Reader Initiated Comments

Preferred Shares & Annuities

An Assiduous Reader writes in and says:

My background is in insurance and mathematics {now retired at 56}. I am intrigued by the perpetual preferred shares offered by quality institutions rated Pfd 1 or 2 {about 12 to 15 issuers}. With the higher yield and the Canadian dividend tax credit, I am comparing this investment strategy to purchasing a joint life-time annuity with a guaranteed period of 25 years. On the surface, the rate of return is about 6% annually. I recognize the annuity has a return of capital component.

So here’s my riddle…why wouldn’t I buy the quality perpetual preferreds for the ongoing income whereby I can transfer the shares to my spouse [or vice versa] and, likewise, to our children in perpetuity – unlike the annuity that would cease upon on our last-to-die joint death and/or 25 years. The fluctuation in the capital value of my preferreds would not concern me – anymore than the annuity where the entire capital is ‘lost’ upon the initial purchase.

Lastly, if I wanted to ‘boost’ my yield on my preferred portfolio, I would re-invest the dividends for a few years to a level of income that I would like [eg 10%/year} and then that would be the rate of return in perpetuity. If this 10%/year is approximately the long-term equity stock market return, why would I even bother taking on the extra risk with equities and the aggravation of trying to select the appropriate securities for my portfolio.

If this makes sense, then my entire investment strategy should be with perpetual preferreds. {I have other significant assets}

Maybe I am missing something so, thus, my email to you. This ‘riddle’ is starting to keep me up at night!

I am not particularly comfortable in this field of investment decision-making, so take everything below with a grain of salt and do your own research. But I’ll give it a stab! Any corrections or elaborations will be gratefully received.

But first, let me say that the Inquiring Reader is on the right track. Preservation of Income – as opposed to Preservation of Capital – is what preferred shares are all about.

Morningstar publishes life annuity rates; a sixty-year-old male is looking at an annual payment of about 7.2% of principal; at 70 it’s about 9%; and at 75 it’s about 10.8%.

According to Standard Life, the income is taxed as regular income:

Registered

The annuity payment is fully taxable

Non-registered

Only the interest portion is taxable

The taxable portion can be reported on a “prescribed” or “non-prescribed” basis

  • Prescribed: level taxable portion each year
  • Non-prescribed: taxable portion changes each year (interest reported each year reduces)

The prescribed taxation basis is attractive to taxpayers as it allows for the deferral of taxes. It is regulated and can only be used with specific types of annuities. All other annuities must be on a non-prescribed taxation basis.

To estimate how much of the annuity payment is return of capital, I used the Canadian Business Life Expectancy Calculator with the following data:

Life Expectance Calculations
Data Required Age 60 Age 70 Age 75
Age 60 70 75
Sex Male
Height 6’0″
Weight 190 lbs
Frame Small
Physically Active? Somewhat
Level of Stwess Low
Smoking Less than 2 packs a day
Drinking Habits Never more than three drinks
Eat Saturated Fats How the hell should I know? I’m a GUY, ferchrissake. Call it once or twice a week
Elevated cholesterol No
Normal blood pressure Um … when talking about regulators and politicians? Or other times? Call it yes
Two subquestions skipped
Parents lived long? Yes
Siblings with bum tickers? No
Accidents or speeding tickets? No
Post-Secondary Yes
Not poor? yes
Safety belt? Even in bed!
Estimated Lifespan 80 83 85

So at age 60, we’ll say 20-years to go; 13 years to go at age 70; and 10 years left at age 75.

Some quick work with MS-Excel, with the assumption that the capital is all gone at the end of the annuity results in required yields of 3.6%, 2.3% and 1.4%. We’ll summarize this in another table:

Annuity Rates and Required Return
Age Years Left Annuity Rate IRR
60 20 7.2% 3.6%
70 13 9.0% 2.3%
75 10 10.8% 1.4%

Holy smokes! I’ve definitely made a mistake somewhere … could be the assumptions, the math, or the fact that I didn’t go into the insurance business.

However, before we leap wholeheartedly into PerpetualDiscounts as life-annuity substitutes, let’s take a look at the risks:

Credit Risk: Annuities are a far more senior claim on the insurers than preferred shares, especialy since – as far as the insurers are concerned – an annuity is a claim on the operating companies assets, while a preferred share is a claim on the parent. It is entirely possible that in times of trouble, a preferred shareholder could get nothing while an annuity holder could get paid in full … even in the absence of a government bail-out.

Return Order Risk: An annuity withdraws principal on a steadily increasing basis – even if that basis has to be calculated on a post hoc basis. Thus, if we are performing a direct comparison, we also have to withdraw principal from our preferred share portfolio on a steady basis. This means we are exposed to Order of Returns Risk. And that’s even before we consider:

Principal Evaporation Risk: With an annuity, the insurance company takes the risk that you will last longer than expected, and covers it with their chances that other clients will make up for it. With a preferred share portfolio – or any investment portfolio – you’re the one stuck with that risk.

Call Risk: Say preferred share yields fall dramatically and your shares get called. This will definitely foul up your long-term returns because your returns after the call date will reflect the coupon of your PerpetualDiscount, and not the initial yield – and that’s even before you account for frictional costs of the process.

As noted in the comments, this is overstated. Your yield will go down but, to at least some extent, your capital will have increased on a call. However:

  • There will be capital gains tax to pay
  • There is no guarantee that suitable replacements will be available
  • A call will normally take place when the issuer can refinance cheaper, so there will be a yield hit to reflect “cheaper”.

Tax Risk: The tax regime for dividends could change, eliminating at least some of the dividend advantage

Inflation Risk: This will be about the same for both strategies, but you do have the option to buy an indexed annuity, whereas there are no indexed preferred shares at present. At some point, a deeply discounted FixedReset with a microscopic spread against five-year Canadas might be functionally equivalent, but we don’t have any of those yet. Other floating rate perpetuals (Ratchet, FixedFloater, Floater) might be considered equivalent, but then you have basis risk (either prime or five-year Canadas vs. inflation) and extant non-FixedReset Floating Rate issues don’t have sterling credit quality.

All in all, the risks are significant, but the returns are certainly juicy. I would advise that annuities are good for the bare-bones-beans-on-a-hotplate portion of retirement income, while preferred shares – and other investments – provide the income that you spend in Florida.

There are probabily mistakes in the above – this is not a topic I spend a lot of time on. My job is to take the investor’s allocation to preferreds and do a better job with it than he could himself – not to decide on the allocation. Any commentary will be be appreciated.

Update: See also Lifetime Financial Advice: Human Capital, Asset Allocation, and Insurance, Ibbotson, Milevsky, Chen & Zhu, ISBN 978-0-943205-94-6

Update, 2010-3-17: See also the So you are going to buy an annuity. With what? discussion on Financial Webring Forum.

Update, 2010-3-17: Another good article is Annuity Analytics: How Much to Allocate to Annuities? by Moshe A. Milevsky.

Update, 2010-3-19: There’s a good table in Milevsky’s Annuitization: If Not Now, When?:

Value of Unisex Mortality Credits:
Assuming 40m/60f (static) Annuity 2000 Table at 6% net interest.
Age of
Annuitant
Spread Above
Pricing Interest
Rate
(in Basis Points = 1/100 %)
55 35
60 52
65 83
70 138
75 237
80 414
85 725
90 1256
95 2004
100 2978
Source: The IFID Centre calculations

Update, 2010-3-25: Interesting conclusions and charts in Kaplan’s Asset Allocation with Annuities for Retirement Income Management

Market Action

March 16, 2010

The IMF has released the March 2010 edition of Finance & Development.

Europe will bail out Greece, if necessary:

Europe’s blueprint for a financial lifeline to Greece amounts to an unprecedented bet by finance ministers that they can avert a euro crisis by sidestepping the no-bailout rules intended to sustain the 11-year-old currency.

Improvising their way through the euro’s harshest test since its debut in 1999, officials meeting in Brussels late yesterday and today worked out a strategy for emergency loans in case Greece’s plan for 4.8 billion euros ($6.6 billion) in tax increases and wage cuts fails to stave off fiscal disaster.

There is no word as to whether the EU will demand management changes, vilify the top guys, claw back pay or threaten criminal charges. S&P affirmed Greece at BBB+.

Moody’s is shift municipal ratings to the global scale:

Municipal bond issuers led by California Treasurer Bill Lockyer began pressing companies that rate their debt two years ago to show investors how they would be rated on a corporate scale. They claimed that the scale cost them more in interest rates because state and local borrowers default at a lower rate than higher-rated corporations.

U.S. Representative Barney Frank, a Massachusetts Democrat who chairs the House Financial Services Committee, called the different rating scales “ridiculous” at a hearing on the $2.8 trillion market in May 2008.

This cosmetic change was last reported on PrefBlog in September 2008 in Global Scale for Municipal Credit Ratings a Bust?. So, the story so far is: CDOs, etc., must get their own scale because global scales are ridiculous. Municipalities must get their own scale because the global scale is ridiculous. Can’t tell your players without a political programme, can you?

In a speech at the Heyman Center on Corporate Governance, Julie Dickson acknowledged the issue of regulatory capture, but didn’t offer any insights:

Simon Johnson, a professor at MIT, says that the failure of supervisory judgement is often linked to regulatory capture. Regulatory capture refers to supervisors thinking like the industry they regulate because they either come from industry, or hope to work in the industry. In some cases there may be a belief that it is easier to just agree with industry rather than to fight their lobbying efforts. He has written many articles on this, which I read with great interest as they contribute to the debate around regulators, incentives, and judgement.

My own view is that clear mandates and accountabilities, independence, resources, and international assessment programs are key to getting the incentives right. I would also say that I have seen some very courageous supervisors in my time, and that sometimes people recruited from industry are even more demanding, having experienced first hand some of the dynamics within institutions. So this issue is rather complex.

There was an interesting and unusual note in today’s FOMC release:

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; James Bullard; Elizabeth A. Duke; Donald L. Kohn; Sandra Pianalto; Eric S. Rosengren; Daniel K. Tarullo; and Kevin M. Warsh. Voting against the policy action was Thomas M. Hoenig, who believed that continuing to express the expectation of exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period was no longer warranted because it could lead to the buildup of financial imbalances and increase risks to longer-run macroeconomic and financial stability.

A good day in the Canadian preferred share market, with volume at above-average levels. Six issues traded more than 100,000 shares on the Toronto Exchange. PerpetualDiscounts gained 3bp and FixedResets were up 8bp, which took yields of the latter down to 3.47%, the second-lowest on record.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.61 % 2.73 % 56,770 20.86 1 0.5116 % 2,114.4
FixedFloater 5.08 % 3.19 % 44,629 19.94 1 -0.4186 % 3,112.6
Floater 1.92 % 1.73 % 45,612 23.24 4 0.4907 % 2,399.5
OpRet 4.90 % 1.67 % 101,349 0.20 13 -0.0984 % 2,309.6
SplitShare 6.41 % 6.54 % 127,596 3.69 2 0.6449 % 2,130.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0984 % 2,111.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.89 % 5.93 % 123,387 5.83 7 0.0738 % 1,889.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.90 % 5.96 % 173,616 13.96 71 0.0256 % 1,790.4
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.47 % 343,275 3.69 43 0.0833 % 2,202.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-16
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-16
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-16
Maturity Price : 24.54
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-16
Maturity Price : 17.63
Evaluated at bid price : 17.63
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-16
Maturity Price : 17.58
Evaluated at bid price : 17.58
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.N OpRet 585,800 National sold 35,000 to RBC at 26.09; then 11,400 to Desjardins at the same price; another 25,000 to RBC at 26.09, and another 24,600 to Desjardins at the same price; finally selling 12,500 to anonymous at 26.09 again RBC crossed 10,000 at 26.09; National crossed 125,000 at 26.04; RBC crossed 123,000 at 26.09. National then crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, one at 26.09, the other at 26.04, then sold 50,000 to RBC at 26.09 and crossed 50,000 at 26.04. Some day!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.04
Bid-YTW : 1.67 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 256,662 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-16
Maturity Price : 24.89
Evaluated at bid price : 24.94
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 153,800 Desjardins bought 47,300 from National at 28.09, then sold 50,000 to CIBC at 28.12. TD sold 34,900 to CIBC at 28.12.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.07
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 132,580 Scotia crossed 15,000 at 28.30; Desjardins bought 48,000 from National at 28.45, then sold 48,500 to CIBC at 28.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.40
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 113,148 Desjardins crossed 68,900 at 28.30; National crossed 35,000 at 28.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.30
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 106,600 Desjardins bought 37,900 from National at 28.10, then sold 40,000 to CIBC at 28.12.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.06
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Regulation

Dudley Warns on Regulatory Reform Progress

William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, gave a speech at the Council of Society Business Economists Annual Dinner, London, 11 March 2010, titled The longer-term challenges ahead:

Turning to the first challenge of regulatory reform, the key issue is how to ensure that we take the right steps so that the type of financial crisis that occurred never happens again.

By me, the only way to ensure that is to reduce the earth to radioactive rubble – but maybe that’s just me.

From my perspective, I have several concerns about where the regulatory reform process is heading. First, the international consensus to harmonize standards globally appears fragile. If each country acts to strengthen its financial system in an uncoordinated way, we will be left with a balkanized system, riddled with gaps that encourage regulatory arbitrage. Second, I am concerned that the focus will be too bank-centric. Although it is clearly appropriate to strengthen the liquidity and capital standards for banks, regulatory reform needs to be comprehensive. Third, I worry that the Federal Reserve’s role with respect to bank supervision will be unduly constrained. Let me discuss each of these concerns in more detail.

Turning first to the issue of harmonization, I think it is underappreciated how important harmonization is to ensure success of the global regulatory reform effort. Without harmonized standards, financial intermediation would inevitably move toward geographies and activities where the standards are more lax. This, in turn, would provoke complaints from those who cannot make such adjustments as easily. The political process, in turn, would be sensitive to such complaints, creating pressure for liberalization, which would cause the tougher standards to unravel over time. In the discussion between countries, the emphasis would subtly shift from how to structure the regulatory regime to ensure financial stability toward negotiating a regulatory regime that works best for the institutions headquartered in each particular country.

The harmonization process has some momentum due to the sponsorship of the G-20 leadership and the efforts of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and other international standard setters. However, the process is fragile because there are pressures to shape the standards in a way that puts the least burden on the domestic banks and financial infrastructures in one country relative to the institutions in other countries. There is understandable and genuine concern that the impact of moving to global standards will fall disproportionately on some types of firms. In my view, the way to mitigate these issues is to have a long phase-in period in the transition to the new standards rather than to soften or alter the standards to shelter those firms that happen – perhaps by historical accident – to be starting in a less advantageous position. The focus should be more on the side of all ending up in a similar place, rather than on the relative degree of difficulty in getting there.

The process is also fragile because some countries seem intent on strengthening their own set of standards before the international process has had a chance to reach consensus. Although it is understandable that countries would want to move quickly to strengthen their regulatory regimes, such actions should not be undertaken in a way that is immutable and unresponsive to the emerging international consensus.

At the end of the day, to achieve harmonized standards, each sovereign nation is going to have to bend a little bit from what it believes is best for its financial system viewed in isolation. This is necessary, of course, because a series of regulatory regimes that appear best for each individual country would likely be distinctly second-best or even worse when considered collectively. The recent crisis underscores the fact that the regulatory regime needs to be harmonized and global in nature.

These concerns echo remarks made by RBC CEO Gord Nixon at his annual meeting, reported on PrefBlog on March 3.

He is alive to the idea that over-regulating banks will lead to activities being performed by non-banks, but his answer to that is simply to regulate everything. Rather than setting ourselves the goal of eliminating financial crises – which leads to the regulation of everything and ultimately won’t work – I suggest that we define, in a clear an orderly way, just what it is that we want to protect. The payments system, definitely. But what else?

For example, he over-reaches when discussing OTC derivatives:

OTC derivatives dealers have natural incentives to favor opaque, decentralized markets that preserve their information advantage relative to other participants. The greater profit margins that derive from this advantage create incentives to favor more bespoke OTC derivatives over more standardized OTC instruments. Making more and better pricing information available to a wider range of market participants will increase competition and lessen the profit incentives that stem primarily from the opacity of these instruments and markets. Improving transparency should make the benefits that stem from standardization such as increased liquidity, reduced transaction costs, and lower counterparty risks more dominant, helping push the evolution of the OTC derivatives market in the direction of greater standardization and homogeneity.

This doesn’t mean that bespoke products will vanish. They will continue to exist. But they will exist primarily because they better serve the needs of the OTC derivatives customer, not because they create an informational asymmetry that allows rents to accrue to the securities dealer.

I suggest it’s up to the customer to decide what he wants and what’s good. Anybody who buys some of the crap developed by the dealers – FX options masquerading as bonds, for one; stock index linked GICs, for another – deserves to have their heads handed to them and the sooner the better.

If regulators had ready access to current OTC derivatives transaction information in trade repositories, I suspect that this would serve as a brake on the use of OTC derivatives that are used for more questionable purposes. For example, this includes trades undertaken to evade accounting rules or to circumvent investment charter limitations.

Is it really the role of Big Brother to monitor and enforce investment charter limitations?

Contingent Capital

Rabobank Issues € 1.25-billion Contingent Capital

Rabobank has announced that it:

successfully issued a EUR 1.25 billion, benchmark 10 year fixed rate Senior Contingent Note (“SCN”) issue, priced at an annual coupon of 6.875%, reflective of a premium to Rabobank subordinated debt paper, as well as a meaningful discount to where we believe Rabobank would be able to complete a hybrid Tier 1 offering.
The transaction enables Rabobank to further enhance the Bank’s creditworthiness, as the offering is designed to ensure that Rabobank’s Core Capital is strengthened in the very unlikely event that the Bank’s Equity Ratio were to fall below 7%. Rabobank has always been amongst the most conservative banks in the world, and this transaction, which effectively hedges tail risk, once again demonstrates the bank’s unwavering commitment to prudence. Finally, the offering anticipates on future (expected) regulatory requirements which are widely expected to be introduced in the near future, and to recognize the value of contingent buffers of capital.

Given the novelty of the transaction structure, an interactive and highly intensive execution process was adopted, starting with the wall-crossing of a limited number of large credit buyers, in the days leading up to Rabobank’s annual results on March 4th, followed by a very intensive 4-day marketing effort across London, Paris and Frankfurt in the week of March 8th during which the product and the issuer’s credit were discussed with over 80 institutional investors.

Having garnered total orders in excess of EUR 2.6 billion, from more than 180 different accounts, it was decided to formally launch and price a more than twice oversubscribed EUR 1.25 billion offering on Friday March 12.

Rabobank has € 38.1-billion equity against € 233.4-billion Risk Weighted Assets, so I suspect that their current equity ratio is about 16.3%, although I cannot find a copy of the prospectus to nail down the definition. One source claims:

Lloyds’ deal, unlike the Rabobank structure, was to a large degree based on substituting existing subordinated debt for the new security. The “trigger”, the point at which the Lloyds debt would convert into equity in the bank, was set for when the bank’s core Tier 1 ratio fell below 5%. Rabobank, by contrast, has a trigger of 7% of its equity capital ratio, at which point the notes will be written down to 25% of their original value and paid off immediately.

However, converting the equity capital ratio, a much simpler measure of shares divided by debt, to a core Tier 1 trigger actually means the Rabobank trigger sits at about 5.5%. compared to Lloyds’, according to one banker on the deal.

Bloomberg claims:

Rabobank hired Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse Group AG, Morgan Stanley and UBS AG to organize presentations, according to Marc Tempelman, a managing director in Bank of America’s financial institutions group. The notes will be written down to 25 percent of face value and repaid if the bank’s capital as a percentage of assets is less than 7 percent.

Rabobank has 29.3 billion euros of equity capital, which it defines as member certificates and retained earnings, according to Tempelman. To trigger the contingent capital notes, capital levels would have to fall by 12.9 billion euros, he said.

This will take a while to think about.

There’s a degree of first loss protection, sure: if the bank loses less than € 12.9-billion, there’s no loss to noteholders. But then the loss gets triggered … equity holders (as defined) have lost 44% and this leads to a 75% loss for noteholders!

This isn’t a bond, it’s an insurance policy. And the presumption that the trigger is based on financial statements is a temptation for all kinds of jiggery pokery. AND in the event that the loss is triggered, there will be cash leaving the firm.

If anybody can find a prospectus, please let me know.

There is speculation that Royal Bank of Scotland is mulling over issuance of a similar structure.

Interesting External Papers

BoE Releases 2010 Q1 Quarterly Bulletin

The Bank of England has released the 2010 Q1 Quarterly Bulletin, with articles on:

  • Markets and operations
  • Interpreting equity price movements since the start of the financial crisis
  • The Bank’s balance sheet during the crisis
  • Changes in output, employment and wages during recessions in the United Kingdom
  • Summaries of recent Bank of England working papers
  • …and other topics

The first section had some notes on bank financing:

At longer horizons, banks face a challenge to secure funding to replace government-sponsored schemes which will expire over the next couple of years. As part of their strategy to address this funding gap, banks issued a significant amount of senior debt over recent months (Chart 21). This included record issuance from UK banks in January, although issuance was markedly weaker in February. And while many government-guarantee schemes continued, some banking sectors reduced their dependence on these.

Contacts also reported that banks were increasingly looking to securitisation and covered bond markets to raise funds. Covered bond issuance continued to increase; including from banks whose issuance was not eligible for ECB purchase. Prospects for issuance of mortgage-backed securities also reportedly improved. Total issuance in the first months of 2010 remained limited (Chart 22), despite individual issues by, for example, Lloyds Banking Group and Co-operative Bank. Other banks were reported to be preparing for future issuance, however, including the possibility of issues that do not give the investor an option to sell back the debt.

However, despite recent debt issuance, contacts highlighted that for many banks the combined pace of long-term funding was not yet sufficient to meet refinancing needs without some corresponding reduction in assets. And while capital markets remained open for banks to issue subordinated debt, contacts noted that banks may have little incentive to issue such securities in light of the uncertainty about prospective changes to prudential regulation. Specifically, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released a consultative document that raised questions about whether new issuance would be counted as capital going forward.


Click for Big

Retail bond investors will find the new LSE programme of interest:

In response to demand from retail investors, on 1 February 2010 the London Stock Exchange launched a new electronic order system for bonds. Similar to arrangements for individuals to deal in shares, the new service offers continuous two-way pricing for trading in increments of as little as £1 for gilts and £1,000 for corporate bonds. Normally these investments would trade in units of £50,000.

Initially, 49 gilts and ten corporate bonds are available for trading including securities issued by a range of large companies and a bond issued specifically for this new service by Royal Bank of Scotland. The new market is supported by dedicated market makers.

I can’t say I found the paper on dividends all that interesting, but some readers might:

Equity markets have experienced large price movements since the financial crisis began in mid-2007. Understanding the factors that drive equity prices is important for policymakers as they may contain information about the future course of the economy. This article uses a simple model to decompose recent equity price movements into changes in earnings expectations, the risk-free rate and the equity risk premium. Indicative evidence suggests that changes in earnings expectations can account for some, but by no means all, of the shifts in equity prices since mid-2007. Policy actions by central banks and governments are likely to have supported equity prices, for example by lowering government bond yields and reducing the likelihood of more severe downside risks to the economy materialising. The latter may also have contributed to a fall in the implied level of the equity risk premium, which had increased sharply during the financial crisis.

One reason I like the BoE publications is the time series:


Click for Big

So just be glad we didn’t have another 1720 (South Sea Bubble) all over again! You want to whimper about asset bubbles? You don’t know NUTHIN’ about bubbles!

Market Action

March 15, 2010

Under proposed legislation, the New York Fed will be politicized:

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York president, who supervises five of the seven largest U.S. banks, would be subject to White House appointment and lawmakers’ approval under legislation proposed today.

Also, one member of the Fed Board of Governors would be designated vice chairman for supervision, and no firm under Fed oversight would be allowed to vote for or have past or present employees serve as directors of regional Fed banks, according to the bill to overhaul financial regulation. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd, a Democrat from Connecticut, unveiled the proposed legislation in Washington.

This might make a bit of sense if one could point to elements of the Credit Crunch and make a case that Fed failure to regulate was responsible. Unfortunately for logic lovers, however, it was basically Fed-regulated entitites who bailed out Non-Fed-regulated entities (JPM/BSC, BAC/MER) and the spectactular bankruptcies (AIG, LEH) were non-regulated. But it’s not logic, it’s politics!

CLOs are coming back!:

The market for collateralized debt obligations backed by high-yield, high-risk loans is poised to reopen in the U.S. for the first time in a year after losses on mortgages prompted investors to flee bundled securities.

Citigroup Inc. is underwriting a $500 million fund managed by New York-based WCAS Fraser Sullivan Investment Management LLC, scheduled to price as soon as this week, according to people familiar with the offering, who declined to be identified because terms are private. The deal refinances an existing collateralized loan obligation and increases its size by more than 50 percent.

The offering would mark the first new issue backed by widely syndicated loans in the $440 billion market for CLOs since last March and a return to investments that contributed to $1.76 trillion of writedowns and credit losses at the world’s largest financial institutions. Citigroup and WCAS Fraser Sullivan are marketing the deal after prices on CLO debt staged a record rally on signs of economic recovery.

JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Deutsche Bank AG have also been approaching managers of leveraged loans since last year to offer terms for new CLOs to restart the market, according to people familiar with the discussions. CLOs pool loans and slice them into securities of varying risk intended to provide higher returns than similarly rated investments.

Volume slackened off today, with only twenty-two issues trading more than 10,000 shares. PerpetualDiscounts lost 9bp on the day – yields are approaching 6.00% – and FixedResets hovered at their 3.50% yield level.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.63 % 2.78 % 52,435 20.85 1 0.0000 % 2,103.6
FixedFloater 5.06 % 3.17 % 41,212 19.97 1 1.1765 % 3,125.7
Floater 1.93 % 1.75 % 42,112 23.20 4 -0.0744 % 2,387.8
OpRet 4.89 % 2.02 % 105,472 0.21 13 0.0805 % 2,311.9
SplitShare 6.45 % 6.74 % 126,605 3.69 2 -0.7066 % 2,116.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0805 % 2,114.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.89 % 5.89 % 123,970 13.66 7 -0.2154 % 1,888.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.90 % 5.98 % 174,194 13.95 71 -0.0921 % 1,789.9
FixedReset 5.36 % 3.50 % 321,986 3.70 43 -0.0008 % 2,200.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.D SplitShare -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-15
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-07-19
Maturity Price : 26.25
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 0.99 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 142,806 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-15
Maturity Price : 24.91
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 44,977 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-15
Maturity Price : 20.10
Evaluated at bid price : 20.10
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 40,900 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-15
Maturity Price : 24.20
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 39,967 RBC crossed 29,200 at 20.83.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-15
Maturity Price : 20.81
Evaluated at bid price : 20.81
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 38,820 RBC crossed 11,000 at 28.05. CIBC bought 16,000 from Desjardins at 28.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.06
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 35,886 CIBC bought 30,000 from Desjardins at 28.09.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.08
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
PrefLetter

March Edition of PrefLetter Released!

The March, 2010, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The March edition contains an appendix discussing the Interest-Equivalency Factor, Tax Effects on FixedReset Premium issues, with a discussion of the odd case of BAM.PR.R thrown in.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the March 2010, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the April, 2010, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close April 9 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on April 12.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Issue Comments

BSD.PR.A May Get New Mandate, New Manager, New Name

Brookfield Investment Management (Canada) Inc. has announced:

a proposal to make amendments to the declaration of trust of its fund Brascan SoundVest Rising Distribution Split Trust (TSX:BSD.UN) (the “Fund”), as well as to change the Fund’s manager, and to rename the Fund “Brookfield Soundvest Split Trust”.

The proposal, which requires approval by the capital unitholders of the Fund, would result in a change to the existing investment strategy. It is proposed that the Fund’s investment mandate be expanded to allow investment in a broader set of primarily high yielding equity securities. The investment objectives will remain the same: for holders of preferred securities, to provide fixed quarterly interest payments and repay the original subscription price at maturity; and for holders of capital units, to provide a regular stream of monthly distributions and to maximize long-term total return.

The Manager believes that expanding the investment flexibility of the Fund will permit it to invest in a broader range of securities to off-set the reduction in the number of income trust investments resulting from the Canadian Federal Government’s decision announced on October 31, 2006 to change the way that income trusts are to be taxed, effective January 1, 2011.

Costs of making these changes including the preparation of materials for and the holding of unitholder meetings will be borne by the Manager. If the extraordinary resolutions are approved, then the Fund will bear any costs associated with repositioning its investment portfolio to reflect the amended investment strategies and restrictions.

The Manager has called a meeting of Fund capital unitholders for 10:00 a.m. on April 20, 2010 to consider the extraordinary resolutions being proposed. It is expected that materials for this meeting, which will provide further details on the proposals, will be available no later than three weeks prior to the date of the meeting and will be delivered to investors who hold capital units in the Fund as of the official record date, which is March 12, 2010.

Subject to capital unitholder and regulatory approval, review by the Funds’ independent review committee, and other closing conditions, the changes are expected to be completed by April 30, 2010.

This trust has been most notable for its appalling performance since inception, although the abusive suspension of retraction rights and lackadaisical Normal Course Issuer Bid run a close second and third.

BSD.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the semi-annual financials were published. BSD.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

BPP REIT Conversion Amended

BPO Properties Limited has announced:

that BPP will be shortly mailing its information circular to shareholders containing some modifications to the previously announced proposal to create Canada’s pre-eminent office real estate investment trust (REIT), to be named Brookfield Office Properties Canada. After consultation with a number of interested parties, including the independent committee of the board of directors and its financial advisor, Brookfield Office Properties Canada has agreed to pay $100 million of the purchase price for Brookfield Properties’ interest in Brookfield Place in cash instead of solely through the assumption of debt and units in the new REIT, as originally announced. The remainder of the purchase price will be paid by the assumption of debt and units valued at approximately $20.90 per unit. In light of this change, Brookfield Office Properties Canada will not pay the previously announced special distribution to unitholders on closing of the transaction.

The impact of the above cash payment is a reduction in the number of units outstanding by approximately five million to 93 million and an increase in expected funds from operations available to unitholders on an annualized basis in 2010 to $1.27 per unit from $1.20 per unit. In addition, Brookfield Office Properties Canada’s monthly distributions commencing on closing of the transaction as modified will increase to $0.07 per unit, or $0.84 per unit on an annualized basis.

On closing of the transaction, Brookfield Properties and its affiliates, which currently hold approximately 89.7% of BPP’s common equity, will hold in aggregate an equity interest in Brookfield Office Properties Canada of approximately 90.6%, including the consideration Brookfield Properties is receiving for the sale of Brookfield Place.

As a result of Brookfield Properties’ ownership of equity interests in the REIT of more than 90%, under applicable Canadian securities laws it would be possible for Brookfield Properties to initiate a privatization of the REIT and certain related party transactions without seeking the approval of the minority unitholders. Recognizing this, Brookfield Properties has agreed that following closing it will not initiate any such privatization or related party transaction without minority approval. This undertaking will terminate in the future if Brookfield Properties and its affiliates hold in aggregate an equity interest in Brookfield Office Properties Canada of 75% or less for a period of 12 months.

The independent committee appointed by the board of directors of BPP to consider the proposed transaction has received an opinion from its financial advisor, Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd., that the transaction as modified is fair, from a financial point of view, to shareholders of BPP other than Brookfield Properties and its affiliates. The board of directors, on the unanimous recommendation of the independent committee, has determined that the proposed transaction as modified is in the best interests of BPP and is unanimously recommending that shareholders vote in favour of the transaction at the meeting.

An information circular describing the modified transaction is anticipated to be mailed shortly, but at least prior to April 1, 2010 and will be available on BPP’s website and at www.sedar.com at that time. The meeting of shareholders to consider the transaction is now expected to take place on April 27, 2010. If shareholders approve the transaction at the meeting, and the requisite court approval is obtained, it is anticipated that the transaction will be completed on or about April 30, 2010.

The plan of arrangement has been discussed on PrefBlog.

BPP has three issues of preferreds outstanding: BPP.PR.G, BPP.PR.J and BPP.PR.M. It is not yet clear whether they will vote as a class on the transaction.

PrefLetter

March PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the March edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The March edition will contain an appendix discussing the Interest-Equivalency Factor, Tax Effects on FixedReset Premium issues, with a discussion of the odd case of BAM.PR.R thrown in.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The March issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the March issue.