MAPF

MAPF Performance: May, 2009

The fund performed well in another month of recovery for the preferred share market. As noted in the report of Index Performance, May 2009, Floaters did extremely well in the month – although still an underperforming sector over the past year – while solid gains were recorded in the key FixedReset and PerpetualDiscount sectors.

Fund performance was hurt by the underweighting in Floating Rate issues noted in MAPF Portfolio Composition: May 2009, as well as an underweighting in lower quality issues (which also outperformed), but these allocation hurdles were handsomely overcome by security selection and trading within the actual portfolio.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close May 29 was $10.6298..

Returns to May 29, 2009
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +8.02% +5.01% +4.00%
Three Months +23.97% +12.05% +11.90%
One Year +26.87% -5.12% -5.99%
Two Years (annualized) +14.15% -3.55%  
Three Years (annualized) +11.08% -2.05%  
Four Years (annualized) +9.59% -0.80%  
Five Years (annualized) +9.70% +0.68%  
Six Years (annualized) +11.56% +1.26%  
Seven Years (annualized) +10.82% +2.17%  
Eight Years (annualized) +11.51% +2.13%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +4.0%, +11.1% and -5.9%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are N/A, N/A & N/A, respectively, according to Morningstar and the Globe and Mail
Figures for AIC Preferred Income Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.9%, N/A & N/A, respectively

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

I am very pleased with the returns, but implore Assiduous Readers not to project this level of outperformance for the indefinite future. The past year in the preferred share market has been filled with episodes of panic and euphoria, together with many new entrants who do not appear to know what they are doing; perfect conditions for a disciplined quantitative approach. While I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform, it should be borne in mind that beating the index by 500bp represents a good year, and there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 0.5288
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 0.5216
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% $0.5287
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% $0.6006
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% $0.7375
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% $0.7633
May 2009 10.6298 7.47% 0.994 7.515% $0.7988
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.
“Portfolio YTW” includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
“Securities YTW” divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
“Sustainable Income” is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per unit, before fees and expenses.

As discussed in the post MAPF Portfolio Composition: May 2009, the fund has positions in splitShares (almost all BNA.PR.C) and an operating retractible, both of which have high yields that are not sustainable: at some point they will be called or mature and the funds will have to be reinvested. Therefore, both of these positions skew the calculation upwards.. Since the yield on thes positions is higher than that of the perpetuals despite the fact that the term is limited, the sustainability of the calculated “sustainable yield” is suspect, as discussed in August, 2008.

Significant positions were also held in Fixed-Reset issues on May 29; all of which currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 6.73% shown in the May 29 Portfolio Composition analysis (which is in excess of the 6.33% index yield on May 29). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be 10.6298 * 0.0673 = $0.7154, an increase from the $0.7016 derived by a similar calculation last month.

Different assumptions lead to different calculations, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Market Action

June 1, 2009

Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton has put together a very good collection of links regarding the Credit Crisis.

Treasuries got hit today, with a Bloomberg story suggesting a cyclical shift:

“Money is rotating out of Treasuries and into other areas,” said Thomas Roth, head of U.S. government-bond trading in New York at Dresdner Kleinwort, one of 16 primary dealers that trade with the Federal Reserve. “There has been a tremendous flight into Treasuries over the past year and if things get better we will see a flight out.”

The yield on the benchmark 10-year note rose 20 basis points, or 0.20 percentage points, to 3.67 percent at 4:03 p.m. in New York, according to BGCantor Market Data. The yield earlier rose as much as 27.74 basis points, the most since advancing 32.97 basis points on Oct. 8. The 3.125 percent security due in May 2019 dropped 1 5/8, or $16.25 per $1,000 face value, to 95 1/2.

Ten-year yields have risen more than 165 basis points since falling to a record low of 2.03 percent last year.

The yield on the 30-year bond climbed 18 basis points to 4.53 percent.

… and Across the curve agrees:

I also believe that we are seeing a reversal of the flight to quality. Investors had piled into risk averse government bonds and they are now fleeing them for equities and investment grade corporate bonds. The change of heart could not come at a worse time as it collides with the massive financing needs of the US Government.

Place yer bets, gents!

June got off to a strong start on continued high volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6173 % 1,300.6
FixedFloater 7.15 % 5.72 % 29,687 15.98 1 0.8626 % 2,108.5
Floater 2.90 % 3.37 % 78,817 18.76 3 0.6173 % 1,624.9
OpRet 5.02 % 4.18 % 144,696 2.56 14 -0.0655 % 2,165.4
SplitShare 5.92 % 6.37 % 52,666 4.27 3 0.7671 % 1,841.4
Interest-Bearing 6.00 % 7.42 % 27,384 0.56 1 0.4016 % 1,987.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2772 % 1,725.1
Perpetual-Discount 6.36 % 6.33 % 162,708 13.47 71 0.2772 % 1,588.8
FixedReset 5.72 % 4.92 % 490,511 4.44 37 0.2742 % 1,984.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -2.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 24.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 20.01
Evaluated at bid price : 20.01
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 20.81
Evaluated at bid price : 20.81
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 24.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 23.05
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 21.94
Evaluated at bid price : 22.26
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.50
Evaluated at bid price : 18.50
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 21.73
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 23.32
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.20
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.58
Evaluated at bid price : 18.58
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 24.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.34
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.43 % Asset coverage of 1.8-:1 as of April 30 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.75
Bid-YTW : 11.58 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 188,105 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 18.80, then bought 19,500 from National at 18.69.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 18.67
Evaluated at bid price : 18.67
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 96,100 RBC crossed 95,000 at 26.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 48,879 Brockhouse (who?) bought 10,000 from RBC at 26.59.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 46,129 Scotia crossed 16,100 at 16.70; anonymous crossed (?) 15,700 at 17.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 16.95
Evaluated at bid price : 16.95
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 40,896 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-01
Maturity Price : 21.26
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 35,120 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.88
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

NEW.PR.B Refunding to Proceed

Newgrowth Corp. has announced:

that the final condition required to extend the term of the Company for an additional five years to June 26, 2014 has been met. Holders of Class A Capital Shares previously approved the extension of the term of the Company subject to the condition that a minimum of 1,340,000 Class A Capital Shares remain outstanding after giving effect to the special retraction right (the “Special Retraction Right”).

Under the Special Retraction Right, 88,897 Class A Capital Shares have been tendered to the Company for retraction on June 26, 2009. Holders of these shares will receive a retraction price equal to the amount, if any, by which the Unit Value exceeds $18.25. Holders of the remaining 2,238,510 Class A Capital Shares will continue to enjoy the benefits of a leveraged participation in the capital appreciation of the Company’s portfolio of publicly listed common shares of selected Canadian chartered banks, telecommunication, pipeline and utility companies.

The Class B Preferred Shares will be redeemed by the Company on June 26, 2009 in accordance their terms at a price per share equal to the lesser of $18.25 and Unit Value. In order to maintain the leveraged “split share” structure of the Company, the Company will offer a new series of Class B Preferred Shares to be called the Series 2 Preferred Shares pursuant to a preliminary prospectus dated May 22, 2009.

The preliminary prospectus for the new issue does not state a dividend rate. Given that the capital units (NEW.A) have a market value of about $44-million and that coverage of at least 2:1 may be reasonably expected, it is unlikely that the new issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™.

The refunding proposal has been previously discussed on PrefBlog. NEW.PR.B is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

Moody's Puts BMO on Outlook Negative

Moody’s has announced it has:

changed the rating outlook on the Bank of Montreal (BMO) and its subsidiaries to negative from stable. BMO is rated B for bank financial strength and Aa1 for deposits. The negative outlook applies to BMO’s Harris subsidiaries including Harris N.A. (bank financial strength rating of B-, long-term deposits of Aa3). Note that there already exists a negative outlook on Harris N.A.’s bank financial strength rating.

Senior vice president, Peter Routledge, stated that “the outlook change is the product of several factors. First, BMO’s business mix has a material weighting towards capital markets activities in general, and structured credit activities specifically, which is likely to result in continued earnings volatility, in Moody’s view. Second, the bank has entered a prolonged period of higher loan losses which will pressure earnings for several quarters. Finally, these two factors will dampen BMO’s risk-adjusted profitability, which is already low relative to its current rating level.” Partially offsetting these concerns is the bank’s strong level of capitalization and an improving risk management discipline.

BMO’s structured credit exposures have produced approximately C$2 billion in pre-tax losses since the turmoil in the credit markets began. Although the bank has bled much of the potential losses contained in these exposures into its earnings, additional losses could accelerate rapidly in a severe economic downturn. Moody’s primary focus is on two BMO exposures: (1) credit protection vehicle — known as Apex Trust; and (2) the structured investment vehicles, Links Finance Corporation / Links Finance LLC and Parkland Finance Corporation / Parkland (USA) LLC.
,,,
According to Mr. Routledge, “the challenge BMO faces is managing these two points of earnings pressure from a low level of risk-adjusted profitability, relative to its current ratings level.” BMO’s performance since 2007 is instructive. During that time, the bank’s capital markets charges have consumed approximately 25% of BMO’s pre-provision, pre-tax (core) earnings, and caused its already weak ratio of core earnings to risk-weighted assets to drop by 50 basis points on average (i.e., from approximately 2.2% to 1.7%). According to Mr. Routledge, “while Moody’s believes that BMO’s core earnings and capital are more than adequate to absorb prospective credit and capital markets losses, a deterioration in risk-adjusted profitability — a long-stated major ratings driver for the bank — could ultimately lead to a downgrade in BMO’s bank financial strength rating.”

As noted above, two positive credit trends offset partially the aforementioned negative rating drivers. First, the bank’s capitalization is very strong, with a Tier 1 ratio of 10.7% and a ratio of tangible common equity (adjusted for Moody’s hybrid credit) as a percent of risk-weighted assets at 9%.

BMO has seven issues of preferreds on the Toronto exchange: the PerpetualDiscounts BMO.PR.H, BMO.PR.J, BMO.PR.K & BMO.PR.L and the FixedResets BMO.PR.M (+165), BMO.PR.N (+383) & BMO.PR.O (+458).

All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and are included in their respective indices.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition: May 2009

Trading activity increased slightly in May, with portfolio turnover of about 90%, as the market extended its gains.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may the thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2009-5-29
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 11.1% (0) 11.67% 6.93
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 69.8% (+6.5) 6.73% 12.90
Fixed-Reset 12.5% (-6.7) 5.38% 4.32
Scraps (OpRet) 6.2% (+0.5) 13.19% 5.02
Cash +0.6% (0) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 7.47% 10.61
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The important change was the shift from FixedResets into PerpetualDiscounts. The initial trade spawned important knock-on trades towards the end of the month:

Shift from FixedReset to PerpetualDiscounts
Date CM.PR.M CM.PR.D HSB.PR.C SLF.PR.B
5/1 Sold
26.90
Bot
20.85
   
5/27   Sold
22.15
Bot
19.95
 
5/29     Sold
20.49
Bot
18.10
5/29
Close
26.68-80 22.00-27 20.00-46 18.05-19

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2009-5-29
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 40.4% (-13.6)
Pfd-1(low) 23.8% (+4.7)
Pfd-2(high) 9.5% (+8.6)
Pfd-2 0% (0)
Pfd-2(low) 19.7% (+0.1)
Pfd-3(high) 6.2% (+0.5)
Cash +0.6% (0)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end.

The increase in weighting of Pfd-2(high) reflects the purchase of POW.PR.D, accumulated as follows:

Accumulation of POW.PR.D
Date GWO.PR.I SLF.PR.B POW.PR.D
4/30
Close
16.33-50 17.17-37 18.54-59
5/20 Sold
17.08
  Bot
18.65
5/21 Sold
17.47
  Bot
18.80
5/26   Sold
18.25
Bot
18.74
5/29
Close
17.50-78 18.05-19 18.75-79
Dividends Missed
0.28125
Earned
0.30
 

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed. The overall credit quality of the portfolio is now superior to the credit quality of CPD at August month-end (when adjusted for the downgrade of BCE).

Claymore provides the following ratings breakdown:

Ratings Breakdown
as of 12/31/08
Pfd-1 61.15%
Pfd-2 23.26%
Pfd-3 15.60%

Two events have occurred since the Dec. 31 calculation date of CPD’s credit quality:

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2009-5-29
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 1.9% (+1.5)
$50,000 – $100,000 19.1% (-1.6)
$100,000 – $200,000 31.6% (-21.7)
$200,000 – $300,000 31.5% (+25.4)
>$300,000 15.5% (-3.7)
Cash +0.6% (0)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from April month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on The Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 29. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is similar
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is similar
Issue Comments

BPO & BPP: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative

Standard and Poor’s has announced:

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services today revised its outlook on Brookfield Properties Corp. (Brookfield) and its Toronto-based affiliate, BPO Properties Ltd. (BPP), to negative from stable. We continue to analytically view these two related companies as one rated entity. Brookfield retains an 89% equity interest (representing 54% of the voting securities and 100% of the non-voting securities) in BPP.

At the same time, we affirmed our ‘BBB’ long-term corporate credit rating on Brookfield and BPP and our ‘BB+’ preferred stock rating on the companies.

The current environment of weak operating fundamentals, lower office property valuations, and more-restrictive lender underwriting in the U.S. will pose challenges to the company’s efforts to recapitalize its highly leveraged U.S. property fund (debt is due in late 2011). We would lower the rating one notch if the company does not meaningfully improve its liquidity position this year or if fixed-charge coverage measures were to decline from their current level (1.6x). We would consider revising the outlook to stable if Brookfield’s management successfully addresses the longer-term recapitalization needs of its U.S. fund while strengthening overall consolidated fixed-charge coverage measures.

BPO has the following preferred issues outstanding: BPO.PR.F, BPO.PR.H, BPO.PR.I, BPO.PR.J, BPO.PR.K.

BPP has the following preferred issues outstanding: BPP.PR.G, BPP.PR.J & BPP.PR.M. Each of these issues were mentioned on PrefBlog in the post BAM / BPP Floater Credit Inversion.

BPO.PR.F & BPO.PR.H were added to the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index in the July 2007 rebalancing. BPO.PR.I was added and BPO.PR.J was removed in the July 2008 rebalancing.

All are tracked by HIMIPref™ all have been relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Seminars

Seminars: Spring Series Complete, Fall Series Planned

Spring Series Complete

Fall Series Planned

Four seminars were presented in the spring of 2009; a series for the fall of 2009 is in the planning stages.

Topics for the fall series have not yet been determined. Among the possibilities:

  • Updates for each asset class
  • Detailed mathematics of fixed-income investment
  • Corporate bonds
  • The purpose of a fixed income portfolio
  • Credit Analysis
  • [Your Choice Here]! Send me an eMail!

Videos of prior seminars are available for purchase.

Update, 2009-6-2: One Assiduous Reader suggests “Innovative Tier 1 Capital”. This could be part of a more general seminar on bank debt.

Index Construction / Reporting

Index Performance: May 2009

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for May, 2009, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
April May 2009
Three Months
to
May 29, 2009
Ratchet +33.18% * +55.96% *
FixFloat +33.18% ** +55.96% **
Floater +33.18% +55.96%
OpRet +1.35% +5.84%
SplitShare +3.50% +11.15%
Interest 0.0% +2.57%
PerpetualPremium +4.24%*** +14.65%***
PerpetualDiscount +4.24% +14.65%%
FixedReset +2.05% +10.55%
* The last member of the RatchetRate index was transferred to Scraps at the February, 2009, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
** The last member of the FixedFloater index was transferred to Scraps at the February, 2009, rebalancing. Performance figures to 2009-5-29 are set equal to the Floater index. The FixedFloater index acquired a member on 2009-5-29.
*** The last member of the PerpetualPremium index was transferred to PerpetualDiscount at the October, 2008, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the PerpetualDiscount index
Passive Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +3.99% +11.90%
DPS.UN +6.35% +14.30%
Index
BMO-CM 50 % %

There is still a negative total return over one year – even for Floaters, despite their astonishing rise in the past three months:


Click for big

Claymore has published NAV and distribution data for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to May 29, 2009
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
February 27, 2009 14.40 0.00    
March 26 14.19 0.2100 0.00% +0.63%
March 31, 2009 14.28   +0.63%
April 30 15.27 0.00   +6.93%
May 29, 2009 15.88 0.00   +3.99%
Quarterly Return +11.90%

The DPS.UN NAV for May 27 has been published so we may calculate the May returns (approximately!) for this closed end fund.

DPS.UN NAV Return, May-ish 2009
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
April 29, 2009 17.07    
May 27, 2009 18.18 0.00 +6.50%
Estimated April Ending Stub** +0.33%
Estimated May Ending Stub +0.19%
Estimated May Return +6.35%
** CPD had a NAV of $15.22 on April 29 and a NAV of $15.27 on April 30. The return for the day was therefore +0.33%. This figure is subtracted from the DPS.UN period return to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month.
* CPD had a NAV of $15.85 on May 27 and a NAV of $15.88 on May 29. The return for the period was therefore +0.19%. This figure is added to the DPS.UN period return to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month.
The May return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of three period returns, +6.50%, -0.33% and +0.19% to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +6.35%

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for March and April:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-May-ish, 2009
March-ish -0.23%
April-ish +7.72%
May-ish +6.35%
Three-months-ish +14.30%
Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: May 2009

HIMI Index Changes, May 29, 2009
Issue From To Because
BAM.PR.G Scraps FixFloat Volume
ACO.PR.A OpRet Scraps Volume

I spent the latter part of the month hoping that CU.PR.B was going to make the leap from PerpetualDiscount to PerpetualPremium, but it fell just shy, closing May 29 at 24.90-99, 13×3. Maybe next month!

But on a brighter note, we now have an issue in the FixedFloater index!

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during May 2009
Issue Action Index Because
SLF.PR.F Add FixedReset New issue
CCS.PR.D Add Scraps New issue
Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performers: May 2009

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

May 2009
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “May 29”)
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -3.60% Was the second-best performer in April. This issue is notoriously volatile. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.19% based on a bid of 16.02 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.I OpRet Pfd-2(low) -0.99% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.84% based on a bid of 23.96 and a softMaturity 2013-12-30 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.O OpRet Pfd-2(low) -0.64% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.29% based on a bid of 23.25 and a softMaturity 2013-6-30 at 25.00.
BMO.PR.O FixedReset Pfd-1 -0.56% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -0.56% based on a bid of 26.76 and a call 2014-6-24 at 25.00.
RY.PR.P FixedReset Pfd-1 +1.06% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.97% based on a bid of 26.43 and a call 2014-3-26 at 25.00.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 +11.17% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.44% based on a bid of 19.80 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) +12.65% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.25% based on a bid of 20.83 and a limitMaturity.
TRI.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +31.15% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.32% based on a bid of 17.05 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) +34.25% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.40% based on a bid of 11.68 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +35.13% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.38% based on a bid of 11.77 and a limitMaturity.

What can I say? The Floaters Index currently has three members. The top three spots in May were occupied by Floaters. That’s a change! I put a chart of the Floater index over the past year in my Market Action post of May 26.