March 23, 2010

March 23rd, 2010

After skirmishing over the Greek bail-out, France has surrendered to Germany:

Germany and France have agreed to back International Monetary Fund aid for Greece, a German Finance Ministry official said, signaling a joint position after weeks of dispute over how to resolve the Greek crisis.

Germany and France, the euro region’s two biggest economies, are now pulling together before a two-day EU summit in Brussels beginning March 25, the official said on condition of anonymity. Greece has pressed the EU to make specific commitments on aid to help lower its borrowing costs.

Apparently, the IMF money will be spent on armanents:

In a bizarre twist to the Greek debt crisis, France and Germany are pressing Greece to buy their gunboats and warplanes, even as they urge it to cut public spending and curb its deficit.

Indeed, some Greek officials privately say Paris and Berlin are using the crisis as leverage to advance arms contracts or settle payment disputes, just when the Greeks are trying to reduce defense spending.

“No one is saying ‘Buy our warships or we won’t bail you out’, but the clear implication is that they will be more supportive if we do what they want on the armaments front,” said an adviser to Prime Minister George Papandreou, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the diplomatic sensitivity.

Ten-Year swap spreads are negative:

The 10-year U.S. swap spread turned negative for the first time on record amid rising demand for higher-yielding assets such as corporate and emerging market securities.

The gap between the rate to exchange floating- for fixed- interest payments and comparable maturity Treasury yields for 10 years, known as the swap spread, narrowed to as low as negative 2.5 basis points, the lowest since at least 1988, when Bloomberg began collecting the data. The spread narrowed 5.38 basis points to negative 2.38 basis point at 3:12 p.m. in New York.

A negative swap spread means the Treasury yield is higher than the swap rate, which typically is greater given the floating payments are based on interest rates that contain credit risk, such as the London interbank offered rate, or Libor. The 30-year swap spread turned negative for the first time in August 2008, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. triggered a surge of hedging in swaps. The difference narrowed to negative 20.5 basis points today.

“It’s hedge-related activity related to new corporate issuance,” said Christian Cooper, an interest-rate strategist at Royal Bank of Canada in New York, one of 18 primary dealers that trade with the Federal Reserve. “As more and more institutions receive, then swap rates will go lower.”

PerpetualDiscounts slid again on a day of elevated volume, losing 10bp, while FixedResets roared ahead, gaining 12bp and taking weighted median average yield down to 3.40%.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.66 % 2.73 % 61,237 20.67 1 0.9048 % 2,073.3
FixedFloater 5.09 % 3.21 % 48,919 19.92 1 -0.0468 % 3,105.4
Floater 1.93 % 1.72 % 47,698 23.24 4 0.6180 % 2,384.6
OpRet 4.89 % 2.89 % 100,637 0.18 13 0.1582 % 2,312.8
SplitShare 6.37 % 6.26 % 135,559 3.67 2 0.5077 % 2,142.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1582 % 2,114.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.93 % 6.03 % 120,056 13.79 7 0.0000 % 1,875.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.97 % 6.00 % 180,024 13.83 71 -0.1000 % 1,771.0
FixedReset 5.34 % 3.40 % 343,611 3.68 43 0.1221 % 2,209.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-23
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-23
Maturity Price : 22.17
Evaluated at bid price : 22.67
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
IAG.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-23
Maturity Price : 24.40
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : 4.47 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 2.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-23
Maturity Price : 23.48
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 1.62 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.R OpRet 376,300 TD crossed 65,900 at 25.95. Scotia bought 75,000 from National at 26.00. Anonymous bought 12,000 from TD at 25.99 and 34,900 from National at the same price. National crossed 12,000 at 25.95, then sold 24,000 to Scotia at 26.00. National crossed 140,000 at 25.96.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-04-22
Maturity Price : 25.60
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : -3.36 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 166,970 RBC crossed 150,000 at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.07
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 87,575 Nesbitt crossed 80,000 at 24.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-23
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 78,344 CIBC bought 14,800 from Desjardins at 28.24 and 10,000 from National at the same price. CIBC then bought two blocks, of 13,000 and 20,000 shares, from National at 28.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.24
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 77,460 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-23
Maturity Price : 24.88
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 65,500 CIBC bought 25,000 from Desjardins at 28.40. National crossed 25,000 at 28.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.40
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
There were 64 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Marginal Tax Rates: BC

March 23rd, 2010

An Assiduous Reader of PrefLetter writes in and says:

I believe your Equivalency Factors for taxes (Table 3 in Preletter March) are wrong for low-income earners.

The dividend credit can be applied to other income which results in a negative marginal tax rate on dividends. For example, for BC $30,000, 2009 tax year, this is -14.36% (regular income taxed at 20.06%) so
equivalency is 1.43.

This handy website will give you the marginal rate without capping them at 0% like the E&Y calculator does:

http://taxtips.ca/taxrates/bc.htm

The point is well taken – but unfortunately I do not consider taxtips.ca to be an authoritative source. According to their website:

TaxTips.ca is owned by a small private company located in Cedar, British Columbia. It is prepared by a husband and wife team who are retired from owning and operating a small business, with one being a retired CGA (Certified General Accountant). The goal of the site is to be a reference site for easy to understand tax, financial, and related information.

In order to consider a source authoritative I want to see names. I also want to see that the person making a claim has something at stake in the matter and is pronouncing on a subject on which they are earning a living. I consider it highly important in this wonderful world of looney-tunes in which we live that somebody maing a claim get hurt – either directly in the pocketbook, or (as in the case of academics) in reputation – if they make a mistake. And size helps (although I am realistic enough to recognize that it’s no guarantee): Ernst & Young, for instance, will have many opinionated partners who will jump on any egregious or doubtful claim because E&Y’s reputation is their reputation. While this means that many publicly expressed opinions get diluted to the point of uselessness, it does imply that what they do say has a reasonably good probability of being right.

So, while the Assiduous Reader’s claim has a ring of truth to it, I am – as I always stress – not competent on tax matters and am looking for an authoritative source to substantiate the claim. Any help will be appreciated.

GWO, PWF PerpetualDiscounts: Implied Volatility Goes Negative

March 22nd, 2010

The recent slide in PerpetualDiscounts has been particularly hard on insurers – and particularly the lower coupon issues in a continuation of the trend discussed in MAPF: February Performance.

In fact, implied volatility has gone negative:


Click for Big


Click for Big

Both graphs have been prepared using the Straight Perpetual Implied Volatility Calculator and, for purposes of the theoretical curve, setting the implied volatility to 15% / 3 Years.

March 22, 2010

March 22nd, 2010

The Office of the Chief Actuary (part of OSFI) has released its eighth actuarial study, titled Technical Aspects of the Financing of the Canada Pension Plan, complete with OSFI’s usual dollop of patronizing paternalistic Panglossian pablum:

The review panel expressed concern that most readers would be unduly distressed that the Canada Pension Plan (CPP or the “Plan”) is not expected to ever be even one-third funded. As such, the panel recommended minimizing or removing “point-in-time” funded status indicators from the actuarial report and to focus instead on the fact that the adequacy and stability of the steady-state contribution rate is the critical tool for judging the sustainability of the CPP, and that the funded ratio (ratio of assets to liabilities), if kept in the report, is at most an indicator of the projected mprovement in the funded level. This paper was thus written with the purpose of analyzing and comparing the financing of the CPP using different measures, in particular, the unfunded obligations (liabilities less assets) and funded ratios of the Plan under various closed and open group methodologies, including a methodology more consistent with that used for occupational defined benefit pension plans.

Let’s donate the Chief Actuary to Europe – he can help advise them on what to do about those CDS-trading terrorists, who caused the Greek crisis all by themselves.

Speaking of the Greek crisis:

Europe’s stalemate over possible aid for debt-encumbered Greece deepened as European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet spoke out against offering low- interest loans for which the Greek government has pressed.

Trichet’s demand for stringent terms and German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s push for sanctions against nations that breach deficit limits heightened the chance that Greece will leave a March 25-26 summit empty-handed. That could force Prime Minister George Papandreou to decide whether he’s ready to fulfill his threat and turn instead to the International Monetary Fund.

Looks like there might finally be some action on the Fannie & Freddie front:

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner said the government should end the “ambiguity” over the government’s involvement in mortgage finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

“Private gains can no longer be supported by the umbrella of public protection, capital standards must be higher and excessive risk-taking must be appropriately restrained,” Geithner said in testimony prepared for the House Financial Services Committee that was obtained today by Bloomberg News. The hearing is scheduled for tomorrow at 10 a.m. in Washington.

Volume jumped up as PerpetualDiscounts got hammered again, losing 36bp, while FixedResets continued to show strength, gaining 3bp which took yields on the latter down to 3.42%. Volatility was also pretty good.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.69 % 2.77 % 56,523 20.62 1 -0.0476 % 2,054.7
FixedFloater 5.09 % 3.21 % 45,194 19.92 1 -0.6047 % 3,106.8
Floater 1.95 % 1.74 % 47,415 23.19 4 0.1982 % 2,370.0
OpRet 4.90 % 2.84 % 96,061 0.19 13 -0.0328 % 2,309.2
SplitShare 6.40 % 6.41 % 125,527 3.67 2 0.1769 % 2,131.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0328 % 2,111.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.93 % 6.02 % 120,049 13.78 7 -0.4554 % 1,875.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.96 % 6.00 % 181,177 13.88 71 -0.3649 % 1,772.8
FixedReset 5.35 % 3.42 % 346,549 3.68 43 0.0339 % 2,206.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -2.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 20.35
Evaluated at bid price : 20.35
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount -1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 20.55
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
GWL.PR.O Perpetual-Premium -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 24.87
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 22.89
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 19.45
Evaluated at bid price : 19.45
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Premium -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 24.69
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 18.90
Evaluated at bid price : 18.90
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 72,991 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-22
Maturity Price : 17.43
Evaluated at bid price : 17.43
Bid-YTW : 6.86 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 71,140 National crossed 49,500 at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.97
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 67,137 RBC crossed 28,000 at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.10
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 65,521 National crossed 49,300 at 28.43.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.46
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 44,670 National crossed blocks of 19,400 and 10,000, both at 28.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.36
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 40,300 HSBC sold 10,000 to RBC at 26.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
There were 62 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

PrefBlog Hacked, Fixed

March 21st, 2010

Users of PrefBlog on March 21 will have noticed that they became redirected to various advertising sites in the course of PrefBlog’s loading.

The site was compromised early in the day (thanks to Assiduous Reader GA for letting me know) and now, late in the day, the hack has been fixed and the vulnerability plugged – at least as far as I know.

I regret any inconvenience.

March 19, 2010

March 20th, 2010

Spend-Every-Penny gave a speech to the UK Chamber of Commerce deemed to be too boring for the Department of Finance website. Highlights were:

“Issues like the concept of ‘too big to fail’ and ‘systemically important’ — quite frankly our view is that these are not useful discussions, and at the end of the day that these concepts are not workable.”

“We are against capital tax, we are against the tax on financial transactions, we are prepared to consider certain issues on contingent capital.”

“When you look at the causes of the crisis, one of the clear causes was excessive leverage, not only in some of the American institutions, but also some of the European institutions.

“Our primary concern overall is to get the leverage rules right and to try and get an agreement on that among our colleagues.”

Boston Fed boss Eric Rosengren also endorsed the idea when giving a speech on March 3, but only when answering a question; it was not part of his prepared remarks.

There was a good long article on the US TruPS CDO market today, albeit a little short on what I consider the interesting detail:

Hildene is part of a lawsuit seeking to prevent a TPG Credit Management LP affiliate from buying trust preferred securities from CDOs for pennies on the dollar. The firm tried to fire Cohen & Co. from managing deals in which Hildene invests. It’s attempting to block BankAtlantic Bancorp from retiring debt held by CDOs at a fraction of face value.

The moves by TPG Credit and BankAtlantic have in part kept the $50 billion market for CDOs backed by the trust securities, known as TruPS, from rebounding, according to Citigroup Inc., even as credit markets recover from the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression. Since 2000, 1,813 banks and thrifts sold TruPS and other debt that were packaged inside the deals, according to Fitch Ratings.

Financial institutions relied on TruPS before credit markets began to seize up in 2007 because interest on the securities is paid from pre-tax income and may be suspended without penalty. The securities, which rank between senior bonds and common equity for repayment in a bankruptcy, also count toward regulatory capital requirements. New York-based Citigroup, 27 percent owned by the U.S. government, sold $2 billion of TruPS last week after repaying bailout funds.

Community banks need the CDO market to revive to issue TruPS because they sell debt in increments of as little as $10 million, which insurers or mutual funds won’t buy. CDOs bought the most TruPS issued by smaller banks before credit markets froze, according to Citigroup.

European CDS spreads are increasing:

French President Nicolas Sarkozy is opposing Germany’s push for an International Monetary Fund loan to Greece, favoring a European solution for the nation as it struggles to lower the region’s biggest budget deficit. Greek bonds fell as the EU divisions widened.

Swaps on Greece jumped 22 basis points to 337.5, according to CMA DataVision prices. Contracts on Portugal climbed 14 to 138, Ireland rose 11 to 135.5, Italy increased 7.5 to 105.5 and Spain was up 11 basis points at 112. These countries are collectively known as the PIIGS.

PerpetualDiscounts got hammered today, losing 52bp, while FixedResets gained 7bp to set a new all-time yield low for that index. Volume was good, and there were a lot of entries on the performance highlights. Volatility = Good!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.69 % 2.77 % 56,850 20.62 1 -2.2791 % 2,055.7
FixedFloater 5.06 % 3.17 % 44,478 19.97 1 0.9390 % 3,125.7
Floater 1.95 % 1.74 % 49,102 23.20 4 -1.1266 % 2,365.3
OpRet 4.90 % 3.22 % 100,045 0.20 13 0.0119 % 2,309.9
SplitShare 6.41 % 6.39 % 126,122 3.68 2 -0.4622 % 2,128.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0119 % 2,112.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.91 % 5.96 % 117,322 6.86 7 -0.1932 % 1,884.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.94 % 6.01 % 178,210 13.87 71 -0.5215 % 1,779.3
FixedReset 5.35 % 3.46 % 350,686 3.69 43 0.0679 % 2,205.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater -3.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 1.66 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet -2.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 21.68
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 2.77 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 24.15
Evaluated at bid price : 24.36
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.66
Evaluated at bid price : 19.66
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 18.43
Evaluated at bid price : 18.43
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.61
Evaluated at bid price : 19.61
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 22.49
Evaluated at bid price : 22.63
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.63
Evaluated at bid price : 19.63
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 20.01
Evaluated at bid price : 20.01
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 20.26
Evaluated at bid price : 20.26
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.55
Evaluated at bid price : 19.55
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.83
Evaluated at bid price : 19.83
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.31
Bid-YTW : 8.07 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.32
Evaluated at bid price : 19.32
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 18.43
Evaluated at bid price : 18.43
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-04-18
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 123,584 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-19
Maturity Price : 24.91
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 82,370 RBC crossed 81,000 at 26.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 66,983 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 28.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.29
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 66,865 Desjardins crossed 49,300 at 28.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.36
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 63,491 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 28.07.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.10
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 52,700 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 2.50 %
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

FixedReset Index Sets New Yield Low

March 20th, 2010

A new low in yield was set by the FixedReset sub-index today.

Some charts will illustrate:


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In the past year, FixedReset yields have declined from 5.72% to 3.46%, while PerpetualDiscounts have declined from 7.29% to 6.01%. Thus, the spread has widened from 157bp to 255bp – although it is dangerous and misleading to talk of the spread between these two classes, since FixedResets may now, by and large, be confidently expected to be called at the first opportunity. Thus, the basis risk that existing at the beginning of the period (more inclined to inflation protection) is not the same as the basis risk that exists now (more inclined to term spread).


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Duration and positive carry have enabled PerpetualDiscounts to outperform in the face of widening. At the current spread of 255bp and Modified Duration of 16.7, and assuming a constant future yield on FixedResets, the breakeven change in spread is a widening of about 15bp p.a.


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The past year’s outperformance by FixedResets in yield terms is consistent with the increase in the Breakeven Inflation Rate on Long Nominals vs. Long RRBs.


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… and longer term data is consistent with the idea that this is finished.

No chart for this one, but LongCorporate investors do not share any inflation fears that PerpetualDiscount investors might have; the spread between interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscounts and Long Corporates (the Seniority Spread) has increased dramatically of late.

Update, 2010-3-20: OK, here are some more charts:


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March 18, 2010

March 18th, 2010

Brinksmanship regarding the Greek bail-out is getting … er … brinkier:

Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou set a one-week deadline for the European Union to craft a financial aid mechanism for Greece, challenging Germany to give up its doubts about a rescue package.

Papandreou said he may turn to the International Monetary Fund to overcome Greece’s debt crisis unless leaders agree to set up a lending facility at a summit March 25-26. The IMF option has already been dismissed by European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who say it would show the EU can’t solve its own crises.

Papandreou toyed with the idea of going to the Washington- based fund, saying today that Greece is already living in an IMF-style fiscal corset without the financing that goes along with it.

“We are under a basically IMF program,” he told a European Parliament committee earlier. “We don’t want to be in a situation where we have the worst of the IMF, if you like, and none of the advantages of the euro.”

The IMF stands ready to respond to a Greek aid appeal, which hasn’t come yet, spokeswoman Caroline Atkinson told reporters in Washington today. Papandreou said he still prefers a European solution and that the EU announcing more explicit support for Greece would be enough to bring down borrowing costs without the need to actually tap emergency funds.

That poor little boy who said the Emperor had no clothes! Now he’s a terrorist!

Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble told the Bundestag on March 16 that the country may have to consider ordering “intelligence agencies to set up surveillance of who is getting together with whom for which kinds of speculative processes, and where” to protect the euro.

“I find it sinister and silly, it is a complete overreaction,” said Philip Whyte of the Centre for European Reform, a pro-European Union research institute in London. “There is a certain school of thought in continental Europe that everything is always the fault of hedge funds.” Schaeuble’s comments reflected “a longstanding paranoia about the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism.”

European politicians blamed speculators after the euro tumbled against the dollar and the cost of insuring Greek government debt rose by a third this year, causing budget cuts that triggered street protests in Athens. Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou and French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that trading in credit default swaps exacerbated the crisis.

I’ve previously noted international problems in bank regulatory reform … but there are also national problems:

If the Senate can produce sweeping bank-reform legislation, expect House and Senate lawmakers to continue squabbling at least a year more or longer, said House Republican Leader John Boehner on Wednesday.

“If the Senate is able to produce a bill, I think it’s just as likely that we’ll be talking about the same issue a year from now as we are right now,” Boehner, R-Ohio, told an enthusiastic crowd of bankers at the American Bankers Association government relations summit.

Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., on Monday introduced a revised bank-reform bill without Republican support. He plans to have the panel vote on the bill next week and hopes to have the bill considered by the Senate in April.

“I don’t know how they ever come to an agreement on some kind of a bill they can bring back to both houses and pass,” Boehner said.

Summers has defended his staff.

Good volume in the Canadian preferred share market today, led by the two TD OperatingRetractibles, with the selling dominated by National Bank. There was also a decent bit more price volatility, with six entries on the Performance Highlights, while PerpetualDiscounts lost 3bp at the same time as FixedResets gained 8bp. That took the FixedReset median weighted average yield down to 3.46%, equal (to five significant figures) to its all-time low on January 11.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.63 % 2.78 % 56,870 20.84 1 0.0000 % 2,103.6
FixedFloater 5.11 % 3.22 % 44,990 19.91 1 0.6616 % 3,096.6
Floater 1.93 % 1.73 % 48,141 23.22 4 -0.0734 % 2,392.2
OpRet 4.90 % 3.15 % 104,193 0.77 13 0.0149 % 2,309.6
SplitShare 6.38 % 6.37 % 125,850 3.69 2 0.7988 % 2,138.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0149 % 2,111.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.89 % 5.93 % 118,170 6.86 7 -0.1758 % 1,888.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.91 % 5.97 % 174,516 13.93 71 -0.0308 % 1,788.6
FixedReset 5.35 % 3.46 % 347,591 3.69 43 0.0824 % 2,204.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet -2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Premium -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 7.92 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-18
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-18
Maturity Price : 20.50
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.M OpRet 638,600 National sold 24,000 to Scotia, then 50,000 to RBC, 21,000 ato Desjardins and 25,000 to TD, 25,000 to RBC, all at 26.00. Then National crossed 200,000 at 25.98. It then sold 25,000 to Scotia, 25,000 to Desjardins and 25,000 to RBC and 20,000 to TD, all at 26.00. RBC crossed 75,000 at 26.00 and TD crossed 40,000 at the same price. National crossed 50,000 at 26.02 and RBC crossed 25,300 at 26.00. National sold blocks of 20,000 and 24,000 to Scotia at 26.00. National crossed 123,000 at 25.96 and sold 25,000 to Scotia at 26.00. Anonymous crossed 25,000 at the same price. Quite the nice day for National! The yield to the SoftMaturity 2013-10-30 is 3.68%.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 2.27 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 224,800 National sold blocks of 20,000 and 24,000 to Scotia at 26.00. It then crossed 123,000 at 25.96. National sold 25,000 to Scotia, and anonymous crossed 25,000, both at 26.00. The yield to the SoftMaturity 2014-1-30 is 3.66%.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 2.50 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 151,850 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-18
Maturity Price : 24.94
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 109,544 Desjardins crossed 14,800 at 28.16. Desjardins then sold 24,400 to CIBC, crossed 25,000 and sold another 25,000 to CIBC, all at 28.24.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.22
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 106,765 RBC crossed blocks of 49,800 and 15,000 and 35,000, all at 26.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 52,271 RBC crossed 21,400 and 17.300, both at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Greenspan Endorses Contingent Capital

March 18th, 2010

Alan Greenspan has lost a little of his mystique since McCain said he continue as Fed Chairman after death, but he’s still one of the most knowledgable people out there.

He has delivered a speech at the Brookings Institute that is of great interest.

I can’t find a copyable paper (update: Dealbreaker has one), so you’ll just have to read the speech yourselves or rely on my paraphrases!

He notes that not a single hedge fund has defaulted on debt throughout the crisis, though many have suffered large losses and been forced to liquidate.

The crash of 1987 and the dotcom bubble bursting led the Fed to believe that financial bubbles had disengaged from the real economy.

He strongly doubts that stability can be achieved in the context of a competitive economy.

Capital and liquidity address all the regulatory shortcomings that were exposed by the crisis. Capital has the advantage that it is not necessary to identify which part of the financial structure is most at risk.

The behaviour of CDS spreads in the wake of the Lehman default and TARP imply that the “well capitalized” requirement for total bank capital should be 14%, not 10%, subject to some Herculean assumptions. This will allow bank equity to earn a competitive return while not constricting credit.

The solution, in my judgment, that has at least a reasonable chance of reversing the extraordinarily large “moral hazard” that has arisen over the past year is to require banks and possibly all financial intermediaries to hold contingent capital bonds, that is, debt which is automatically converted to equity when equity capital falls below a certain threshold. Such debt will, of course, be more costly on issuance than simple debentures, but its existence could materially reduce moral hazard.

The global housing bubble was driven by lower long-term rates, not policy rates. Home mortgage 30-year rates led the Case-Shiller index by 11 months with R-squared of 0.511, compared with Fed Funds, R-squared = 0.216 and and eight-month lead. This makes sense because housing is a long-term asset.

Some people (silly people) get this muddled because the correlation between Fed Funds and 30-year mortgages is 0.83 (until 2002). But the relationship delinked, which was the Greenspan Conundrum, so up yours.

Taylor’s wrong. He equates housing starts (supply) with demand. But starts don’t drive prices, it’s the other way ’round. Builders look at housing prices, not the Fed Funds rate. What’s more the correlation between house prices and consumer prices is small to negative.

Some people (silly people) believe that low Fed Fund rates lowered ARM teaser rates and led to increased demand. But the balance of probabilities is that the decision to buy preceded the decision on financing. Anyway, the correlation of Taylor rule deviations with house prices is statistically insignificant (Dokko, Jane, et al., “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble”, Finance & Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, Dec. 22, 2009)

Any attempt to instigate a “Systemic Regulator” is ill-advised and doomed to fail. Their models and forecasting ain’t gonna be any better than anybody else’s.

The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown

March 17th, 2010

Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart’s senior thesis has attracted some media interest, so I’ll highlight it here – since a kind soul on Financial Webring Forum went to the trouble of finding the link.

The title is The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical Analysis:

Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) have been responsible for $542 billion in write-downs at financial institutions since the beginning of the credit crisis. In this paper, I conduct an empirical investigation into the causes of this adverse performance, looking specifically at asset-backed CDO’s (ABS CDO’s). Using novel, hand-collected data from 735 ABS CDO’s, I document several main findings. First, poor CDO performance was primarily a result of the inclusion of low quality collateral originated in 2006 and 2007 with exposure to the U.S. residential housing market. Second, CDO underwriters played an important role in determining CDO performance. Lastly, the failure of the credit ratings agencies to accurately assess the risk of CDO securities stemmed from an overreliance on computer models with imprecise inputs. Overall, my findings suggest that the problems in the CDO market were caused by a combination of poorly constructed CDOs, irresponsible underwriting practices, and flawed credit rating procedures.

I must admit that the phrase “irresponsible underwriting practices” caught my attention. Since when does or should the underwriter care? It’s up to the buyer to figure out just what he’s buying.

As far as the CRAs are concerned, John Hull’s work on the ratings has been previously reported on PrefBlog – he concluded:

It should be noted that a CDO created from the triple BBB tranches of ABSs is quite different from a CDO created from BBB bonds. This is true even when the BBB tranches have been chosen so that their probabilities of default and expected losses are consistent with their BBB rating. The reason is that the probability distribution of the loss from a BBB tranche is quite different from the probability distribution of the loss from a BBB bond.

The AAA ratings for Mezz ABS CDOs are much less defensible. Scenarios where all the underlying BBB tranches lose virtually all their principal are sufficiently probable that it is not reasonable to assign a AAA rating to even a quite thin senior tranche. The risks in Mezz ABS CDOs depend critically on a) the width of the underlying BBB tranches, b) the correlation between pools, c) the tail default correlation, and d) the relationship between the recovery rate and the default rate. An important point is that the BBB tranche of an ABS cannot be assumed to be similar to a BBB bond for the purposes of determining the risks in ABS CDO tranches.

In practice Mezz ABS CDOs accounted for about 3% of all mortgage securitizations. Our conclusion is therefore that the vast majority of the AAA ratings assigned to tranches created from mortgages were reasonable, but in a small minority of the cases they cannot be justified.

The distinction between Mezz ABSs and Mezz ABS CDOs must be borne firmly in mind when trying to understand this thing. The Mezz ABSs is the BBB (about) tranche of a pool of mortgages. A Mezz ABS CDO is another security that does not hold mortgages directly; it holds Mezz ABSs.

So anyway, back to the Barnett-Hart paper:

In response to the explosion in CDO issuance, the increased demand for subprime mezzanine bonds began to outpace their supply.12 Figure 2 shows the percentage of subprime bonds that were repackaged into CDOs, illustrating the drastic increase in subprime demand by CDOs. This surge in demand for subprime mezzanine bonds helped to push spreads down – so much so that the bond insurers and real estate investors that had traditionally held this risk were priced out of the market. The CDO managers that now purchased these mortgage bonds were often less stringent in their risk analysis than the previous investors, and willingly purchased bonds backed by ever-more exotic mortgage loans.13 Figure 3 looks specifically at the performance of the subprime collateral, comparing the rating downgrades of the subprime bonds that were in CDOs versus those that were not put in CDOs. Clearly, the bonds in the CDOs have performed worse, indicating that there might have been a degree of adverse selection in choosing the subprime bonds for CDOs14

Footnotes:
12: Deng et. al. (2008) find that the demand for subprime mezzanine bonds for CDOs was so great that it was a significant factor in causing a tightening in the subprime ABS-treasury spread prior to 2007.

13: A recent note by Adelson and Jacob (2008) argues that CDOs’ increasing demand for subprime bonds was the key event that fundamentally changed the market.

14: However, this result needs further investigation as it may be a result of the fact that the mezzanine tranches, most common in CDOs, have all performed the worst, or that the rating agencies had an incentive to monitor subprime bonds in CDOs more carefully, leading to a higher level of downgrades.


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Investors came to rely almost exclusively on ratings to assess CDO investments: in essence substituting a letter grade for their own due diligence.

Footnote: In a report to shareholders, UBS cites over-reliance on ratings as a cause of their massive write-downs, saying that their risk committee “relied on the AAA rating of certain subprime positions, although the CDOs were built from lower-rated tranches of RMBS. This appears to have been common across the industry. A comprehensive analysis of the portfolios may have indicated that the positions would not necessarily perform consistent with their ratings”(UBS 39).

With respect to the above footnote, remember that UBS is also the poster-child for insane leverage ratios.

In addition to the problems with the accuracy of the ratings, there was also the fact that the ratings themselves were not meaningful indicators for assessing portfolio risk. As Coval et. al. (2009) notes, credit ratings, “by design only provide an assessment of the risks of the security’s expected payoff, with no information regarding whether the security is particularly likely to default at the same time as there is a large scale decline in the stock market or that the economy is in recession.” 28 Furthermore, ratings are a static measure, designed to give a representation of expected losses at a certain point in time with given assumptions. It is not possible for a single rating to encompass all the information about the probability distribution that investors need to assess its risk. Dr. Clarida, an executive vice president at PIMCO, points out that, “distributions are complicated beasts – they have means, variances, skews, and tails that can be skinny or, more often, fat. Also – they have kurtosis, fourth moments, and transition probabilities.”29 Investors often overcame these limitations by looking at ratings history, filling in their missing information with data about the track record of defaults for a given rating. Since there was little historical data for CDOs, investors instead looked at corporate bond performance. However, as noted above, asset-backed ratings have proven to have very different default distributions than corporate bonds, leading to false assessments.

So the question becomes: who were these bozo investors?

While the investment banks earned what they thought to be “riskless” profits from CDOs, they were actually loading up on more CDO risk than they realized thanks to so-called “super senior” tranches, created in part to generate even higher-yielding AAA tranches for CDO investors. To manufacture a super senior tranche, the AAA portion of a CDO was chopped up into smaller AAA tiers, enabling the “subordinate” AAA tranche to yield more and the “super senior” AAA tranche to carry an extremely low level of credit risk. Many banks found it convenient to simply retain the super senior tranches, as the Basel Accords imposed only a small capital charge for AAA securities. In addition, a significant amount of super senior exposure was retained not by choice, but rather because underwriters had difficulty selling these bonds.

Footnote: Krahen and Wilde (2005) gave a warning to regulators in 2005 about the increasing number of banks retaining senior tranches, saying that: “To the extent that senior tranches absorb extreme systematic losses, banks should be encouraged to sell these tranches to outside investors. In the interest of financial system stability, these outside buyers of bank risk should not be financial intermediaries themselves. Only if this requirement is fulfilled will the bank and the financial system be hedged against systematic shocks. Since this is supposedly one of the macroeconomic objectives of regulators, one would expect that regulatory requirements stipulate the sale of senior tranches, rather than encouraging their retention.

Which simply goes to show: don’t ever take investment advice from the sell-side.

It also makes a strong argument against tranche retention: I suggest that instead, retention of underwritten securities be penalized by capital regulation; this will ensure that the investment banks only create what they can actually sell, rather than relying on in-house analysts who, to put it bluntly, aren’t worth very much.

I will also suggest – again! – that a clear delineation be made in the new capital rules between investment banks (who should be encouraged to trade stuff and penalized for holding it) and vanilla banks (who should be encouraged to hold stuff and penalized for trading it).