees, for example, that having a good payment record is one of the best indicators of credit worthiness. OSFI, therefore, expects that FRFIs themselves will remain responsible for deciding what level of review to place on borrowers’ qualifications at the time of renewal. FRFI renewal practices should be articulated in internal policies governing their underwriting of residential mortgage loans. FRFIs, however, will be expected to refresh the borrowers’ credit metrics periodically (not necessarily at renewal) so that FRFIs can effectively evaluate their credit risk.

2. Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs) – OSFI is maintaining its position that the HELOC component of a mortgage be restricted to a maximum loan-to-value ratio of 65 per cent. HELOCs are inherently riskier products, given their revolving nature, persistence of debt balances and their ineligibility for mortgage insurance. However, HELOCs at or below an LTV ratio of 65 per cent will not be required to be amortized, as the revolving aspect of a HELOC is a fundamental feature of the product.

The BoC has released a discussion paper by Francisco Rivadeneyra titled The U.S.-Dollar Supranational Zero-Coupon Curve:

The author describes the construction of the U.S.-dollar-denominated zero-coupon curve for the supranational asset class from 1995 to 2010. He uses yield data from a cross-section of bonds issued by AAA-rated supranational entities to fit the Svensson (1995) term-structure model. Results show the expected pattern of interest rates over the U.S. business cycle. The author computes the spreads relative to the U.S. Treasury zero-coupon yields data of Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007). The average spread for this period is equal to 44 basis points; it increases during recessions and narrows during expansions. Also, the slope of the term structure of spreads shows a countercyclical pattern.

The Toronto Water Department has confirmed that it was their gross incompetence that dumped sewage into Union Station and PATH last week:

On the morning of June 1, a brief, but intense rainfall event caused a rapid surge of storm water flow within the City’s sewer collection system and wastewater treatment plants. (The downtown area experienced rainfall ranging from 27mm to 37mm.) The heavy rainfall event did not exceed the capacity of the entire sewer collection system.

As part of the contract for the TTC’s Union Station New Platform Project in the subway, the TTC’s contractor is also reconstructing a large sewer on behalf of the City for the Union Station Revitalization Project. To enable construction of the new lowered sewer, a section of the existing sewer was removed and pumps put in place in order to install maintenance holes at one of the future connection points. During the heavy rainstorm, sanitary and storm water overflowed from the open section of sewer at this location (flooding was localized to this area of the City).

The contractor and the project management team are working to put in place measures to avoid a recurrence during construction. One such measure includes the installation of two additional pumps on site as contingency. As well, the pipe that was temporarily exposed to perform this work will be capped by Friday.

In other words, they placed a bet that full capacity of the sewage line would not be needed during repair. They lost the bet and Toronto paid. Thanks a lot, guys! Fortunately for the guys who should be fired, council’s got other things on its mind:

Plastic shopping bags will be banned in Toronto as of Jan.1, 2013 after city council, in a surprise move, voted to make Toronto the first major city in Canada to forbid retailers from providing plastic single-use carryout bags.

It’s not clear if the city even has the jurisdiction to pass such a ban.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 2bp, FixedResets winning 13bp and DeemedRetractibles down 4bp. Volatility was minor. Volume was very low.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.09%, equivalent to 6.62% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.4% (OK, just a hair under) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 225bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) decline from the 230bp reported May 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0987 % 2,320.0
FixedFloater 4.45 % 3.83 % 27,240 17.64 1 0.7075 % 3,543.0
Floater 3.11 % 3.14 % 73,444 19.31 3 -0.0987 % 2,505.0
OpRet 4.81 % 2.59 % 37,201 1.03 5 0.0232 % 2,497.7
SplitShare 5.32 % -0.43 % 49,328 0.52 4 0.5095 % 2,691.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0232 % 2,283.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 3.40 % 79,771 0.64 26 0.0158 % 2,225.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.06 % 5.09 % 131,821 15.23 7 0.1010 % 2,434.8
FixedReset 5.05 % 3.18 % 195,080 7.80 71 0.1325 % 2,385.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 3.89 % 148,533 3.16 45 -0.0381 % 2,291.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -9.09 % Not a real decline. The issue traded 1900 shares in a range of 23.58-71 before the bid disappeared. It will be recalled that the Exchange refuses to sell Closing Quotes, so the actual close might have looked a little better. These numbers reflect the Last Quotes.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
FBS.PR.C SplitShare 2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.26
Bid-YTW : -0.43 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 383,687 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 207,488 Desjardins bought blocks of 23,100 and 14,000 from Nesbitt and blocks of 10,000 and 25,000 from anonymous, all at 25.40. Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 56,200 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.40
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 81,716 Desjardins crossed 49,000 at 25.50; RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.61.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 61,267 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 54,401 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 21.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 6.41 %
BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 43,586 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 25.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %
There were 15 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 21.51 – 23.65
Spot Rate : 2.1400
Average : 1.1751

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 16.90 – 18.14
Spot Rate : 1.2400
Average : 0.7184

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-06
Maturity Price : 16.90
Evaluated at bid price : 16.90
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %

MFC.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 25.89 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2289

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.89
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.60 – 22.85
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1893

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %

CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.89 – 26.08
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1370

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.89
Bid-YTW : -27.70 %

BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.50 – 26.69
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1374

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-29
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 2.87 %

Issue Comments

VNR.PR.A Firm on Good Volume

Valener Inc. has announced:

the closing of the previously announced public offering of Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series A (the “Series A Preferred Shares”). Valener issued a total of 4,000,000 Series A Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per Series A Preferred Share, for gross proceeds of $100,000,000. The offering was made on a bought deal basis through a syndicate of underwriters co-led by BMO Capital Markets and TD Securities Inc.

The Series A Preferred Shares commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the symbol VNR.PR.A.

“We are pleased that Valener has successfully completed its first distribution of Preferred Shares, which reflects the confidence the financial markets have in our company”, Mr. Pierre Monahan, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Valener, stated.

The net proceeds of the offering will be used by Valener to subscribe to additional units of Gaz Métro Limited Partnership (“Gaz Métro”) in order for Gaz Métro to finance part of its proposed acquisition of Central Vermont Public Service Corporation (the “CVPS Acquisition”) and any balance, for general corporate purposes. In the event the CVPS Acquisition does not proceed, Valener will use the net proceeds of the offering to repay amounts under its credit facility and for general corporate purposes.

Note that the issue size was upsized following announcement of the issue.

VNR.PR.A is a FixedReset, 4.35%+281, announced May 15. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and assigned to the FixedResets subindex.

VNR.PR.A traded 400,176 shares today in a range of 25.10-18 before closing at 25.14-15, 21×26. Vital statistics are:

VNR.PR.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
Better Communication, Please!

LFE.PR.A Tight-Lipped Regarding Special Retraction Results

It will be recalled that LFE.PR.A is undergoing a reorganization; a very important part of this reorganization was:

Shareholders who do not wish to remain invested in the Company under its reorganized share structure will have until the close of business on May 17, 2012 to provide the Company with notice through their CDS participant that they wish to have their Preferred Shares or Class A Shares redeemed pursuant to the 2012 Special Retraction Right, and to surrender their Shares for retraction. On such a special retraction, each holder of a Preferred Share will receive the lesser of (i) $10.00 and (ii) the net asset value per Unit calculated on May 31, 2012; while holder of a Class A Share will receive the net asset value per Unit calculated on May 31, 2012, less $10.00. Shareholders interested in exercising such retraction right should contact the CDS Participant through which they hold the Shares for further information and instructions as to how to exercise this right. Shareholders should note that the requirements of any particular CDS Participant may vary, and that Shareholders may need to inform their CDS Participant of any intention to exercise this retraction right in advance of the May 17 deadline. Payment for the Class A Shares or Preferred Shares so tendered for retraction pursuant to the 2012 Special Retraction Right will be made no later than June 19, 2012.

So – the company has known what the consolidation ratio was going to be for which issue (either the capital units or the preferreds) since … oh, call it the morning of May 18. In my innocence, I had assumed that the details of the consolidation would be made available on the NAV date of May 31 (or June 1, anyway!):

If more Class A Shares are tendered for retraction under the 2012 Special Retraction Right than Preferred Shares, the outstanding Preferred Shares will be consolidated so that following the retraction pursuant to the 2012 Special Retraction Right there would be an equal number of Preferred Shares and Class A Shares outstanding. Similarly, if more Preferred Shares are tendered for retraction than Class A Shares, the outstanding Class A shares will be consolidated so that again there would be an equal number of Preferred Shares and Class A Shares outstanding following implementation of the 2012 Special Retraction Right. The Company may implement this consolidation by adjusting the number of 2012 Preferred Shares, 2013 Warrants and 2014 Warrants to be issued to holders of Preferred Shares, in the event a consolidation of Preferred Shares is required.

No announcement has yet been made, so I inquired; the answer received was:

A news release will likely be disseminated close to the June 19th Special Retraction payment date.

Knowing the consolidation ratio is critical when evaluating credit quality of LFE.PR.A; it is also critical when evaluating the option value of LFE. But good old Quadravest is going to keep us in the dark; and I cannot even begin to fathom the purpose behind the delay.

All I can suggest is that according to the 2011 Financials, there were 10,712,753 units outstanding on 2011-11-30 and this number is reflected for each part of the unit on the TMX Money Website. Another possibility is to check SEDAR for filings that are only semi-publicized.

What a total waste of time.

Issue Comments

ALA.PR.U Weak on Good Volume

AltaGas has announced:

it has closed its previously announced public offering of 8,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Five-Year Fixed Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series C (the “Series C Preferred Shares”) at a price of US$25.00 per Series C Preferred Share (“the Offering”) for aggregate gross proceeds of US$200 million. The previously announced underwriters’ option to purchase an additional 2,000,000 Series C Preferred Shares at a price of US$25.00 per share was exercised in full.

The Offering was first announced on May 29, 2012 when AltaGas entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters, co-led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC and Scotiabank.

Net proceeds will be used to reduce outstanding indebtedness and for general corporate purposes.

The Series C Preferred Shares will commence trading today on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol ALA.PR.U.

ALA.PR.U is a FixedReset, US-Pay, 4.40%+358, announced May 29. The issue traded 402,860 shares today in a range of 24.35-60 before closing at 24.45-49, 20×1.

ALA.PR.U will not be tracked by HIMIPref™ as there are insufficient USD issues available to form a coherent universe.

Market Action

June 5, 2012

Oh, the technology!

The Romney and Obama campaigns want supporters to be able to send contributions instantly using their smartphones, a step that would let telecommunications companies join in collecting fees that now flow to bank-card networks.

Campaigns will have access to texters’ phone numbers, creating the opportunity to “upsell” them for larger donations, according to Armour, a press secretary in Al Gore’s 1988 presidential campaign.

Political campaigns can expect to see 50 to 70 percent of a donation, with the rest going to fees to aggregators and carriers, Sege said. By comparison, a “card not present” transaction, such as one involving a credit card number entered into a campaign website, carries a fee ranging between 2 and 3 percent, according to Trish Wexler, spokeswoman for the Electronic Payments Coalition, a trade group that represents credit card networks and banks.

Tax the rich? It gets a little complex:

Increasing volatility in tax collections is complicating local governments’ emergence from the worst fiscal crisis since the Great Depression. States projected or dealt with a combined $54 billion of deficits in the fiscal year starting July 1, according to a report from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a nonprofit group in Washington focusing on issues affecting lower-income Americans.

California Governor Jerry Brown, a Democrat, last month cut the most-populous state’s revenue forecast by $4.3 billion after capital gains receipts fell 5 percent, instead of gaining 15 percent as forecast. In response, he proposed steps such as reducing government employees’ workweek by 5 percent.

A one-step rating cut in January by Moody’s Investors Service, to Aa3, has contributed to weakness in Connecticut debt, said Brian Steeves, a portfolio manager at Belle Haven Investments in White Plains, New York. The rank is Moody’s fourth-highest.

Moody’s cited pension and debt costs as well as the state’s susceptibility to “financial market fluctuations,” given the dependence on capital gains.

There are more official worries about the US national debt:

The U.S. government risks a fiscal crisis unless it makes significant changes in tax and spending policies, the Congressional Budget Office said.

The nonpartisan agency said today that without policy changes, the national debt within 15 years will top the historical peak set after World War II. In 1946, government debt amounted to 109 percent of the economy.

The gap between projected taxes and spending is so large, the report said, that if lawmakers merely wanted to prevent the debt-to-GDP ratio from increasing over the next 25 years, they’d have to immediately and permanently cut $700 billion from the $3.6 trillion U.S. budget.

Nothing will happen until the Treasury Secretary has to ask the President to play “Bond Salesman”. That’s what it took in Canada in 1994.

There is more despairing acknowledgement that the TMX / Maple deal is anti-competitive:

Chief among the concerns is that the result will be higher costs for users of TMX’s services that provide trading and market data, RBC said in its submissions. ITG, another large trading house, echoed many of RBC’s concerns in its own comments, which were also handed to the OSC on Monday.

RBC argues that the Maple proposal “will require a significantly different approach to the regulation of fees and fee models in Canada,” and will require the OSC to bulk up to deal with the added workload.

“The commission should recognize the very substantial increase in its capacity and capability that will be required in order to make it an effective regulator of market structure and fees,” RBC said.

ITG’s suggestions were along the same lines, saying that “the structure proposed by the Maple acquisition is fraught with conflicts of interest across every facet of the trading, clearing and settlement infrastructure of this country” and those conflicts “have the potential to seriously affect the ability of other participants to compete effectively in our capital markets.”

A successful deal will mean more jobs for more important regulators! Golly, I wonder if the regulators will approve it.

Investors have learned to demand to be shown the money whenever the Europeans politicians talk about ending the crisis. They are not yet so realistic about the G-7:

Asian stocks rose as finance ministers and central bank governors from the world’s leading economies agreed to coordinate their response to Europe’s financial crisis and U.S. service-industry growth tempered concern the world’s largest economy is slowing.

Finance ministers and central bank governors from the Group of Seven economies agreed to coordinate their response to Europe’s financial crisis on a conference call yesterday. G-7 officials said they will work together to help Spain and Greece place their public finances on a sustainable footing, Japanese Finance Minister Jun Azumi told reporters in Tokyo following the call.

I’m just overjoyed that they’re going to work together to coordinate their response! Yay!

The latest wooly-thinking comes from commentary on the Wisconsin gubernatorial re-run:

Over the past year, Wisconsinites divided into two camps: those who see public unions as critical to ensuring a stable middle-class and those like Mr. Walker who see them as the source of ballooning government debts and higher taxes.

Wrong! Public unions are not the source of ballooning government debts and higher taxes. The source of ballooning government debts and higher taxes are gutless wonder politicians (and do-gooders and their wooly minded supporters) who agree to ludicrous contracts. You will never hear me criticize welfare recipients, whether of the human or corporate variety, who ask for government largesse. Anybody can ask for money! It’s a free country! The villains are the idiots who give it to them.

What, never? Hardly ever.

Much more interesting was the note that:

But since Mr. Walker signed the collective-bargaining bill, which was passed last year by Wisconsin’s Republican-controlled legislature amid weeks of protests around the state capitol, membership in the state’s public-sector unions has withered.

That is because the law ended the automatic deduction of union dues. Public workers must now choose to opt in to the union, rather than being included by virtue of their job.

The result is that the main union that represents state and municipal workers in Wisconsin saw its membership fall by more than half to about 29,000 from 63,000 in the past year. The Wisconsin wing of the American Federation of Teachers lost a third of its members.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums gaining 10bp, FixedResets winning 18bp and DeemedRetractibles off 9bp. Insurance losers were again notable in the Performance Highlights table, but on a much less overwhelming basis than they were yesterday. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4128 % 2,322.3
FixedFloater 4.48 % 3.86 % 28,310 17.59 1 0.1890 % 3,518.1
Floater 3.11 % 3.14 % 76,489 19.32 3 -0.4128 % 2,507.4
OpRet 4.81 % 2.56 % 38,740 1.03 5 -0.0696 % 2,497.1
SplitShare 5.35 % 3.93 % 50,124 0.52 4 -1.2945 % 2,678.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0696 % 2,283.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % 3.08 % 79,937 0.60 26 0.0981 % 2,225.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.06 % 5.11 % 136,606 15.22 7 -0.3845 % 2,432.3
FixedReset 5.07 % 3.18 % 191,030 7.90 70 0.1843 % 2,382.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 3.91 % 149,988 3.16 45 -0.0885 % 2,292.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FBS.PR.C SplitShare -5.47 % Not a real loss! There was exactly one trade today, for 3,000 shares at 10.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.03
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.33
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.56
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-05
Maturity Price : 24.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.56 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset 2.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 263,360 National crossed 261,800 at 26.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 250,019 National crossed four blocks: 40,000 and 50,000 shares, then 46,200 and 30,000, all at 26.63. TD crossed blocks of 47,900 and 25,000, both at 26.63 again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 90,700 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 87,600 National crossed 80,000 at 26.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium 79,762 Desjardins crossed 71,400 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 70,960 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 24.33 – 24.79
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.2647

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.33
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %

FBS.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 10.03 – 10.60
Spot Rate : 0.5700
Average : 0.4295

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.03
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.32 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.5603

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.32
Bid-YTW : 2.56 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.36 – 25.85
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3975

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.10 – 24.45
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2657

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %

IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.77 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1535

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %

Market Action

June 4, 2012

RBC is defending its capital markets exposure:

Frustrated with a recent ratings downgrade and worried by the imminent possibility of another, Royal Bank of Canada is intent on proving that its capital markets arm poses no real threat to its future.

Facing another blow, RBC lashed out, arguing that its inclusion in a review of too-big-to-fail firms was “unwarranted,” in part because its capital markets business represented less than 25 per cent of the bank’s bottom line.

Building on this argument, RBC put together a special presentation for analysts and investors on Friday that focused solely on its capital markets business. The bank did not come out and say that the presentation was designed to prove Moody’s wrong, but the potential downgrade was hinted at many times.

RBC also devoted a lot of time to risk management practices, another of Moody’s concerns. In February, the rating agency noted that “rapidly changing risk positions expose these firms to unexpected losses that can overwhelm the resources of even the largest, most diversified groups.” RBC noted that of the roughly 1,000 people added since 2008, the majority have been in the back office, where divisions such as risk management are housed.

Divisions such as compliance are also housed in the back office. The RBC Presentation proudly states that the Capital Market division is:

Strategically extending our loan book to deepen client relationships

  • Modest sized loan book representing 13% of RBC’s total outstanding loans and acceptances
  • Since 2009, increased the number of lending clients by 30% to over 1,200

… but I’m not sure if that’s a good thing for either the bank or society, despite all their protestations regarding diversification, exposure limits and profitability. The lending makes it difficult, if not impossible, for non-bank dealers to compete; and the dual purpose of the lending (to make a lending profit and to make a trading profit) makes these loans somewhat more suceptible to jiggery-pokery at approval time.

The OSC has a new policy:

Staff of the Compliance and Registrant Regulation Branch of the Ontario Securities Commission (the OSC) is sending this email to firms that are registered under the Securities Act (Ontario) (the Act) in the categories of exempt market dealer, scholarship plan dealer, or portfolio manager, to advise such firms of a new approach OSC staff will be adopting when performing compliance reviews under section 20 of the Act. Specifically, OSC staff will now contact clients of registered firms as a routine part of its compliance review process.

While OSC staff have historically not contacted clients of a registered firm as part of the compliance review process, we have done so in a number of exceptional cases and have found that client contact is a valuable method of assessing the firm’s compliance with Ontario securities law. Accordingly, we will be expanding our use of this important tool and will be contacting clients in the normal course of compliance reviews. Clients may be asked a variety of questions regarding their experience with their registered firm and representative, including such things as the accuracy of know-your-client information the firm has about them and investment recommendations and advice provided to them.

Unless OSC staff have reason to believe that regulatory action against a firm may be warranted, clients who are contacted by OSC staff will be informed that they are being contacted in the normal course of a compliance review of the firm, and that the call to them should not be interpreted as a sign of any misconduct by the firm. Clients will also be informed that they are not required to speak with OSC staff should they choose not to, and that their participation in the compliance review process is entirely voluntary.

The Globe has a very interesting piece on housing affordability:

Where things get weird is in how they calculate the average house price. What they’ve done is set the price at $144,600 in 1990, which is simply the average resale price at the time as calculated by the Canadian Real Estate Association (CREA). From that point, the Bank of Canada estimates the change in the average house price by averaging out gains as reported by Statistics Canada’s New House Price index (NHPI), and by Royal Lepage (i.e. CREA).

The issue here is that the NHPI is a quality-adjusted index, which means it seeks to measure the change in a comparable dwelling over time. This is a very important concept when it comes to tracking true inflation over time as you need an apples-to-apples comparison.

We know that the average size of new dwellings has risen in Canada, with the average new house being just under 2,000 square feet, according to data from the Canadian Home Builders Association. This is up markedly since the 1970s when the average house size in Canada was under 1,100 square feet. So as a society, we’ve changed our expectations for what constitutes a “normal sized” house. The problem is that as we’ve demanded larger and larger homes with better amenities and have been willing to stretch the household budget further to get those, the NHPI has been busy factoring out these changes.

The end result is that by pegging 50 per cent of the growth in house prices to the NHPI, the average house price used in the Bank of Canada affordability index has significantly underperformed other measures of house price appreciation. The chart above illustrates the change in value of the average house used in the Bank of Canada affordability index. If you believe that the average house in Canada is $260,000, I can see how you’d think that there was no problem with affordability in Canada.

The full piece is well-worth reading and is a good companion to the recent RBC quarterly report on the topic.

Henry Paulson has joined the fray on new US MMF rules:

Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is backing U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro’s effort to impose new rules on money- market funds.

In a letter that the SEC published May 30 on its website, Paulson highlights excerpts of his 2010 book, “On the Brink,” which provides his account of the financial crisis. Paulson’s letter covered the period between Sept. 16 and Sept. 19, 2008 when Bank of New York Mellon Corp., BlackRock Inc. (BLK) and Northern Trust Corp. (NTRS) reported requests for “billions in redemptions” from their money funds. Such requests exacerbated a credit crisis that began earlier that month, he wrote.

Schapiro initially proposed requiring money-market firms float their $1 net asset value along with mandating more capital and preventing customers from withdrawing all of their funds for 30 days. The so-called holdback provision has been particularly controversial in the industry and Schapiro is said to be open to replacing it with a fee that would be imposed on customers who take out their money during a liquidity crisis.

Money-market firms have also fought the effort to move the industry to a floating net asset value. Paulson’s letter highlights a passage in his book that supports the floating value.

How is one to square the circle? MMFs invest in risky assets – corporate paper. No amount of rules will eliminate the credit risk. Only capital will do that – all MMFs must have either a second class of securities that will take the first loss following a credit event or a credible guarantee from their sponsors … nothing else will do. All together folks … MMFs ARE BANKS IN FUNDS’ CLOTHING! They should be regulated as such! And – importantly – since they are banks, they should hold more capital against holdings of bank paper – any bank paper, from any bank – than should be the case for non-bank paper!

It was a rotten day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums off 16bp, FixedResets down 26bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 41bp. To make things more interesting, Floaters got whacked for 431bp, so it is not enough to speak glibly about ‘rising interest rates’! A very lengthy list of losers in the Performance Highlights table was comprised almost entirely of insurance issues. Volume was below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -4.3077 % 2,331.9
FixedFloater 4.49 % 3.87 % 29,476 17.58 1 0.1420 % 3,511.4
Floater 3.10 % 3.12 % 77,012 19.37 3 -4.3077 % 2,517.8
OpRet 4.81 % 2.55 % 38,967 1.04 5 0.0155 % 2,498.8
SplitShare 5.28 % -5.32 % 50,745 0.54 4 0.6061 % 2,713.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0155 % 2,285.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.46 % 3.31 % 78,569 0.60 26 -0.1590 % 2,223.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.04 % 5.07 % 137,290 15.30 7 -0.2184 % 2,441.7
FixedReset 5.08 % 3.25 % 191,552 7.90 70 -0.2570 % 2,378.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 3.92 % 155,934 3.17 45 -0.4091 % 2,294.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -4.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -4.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 17.01
Evaluated at bid price : 17.01
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -3.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 16.86
Evaluated at bid price : 16.86
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset -2.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 22.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -2.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.54
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -2.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.89
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.35
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 24.89
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.07
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 24.48
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.31
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 97,915 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 78,166 TD sold 10,000 to Scotia at 25.00 and crossed 40,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 65,698 Scotia bought 11,900 from anonymous at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 24.68
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 52,793 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 43,087 Desjardins crossed 40,000 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 42,965 Scotia crossed 28,700 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
There were 24 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.95 – 26.88
Spot Rate : 0.9300
Average : 0.5744

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 2.24 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.32 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.4400

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.32
Bid-YTW : 2.55 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.12 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.3632

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 24.89
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %

BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 24.51 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.2928

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-06-04
Maturity Price : 22.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 51.80 – 52.50
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.5387

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.80
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.54 – 23.99
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3145

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.54
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %