Best & Worst Performers: April 2010

May 1st, 2010

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

April 2010
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “April 30”)
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(low) -6.35% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.34% based on a bid of 18.28 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -5.61% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.59% based on a bid of 22.48 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -5.35% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.48% based on a bid of 22.10 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -5.32% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.38% based on a bid of 18.36 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.T Fixed-Reset Pfd-1(low) -5.29% I don’t think we’ve ever seen a FixedReset in this part of the table before! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.96% based on a bid of 26.26 and a call 2014-5-25 at 25.00.
CM.PR.A OpRet Pfd-1(low) +0.59% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of -8.94% based on a bid of 25.55 and a call 2010-5-30 at 25.25. If it somehow survives to its SoftMaturity 2011-7-30 it will have yielded 3.51% … but you won’t see me betting on that!
PWF.PR.A Floater Pfd-1(low) +0.85% Will be dropped from the Floater index due to low volume.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat Pfd-2(low) +0.96% The second best performer in March and the fifth-best performer in February. Strong pair with BAM.PR.E
PWF.PR.D OpRet Pfd-1(low) +1.58% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -8.46% based on a bid of 25.89 and a call 2010-5-30 at 25.60. If it makes it to its SoftMaturity 2012-10-30 at 25.00, it will have yielded 3.72% … another bet I won’t take!
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +1.74% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.07% based on a bid of 23.90 and a limitMaturity.

Nice to see an end to the Floating Rate hegemony over the Best Performers!

FTU.PR.A Reinstates Dividend, Pays Partial Arrears

May 1st, 2010

US Financial 15 Split Corp. has announced:

the reinstatement of the regular monthly distribution of $0.04375 for each Preferred share ($0.525 annually) effective for the month of April as well as a dividend of $0.05 representing a portion of the accrued dividends in arrears. Both dividends will be payable on May 10, 2010 to Preferred shareholders on record as at April 30, 2010.

Management believes that the strong recovery in the US financial services companies held in the portfolio from the March 2009 lows combined with the current level of dividend income and option premiums from the covered call writing program presents the necessary conditions to reinstate the monthly dividend and to begin the process of making payments on the accrued dividends.

The 14 months of cumulative accrued dividends from February 2009 to March 2010 totaling $0.6125 per Preferred share are currently recorded as a liability of the Company and are accrued to the benefit of the Preferred shareholders. The accrued liability will decrease to $0.5625 per Preferred share after the payment of the $0.05 dividend. The timing and amount of any future payments of the cumulative dividends will be reviewed by the Board on an ongoing basis and will be based on market conditions, the level of the net asset value and income realized in the portfolio.

Regular monthly dividends of $0.04375 will continue each month and will be payable to Preferred shareholders on record on the last business day of each month.

The net asset value per unit as at April 15, 2010 was $7.17.

FTU.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when they published the 2009 Semi-Annual Financials. FTU.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

April 30, 2010

May 1st, 2010

I can’t resist picking on Basis Yield Alpha Fund (discussed yesterday; it’s crying about having bought Timberwolf notes from Goldman) a little bit more. It was among the earliest crunch casualties:

[2007-08-28] Basis Yield Alpha Fund, a hedge fund specializing in corporate and structured credit, on Wednesday filed for bankruptcy protection in the United States amid mounting losses from U.S. subprime mortgage assets, court papers show.

Earlier in the month, the hedge fund firm told investors that losses at one of its portfolios had lost more than 80 percent in assets.

Award winning!

Basis earned the “Fund of the Year” title at the 2005 AsiaHedge awards and Macquarie Bank Ltd.’s “Skilled Manager of the Year” in 2004.

The lenders got paid:

Banks that lent to failed hedge fund Basis Yield Alpha, run by Australia’s Basis Capital, are likely to get all their money back and there could be a payment to investors, the fund said. Yield Alpha, which started the year with about $700m, has returned to solvency and can afford to repay banks which seized the fund’s assets when it missed margin calls earlier this year. The development is a result of continued payouts by structured credits in which Basis invested, apparently resolving one of the few situations in which lenders to a hedge fund lost money. Basis became the second hedge fund group this year to see one of its funds collapse amid the US subprime crisis, after the failure of two funds run by Bear Stearns.

Budget cuts in Greece may put Canada’s 1990’s experience to shame:

Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou said the country’s survival was at stake in talks to win a potential $159 billion European Union-led bailout in exchange for budget cuts denounced by unions as “savage.”

Papandreou’s budget cuts may include a three-year wage freeze for public workers and eliminating two of their 14 annual salary payments, the ADEDY union said. Greece’s NET Radio reported that cuts could amount to 10 percentage points of gross domestic product. The deficit was 13.6 percent of GDP in 2009.

Other deficit-cutting steps include increasing sales tax and raising the cap on the number of workers who can be fired to 4 percent from 2 percent, Kathimerini newspaper said, without saying where it got the information.

There is a sort-of encouraging trend for US banks:

Gerald J. Ford, who became a billionaire by purchasing distressed lenders during the last banking crisis, isn’t waiting around during this one for Sheila Bair’s Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. to offer him a deal.

After bidding unsuccessfully on several lenders seized by the FDIC, Ford said he’s pushing ahead with a $500 million injection for Pacific Capital Bancorp, a California lender that has said it may collapse. He’s among the private-equity investors who are now willing to buy banks without an FDIC guarantee on loan losses.

“We’re trying to do this one sooner rather than later,” Ford, 65, said in an interview yesterday. “We’ve been out there looking for a long time.”

Private-equity firms are going after live banks after complaining the FDIC put up too many obstacles and changed the rules for buying failed lenders, which are piling up at the fastest rate in two decades. Three days before Ford’s deal, private-equity firm Thomas H. Lee Partners LP agreed to pay $134.7 million for a stake in Sterling Financial Corp., a Spokane, Washington-based lender that’s still open after posting two annual losses.

Both deals depend on the U.S. Treasury Department agreeing to take a loss on the stake held by its bank bailout fund. The Treasury signed on to the Sterling deal yesterday, according to the bank.

The Sterling accord calls for the bank to raise a total of $720 million and would give Boston-based Lee a 19.9 percent stake. The U.S. agreed to swap its $303 million stake for new securities valued at $75.8 million, Sterling said in a statement on April 29. Treasury spokesman Andrew Williams declined to comment and Richard Walsh Jr. at Thomas H. Lee didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.

At Pacific Capital, the agency would be required to exchange $180.6 million for common shares at about 20 cents on the dollar, according to a statement. Pacific Capital has told investors it may not survive without new capital.

If Treasury is involved, then it’s a political issue – which it should be. However, the details of the deals would have to be examined very closely to see whether, all in, Treasury taking a loss now is better for taxpayers than the FDIC (maybe) taking a loss later.

The forces of do-goodism have received a mild rebuff:

Spain is lancing an 18 billion-euro ($24 billion) investment bubble in solar energy that has boosted public liabilities, choking off new projects as it works to cut power prices and insulate itself from Greece’s debt crisis.

Industry Minister Miguel Sebastian is negotiating reductions in subsidies for solar plants that would curb energy costs, a ministry spokesman said this week. Grupo T-Solar Global SA, the world’s biggest photovoltaic plant owner, shelved its Spanish stock offering three days ago. Solar Opportunities SL postponed a 130 million-euro deal due to be signed today.

Spain is battling on several fronts to revive its economy and convince government bondholders it can avoid getting dragged into a Greek-style debt spiral after Standard & Poor’s cut its credit rating April 28. Solar-plant owners including General Electric Co. earn about 12 times what’s paid for power from fossil fuels. Most of that is a subsidy charged to customers.

You can only waste money if you’ve got money to waste! Unfortunately, the Smitherman subsidy aimed at making Ontario a hot-bed of world-class lobbying is still considered sane.

OSFI’s Mark White has delivered a speech titled P&C Reinsurance to Fit the Times – A Question of Balance; the limits and collateralization rules on Property and Casualty reinsurance are being revamped. This follows the Response Paper: Reforming OSFI’s Regulatory and Supervisory Regime for Reinsurance, published in late March.

Transcripts from 2004 show that the Fed was perplexed by the early housing boom; at the June meeting a researcher stated:

With regard to the question of owning versus renting, it depends to some extent on what is happening to interest rates because that changes that calculation at the margin. So it’s really important to plot any kind of valuation measure relative to an opportunity cost. Just showing the rent-to-price ratio I think would have been somewhat misleading; it’s really that gap that we think is the meaningful measure of valuation. And it looks somewhat rich, taking account of the fact that interest rates are relatively low and income growth has been relatively strong. I don’t want to leave the impression that we think there’s a huge housing bubble. We believe a lot of the rise in house prices is rooted in fundamentals. But even after you account for the fundamentals, there’s a part of the increase that is hard to explain.

SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar has delivered a speech to the Investment Adviser Association Annual Conference

The Senate Bill, however, has abandoned its strong position in the face of determined lobbying by the insurance and brokerage industries. The revised version that was voted out of the Senate Banking Committee on March 22nd has eliminated the provision applying the fiduciary standard to brokers who provide investment advice. It would, instead, require a one-year study by the SEC concerning the effectiveness of existing standards for “providing personalized investment advice and recommendations about securities to retail customers.”

I continue to have concerns about this retreat from requiring a fiduciary standard for all who provide investment advice. First, I see no need to study the effectiveness of existing obligations for investment advisers. We already have a strong, workable standard that has been in use successfully for decades, and I would not support any attempt to weaken it. Second, as with the House Bill, I question why the protection of the fiduciary standard should be limited to “retail” customers. It is readily apparent from recent Commission enforcement cases — such as the cases involving auction rate securities — that all investors, including institutional investors, need the protection of the fiduciary standard. Third, I question why the study, as well as the reach of the House Bill, should be limited to “personalized services.” This qualification would narrow the range of clients that would be protected by the fiduciary standard, and I fear that it may become a loophole that would make it easy to avoid putting clients first.

This is completely insane. Institutional investors are acting as fiduciaries for the institutions they represent. How many layers of fiduciary responsibility are necessary? How many have to be paid for? Why do F-Class and discount brokerages exist in the first place? As discussed yesterday, an institutional investor will discuss trades with the sell side with the clear understanding that his counterparty wants to clean him out and send him home naked and hungry. Any buy-side investor who does not understand this – and does not understand that there is exactly one layer of fiduciary between the lions and lambs an that he’s it; or who does not devote independent analysis to each investment idea with precisely this fact in mind – should lose his license. I am sick to bloody death of politicians and regulators telling me that I’m too stupid to negotiate deals for my clients — and that only the sell side can be trusted with such important decisions.

Commissioner Aguilar’s background should be noted:

Prior to his appointment as an SEC Commissioner, Mr. Aguilar was a partner with the international law firm of McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP, specializing in securities law. During his career, his practice included matters pertaining to general corporate and business law, international transactions, investment companies and investment advisers, securities law, and corporate finance. He also focused on issues related to corporate governance, public and private offerings (IPOs and secondary offerings), mergers and acquisitions, mutual funds, investment advisers, broker-dealers, and other aspects of federal and state securities laws and regulations.

A lawyer. Almost certainly has never been on the ‘phone and said “done” in his life.

A long, long month for Canadian preferred share investors shuddered to an end today with, wonder of wonders, gains for both PerpetualDiscounts (up 5bp) and FixedResets (up 3bp). Volume continued heavy.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.35%, equivalent to 8.89% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates have returned +1.21% on the month (+6.29% on the year-to-date) and now yield about 5.7%, making the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) about 320bp, about the same as was reported April 28 and a massive jump higher than the +285 bp reported March 31.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.58 % 2.66 % 51,230 20.94 1 -2.1525 % 2,144.0
FixedFloater 4.94 % 3.01 % 45,896 20.36 1 0.0000 % 3,237.9
Floater 1.92 % 1.66 % 45,744 23.47 4 -0.0609 % 2,408.2
OpRet 4.90 % 3.96 % 102,875 1.05 10 0.0703 % 2,303.4
SplitShare 6.40 % 6.53 % 135,075 3.57 2 -0.1982 % 2,133.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0703 % 2,106.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.91 % 4.77 % 25,341 15.86 2 -0.0205 % 1,822.8
Perpetual-Discount 6.28 % 6.35 % 215,916 13.41 76 0.0523 % 1,700.1
FixedReset 5.56 % 4.55 % 506,444 3.60 44 0.0296 % 2,128.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -3.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 18.28
Evaluated at bid price : 18.28
Bid-YTW : 7.34 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet -2.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 22.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.82
Bid-YTW : 2.66 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset -1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 23.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.72
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 17.47
Evaluated at bid price : 17.47
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 23.97
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 22.91
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 22.01
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 20.43
Evaluated at bid price : 20.43
Bid-YTW : 6.45 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 19.16
Evaluated at bid price : 19.16
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 105,057 RBC crossed 100,000 at 25.73.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 4.69 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 86,546 TD crossed 50,000 at 18.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 18.57
Evaluated at bid price : 18.57
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 74,915 RBC crossed 64,000 at 24.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 4.50 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 67,551 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 18.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-30
Maturity Price : 18.64
Evaluated at bid price : 18.64
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 65,984 RBC crossed two blocks of 30,000 each at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 63,946 RBC crossed two blocks of 25,000 each at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
There were 55 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

DGS.PR.A Gets Bigger

April 30th, 2010

Dividend Growth Split Corp. has announced:

that it has completed its treasury offering of 1,115,000 class A shares and 1,115,000 preferred shares for aggregate gross proceeds of $22,021,250. Shares will continue to trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the existing symbols DGS (class A shares) and DGS.PR.A (preferred shares).

Dividend Growth Split Corp. invests in a portfolio of common shares of high quality, large capitalization companies, which have among the highest dividend growth rates of those companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index.

The preferred shares were offered at a price of $10.00 per share. The investment objectives for the preferred shares are to provide their holders with fixed cumulative preferential quarterly cash distributions in the amount of $0.13125 per preferred share to yield 5.25% per annum on the original issue price, and to return the original issue price at the time of redemption on November 30, 2014.

The class A shares were offered at a price of $9.75 per share. The investment objectives for the class A shares are to provide their holders with regular monthly cash distributions targeted to be $0.10 per class A share, and to provide the opportunity for growth in net asset value per class A share.

The offering was placed through a group of agents co-led by RBC Capital Markets and CIBC World Markets Inc., and included National Bank Financial Inc., TD Securities Inc., BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc., Mackie Research Capital Corporation, Raymond James Ltd., Canaccord Financial Ltd., Dundee Securities Corporation, Desjardins Securities Inc., Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. and Wellington West Capital Markets Inc.

DGS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the offering was announced. It is not tracked by HIMIPref™ as it is too small an issue to trade efficiently (slightly over 2-million shares outstanding on 2009-12-31, according to the 2009 Annual Report) … but the addition of 1.1-million-odd shares brings it closer!

BSC.PR.A Proposes Term Extension

April 29th, 2010

BNS Split Corp. II has announced:

that its Board of Directors has approved a proposal to reorganize the Company. The reorganization will permit holders of Capital Shares to extend their investment in the Company beyond the scheduled redemption date of September 22, 2010 for an additional five years. The Preferred Shares will be redeemed on the same terms originally contemplated in their share provisions. Holders of Capital Shares who do not wish to extend their investment and all holders of Preferred Shares will have their shares redeemed on September 22, 2010.

The reorganization will involve (i) the extension of the originally scheduled redemption date, (ii) a special retraction right to enable holders of Capital Shares to retract their shares as originally contemplated should they not wish to extend their investment and (iii) the issuance of a new class of preferred shares in order to provide continuing leverage for the Capital Shares.

A special meeting of holders of the Capital Shares will be held on July 5, 2010 to consider and vote upon the proposed reorganization. Details of the proposed reorganization will be outlined in an information circular to be prepared and delivered to holders of Capital Shares of record on May 20, 2010 in connection with the special meeting and will be available on www.sedar.com. Implementation of the proposed reorganization will also be subject to applicable regulatory approval including the Toronto Stock Exchange.

BSC.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the company announced it was considering extending term. BSC.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™ …. but if they extend term and maybe up the size just a little, its successor might be.

April 29, 2010

April 29th, 2010

Interesting mutual fund idea:

BlackRock Inc., the world’s largest asset manager, and Blackstone Group LP’s GSO Capital Partners LP are forming mutual funds to invest in loans as the London interbank offered rate rises to the highest level since August.

Within the past two months, the firms have joined Goldman Sachs Group Inc. in announcing funds that invest in leveraged loans pegged to short-term interest rates. Investors poured more than $2.5 billion into bank loan mutual-funds in March and the first three weeks of April, more than triple the amount for March and April last year, according to Lipper FMI data.

The S&P/LSTA U.S. Leveraged Loan 100 Index has returned 5.68 percent this year, building on last year’s record 52 percent as lending continues to open up. New money “will provide financing, which will help” merger and acquisition deals get done, according to Invesco Ltd.’s Tom Ewald.

This year, $91.6 billion in leveraged loans have been underwritten, more than four times the figure from the same period in 2009, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The interest charge on leveraged loans is typically tied to Libor.

However, the only term-criteria for inclusion in the index is:

Minimum initial term of one year

… which suggests that – as always – people are so fixated on interest-rate risk that credit risk is forgotten. It brings up a number of issues … we’ve seen (oh boy, have we ever seen) how the redemption on demand nature of mutual funds doesn’t mix too well with borrowers’ desire for long-term funding at short term rates (see Volcker to Regulate Money Market Funds as Banks? and The US Dollar Shortage & Policy Response).

This dichotomy will not play out in precisely the same manner as the USD MMF crisis, of course, since the loans have a contractual term that didn’t begin as money-market …. but a similar crunch could lead to forced selling that that will put the Credit Crunch to shame.

There are rumours that regulatory extortion works as well as ever:

After 11 hours of accusations by members of the Senate Subcommittee on Permanent Investigations, people close to the bank said Goldman is mulling closing the SEC fraud-case chapter on the belief the firm’s reputation, already damaged, might not endure a street fight with the Wall Street watchdog.

“It’s almost a certainty that there will be a settlement,” said a source.

As another person put it, the SEC has an “unlimited supply of ammunition” in the form of e-mails and records that it could release, and Goldman officials would like to avoid having those documents fired back at them the way they were on Tuesday.

Predictably, the boo-hoo-hoo brigade is in full cry. For example, there are reports that Basis Yield Alpha Fund is claiming that it did not independently analyze its investment and simply bought whatever their salesman offered:

Citing several people familiar with the matter, The FT said Basis Yield Alpha Fund was seeking compensation over its $100 million investment in Timberwolf, a so-called hybrid collateralized debt obligation that Goldman took to market in March 2007, Reuters reported.

As far as I can tell, Basis Yield Alpha Fund was run by Basis Capital. It is worthwhile to note the company’s Executive Team page; the proprietors, Steven Howell and Stuart Fowler tout their experience but not their results.

There is pressure to use German banks as a political tool:

German lawmakers considering a bill to aid Greece challenged Chancellor Angela Merkel to involve banks in the rescue, refusing to back down after her government said that would send a “fatal signal” to markets.

The main opposition Social Democratic Party threatened to withhold support for aid next week when the bill is fast-tracked through parliament unless banks are asked to contribute. Members of Merkel’s Christian Democrats said the government should ask banks to voluntarily accept losses on their investments.

After having been hammered by dumb investments in CDOs, the banks should be grateful to the politicians for pointing out better investments, eh?

So-called “Strategic Mortgage Defaults” in the States are increasing:

Decisions by U.S. homeowners to walk away from mortgages they can afford account for an increasing share of defaults, according to Morgan Stanley.

About 12 percent of all mortgage defaults in February were “strategic,” up from 4 percent in mid-2007, New York-based Morgan Stanley analysts led by Vishwanath Tirupattur wrote in a report today. Borrowers are more likely to stop paying their mortgages the higher their credit scores and the larger their loans, the analysts said.

Defaults by borrowers who owe more than their homes’ values are among the biggest risks for the housing market, according to analysts including Zelman & Associates’ Ivy Zelman and Amherst Securities Group LP’s Laurie Goodman. Last month, the Obama administration said it would adjust its anti-foreclosure program to encourage reductions to borrowers’ principal amounts, instead of just the payments they make, to address the issue.

The importance of asset-ratio relative to income-ratio in mortgage default analysis was discussed in the post Redefault on Modified Mortgages

You knew this was coming, didn’t you? The US Senate financial regulation bill says that pension fund managers are too dumb to act as principal or, to put it another way, only the sell-side has the ability to analyze financial instruments:

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Harvard University are among public and private entities that could be shut out of the $605 trillion privately negotiated derivatives market they use to manage risks under legislation being debated in the U.S. Senate, according to an industry group.

The bill would impose a fiduciary duty on swaps dealers doing business with cities, states, government agencies, pension plans and endowments, applying standards that would require banks such as JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. to put the interest of those entities ahead of their own.

But I guess it all makes sense, eh? The politicians have to do something to show they are Responding To The Credit Crunch and since the buy side was (approximately, more or less, give or take) unscathed by the horror, the sell side (which nearly destroyed itself) must take on responsibility for advising it.

A mixed day on continued heavy volume for the Canadian preferred share market, as PerpetualDiscounts were able to record a gain of 9bp, while FixedResets continued their descent, losing 17bp to bring the median average yield-to-worst up to 4.56%. That’s a point more than their yield on March 31. A full point!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.53 % 2.56 % 50,886 21.06 1 0.2247 % 2,191.2
FixedFloater 4.94 % 3.01 % 45,316 20.36 1 -0.4525 % 3,237.9
Floater 1.92 % 1.67 % 46,102 23.43 4 0.2685 % 2,409.7
OpRet 4.91 % 3.79 % 103,181 1.05 10 -0.1871 % 2,301.8
SplitShare 6.38 % 6.44 % 137,077 3.57 2 0.7542 % 2,137.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1871 % 2,104.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.91 % 4.77 % 26,181 15.86 2 0.1641 % 1,823.1
Perpetual-Discount 6.28 % 6.35 % 218,797 13.40 76 0.0944 % 1,699.2
FixedReset 5.57 % 4.56 % 512,068 3.60 44 -0.1721 % 2,127.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -3.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-29
Maturity Price : 16.84
Evaluated at bid price : 16.84
Bid-YTW : 7.13 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-29
Maturity Price : 20.70
Evaluated at bid price : 20.70
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.L FixedReset 111,305 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.05; RBC crossed blocks of 34,600 and 15,400 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 105,800 RBC crossed blocks of 50,400 shares, 27,500 and 25,000, all at 25.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 102,357 TD crossed blocks of 50,000 and 25,000, both at 20.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-29
Maturity Price : 20.26
Evaluated at bid price : 20.26
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 96,325 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 73,425 TD crossed 70,000 at 23.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-29
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset 72,798 TD bought 12,500 from anonymous at 26.55, followed by blocks of 11,000 and 12,000 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
There were 62 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Bank Capital Surcharge Proposals Gaining Ground

April 29th, 2010

Bank capital surcharges have long been advocated by PrefBlog; with the idea, for instance, that Risk-Weighted Assets in excess of – say – $250-billion should attract a progressively higher surcharge. There are other proposals around, naturally, many of them dependent upon a regulatory evaluation of linkages between banks on the grounds that RWA is not an ideal proxy for systemic importance.

One way or another, the idea seems to be achieving at least some degree of consensus. Professor Axel A Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, delivered a speech at the International Capital Markets and Emerging Markets Roundtable, Institute of International Finance (IIF), Washington DC, 25 April 2010:

Other major elements of reform centre on the problem of systemically important financial institutions. Here, the reform of the Basel framework is part of the solution, too, as it will help to improve the capacity of such institutions to absorb losses. However, what is required is a more comprehensive approach which specifically ensures that accountability is brought back into the game. Necessary proposals that go beyond the reformed capital and liquidity framework include capital surcharges for systemically important institutions, better resolution regimes and a strengthening of the financial infrastructure. Commissioned by the G20, the FSB is already working towards that goal. Nevertheless, some thorny issues are still waiting to be resolved, such as the calibration of measures to assess systemic relevance.

This builds on a paper by Hervé Hannoun Deputy General Manager, Bank for International Settlements, TOWARDS A GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY FRAMEWORK:

Asian central banks have taken the lead in implementing various macroprudential tools before and following the experience of the 1997 crisis, as can be seen in Table 6. Their knowledge of these tools is particularly rich compared with that of other regions, and their experience provides interesting lessons for other countries.

For example, Asian countries are using countercyclical provisioning, loan-to-value ratios and direct controls on lending to specific sectors to manage procyclicality in their financial systems. They are also addressing aggregate risk in the financial system through capital surcharges and liquidity requirements.

These comments are somewhat more approving than those quoted in the post BIS Schedule for Regulatory Reform

OSFI's Dickson Highlights Insurance Holding Company Regulation

April 29th, 2010

In a speech delivered to the Canadian Reinsurance Conference, Julie Dickson, head of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, remarked on insurance holding company regulation:

Another example of how life insurance and life reinsurance regulation is changing is evidenced by recent announcements by the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA). APRA has made it clear that non-operating holding companies of life insurers should be subject to a similar regime to that which applies to life insurers themselves, and to banks and Property and Casualty (P&C) insurers. This means that the holding company is subject to some of the same regulatory requirements as the underlying risk-taking institution or institutions.

This is a significant change, as this approach is not the norm in many countries.

We think OSFI’s risk based capital rules are ahead of many existing systems in Europe but Solvency 2 is staking out new ground and we are watching it, as well as what other regulators are doing, like Australia.

… which is somewhat less emphatic than her statement on the issue last November.

She also mentioned accounting standards:

Finally, major accounting changes are also in the works. The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) Phase II is not yet finalized but there is already considerable discussion of the potential impacts. One theme I see developing internationally seems to argue that if we can’t all agree on accounting changes, then there should be two sets of books – one that pleases the accounting standard setters and one that pleases everyone else (regulators and companies, assuming they can agree).

Historically there have been instances of having two sets of books – a statutory set and a GAAP set. This is a backwards step in OSFI’s view. A key aspect of the Canadian system is that all financial institutions report based on GAAP, and OSFI uses those same reports. Without such a system, how does management know what they are managing to? Why should regulators use different statements than shareholders and policyholders, when our interests ultimately converge? Will there be less transparency rather than more if two sets of statements are produced and used?

The debate over which set of books get used is something of a red herring – I don’t care which set is used for the media to report headline number, as long as there are adequate disclosures in the notes. All the good stuff’s in the notes anyway – to the occasional chagrin of pseudo-quants who pick all their numbers off Compustat!

There are also hints of a new regulatory regime for reinsurance:

The aim of the proposed regulatory changes is to better align the risk charges in capital between the P&C sector and the Life sector. Currently, the Life sector has a minimum capital charge based on gross requirements to account for the fact that a company could cede all its business and end up with no capital to cover its operational risk, whereas the P&C sector has a charge for counterparty credit risk. As transactions taking place between ceding and assuming companies are similar in nature (although the risks are different) OSFI is proposing to have similar risk charges for the two industries.

As a result, the P&C sector can expect to bear a minimum capital charge on the MCT, whereas the Life sector can expect to see the introduction of counterparty risk charge in the MCCSR. The scope and scale of the charges will be discussed with industry over the course of the year.

There are also changes coming with reinsurance credits:

As a result of the global financial crisis, one of the key lessons learned for regulators was that the amount and quality of collateral are very important to reflect the risk in financial transactions. As OSFI is an integrated regulator, this is our perspective and we will apply the same thought process to insurance.

From OSFI’s point of view, we can understand how lifting collateral requirements would be a benefit to certain global reinsurers, but we believe that regulators and supervisors would need to be assured that the security offered by a strong financial institution at the time of signing of the treaty would still be there to meet the obligations of the policyholders many years in the future. Consequently, we are still of the strong opinion that collateral must be posted by non-registered reinsurers to secure the benefits of the Canadian ceding company and its Canadian policyholders.

It should be noted that, to the extent that insurers do not meet OSFI’s minimum expectations on sound reinsurance practices and procedures, capital credit for reinsurance arrangements may not be granted.

And at the same time, reinsurance of longevity risk got a boost:

We understand that insurers have assumed both mortality risk and longevity risk to meet the needs of their clients, however, until recently reinsurers have chosen not to reinsure longevity risk in a material way.

We understand that reinsurers have argued that there is not enough tangible evidence of the predictability of longevity risk to mirror the experience which the reinsurers have had with mortality risk. Up to now, that has been the prevailing view of reinsurers, especially in North America. However, as a regulator, we are watching with interest the developments in Europe with respect to the reinsurance of longevity risk. In its simplest form, we can see how longevity risk serves as a natural, if imperfect, hedge to mortality risk.

We can see that there is clearly a need for longevity reinsurance, especially when that longevity risk is sourced from private pension plans.

That’s good news for JPMorgan – they’ve been flogging LifeMetrics for years.

She mentioned adverse selection as an element in the pricing of annuities:

OSFI is weighing the merits of these potential longevity transactions, but this growth opportunity for reinsurers comes with significant risk management challenges:

  • Annuities are particularly prone to the risk of mis-pricing and uncertainty regarding adverse selection (that is, annuitants living longer than their life expectancy).
  • Asset/liability mismatch is difficult considering the long term nature of this business, and these risks.

Adverse selection as it relates to annuities was discussed in the April 2010 PrefLetter, on sale now at a selected high-end website near you!

April 28, 2010

April 28th, 2010

Spain’s been downgraded:

Spain had its credit rating cut one step by Standard & Poor’s to AA, putting it on a par with Slovenia, as contagion from Greece’s debt crisis spreads through the euro region.

S&P said in a statement today that the outlook on Spain is negative, reflecting the chance of a possible further downgrade if the “budgetary position underperforms to a greater extent than we currently anticipate.” Spain was last cut by S&P in January 2009.

The risk premium investors demand to hold Spanish bonds surged to the highest in more than a year today and the price of insuring Spanish bonds against default reached a record as doubts about Greece’s ability to pay its debt spilled over into Spanish and Portuguese markets.

… and S&P is making recovery-on-default estimates for Greece:

The ratings firm yesterday cut Greece three steps to BB+, or below investment grade, and said bondholders may recover only 30 percent to 50 percent of their investments if the nation fails to make debt payments. Europe’s most-indebted country relative to the size of its economy has about 296 billion euros of bonds outstanding, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

OSFI’s Assia Billig gave a presentation on the Canada Pension Plan. Real returns on the fund’s portfolio are estimated to be 4.2% +/- 1.5% with 95% confidence. It won’t be holding a lot of government bonds!

Senator Levin is doing some more grandstanding:

Levin, who questioned Goldman Sachs executives during a hearing in Washington yesterday, said the regulatory reform bill being weighed in the Senate will address conflicts where companies have undisclosed interest in betting against clients.

Today’s FOMC statement was encouraging for fixed-income investors:

Although the pace of economic recovery is likely to be moderate for a time, the Committee anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability.

With substantial resource slack continuing to restrain cost pressures and longer-term inflation expectations stable, inflation is likely to be subdued for some time.

The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period.

Another day of poor performance on high volume for the Canadian preferred share market, as PerpetualDiscounts lost 16bp while FixedResets were down 12bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.35%, equivalent to 8.89% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates (which are up 0.70% on the month-to-date and +5.76% year-to-date) now yield about 5.7% (edging towards 5.6%!) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 320bp, a significant widening from the 305bp reported April 22, above the recent high of +310bp reported April 7 and a big move wider than the +285bp reported on March 31.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.53 % 2.57 % 52,850 21.05 1 0.0309 % 2,186.3
FixedFloater 4.92 % 2.99 % 45,873 20.39 1 -0.4504 % 3,252.7
Floater 1.92 % 1.67 % 47,982 23.43 4 -0.0488 % 2,403.2
OpRet 4.90 % 3.87 % 137,138 1.20 10 0.0507 % 2,306.1
SplitShare 6.43 % 6.75 % 138,950 3.57 2 -0.4857 % 2,121.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0507 % 2,108.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.92 % 4.77 % 27,264 15.86 2 -0.0615 % 1,820.2
Perpetual-Discount 6.28 % 6.35 % 215,937 13.41 76 -0.1609 % 1,697.6
FixedReset 5.55 % 4.49 % 517,506 3.61 44 -0.1169 % 2,131.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-28
Maturity Price : 23.01
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-28
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-28
Maturity Price : 19.25
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.01
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
IAG.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-28
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-28
Maturity Price : 17.62
Evaluated at bid price : 17.62
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-28
Maturity Price : 21.37
Evaluated at bid price : 21.37
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-28
Maturity Price : 17.10
Evaluated at bid price : 17.10
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 144,405 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 82,000, both at 27.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.05
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
PWF.PR.J OpRet 125,828 RBC crossed blocks of 91,500 and 30,000, both at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 125,080 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 70,000 and 40,000, both at 23.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-28
Maturity Price : 22.89
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 78,874 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 18.58.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-28
Maturity Price : 18.56
Evaluated at bid price : 18.56
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 78,430 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 25,000, both at 25.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 54,830 TD bought 10,000 from Scotia at 26.56 and crossed 25,000 at 26.62.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.59
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
There were 51 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BSD.PR.A Extraordinary Motion Passes

April 28th, 2010

Brascan SoundVest Rising Distribution Split Trust has announced (April 20, Material Change Report, via SEDAR):

On April 20, 2010, at an extraordinary meeting of unitholders of the Fund (the “Meeting”), the unitholders of the Fund approved resolutions with respect to a proposal (the “Proposal”) to amend the existing investment strategy and to change the fund manager for the Fund. The amendments and change of Manager included in the Proposal are expected to be completed on or about April 30, 2010.

At the Meeting on April 20, 2010, unitholders of Brascan SoundVest Rising Distribution Split Trust approved the Proposal by approximately 95%. Pursuant to the Proposal, the manager of the Fund will change to Brookfield Soundvest Capital Management Ltd. on or about April 30, 2010 (the “Effective Date”). Also on the Effective Date, the investment mandate of the Fund will be expanded to allow investment in a broader set of primarily high yielding equity securities. The investment objectives will remain the same: with respect to the preferred securities, (i) to provide securityholders with fixed quarterly interest payments in the amount of $0.15 per preferred security ($0.60 per annum to yield 6% per annum on the original subscription price of $10.00); and (ii) to repay the original subscription price at maturity on March 31, 2015; and with respect to the capital units, (i) to provide unitholders with regular distributions and (ii) to maximize long term total return with the Fund’s portfolio. Further amendments to be made to the declaration of trust of the Fund on the Effective Date include eliminating the fixed termination date of the Fund, and permitting the manager, in its sole discretion to wind-up the Fund should its net asset value fall below $15 million, subject to compliance with the trust indenture between the Fund and CIBC Mellon Trust Company dated March 16, 2005 governing the 6% Preferred Securities.

According to the press release, Kevin Charlebois (who has overseen the vapourization of client money in the fund) is the new president of the new manager.

BSD.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the extraordinary resolution paperwork was mailed. BSD.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.