OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital

February 4th, 2011

OSFI has released an Advisory titled Treatment of non-qualifying capital instruments:

This Advisory does not apply to regulated life insurance companies, insurance holding companies, federally regulated property and casualty insurance companies or cooperative credit associations. OSFI will, after consultation, determine how and to what extent the Basel III rule changes will be applied to these federally regulated institutions and additional guidance will be released in due course.

Beginning on January 1, 2013, DTIs would be expected to comply with the applicable cap on the first fiscal quarterly reporting date of each year (refer to Appendix A for a description of the applicable percentages) and for subsequent reporting periods until a new cap applies.
The rules to be applied to govern the phase-out of non-qualifying capital are as follows:

  • 1. Capital instruments issued prior to September 12, 2010 that previously qualified as regulatory capital but do not meet the Basel III criteria for regulatory capital will be considered non-qualifying capital instruments and subject to the phase-out described in this Advisory.
  • 5. The cap will apply separately to Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. As the Basel III cap refers to the total amount of non-qualifying instruments outstanding within each tier of capital, some instruments in a tier may continue to fully qualify as capital while others may need to be excluded to comply with the cap.
  • 6. OSFI expects DTIs to comply with the Basel III requirements concerning the phase-out of non-qualifying capital instruments, while maximizing the amount of available regulatory capital and, to the maximum extent practicable, giving effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties to such capital instruments (as evidenced by the terms of such instruments). Accordingly, a DTI should prioritize redeeming capital in a way that will give effect to the following priorities:
    • (a) Maximize the amount of non-qualifying capital instruments outstanding during the Basel III transition period (based on the assumption that all capital will be redeemed at the earliest regular9 par redemption date); and
    • (b) Minimize the amount of capital that would be subject to a regulatory event.

Asinine. OSFI’s contempt for the capital markets shines through their pious muttering about “the legitimate expectations of the parties to such capital instruments”. They would much rather that the markets are a casino.

For more on the Basel rules, see BIS Finalizes Tier 1 Loss Absorbancy Rules.

Look for a big, big market pop in PerpetualDiscount prices on Monday.

Update, 2011-2-5: Josh Greenwood, Financial Post, Hybrid capital gets staged phase out.

Update, 2011-2-5: Doug Alexander and Frederic Tomesco, Bloomberg, Canada Banks Urged by Regulator to Limit Early Redemptions on Hybrid Bonds:

Prices for the securities have plunged on concern that the regulator may allow the banks to redeem the notes early at par, or as much as 30 percent below current prices.

TD Capital Trust’s 10 percent notes due in June 2108 sold by Toronto-Dominion fell 15.6 percent to 129.78 cents on the dollar in the six months through yesterday, while Scotiabank Tier 1 Trust’s 7.8 percent notes due in June 2108 dropped 5.8 percent. Declines in the period average 7.5 percent, according to Bloomberg data.

Update, 2011-2-8 .John Greenwood, Financial Post:

According to Bloomberg, $450-million of TD notes with annual interest of 10% and a call date of 2039 shot up to $136 from $127 on Monday, the most recent period for which prices are available. A similar issue of $300-million of 10.25% hybrids sold by CIBC callable in 2039 rose to $140 from $131.

Bank of Nova Scotia’s 7.8% notes with a call date of 2019 rose to $117 from $114.

The price moves come after a statement by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions on Friday telling banks not to take advantage of prospectus wording allowing issuers to redeem hybrids at par value if a regulatory event had taken place.

The majority of issues had call dates between 2019 and 2021, but at least two were callable in 2039.

Because of the high coupons, the bonds trade significantly above par value. For instance, the TD notes were changing hands in August at nearly $160 before slumping to $130 by mid-November amid concern about whether or not the new Basel rules constituted a regulatory event.

Similarly, the CIBC notes were fetching as much as $155 in August but by mid-November they declined to 127%.

OSFI Announcement on Non-Qualifying Capital Instruments

February 4th, 2011

OSFI has announced:

Media are invited to participate in a briefing via teleconference with the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) on two Advisories relating to BASEL III: Treatment of non-qualifying capital instruments under Basel III and Non-Viability Contingent Capital.

Mark White, Assistant Superintendent, Regulation Sector, will provide a brief overview and will be available to answer questions.

Media who wish to participate must confirm their attendance with Léonie Roux, Communications and Consultations.

Please note that all details are subject to change. All times are local.

DATE: Friday February 4, 2011
TIME: 4:00 PM
PLACE: 613-960-7518 (Ottawa)
1-888-265-0903
Participant pass code: 725300

Update, 4:21pm: Good old OSFI, hopelessly incompetent and secretive as always!

I notified Ms. Roux of my intent to participate and was answered with:

Good afternoon,
Please note that today’s conference call is for media only.

A separate conference call is being set up for analyts and investors that may wish to participate.

The conference call will take place on Monday morning at 11:30AM, an advisory will be issued shortly.

I responded:

I represent media via my blog at http://www.prefblog.com

No response. So I called in at about 4:01pm and got some fragments of seemingly random open-mike buzz.

OSFI has deleted the original advisory and replaced it with one that does not include a telephone number or pass code.

OSFI: The dumbest shits on the planet.

OSFI Seeking to Manipulate Bond Indices and Retail Investors?

February 4th, 2011

Barry Critchley of the Financial Post has written a piece titled Banks prepare for CoCos that contains the interesting assertion:

“We would expect that the banks would make use of the contingent market for the incremental 3.5% of their capital because holding the balance in common equity could potentially adversely affect profitability,” said Altaf Nanji, an analyst with RBC Capital Markets.

But lots of things have to be clarified before that issuance starts.

– The securities have to be rated. And that’s not a slam dunk given that the securities are convertible if certain trigger points are reached. So far, Fitch is the only ratings agency that has rated any of the securities, though Standard & Poor’s has issued a request for comment on them.

– The determination has to be made whether the securities should be in a bond index. Certainly OSFI wants them in the index and has make its plan very clear.

Shades of Hades, or at least the UK! Assiduous Readers will remember the tergiversations that were the topic of the post Merrill Keeps Lloyds ECNs out of UK Bond Indices that started when UK authorities made a similar attempt to debase the bond indices.

There’s only one teensy little problem with putting CoCos into bond indices: they’re not freaking bonds! If you don’t have the ability to bankrupt your debtor for being a day late or a dollar short, you’re not a bond-holder.

Canadian retail investors should be concerned, since bond ETFs are the most reasonable way for a bond investor to get exposure to bonds and there is already a high degree of aldulteration in bond ETFs, as I pointed out in my article Bond ETFs. On the positive side, there is the chance that a sharp divergence of opinion on the matter may lead to a wider variety of bond indices being marketted. REAL bond indices, I mean, not garbage like the DEX HYBrid index, discussed on September 30, 2010.

Update, 2011-2-7: A Reader has advised me (in rather polemical language!) that he considers my views on the DEX HYBrid Index to be significantly influenced by a conflict of interest, to wit: in late 2006, following the purchase by the TSX of the bond indices from Scotia Capital, it occurred to me that there was the potential for doing some kind of business with the Exchange based on my HIMIPref™ software, analytics, and indices (at that time, TXPR did not exist). I contacted them, they expressed curiosity and I made a presentation to them.

Sadly, nothing came of this attempt and my correspondent alleges that I have been left with a conflict of interest that renders it impossible for me to present my views on the DEX HYBrid Index as being independent.

I don’t see it. If I harboured such a violent grudge over every unsuccessful sales pitch I’ve made over the years, I wouldn’t have time for much else! However, given the nature of the allegations and the language used, I deem it proper to err on the side of disclosure. So make your own minds up regarding my motivation for disrespecting the DEX HYBrid Bond Index!

My correspondent has been invited to post a comment on the blog stating his views, or to provide me with a rebuttal that will be given equal time; to date, this invitation has been declined.

James Hymas Quoted in Financial Post

February 4th, 2011

John Greenwood of the Financial Post wrote a piece titled Former darling hybrid capital still in limbo. I can’t say the published quote constitutes my deepest thinking on the subject, but it was nice to be mentioned:

The problem is that more than $3-billion of the capital was raised in the form of innovative Tier 1 instruments or hybrid capital around the crisis but under pressure from international regulators, the Canadian financial watchdog is forcing banks to redeem those securities well before they are scheduled to mature.

Result: Markets for these normally stable fixed income investments has whipsawed, even evaporated in some cases, leaving a few investors wishing they kept their money in their pockets.

“When the rules came out from [the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision] a lot of hybrid capital came under significant selling pressure,” said Todd Johnson, who helps manage about $100-million at BCV Asset Management in Winnipeg. (Mr. Johnson does not expect to lose money on his investment.)

The Basel Committee, the top standard setter for banks globally, lays out broad policy but it’s up to national regulators such as Canada’s Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions to interpret and institute that policy.

However, for its part, OSFI has stayed mysteriously absent from the discussion, declining to provide any public guidance at all and increasing uncertainty — which of course is bad for markets. Greater clarity is expected shortly, possibly as soon as Friday.

“Basically, some of these holders are looking at large capital losses,” said James Hymas, president of Hymas Investment Management Inc. and editor of a popular internet blog on preferred shares.

For more, see BIS Finalizes Tier 1 Loss Absorbancy Rules.

BNS.PR.Z, FixedReset 3.70%+134, Listed for Trading

February 4th, 2011

BNS.PR.Z has been listed for trading on Pure and the TMX, although there were no trades today.

This issue was created as part of the Scotia takeover of Dundee Wealth, which has now closed.

Details of the issue are not yet posted on Scotia’s preferred share page, but are available on SEDAR, filled under Bank of Nova Scotia, December 2, 2010, Material Document – English, in Schedule C.

This is kind of interesting, because these preferred shares have a “Regulatory Event” clause, whereby they become redeemable immediately following advice from OSFI that they are no longer Tier 1 Capital. This clause has caused great grief and consternation amongst those who bought Innovative Tier 1 Capital at a fat premium in the past year or two, given the new BIS loss absorbancy rules and the possibility that just such a regulatory event is in the offing. This is a new feature in preferred share land: BMO.PR.L has no such feature and neither does Scotia’s most recent normal FixedReset, BNS.PR.Y.

Another damn thing to worry about! Still, at 3.70%+134, these things are unlikely to trade at much, if any, premium.

There’s a good whack of these things out: 15,946,085 shares, according to TMXMoney.com.

This issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™, but I am delaying incorporation of it into the analytics until there is actually some activity.

Update, 2011-2-8: A better description of the issue, which provides details of dates left undefined in the takeover agreement noted earlier, is the “Security holders documents – English”, dated 2011-2-1. The “Initial Fixed Rate Period” ends 2016-2-1.

February 3, 2011

February 3rd, 2011

There was rather an alarming headline, but a story in the Globe made some important points about junk:

Still, demand for these [junk bond] deals has quickly escalated after a decade of inactivity, and 13 new Canadian offerings worth over $3-billion ultimately hit the market in 2010.

In theory, [Barry Allan, who runs Marret Asset Management] said, 100 per cent of the volatility in the price of a government bond stems from interest rate movements. (Though, sovereign risk is now toying with that assumption.) Investment-grade bonds fluctuate in a similar fashion, with 80 per cent of price movements related to interest rates.

In contrast, only 20 per cent of movements in the prices of high-yield debt are tied to interest rates.

The sector is hot in Canada because income trusts have all but disappeared, said Greg Woynarski, co-head of fixed income at Scotia Capital, which now has five people dedicated to high-yield products. “Debt is becoming the new equity.”

Back when trusts yielded 5 to 8 per cent in annual distributions, they effectively served the same function for income-seeking investors that high-yield debt does today.

It was a day of average volume on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 14bp and FixedResets won 6bp. As a result the Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) has gone negative – not necessarily a death knell for my conjecture that retail evaluates the relative attractiveness of these classes by comparing Current Yields, but it does make it more complex: the indices will have to be disaggregated to make it work (i.e., compare RY-RY, or TD-TD, not index-index).

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2730 % 2,396.2
FixedFloater 4.77 % 3.47 % 22,982 19.13 1 0.2198 % 3,568.8
Floater 2.50 % 2.29 % 45,988 21.53 4 -0.2730 % 2,587.2
OpRet 4.82 % 3.53 % 66,423 2.25 8 0.0386 % 2,387.0
SplitShare 5.29 % 1.54 % 337,461 0.84 4 -0.1693 % 2,471.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0386 % 2,182.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.62 % 5.20 % 146,858 5.14 26 0.1145 % 2,040.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.25 % 5.25 % 272,756 15.00 51 0.1388 % 2,096.3
FixedReset 5.26 % 3.55 % 290,535 3.01 52 0.0571 % 2,270.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-03
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-03
Maturity Price : 24.97
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-03
Maturity Price : 21.67
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-03-05
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.83
Bid-YTW : -9.18 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.S FixedReset 72,500 Desjardins crossed blocks of 40,000 and 26,800, both at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.84
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 59,700 Desjardins crossed blocks of 27,800 and 26,700, both at 27.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.22
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 48,803 National crossed 18,000 at 23.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-03
Maturity Price : 23.49
Evaluated at bid price : 23.71
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 42,101 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 32,700 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 30,482 Nesbitt bought 12,200 from anonymous at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.41
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.50 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.6707
BAM.PR.I OpRet Quote: 25.35 – 25.95
Spot Rate : 0.6000
Average : 0.3825
BMO.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.90 – 27.35
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2867
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 50.50 – 50.95
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2981
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.16 – 22.50
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2349
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.46 – 22.75
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2024

February 2, 2011

February 3rd, 2011

In law school, you learn that a contract is holy. On the street, you learn that a contract is where you start:

New Jersey Governor Chris Christie said he doesn’t mind breaking promises to pensioners to close a $10.5 billion budget deficit — even if they sue.

“I have bigger issues than who sues me,” said Christie, 48, a Republican and former federal prosecutor who wants to end cost-of-living increases for retirees. “Get in line.”

Public workers in Colorado, South Dakota and Minnesota are already suing their states, which are among 18 that want to pare pension costs by increasing employee contributions, raising the retirement age or curbing cost-of-living increases.

“We believe it’s unconstitutional,” said Gary Justus, 63, a retired mathematics teacher in the Denver public schools who’s a plaintiff in the Colorado suit. “These are contracts that I and 100,000 other retirees worked for.”

BIS has released a working paper titled Messages from the academic literature on risk measurement for the trading book which I find very disappointing:

The artificial distinction between a “trading book” and a “banking book” refers to positions, but these positions need not be exposed to different sets of risk. If the risks associated with these books are distinct, even if they are not independent, then adding the VaR measures of these books will be conservative. If the risks associated with the two books are not distinct, (eg if the separation is due only to accounting rules), then adding compartmentalised VaR risk measures is guaranteed to be conservative only if all risks relevant to each book are accounted for. If not, the sum of compartmentalised risk measures may understate the risk of the combined portfolio risk.

The last two sections 5 and 6 include management aspects, such as inter-risk aggregation and the borderline between the banking and trading books (which is discussed only briefly).

This ignores the very essence of the trading book, namely that it is used for trading. There is an army of prop traders (EVIL prop traders!) on the Street who could have explained this to the committee, but it would appear that the committee would prefer to ignore them.

The epitome of a prop trader is a high-frequency trader; a high-frequency trader is nothing more than a guy who has examined the “gut reactions” of prop traders, systemized them and created an expert system with a fast reaction time.

Now, let us assume that you’re a high frequency trader and you’re designing an algorithm to trade British Petroleum. Here’s my question: how much time do you spend worrying about peak oil, the growing influence of the Russion state, and the potential for increased regulation in the US? How much of your algorithm execution time considers such matters?

None. You couldn’t care less. The only reason your algorithm buys at a nickel is because there is good reason to believe that you can sell at a dime within, say, ten minutes. All that peak oil garbage is for investors, not traders. It’s a whole different time scale, with a completely different set of problems – an obvious fact which the committee chooses to ignore:

The accuracy of square-root of time scaling depends on the statistical properties of the data generating process of the risk factors. Diebold et al (1998) show that, if risk factors follow a GARCH(1,1) process, scaling by the square-root of time over-estimates long horizon volatility and consequently VaR is over-estimated. Similar conclusions are drawn by Provizionatou, Markose and Menkens (2005). In contrast to the results that assume that risk factors exhibit time-varying volatility, Danielsson and Zigrand (2006) find that, when the underlying risk factor follows a jump diffusion process, scaling by the square root of time systematically under-estimates risk and the downward bias tends to increase with the time horizon. While these results argue against square-root of time scaling, it is important to acknowledge that we were not able to find immediate alternatives to square-root of time scaling in the literature. Therefore, the practical usefulness of square-root of time scaling should be recognised.

As I have stated often before, the most important element of risk control for banks is to ensure that positions held in the trading book are, in fact, traded. Aged inventory should be encouraged to move to the banking book by steadily more punitive capital charges with the passage of time. This is, in fact, how smart trading houses keep their traders honest – the amount they’re charged for their use of capital, which affects their P&L, which affects their bonuses (EVIL bonuses!), progressively increases.

S&P cut Ireland again:

We are lowering our ratings on the Republic of Ireland to ‘A-/A-2’ from ‘A/A-1’ following our revision of the Irish Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment to Group ‘6’ from ‘4’.

We are keeping the ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications, reflecting our view of the uncertainties surrounding the size of Ireland’s additional capital needs for its largely state-owned financial sector.

We expect to resolve the CreditWatch placement by April, when we should be in a position to assess the impact of additional capital injections on the government’s debt dynamics.

Speaking of Europe, one of my favourite topics of reflection is the Law of Unintended Consequences:

Century-old controls on rents and evictions are stifling investment in Portuguese real estate and leaving the country with crumbling city centers as rental income fails to keep pace with maintenance costs, according to landlords and property industry groups. The government has pledged to introduce measures in March to streamline rules on rental properties as it seeks to jumpstart an economy that’s had one of Europe’s weakest growth rates over the last decade.

While legislation in 1981 lifted rent controls on new contracts and a 1990 law allowed landlords to set expiry dates on leases, more than half of Portugal’s rentals are subject to the older restrictions. That means most owners are still coping with contracts that never expire and rates that are frozen or limited to inflation adjustments, said Miguel Marques dos Santos, an attorney specializing in real estate at the Lisbon office of Garrigues. Even death isn’t always enough to break a lease because tenants can pass on a contract to their children, spouses or parents.

The country had the third-most restrictive laws on eviction in 2009 among the 30 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, trailing only Sweden and Greece, the OECD said in a report published this year. It had the ninth- toughest rent-control restrictions.

New development still attracts the vast majority of construction investment in Portugal, with only 6.2 percent going to renovation in 2009, according to Aecops. Only Romania spends less on renovations among the 14 European countries for which data was available, the European Construction Industry Federation said. The average is 23 percent.

Owners of rent-controlled properties don’t get enough income to support their upkeep, leaving Lisbon and other cities pockmarked with crumbling structures, Aecops said. It estimates that about 36 percent of the country’s residential buildings are in need of repair.

“Some of these contracts date back to the 60s and pay as little as 5 euros per month for a four-bedroom apartment in the capital,” Luis Menezes Leitao, president of Portugal’s Association of Landlords, said in an interview.

The lack of incentives to invest in renovation has caused a chronic shortage of rental accommodation, which now represents less than 20 percent of Portugal’s total housing stock, Menezes Leitao said. That has forced people to buy property instead, boosting debt and pushing up home prices.

“They couldn’t rent, so they bought and borrowed too much money,” he said. “It’s a contributing factor in the current crisis.”

Volume was surpisingly good today, considering the number of little girls who took a snow-day off work, but price action was restrained. PerpetualDiscounts were up 1bp, while FixedResets were down 4bp, as the Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) remained at zero.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.26%, equivalent to 7.36% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates have popped up to 5.6%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 175bp, a significant narrowing from the 190bp reported at month-end.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3932 % 2,402.7
FixedFloater 4.78 % 3.48 % 23,917 19.12 1 -0.6550 % 3,561.0
Floater 2.49 % 2.29 % 45,469 21.53 4 0.3932 % 2,594.3
OpRet 4.82 % 3.55 % 68,838 2.26 8 -0.0675 % 2,386.0
SplitShare 5.28 % 1.30 % 350,409 0.85 4 0.1047 % 2,475.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0675 % 2,181.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.62 % 5.23 % 141,221 5.14 26 0.0968 % 2,038.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.26 % 275,245 15.00 51 0.0118 % 2,093.4
FixedReset 5.26 % 3.57 % 283,753 3.01 52 -0.0376 % 2,269.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.Y FixedReset -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.90
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-02
Maturity Price : 24.66
Evaluated at bid price : 24.71
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.30
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.I FixedReset 75,560 TD crossed 40,000 at 26.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 37,503 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-02
Maturity Price : 21.37
Evaluated at bid price : 21.37
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 37,275 RBC crossed 27,600 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 32,615 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-02
Maturity Price : 22.82
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 30,310 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 30,190 RBC crossed 13,000 at 23.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-02
Maturity Price : 22.81
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
There were 43 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 24.78 – 25.78
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.5799
SLF.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 27.15 – 27.75
Spot Rate : 0.6000
Average : 0.3863
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.14 – 25.43
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1890
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.68 – 26.03
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2544
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.66 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2076
BNS.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 27.30 – 27.49
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1343

HIMIPref™ Rebalancing: January 2011

February 2nd, 2011
HIMI Index Changes, January 31, 2011
Issue From To Because
TD.PR.P PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
TCA.PR.X PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
GWO.PR.M PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
GWO.PR.L PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
IGM.PR.B PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during January 2011
Issue Action Index Because
CL.PR.B Delete PerpetualDiscount Redeemed
FN.PR.A Add Scraps New Issue
REI.PR.A Add Scraps New Issue
NPP.PR.A Delete Scraps Ticker Change
NPI.PR.A Add Scraps Ticker Change

February 1, 2011

February 1st, 2011

Mr Joseph S Tracy, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, gave a speech titled A strategy for the 2011 economic recovery:

The Great Recession distinguished itself from earlier recessions in terms of its severity rather than its length. There was a decline in real output relative to trend of $1.1 trillion or 8 percent (Chart 1). This contraction brought the level of real output back to its level in 2006. In most recessions, consumption growth slows but remains positive. In this recession, there was an actual decline in consumption rather than just a slowdown (Chart 2). When households need to cut back on their consumption, they typically do so first with durable goods – for example, by delaying the decision to replace a car or to trade up to a nicer house. It is no surprise then that auto sales dropped significantly (Chart 3). Housing starts had been declining since late 2005, and the decline continued during the recession (Chart 4). Producers reacted quickly to the sharp decline in consumer demand, but inventories still rose sharply relative to sales (Chart 5).


Click for Big

How many more stories like the following must we read before the current craze for paid government informants dies down?

An immigration officer tried to rid himself of his wife by adding her name to a list of terrorist suspects.

He used his access to security databases to include his wife on a watch list of people banned from boarding flights into Britain because their presence in the country is ‘not conducive to the public good’.

As a result the woman was unable for three years to return from Pakistan after travelling to the county to visit family.

The tampering went undetected until the immigration officer was selected for promotion and his wife name was found on the suspects’ list during a vetting inquiry.

Interesting opinion on the Canadian bond market:

In order to maximize value in their bond portfolios, investors should limit exposure to Canada’s corporate bond market, one of the most expensive and least diversified of its kind in the world, says Ed Devlin, executive vice president and portfolio manager at PIMCO Canada Corp.

“The fundamental problem with the Canadian corporate bond market is that there is are too many investors chasing too few issuers,” Mr. Devlin said in a recent note to clients.

He noted that 59% of Canada’s main corporate bond benchmark is concentrated in just 10 issuers. By comparison the percentage of the index concentrated in 10 issuers is 20% in the U.S., 26% in Great Britain and 35% in the Eurozone.

Just another reason to start marketting Maple bonds to Canadians … it will never happen. Maple issuers don’t make a point of hiring Canadian ex-regulators.

It was a good day on the Canadian preferred share market as PerpetualDiscounts were up 18bp while FixedResets gained 4bp. The Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) is now zero!

The market was well-behaved, with no entries at all in the Performance Highlights.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2377 % 2,393.3
FixedFloater 4.75 % 3.45 % 24,754 19.17 1 -0.8658 % 3,584.4
Floater 2.50 % 2.29 % 45,970 21.54 4 -0.2377 % 2,584.2
OpRet 4.82 % 3.44 % 69,738 2.26 8 -0.0723 % 2,387.6
SplitShare 5.28 % 1.41 % 364,948 0.85 4 0.2900 % 2,472.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0723 % 2,183.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % 5.26 % 142,230 5.14 26 0.0242 % 2,036.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.27 % 275,331 15.03 51 0.1823 % 2,093.2
FixedReset 5.26 % 3.58 % 288,505 3.01 52 0.0427 % 2,270.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 89,824 Desjardins crossed 15,000 at 23.61 and 25,000 at 23.65. TD crossed 10,000 at 23.65 and finally Desjardins crossed another 10,200 at 23.67.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-02-01
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 23.63
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 76,530 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 27.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 54,175 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 53,829 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 52,130 RBC crossed 50,000 at 27.54.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.42
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 48,100 RBC crossed 44,100 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.50 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.7500
Average : 0.4409
BNS.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 27.06 – 27.40
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2512
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.10 – 20.47
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2824
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 25.02 – 25.25
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1502
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.55 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3703
CM.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 26.60 – 26.91
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2419

New Issue: GMP FixedReset 5.50%+289

February 1st, 2011

GMP Capital has announced:

that it has entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters led by National Bank Financial Inc., GMP Securities L.P. and Scotia Capital Inc., acting as joint bookrunners, under which the underwriters have agreed to purchase, on a bought-deal basis, 4,000,000 Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series B (the “Series B Preferred Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per share for aggregate gross proceeds to GMP of $100,000,000.

The Series B Preferred Shares will pay fixed cumulative dividends of $1.375 per share per annum, yielding 5.50% per annum, payable quarterly on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of GMP, for the initial five year period ending on March 31, 2016. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the sum of the then current five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.89%.

The Series B Preferred Shares will be redeemable in whole or in part by GMP, at its option, on March 31, 2016, and on March 31 of every fifth year thereafter in accordance with their terms, at a cash redemption price per share of $25.00 together with all accrued and unpaid dividends.

Holders of Series B Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series C (the “Series C Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions and GMP’s right to redeem the Series B Preferred Shares as described above, on March 31, 2016 and on March 31 of every fifth year thereafter. Holders of the Series C Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.89%, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of GMP.

Holders of the Series C Preferred Shares may convert their Series C Preferred Shares into Series B Preferred Shares, subject to certain conditions and GMP’s right to redeem the Series C Preferred Shares as described below, on March 31, 2021 and on March 31 every five years thereafter.

The Series C Preferred Shares will be redeemable in whole or in part by GMP, at its option, at a cash redemption price per share of $25.00 together with all accrued and unpaid dividends in the case of redemptions on March 31, 2021 and on March 31 every five years thereafter or $25.50 together with all accrued and unpaid dividends in the case of redemptions on any other date after March 31, 2016.

The Company has also granted the underwriters an option (the “Over-Allotment Option”) to purchase up to an additional 600,000 Series B Preferred Shares, on the same terms and conditions as the offering, exercisable any time, in whole or in part, until the date that is 30 days from the closing date of the offering. If the Over-Allotment Option is exercised in full, the total gross proceeds to GMP will be $115,000,000.

The net proceeds of the offering will be used by GMP for general corporate purposes, which may include the reduction of indebtedness.

The Series B Preferred Shares will be offered for sale to the public in each of the provinces of Canada pursuant to a short form prospectus to be filed with Canadian securities regulatory authorities in all Canadian provinces.

DBRS Limited (“DBRS”) has assigned a provisional rating of Pfd-3 (low) for the Series B Preferred Shares.

The offering is scheduled to close on or about February 22, 2011, subject to certain conditions, including Toronto Stock Exchange and other customary regulatory approvals, as well as other conditions set forth in the underwriting agreement.

More junk! This is going to end in tears. It always does.

Update: The DBRS press release offers a lengthy justification of the rating. Note that according to DBRS, Pfd-3(low) is “investment grade”.