The IMF has released the March 2011 edition of Finance and Development. There’s an article by André Meier titled Up or Down:
Some have predicted postcrisis deflation in advanced economies, others high inflation. Worries about either are probably exaggerated.
…
Historical episodes of persistent large output gaps in advanced economies show a clear pattern of disinflation, supported by weak labor markets and low wage growth. However, declines in inflation appear to become more modest when the initial rate of inflation is already quite low, suggesting some combination of better-anchored inflation expectations and downward nominal rigidities, such as resistance to outright wage cuts. Moreover, fluctuations in oil prices and exchange rates can introduce significant shortterm volatility in inflation outturns.Developments since the beginning of the global financial crisis are consistent with this pattern. Despite large swings in headline rates, underlying inflation in advanced economies has generally declined, with many core measures reaching the very low rates at which disinflation typically petered out during past [persistent large output gap] episodes. Thus, while upside inflation risks should be limited in countries facing continued economic slack, a slide into outright deflation does not seem very likely either.
There’s also a very hopeful article titled Healing Health Care Finances by Benedict Clements, David Coady, Baoping Shang, and Justin Tyson. Hey, here in Canada, no problem! You see, what we’re going to do is keep standards high but costs low through the use of a well-respected technique that has just been approved by an expert group of 23-year-old B.Comms with clipboards: Doing a shitty job. Whenever something goes wrong and this becomes public knowledge, just fire whoever was standing nearest. Works every time. How many voters really have any insights into the public health system, anyway?
It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 21bp, FixedResets gaining 17bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 16bp. For all that, the market was relatively well behaved, with only one entry on the Performance Highlights table. Volume remained high.
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.0238 % | 2,395.6 |
FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.0238 % | 3,603.0 |
Floater | 2.50 % | 2.27 % | 45,102 | 21.55 | 4 | -0.0238 % | 2,586.6 |
OpRet | 4.87 % | 3.34 % | 59,836 | 0.40 | 9 | 0.0644 % | 2,394.0 |
SplitShare | 5.09 % | 2.93 % | 228,998 | 1.04 | 5 | -0.0529 % | 2,484.3 |
Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0644 % | 2,189.1 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.75 % | 5.65 % | 124,741 | 1.27 | 10 | -0.0556 % | 2,032.4 |
Perpetual-Discount | 5.52 % | 5.63 % | 125,140 | 14.38 | 14 | -0.2094 % | 2,113.4 |
FixedReset | 5.21 % | 3.46 % | 199,740 | 2.99 | 54 | 0.1696 % | 2,281.8 |
Deemed-Retractible | 5.23 % | 5.26 % | 369,455 | 8.28 | 53 | -0.1600 % | 2,077.9 |
Performance Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
GWO.PR.M | Deemed-Retractible | -1.18 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2019-04-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.15 Bid-YTW : 5.68 % |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
BAM.PR.H | OpRet | 99,471 | CIBC sold 28,900 to Desjardins and 34,700 to TD, both at 25.60. Desjardins crossed 30,000 at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2011-04-03 Maturity Price : 25.25 Evaluated at bid price : 25.60 Bid-YTW : 0.82 % |
TD.PR.Q | Deemed-Retractible | 63,917 | Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 25.75. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2017-03-02 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.76 Bid-YTW : 5.14 % |
MFC.PR.E | FixedReset | 59,777 | Anonymous crossed (?) blocks of 10,000 and 15,000 at 26.60. RBC crossed 16,000 at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-10-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 26.61 Bid-YTW : 3.66 % |
MFC.PR.D | FixedReset | 52,785 | RBC bought blocks of 10,000 and 19,100 from Nesbitt, both at 27.25. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-07-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.40 Bid-YTW : 3.54 % |
TD.PR.G | FixedReset | 42,822 | TD sold 14,500 to anonymous at 27.41. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-05-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.31 Bid-YTW : 3.48 % |
HSB.PR.E | FixedReset | 42,393 | Desjardins crossed 12,900 aat 27.80; Nesbitt sold 15,000 to anonymous at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-07-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.76 Bid-YTW : 3.58 % |
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. |
Wide Spread Highlights | ||
Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
RY.PR.P | FixedReset | Quote: 27.10 – 27.44 Spot Rate : 0.3400 Average : 0.2217 YTW SCENARIO |
BAM.PR.H | OpRet | Quote: 25.60 – 25.97 Spot Rate : 0.3700 Average : 0.2520 YTW SCENARIO |
GWO.PR.M | Deemed-Retractible | Quote: 25.15 – 25.54 Spot Rate : 0.3900 Average : 0.2804 YTW SCENARIO |
BAM.PR.R | FixedReset | Quote: 26.02 – 26.45 Spot Rate : 0.4300 Average : 0.3206 YTW SCENARIO |
RY.PR.Y | FixedReset | Quote: 27.46 – 27.70 Spot Rate : 0.2400 Average : 0.1558 YTW SCENARIO |
TDS.PR.C | SplitShare | Quote: 10.41 – 10.77 Spot Rate : 0.3600 Average : 0.2846 YTW SCENARIO |
SplitShare Capital Unit Debate
March 3rd, 2011Assiduous Readers will remember that I was quoted in a recent article by John Heinzl expressing a strong opinion on the Capital Units issues by SplitShare corporations:
This statement has attracted a certain amount of commentary and I have received some material criticizing my views. All further quotes in this post have been taken, in order, from an eMailed commentary – it has been interspersed with my commentary, but is quoted verbatim and in its entirety.
Asymmetry of returns is a feature of all fixed income, not simply SplitShare preferreds. Naturally, they can default, and one must take account of the chance of default: but firstly most will have Asset Coverage of at least 2:1 at issue time – meaning that the underlying portfolio can drop by half before the preferred shareholders take any loss at all – and secondly the Capital Unitholders will be wiped out before the preferred shareholders lose a penny.
No, there are no guarantees – there never are. But the preferreds have at issue time a significant amount of first-loss protection provided by the Capital Units.
These numbers can be illustrated by the following:
Preferred Par Value: $10.00
Whole Unit NAV: $13.64
Price of Capital Units: $2.91
However, the capital units are issued at a premium to NAV (since they absorb all the issue expenses) of 5-10%. Thus, by choosing this example, you are to a degree saying that the Capital Units are only worth buying once they have lost about 25% of their value relative to NAV and have lost most of their NAV as well. I claim that this shows that the guys who paid full price for them are suckers.
While discounts of market price to intrinsic value are not unknown, they are by no means automatic. I gave a seminar on SplitShares in March, 2009 – the very height of the crisis! – and used the following chart to illustrate the fact that, even (or particularly!) when distressed, these things will generally trade at a premium to intrinsic value:
Click for Big
The seminar was videotaped and is available for viewing (and downloading in Apple QuickTime format for personal use) for a small fee.
Yes, certainly, but you are not looking at the situation at issue time. You are looking for a distressed situation, in which somebody (the sucker) has already taken an enormous loss, not just on the NAV but also on the market price relative to NAV. Your illustration relies on the same presumption as the attractiveness of the preferred shares: the willingness of the sucker to take the first loss.
I discussed the valuation of Capital Units as options in my Seminar on SplitShares and provided the following charts. The first shows the theoretical value – given reasonable assumptions regarding volatility – of the capital units as the Whole Unit NAV changes. I will also note that this computation of theoretical value ignores all of the cash effects in the portfolio – dividends in, dividends out, fees and expenses out and portfolio changes to offset these effects – that will, in general, reduce the attractiveness of the Capital Units.
Click for Big
The second shows the premium of expected market price over intrinsic value as the NAV changes:
Click for Big
Scott, I suggest that the critical element of your argument is the phrase “remarkable set of circumstances” and that, in the absence of such remarkable circumstances, our views are probably not very different.
Perhaps, as printed, my “sucker” epithet was too general – I certainly did not mean to suggest that all capital units were always bad all the time at all prices. If somebody offers to sell me capital units with an intrinsic value of $10 for a penny each, I’ll back up the truck! As I like to say, at the right price, even a bag of shit can be attractive: I buy fifteen of them every spring for my garden! So, perhaps I can be faulted for not qualifying my statement enough – but the reporter and I were talking about the issuance of these securities and he only had 1,000 words or so to work with – a full investigation of Split Shares takes considerably more space than that.
But your argument, as stated earlier, rests on the assumption that somebody else has taken a double loss – first on NAV, then on market price relative to NAV. I claim, that given the risk-reward profile of capital units at issue time in general, the IPO buyers (and most of those in the secondary market) are suckers.
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