Market Action

July 12, 2009

Regulators have discovered there’s one teeny-tiny problem with quality: it costs money:

A push to water down stringent standards proposed last year by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and to allow more time to implement them, is led by France and Germany, according to bankers, regulators and lobbyists involved in the talks. Representatives from the U.S. and the U.K., who have sought to rein in risk-taking, are willing to compromise on how capital is defined to reach an agreement at a committee meeting that begins tomorrow, the people said.

Another concession may involve granting transition periods of up to 10 years to ease concerns of some member countries that their banks and economies won’t be able to bear the burden of tougher capital requirements until a recovery takes hold. As a result, the amount of capital European banks will be forced to raise in the next two years won’t be as much as investors fear.

One part of the definition would exclude minority interests that banks hold in other financial institutions when calculating common equity on the theory that they can’t readily withdraw the capital. Many European lenders, which have lobbied against the rule, have non-controlling stakes in emerging-market banks that would no longer count as the highest level of capital, while the assets of the subsidiaries would have to be included in the banks’ risks.

European banks are likely to win a concession on the minority-stakes rule, according to the people involved in the talks. One possible compromise would allow a bank to count part of its stake in relation to the risk the capital is supposed to cover at the entity in which it invested, the people say.

A study released in June by the Institute of International Finance, which represents more than 375 financial companies, said the regulations could erase 3.1 percent of gross domestic product in the U.S., the euro region and Japan by 2015. About 9.7 million fewer jobs could be created over the five-year period than would otherwise be the case, the IIF said.

Regulation is “never free,” said Bank of New York Mellon Corp. Chief Executive Officer Robert Kelly, who visited London and Brussels in June to meet lawmakers and regulators with the Financial Services Roundtable, a Washington-based industry group. “There has to be some impact on growth and jobs.”

The Basel committee, whose members have touted the benefits of financial stability, is preparing its own economic impact study with the help of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel and the International Monetary Fund.

Banks currently need to hold capital equal to a minimum of 8 percent of risk-weighted assets. Half of that must be Tier 1 and half of the Tier 1 needs to be common stock. The Basel committee might triple the common ratio requirement and double Tier 1, [Paul Miller, an analyst for FBR Capital Markets] estimates.

BNY Mellon’s Kelly said the original Basel proposals would have forced some banks’ return on equity, a measure of profitability, to mid-single digits.

“If that was true, then they effectively become government utilities, because you couldn’t really raise capital in the private markets after that,” he said.

The IIF report is titled Interim Report on the Cumulative Impact on the Global Economy of Proposed Changes in the Banking Regulatory Framework and is available via a lengthy press release.

I will be most interested to see the promised regulatory response to that and will review the papers on PrefBlog when available … but I am ecstatic that this is being discussed. In Canada we – or OSFI and the politicians, anyway – are always touting the benefits of a very highly capitalized banking system, but never discuss the cost; and there is a cost. That’s a lot of capital tied up that could be invested in other things. I’m not saying I advocate lower capitalization … what I am advocating is an honest debate.

The Canadian experience is interesting … with banks, we obsess about stability and never discuss cost, whereas with electricity we obsess about cost and never discuss stability.

A good day on low volume for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 11bp and FixedResets up 15bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.81 % 2.89 % 23,360 20.32 1 0.0000 % 2,073.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3280 % 3,123.4
Floater 2.30 % 1.97 % 45,192 22.45 4 -0.3280 % 2,226.2
OpRet 4.88 % 2.66 % 86,611 0.08 11 -0.0141 % 2,341.3
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.23 % 85,431 3.44 2 0.0000 % 2,185.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0141 % 2,140.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.97 % 5.64 % 114,897 1.84 4 0.0497 % 1,920.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.91 % 5.95 % 179,797 13.97 73 0.1093 % 1,829.5
FixedReset 5.35 % 3.71 % 303,348 3.48 47 0.1457 % 2,207.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-12
Maturity Price : 20.20
Evaluated at bid price : 20.20
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-12
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.82
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-12
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-12
Maturity Price : 22.91
Evaluated at bid price : 23.67
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 103,720 Desjardins crossed 94,400 at 24.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-12
Maturity Price : 24.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.21
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 57,847 RBC crossed 40,000 at 19.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-12
Maturity Price : 19.79
Evaluated at bid price : 19.79
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 47,589 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 36,850 Desjardins crossed 29,700 at 26.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 36,097 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 35,700 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 27.63.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
PrefLetter

July Edition of PrefLetter Released!

** See Update Below for Delivery Problems **

The July, 2010, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The July edition contains an appendix discussing the potential for calls in the PerpetualDiscount sector and the evidence (or lack thereof!) that the market is accounting for this potential.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the July 2010, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the August, 2010, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close August 13 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on August 16.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Update, 2010-7-12: I regret to advise that there were delivery problems with the July issue – the file was somehow corrupted at some point during the delivery process. If you are unable to open your issue, please either contact me or use the subscriber download feature and it will be replaced.

PrefLetter

July Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the July edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The July edition will contain an appendix discussing the potential for calls in the PerpetualDiscount sector and the evidence (or lack thereof!) that the market is accounting for this potential.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The July issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the July issue.

Indices and ETFs

TXPR Rebalancing: July 2010

Standard & Poor’s has announced a massive revision to the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index, reflecting their new methodology:

These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, July 19, 2010

TXPR Revision 2010/7
Additions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
BMO.PR.N FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BMO.PR.O FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.R FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.T FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.X FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(low)  
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(low)  
BAM.PR.R FixedReset Pfd-2(low)  
BPO.PR.L Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
BPO.PR.N Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
BRF.PR.A Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.K FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.L FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
CM.PR.M FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
EMA.PR.A Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
FFH.PR.E Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(low)  
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
AER.PR.A Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3  
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
PWF.PR.P FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
PWF.PR.M FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
PWF.PR.D OpRet Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.L FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.N FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.P FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.Y FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
SLF.PR.F FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.S FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.A FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.E FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.I FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.K FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TD.PR.C FixedReset Pfd-1(low)  
TRP.PR.B FixedReset Pfd-2(low)  
TRP.PR.C FixedReset Pfd-2(low)  

TXPR Revision 2010/7
Deletions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
BAM.PR.J OpRet Pfd-2(low) &nsbp;
CCS.PR.D Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3  
CZP.PR.B Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3  
DC.PR.A Scraps
(OpRet)
Pfd-3  
DW.PR.A Scraps
(OpRet)
Pfd-3
FTS.PR.E Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
FTS.PR.G Scraps
(FixedReset)
Pfd-3(high)  
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high)  
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Pfd-2(high)  

The net effect of these changes (counting solely by issue count, not by the undisclosed index weight; and counting HIMIPref™ "Scraps" issues according to their bracketted ‘would be’ subindex) are:

TXPR
Net Changes by Issue
July 2010
Category Adds Deletions Net
Class
FixedReset      
OpRet      
PerpDis      
PerpPrem      
Credit
Pfd-1(low)      
Pfd-2(high)      
Pfd-2      
Pfd-2(low)      
Pfd-3(high)      
Pfd-3      
Pfd-3(low)      

I regret that I do not have time at the moment to fill in all of the empty boxes or to make any comments – but I will!

Well – maybe a quick comment … looks like credit quality will improve significantly … but it depends on the weighting factors they use.

Indices and ETFs

TXPR: S&P Announces Major Methodological Change

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

the following modifications to the methodology of the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index, which will become effective after the close of trading on Friday, July 16, 2010, with the second semi-annual review of the index in 2010:

  • There will be no limit to the number of preferred share issues from any given issuer. Previously, the number of issues per issuer was limited to a maximum of three.
  • There will be a maximum relative weight of 10% set per issuer. All eligible lines for an issuer will be included in the index and capped on a pro-rata basis to a maximum of 10% of the total index market capitalization.
  • Preferred shares that have a mandatory conversion or a scheduled maturity or redemption within 12 months of the review period will not be added to the index. Existing index constituents which have a redemption or conversion will be removed on the redemption or conversion date.
  • A buffer rule for existing index constituents will be applied for the dollar value traded liquidity requirement. Existing constituents must have a minimum average dollar value traded in the 3 months prior to the review date of C$100,000.
  • The liquidity requirement to get included in the index will increase from C$100,000 to C$200,000.
  • Effective January 2011 the rebalance scheduled will change from semi-annually to quarterly. Rebalancing will occur after the close on the third Friday of January, April, July and October.

In order to lessen the impact of these changes, the new methodology will be phased in beginning with the July 2010 rebalance. The index will rebalance 25% each month from July to October, effective after the close on the third Friday, where S&P will apply a weight factor to each issue in order to gradually bring each in to the index.

It will take me a little time to digest the effect of all these changes. Clearly, they are attempting to make life easier for CPD so that mechanical application of trading rules to a change in relatively small issue doesn’t burn them as badly as POW.PR.C, inter alia, burned them last time.

I find the liquidity requirement to be fascinating. Assiduous Readers will remember that HIMIPref™ has a relatively complex methodology for determining averageTradingValue. This is because preferred share volumes are lumpy: a few block trades can distort a simple mean average considerably. We may well see some issues added that don’t really meet a sensible trading criteria.

Market Action

July 9, 2010

Naturally, the poster child for the financial crisis is the American homeowner, flim-flammed into buying a house and now being foreclosed. But see Subprime mortgages: Myths and reality for one take on this … and now it’s hitting the papers:

Whether it is their residence, a second home or a house bought as an investment, the rich have stopped paying the mortgage at a rate that greatly exceeds the rest of the population.

More than one in seven homeowners with loans in excess of a million dollars are seriously delinquent, according to data compiled for The New York Times by the real estate analytics firm CoreLogic.

By contrast, homeowners with less lavish housing are much more likely to keep writing checks to their lender. About one in 12 mortgages below the million-dollar mark is delinquent.

Though it is hard to prove, the CoreLogic data suggest that many of the well-to-do are purposely dumping their financially draining properties, just as they would any sour investment.

One of the big problems with the US system is that, typically, mortgages are extended without recourse. Instead of layering on extra rules, as I reported Fannie Mae did on June 23, simply charge a premium for non-recourse mortgages. Piece of cake, and one big source of problems eliminated.

Low volume today, but prices did OK, with PerpetualDiscounts up 7bp and FixedResets up 5bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.80 % 2.88 % 24,323 20.33 1 1.2048 % 2,073.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.1009 % 3,133.7
Floater 2.30 % 1.97 % 45,062 22.47 4 1.1009 % 2,233.5
OpRet 4.88 % 2.20 % 81,841 0.08 11 -0.0035 % 2,341.6
SplitShare 6.34 % 6.23 % 85,027 3.44 2 0.6606 % 2,185.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0035 % 2,141.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.97 % 5.62 % 116,382 1.84 4 0.0000 % 1,919.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.91 % 5.95 % 179,872 13.99 73 0.0674 % 1,827.5
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.72 % 313,229 3.49 47 0.0478 % 2,204.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.61
Bid-YTW : 8.00 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.67
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.75
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 15.36
Evaluated at bid price : 15.36
Bid-YTW : 2.86 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 2.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 15.41
Evaluated at bid price : 15.41
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 87,094 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 74,488 Nesbitt crossed 65,100 at 18.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 18.45
Evaluated at bid price : 18.45
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 68,400 Nesbitt crossed 21,300 at 25.21 and bought 11,800 from TD at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 54,118 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 51,325 National crossed 45,000 at 24.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 24.32
Evaluated at bid price : 24.54
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 46,316 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

SBC.PR.A: Warrants for Capital Unitholders

Brompton Split Banc Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a final prospectus for an offering of warrants to Class A shareholders of the Company. Each Class A shareholder of record on July 19, 2010 will receive one half of one warrant for each Class A share held.

One warrant will entitle the holder to purchase a Unit (consisting of one Class A share and one Preferred share of the Company) upon payment of the subscription price. The subscription price is $20.58, which is the sum of:
a) the most recently calculated NAV per Unit prior to the date of filing the final prospectus; and
b) the estimated per Unit fees and expenses of the offering.

Warrants may be exercised on or before October 22, 2010, the expiry date. The Company has applied to list the warrants (under the ticker symbol SBC.WT) and the Class A shares and Preferred shares issuable on the exercise thereof, on the TSX. Warrants will be distributed to client accounts on a best-efforts basis after the July 19, 2010 record date.

Successful completion of the warrants offering will provide the Company with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. It is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A shares and Preferred shares, and reduce the ongoing management expense ratio of the Company.

The intention to undertake this warrant offering was discussed in the post SBC.PR.A to Get Bigger. SBC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

LBS.PR.A: Warrants for Capital Unitholders

Life & Banc Split Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a final prospectus for an offering of warrants to Class A shareholders of the Company. Each Class A shareholder of record on July 19, 2010 will receive one half of one warrant for each Class A share held.

One warrant will entitle the holder to purchase a Unit (consisting of one Class A share and one Preferred share of the Company) upon payment of the subscription price. The subscription price is $17.66, which is the sum of:
a) the most recently calculated NAV per Unit prior to the date of filing the final prospectus; and
b) the estimated per Unit fees and expenses of the offering.

Warrants may be exercised on or before August 23, 2010, the expiry date. The Company has applied to list the warrants (under the ticker symbol LBS.WT) and the Class A shares and Preferred shares issuable on the exercise thereof, on the TSX. Warrants will be distributed to client accounts on a best-efforts basis after the July 19, 2010 record date.

Successful completion of the warrants offering will provide the Company with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. It is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A shares and Preferred shares, and reduce the ongoing management expense ratio of the Company.

The intention to issue warrants was discussed in the post LBS.PR.A to Get Bigger. LBS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update, 2010-12-16: In their 2010 Semiannual report, Brompton discloses:

Unitholders received warrants on the basis of one-half of one warrant for each Class A share held on July 19, 2010. A whole warrant entitled the holder to subscribe for one unit (consisting of one Class A share and one Preferred share) of the Fund at a subscription price of $17.66. Warrants not exercised prior to August 23, 2010 were void and of no value. Upon the exercise of a warrant, the Fund paid a fee equal to $0.27 per warrant to the dealer whose client exercised the warrant.

… which is nice to know, but some disclosure of the success of the offering would have been appreciated. However, that report indicates there were 10,059,675 units outstanding as of 2010-6-30, and there are 10,307,447 (according to the Toronto Stock Exchange), so they were able to sell about 250,000 units.

Interesting External Papers

IMF Releases GFSR Update

The International Monetary Fund has released an update to the Global Financial Stability Report:

Despite generally improved economic conditions and a long period of healing after the failure of Lehman Brothers, progress toward global financial stability has recently experienced a setback. Sovereign risks in parts of the euro area have materialized and spread to the financial sector there, threatening to spill over to other regions and re-establish an adverse feedback loop with the economy. Further decisive follow-up is needed to the significant national and supranational policy responses that have been taken in order to strengthen confidence in the financial system and ensure continuation of the economic recovery.

Banks are also confronted by significant funding pressures coming from maturing bonds. As was emphasized in the April 2010 GFSR, banks face a wall of maturities in the next few years, especially in the euro area, and the recent turbulence has at least temporarily dampened the primary market for financial institutions’ bond issuance

Regulatory reform efforts aimed at making the global financial system safer need to continue in an expeditious fashion. The basics of such reforms—to the quality and quantity of capital and more liquidity—need to be finalized and an appropriate timetable for implementation established. The current level of uncertainty surrounding the final set of reforms is making it difficult for banks to take business decisions about various activities and constraining their willingness to lend. Greater clarity on the details and timing of intended regulatory reforms is thus required. Moreover, the implementation schedule will need to take into account the current health of the financial institutions and the status of the economic recovery to support trend growth and enhance stability. A crucial complement to regulatory reform is strong supervision. This applies in the steady state, but even more so during the transition period when there may be variances in the implementation of the new rules between jurisdictions. Adherence to strong supervisory principles can help contain the risk of regulatory arbitrage.

Presumably, the regulators will require extra staff, and hence extra managers. Fortunately, the IMF has some very well trained and competent staff who are willing to discuss the potential for new jobs!

Market Action

July 8, 2010

There’s some criticism of the European stress tests:

Regulators have told lenders the tests may assume a loss of about 17 percent on Greek government debt, 3 percent on Spanish bonds and none on German debt, said two people briefed on the talks who declined to be identified because the details are private.

“This isn’t a stress test,” said Jaap Meijer, a London- based analyst at Evolution Securities Ltd. It’s “merely the current valuation of government bonds.”

Credit markets are pricing in losses of about 60 percent on Greek bonds should the government default, more than three times the level said to be assumed by CEBS. Derivatives known as recovery swaps are trading at rates that imply investors would get back about 40 percent in a Greek default or restructuring.

“I wonder how much these stress tests are reverse- engineered to inspire confidence in the market” and banks, said Bruce Packard, an analyst at Seymour Pierce Ltd. in London.

Reverse engineering? Surely not! That’s done by evil bonus-seeking bankers underwriting sub-prime, not by Holy Regulators!

American banks are hoping to generate investor opposition to fair value accounting:

The American Bankers Association opposes the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s plan to apply fair-value rules to all financial instruments, including loans, rather than just to securities. The group says the rule could make strong banks appear undercapitalized.

The association’s website, noting that FASB’s stated mission is to serve investors, provides a sample letter for people writing to the board and suggests they focus on why the proposal isn’t “useful for investors.”

The ABA has devoted a whole page to the campaign.

State Street reached for yield – and suffered:

State Street Corp., the third-largest U.S. custody bank, reported second-quarter earnings that missed analysts’ estimates because of a $251 million after-tax charge related to its securities lending business.

State Street recorded the charge, which reduced earnings by 50 cents a share, to replenish funds that managed money on behalf of securities lenders. The funds invest cash deposited as collateral by securities borrowers. The injection allows State Street to lift redemption restrictions placed on clients in the fall of 2008 after the funds suffered losses.

Pensions & Investments has some interesting background:

It could be argued that the U.S. pension fund sector had historically engaged proportionately more in leveraged finance — by lending securities to raise cash collateral that can be reinvested for returns — than securities lending over recent years and that pension funds only very recently adopted a profile more in line with the U.S. mutual fund sector. That profile has maturity and liquidity more in line with the underlying loan transaction, that is, short term.

The mean return of the total return to lendable securities in a portfolio generated by the U.S. pension fund sector is almost double than that of the U.S. mutual fund sector over the three-year period under consideration. What should really worry the pension fund sector now is that the difference is at its historic low. The pension fund sector has reined in reinvestment guidelines and reduced its return expectations to reduce risk.

AIG writ small!

It was a good day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 16bp and FixedResets gaining 3bp. Volume was moderate.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.83 % 2.94 % 23,320 20.28 1 0.0000 % 2,048.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1860 % 3,099.6
Floater 2.32 % 1.98 % 45,470 22.44 4 0.1860 % 2,209.2
OpRet 4.88 % 1.08 % 80,223 0.08 11 0.0849 % 2,341.7
SplitShare 6.39 % 6.32 % 87,945 3.45 2 0.0882 % 2,171.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0849 % 2,141.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.97 % 5.61 % 117,537 1.85 4 0.0497 % 1,919.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.92 % 5.96 % 180,568 13.97 73 0.1553 % 1,826.3
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.74 % 317,257 3.49 47 0.0271 % 2,203.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 23.49
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 20.55
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.60
Evaluated at bid price : 23.18
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 106,516 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 22.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 106,016 RBC crossed 50,000 at 26.80; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 87,830 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
PWF.PR.J OpRet 75,950 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-08-07
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 1.08 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 64,593 RBC crossed 55,000 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 58,000 Nesbitt crossed 44,200 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-08
Maturity Price : 25.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.