Boston Fed Paper on Mortgage Renegotiation and Securitization

July 6th, 2009

The Boston Fed has released a new Public Policy Discussion Paper by Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen, Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? The Myth of Securitization:

We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment-reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securitization: servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of loans that they hold in their portfolios. Our results are robust to different definitions of renegotiation, including the one most likely to be affected by securitization, and to different definitions of delinquency. Our results are strongest in subsamples in which unobserved heterogeneity between portfolio and securitized loans is likely to be small, and for subprime loans. We use a theoretical model to show that redefault risk, the possibility that a borrower will still default despite costly renegotiation, and self-cure risk, the possibility that a seriously delinquent borrower will
become current without renegotiation, make renegotiation unattractive to investors.

This follows the earlier Boston Fed paper, Reducing Foreclosures, which argued that it was income shocks and housing price declines, not high payment-to-income ratios at origination, that were the driving force in the foreclosure boom.

S&P Places BAM on Outlook Negative

July 6th, 2009

Standard & Poors has announced:

it revised its outlook on Brookfield Asset Management Inc. to negative from stable. At the same time, we affirmed the ratings, including the ‘A-‘ long-term corporate credit rating on the company.

“The outlook revision reflects what we view as pressure on the credit risk profile of Brookfield’s core subsidiaries, Brookfield Properties Corp. and Brookfield Renewable Power Inc., as well as our expectation of weaker operating cash flows, in particular, a lower level of investment gains,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Greg Pau.

In the past two months, we have revised the outlook on the ‘BBB’ ratings on both Brookfield Properties (BBB/Negative/–) and Brookfield Renewable Power (BBB/Negative/A-3) to negative from stable to reflect the pressure on their respective credit standings. In the case of Brookfield Properties, we expect that valuation declines on its commercial properties and stricter lender underwriting could heighten refinancing risks of maturing debt, particularly that in the pro rata US$1.6 billion debt maturing in its U.S. fund in 2011. With the generally weak state of commercial property market in major U.S. cities and financial centers, we believe that any recovery in valuation could be slow and modest.

The negative outlook reflects our expectation that pressures on Brookfield’s core subsidiaries’ credit risk profile, cash flow volatility from potentially lower investment gains, and the challenging market conditions could weaken the company’s own financial risk profile. Standard & Poor’s could consider lowering the rating if the credit risk profiles of Brookfield Properties and Brookfield Renewable Power deteriorate further. We could also lower the rating if remitted cash flows further weaken to result in remitted OCF interest coverage falling below 4x or OCF to total debt falling below 20%. Conversely, we could revise the outlook to stable when the company’s cash flows strengthen again when market conditions improve or the company materially reduces its corporate level debts, resulting in OCF coverage measures returning to levels similar to those attained in 2008.

On a perhaps not entirely unrelated note, DBRS has confirmed Brookfield Renewable Power following a shuffling of assets down the line:

DBRS has today confirmed the Senior Unsecured Debentures and Notes rating of Brookfield Renewable Power Inc. (BRP or the Company) at BBB (high), with a Stable trend. This action follows today’s announcement that BRP intends to sell substantially all of its renewable generating facilities in Canada with a total capacity of 387 MW to its 50.01% owned Great Lakes Hydro Income Fund (the Fund, rated STA-2 (high)). BRP will also amend two existing power purchase arrangements (PPAs) under which it acquires power from two of the Fund’s generating assets, and will provide a price guarantee in connection with the bulk of the transferred assets.

Total consideration payable by the Fund to BRP is $945 million, to be funded with the net proceeds from the sale of $760 million of Fund units, and a $200 million senior unsecured note to BRP. BRP will subscribe for 50.01% of the $760 million equity offering in order to maintain its current ownership percentage. Initial cash proceeds to BRP will be approximately $365 million, with an additional $200 million when the note matures.

BRP’s consolidated financial profile is not expected to be materially changed as a result of the Transaction as the Company will continue to consolidate the Fund’s results. On a non-consolidated basis, while BRP would lose a modest amount of operating cash flow from the sale of the physical generating assets, and will take on additional price exposure through the additional/amended power purchase agreements with certain of the Fund’s assets, these challenges are viewed as largely offset by the considerable Transaction consideration to be received, the expectation of BRP continuing with a prudent hedging strategy, and the Company maintaining its ownership position in the Fund.

The following BAM issues are tracked by HIMIPref™: BAM.PR.B, BAM.PR.E, BAM.PR.G, BAM.PR.H, BAM.PR.I, BAM.PR.J, BAM.PR.K, BAM.PR.M, BAM.PR.N, BAM.PR.O & BAM.PR.P.

Additionally, the ratings of BAM Split Corp are capped by BAM’s rating: BNA.PR.A, BNA.PR.B, BNA.PR.C and the new issue that closes 2009-7-9.

July 3, 2009

July 3rd, 2009

The FDIC – which shut down a boatload of banks yesterday – has published draft rules for private equity buyers interested in sniffing around the assets. Very, very stringent, and at first glance, I have to agree with the statement:

“The FDIC’s proposed guidance would deter future private investments in banks that need fresh capital,” Douglas Lowenstein, president of the industry group the Private Equity Council, said in a statement yesterday.

The rules that catch my eye have to do with a 15% minimum Tier 1 Capital Ratio, three year ownership lockup and cross-guarantees from other depository institutions owned by the investor. Unfortunately, the proposals are presented in bald, finished form without discussion, so I am at a loss to determine whether there is any real purpose being served by the proposals.

There was some more some more Chinese mischief-making today:

“There should be a system to maintain the stability of the major reserve currencies,” Zeng, the head of a Chinese research center, said in Beijing today. He advocated supervision of fiscal and current-account deficits, adding that “your currency is likely to become my problem.”

Premier Wen Jiabao said in March that he was “worried” about his nation’s holdings of Treasuries as spiraling U.S. debt threatens the value of the dollar. China, the owner of the world’s biggest foreign-exchange reserves, called yesterday for a stable dollar and damped speculation that it is seeking talks on a new international reserve currency at next week’s Group of Eight meeting.

If China doesn’t like the USD as a reserve currency, that’s an easy problem to solve: don’t hold it. They can keep their reserves in gold, if they like, although copper or oil would probably be a better choice. And making their currency freely exchangeable and doing so much business with the rest of the world that the remnimbi becomes a reserve currency is another option.

And the idea of solemnly going into the G-8 meeting proposing to elect a new reserve currency is utter nonsense. It’s like having a vote to determine who’s tallest. I’m convinced that this is all just posturing to put the US on notice China won’t be pushed around at the meeting … but there’s a better way to do that, too … aircraft carriers.

Sabre-rattling aside, looks like they’re going for the asset-backed reserve currency idea:

Teck Resources Ltd., Canada’s largest diversified mining company, sold a 17 percent stake to China’s $200 billion fund sovereign wealth fund for C$1.74 billion ($1.5 billion) to reduce debt.

China Investment Corp., also known as CIC, will buy 101.3 million Class B subordinate voting shares for C$17.21 each, Vancouver-based Teck Resources said today in a statement. Teck said the deal will give CIC a 6.7 percent voting interest.

There’s some talk about an Argentinian oil deal, too.

Macroblog‘s John Robertson was kind enough to mention an old PrefBlog post in his commentary, A funny thing happened on the way to the federal funds market. While the institution of the Excess Balance Account will relieve some of the leverage-driven selling of Fed Funds, there’s yet another nuance:

Technically, the FHLBs [Federal Home Loan Banks], like other government-sponsored enterprises, are ineligible to earn interest on their own reserve balances held at the Fed, but the FHLBs were given an exemption under the interim rule published last year, which did not distinguish between an FHLB’s own reserve balances and those of their respondents. With the amended Reg. D, the pooling of reserves will no longer be allowed. Thus, the FHLBs will not be able to earn interest on their own reserve balances.

Will this change matter to them? A look at the FHLB consolidated balance sheet suggests it could. For instance, as of Sept. 30, 2008, the FHLBs were sellers of some $94 billion of fed funds and held zero on deposit at the Fed. But as of Dec. 31, 2008, after the Fed started paying interest on reserves, the FHLBs sold only $40 billion of fed funds and held $47 billion on deposit at the Fed.

Fed funds market nerds stay tuned.

I object! I’m not a Fed Funds nerd; I’m a Fed Funds geek!

Another strong day for preferreds – especially FixedResets! – on reduced volume; probably due to the US holiday.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5670 % 1,187.7
FixedFloater 7.08 % 5.47 % 34,811 16.36 1 -0.3245 % 2,130.7
Floater 3.21 % 3.70 % 81,989 18.10 3 -0.5670 % 1,483.8
OpRet 4.97 % 2.34 % 118,588 0.09 15 0.1777 % 2,213.8
SplitShare 5.75 % 6.40 % 68,952 4.19 3 0.0151 % 1,895.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1777 % 2,024.3
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1561 % 1,750.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.37 % 159,489 13.42 71 0.1561 % 1,611.8
FixedReset 5.60 % 4.49 % 474,879 4.34 40 0.2274 % 2,045.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.51
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 20.38
Evaluated at bid price : 20.38
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 25.44
Evaluated at bid price : 25.49
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 16.01
Evaluated at bid price : 16.01
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 21.04
Evaluated at bid price : 21.04
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 2.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 103,060 Scotia bought 19,100 from anonymous at 25.40, then crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 72,350 RBC bought 18,800 from anonymous at 25.04; then crossed 18,400 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 24.96
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 54,257 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
GWO.PR.X OpRet 40,162 RBC crossed two blocks, 25,000 and 12,000 shares, both at 26.11.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.67
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 36,851 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 29,603 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-03
Maturity Price : 19.83
Evaluated at bid price : 19.83
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MAPF Performance: June 2009

July 3rd, 2009

The fund performed well in another month of recovery for the preferred share market. As noted in the report of Index Performance, June 2009, both the FixedReset and PerpetualDiscount now have positive total return over the past years – rather a back-handed compliment, but it’s a lot better than has been the case lately!

Fund performance was hurt by the underweighting in FixedReset issues noted in MAPF Portfolio Composition: June 2009, as well as an underweighting in lower quality issues (which also outperformed), but these allocation hurdles were handsomely overcome by security selection and trading within the actual portfolio.

Note that the passive funds (DPS.UN and CPD) both have relatively high weightings in Pfd-3-tier issues; as shown in the uploaded chart, these “Credit Class 3” issues have tightened massively recently. Note that in the chart, the Credit Class 3 spread is shown as a spread against Credit Class 2; while the Credit Class 2 spread is shown as a spread against Credit Class 1.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close June 30 was $10.9846 after a dividend distribution of $0.168846 per unit.

Returns to June 30, 2009
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +4.93% +1.60% +1.38%
Three Months +26.29% +13.49% +12.77%
One Year +42.19% -0.18% -0.47%
Two Years (annualized) +16.60% -2.28%  
Three Years (annualized) +12.69% -1.63%  
Four Years (annualized) +10.60% -0.55%  
Five Years (annualized) +10.44% +0.82%  
Six Years (annualized) +12.04% +1.39%  
Seven Years (annualized) +11.32% +2.31%  
Eight Years (annualized) +11.82% +2.41%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are 2.0%, 12.7% and -1.0%%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are N/A, N/A & N/A, respectively, according to Morningstar and the Globe and Mail
Figures for AIC Preferred Income Fund (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.7%, N/A & N/A, respectively

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

I am very pleased with the returns, but implore Assiduous Readers not to project this level of outperformance for the indefinite future. The past year in the preferred share market has been filled with episodes of panic and euphoria, together with many new entrants who do not appear to know what they are doing; perfect conditions for a disciplined quantitative approach. While I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform, it should be borne in mind that beating the index by 500bp represents a good year, and there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The outperformance of the fund is almost – not quite! – embarrassing. You will find no shortage of people who will be willing to state flatly that it is not possible to achieve such returns without incredible risks; there will be others who deprecate the size of the fund and say that trading in size would eliminate every scrap of outperformance. These are the same things I kept hearing when I was trading Canada bonds for pension funds. All I can do is point to my portfolio composition, financial statements & trading records and state that I see lots of silly prices on the Exchange that I can’t take full advantage of because I’ve reached my position limits. There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. Just don’t expect index+4237bp every year, OK?

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 0.5288
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 0.5216
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% $0.5287
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% $0.6006
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% $0.7375
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% $0.7633
June 2009 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% $0.7752
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.
“Portfolio YTW” includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
“Securities YTW” divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
“Sustainable Income” is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per unit, before fees and expenses.

As discussed in the post MAPF Portfolio Composition: May 2009, the fund has positions in splitShares (almost all BNA.PR.C) and an operating retractible, both of which have high yields that are not sustainable: at some point they will be called or mature and the funds will have to be reinvested. Therefore, both of these positions skew the calculation upwards.. Since the yield on thes positions is higher than that of the perpetuals despite the fact that the term is limited, the sustainability of the calculated “sustainable yield” is suspect, as discussed in August, 2008.

Significant positions were also held in Fixed-Reset issues on June 30; all of which currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. It is the increase in exposure to the lower-yielding Fixed-Reset class that accounts for the apparent stall in the increase of sustainable income per unit in the past six months. In December 2008, FixedReset exposure was zero; it is now 11.5%. Exposure to the extraordinarily high-yielding SplitShare class has also been reduced due to credit concerns.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 6.58% shown in the June 30 Portfolio Composition analysis (which is in excess of the 6.36% index yield on June 30). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be 10.9846 * 0.0658 = $0.7228, an increase from the $0.7154 derived by a similar calculation last month, despite the negative effects on the calculation of having distributed the accumulated dividends.

Different assumptions lead to different calculations, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Index Performance: June 2009

July 3rd, 2009

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for June, 2009, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
June 2009
Three Months
to
June 30, 2009
Ratchet -8.20% * +36.36% *
FixFloat +1.86% +51.30% **
Floater -8.20% +36.36%
OpRet +1.93% +6.52%
SplitShare +4.02% +15.63%
Interest +2.03% +4.77%
PerpetualPremium +1.66%*** +15.34%***
PerpetualDiscount +1.66% +15.34%
FixedReset +2.70% +11.39%
* The last member of the RatchetRate index was transferred to Scraps at the February, 2009, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
** The last member of the FixedFloater index was transferred to Scraps at the February, 2009, rebalancing. Performance figures to 2009-5-29 are set equal to the Floater index. The FixedFloater index acquired a member on 2009-5-29.
*** The last member of the PerpetualPremium index was transferred to PerpetualDiscount at the October, 2008, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the PerpetualDiscount index
Passive Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +1.38% +12.73%
DPS.UN +2.28% +17.17%
Index
BMO-CM 50 +1.60% +13.49%

The major indices have managed to stagger into the black over the trailing 12-month period. Full speed ahead!


Click for big

And yes, what you see is true: PerpetualDiscounts have outperformed FixedResets over the past twelve months. June 2008, now dropped from the trailing year’s return was a horrible, horrible month for them.

Claymore has published NAV and distribution data (problems with the page in IE8 can be kludged by using compatibility view) for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to June, 2009
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
March 31, 2009 14.28    
April 30 15.27 0.00   +6.93%
May 29, 2009 15.88 0.00   +3.99%
June 25 15.88 0.2100 +1.32% +1.38%
June 30, 2009 15.89   +0.06%
Quarterly Return +12.73%

The DPS.UN NAV for June 24 has been published so we may calculate the June returns (approximately!) for this closed end fund. I am rather annoyed that this calculation will not include the distribution with the June 26 ex-Date!

DPS.UN NAV Return, June-ish 2009
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
May 27, 2009 18.18    
Estimated May Ending Stub -0.19% *
June 24, 2009 18.56   +2.09%
Estimated June Ending Stub** +0.375%
Estimated June Return +2.28%
** CPD had a NAV of $16.04 on June 24, paid $0.21 June 25 with a NAV of 15.88 and a NAV of $15.89 on June 30. The return for the period was therefore +0.375%. This figure is added to the DPS.UN period return to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month.
* CPD had a NAV of $15.85 on May 27 and a NAV of $15.88 on May 29. The return for the period was therefore +0.19%. This figure is subtracted from the DPS.UN period return to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month.
The June return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of three period returns, -0.19%, +2.09% and +0.375% to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +2.28%

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for April and May:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-June-ish, 2009
April-ish +7.72%
May-ish +6.35%
June-ish +2.28%
Three-months-ish +17.17%

July 2, 2009

July 2nd, 2009

Interesting news from Peru today:

IShares, the world’s biggest provider of exchange-traded funds, reached an agreement with Peru’s pension funds that will increase the assets of the first Peruvian exchange traded fund in the U.S., according to Gonzalo Presa, a pension fund manager at Lima-based AFP Horizonte.

The Peruvian pension funds, known as AFPs, will swap shares of local companies in exchange for shares in the iShares MSCI All Peru Capped Index Fund, said Presa. BlackRock Inc. agreed to buy Barclays Plc’s global fund unit, including iShares, for $13.5 billion in June.

“We’ll give Barclays shares to build up this ETF,” Presa, who helps manage $3.4 billion as head of local equities at AFP Horizonte, said in a phone interview. “The idea is to issue $300 million in new shares in two, three weeks.”

Presa said it would be “very difficult” for Barclays to acquire the shares in the local market because of the lack of liquidity.

There’s no information given as to whether the pension funds got a sweetheart deal on fees.

I hadn’t known this in advance, but to my astonishment there was no early close of the bond markets today:

“SIFMA’s Board of Directors and membership reassessed the early close policy, recognizing that additional access to the liquidity provided by our members would benefit all market participants. The interconnected, global nature of the fixed income markets and the significant–and nearly round the clock–access to liquidity that many members provide would be enhanced by this change. Since shortened trading days may limit the liquidity window and create possible market risks which could be mitigated with a full functioning fixed income market on days when liquidity could be normal, we have determined eliminating some of the early closes is a better solution,” said Randy Snook, executive vice president at SIFMA. “This step will allow firms of all sizes around the globe to have access to fixed income liquidity on an almost continuous basis on most trading days of the year.”

Early close recommendations will be eliminated for the following holidays:

· Friday before Martin Luther King, Jr. Day
· Friday before President’s Day
· Day before Independence Day
· Friday before Labor Day
· Day before Columbus Day
· Day before Veterans Day
· Day before Thanksgiving

I’ve heard a rumour that this is TARP-related, which may well be true, but I’m glad of it anyway. Ever since I got into this business, I’ve been amazed that the highest paid profession on earth has had a half-day in advance of long weekends. All the B-School Babies will be whining about having to put in a full day’s work, poor things.

The SEC may be preparing a short-selling cosmetic makeover:

Given the climate in Washington, as well as the running suspicion of Wall Street, new rules seem inevitable, analysts say. Mary L. Schapiro, chairwoman of the S.E.C., has said that considering new rules restricting short-selling is a priority. Members of Congress like Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who heads the House financial services committee, are calling for quick action.

For the moment, the most likely outcome may be for the S.E.C. to reinstate a rule that the commission itself abolished with a unanimous vote in 2007, under its previous chairman, Christopher S. Cox. Known as the uptick rule, it would bar investors from shorting a stock until its price ticks at least a penny above its previous trading price.

But current and former S.E.C. staff members appear to doubt that reinstating the uptick rule would have much of an effect on trading. Some say the change would be merely cosmetic.

Sally Miller, a spokesman for the A.B.A., said the member banks thought there was clear link between the market turmoil and the rule change. “All of a sudden subsequent to 2007 they can see all their stocks going haywire,” Ms. Miller said. “It’s cause and effect.”

I wonder what Ms. Miller actually said, in context. She surely can’t be claiming that the most important determinant of bank equity price volatility in the 2007-09 period was the removal of the uptick rule!

Still and all, I wonder what BIS thinks of it. Their annual report contains an argument in favour of short sales as a bubble-controller.

Continued strength in FixedResets brings the yield-to-worst down to 4.55%! Holy smokes, how low can they go?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6522 % 1,194.5
FixedFloater 7.06 % 5.46 % 35,241 16.37 1 0.3909 % 2,137.7
Floater 3.19 % 3.68 % 82,780 18.15 3 0.6522 % 1,492.2
OpRet 4.98 % 3.41 % 118,629 0.88 15 0.0575 % 2,209.8
SplitShare 5.76 % 6.38 % 69,320 4.19 3 -0.3160 % 1,894.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0575 % 2,024.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0938 % 1,747.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.31 % 6.38 % 161,955 13.40 71 -0.0938 % 1,609.2
FixedReset 5.60 % 4.55 % 483,655 4.34 40 0.3709 % 2,040.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 20.71
Evaluated at bid price : 20.71
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 18.18
Evaluated at bid price : 18.18
Bid-YTW : 7.33 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 20.92
Evaluated at bid price : 20.92
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 17.72
Evaluated at bid price : 17.72
Bid-YTW : 6.76 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 10.74
Evaluated at bid price : 10.74
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.65
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.88
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 25.62
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.67
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 2.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 15.55
Evaluated at bid price : 15.55
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 85,595 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 81,135 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 67,360 Scotia crossed 63,500 at 16.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 16.77
Evaluated at bid price : 16.77
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 61,780 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 18.26
Evaluated at bid price : 18.26
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 57,359 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-02
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.71
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 51,633 National Bank bought two blocks from anonymous, 10,000 and 13,500 shares, both at 27.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 4.85 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: June 2009

July 2nd, 2009

Trading activity increased in June, with portfolio turnover of about 130%, as the market extended its gains.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may the thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2009-6-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 10.7% (-0.4) 10.25% 6.99
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 72.2 (+2.4) 6.58% 13.13
Fixed-Reset 11.5% (-1.0) 4.85% 4.28
Scraps (OpRet) 5.6% (-0.6) 11.54% 5.27
Cash +0.1% (-0.5) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 7.05% 11.00
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Not much change in the sectoral distribution!

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2009-6-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0.4% (-40.0)
Pfd-1(low) 67.2% (+43.4)
Pfd-2(high) 13.6% (+4.1)
Pfd-2 0% (0)
Pfd-2(low) 13.2% (-6.5)
Pfd-3(high) 5.6% (-0.6)
Cash +0.1% (-0.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end.

The dramatic change in reported credit quality is largely due to the DBRS Mass Downgrade of Banks. At month-end, the fund held positions affected by this change summarized as follows:

MAPF Month-End Positions
Affect by DBRS Mass Downgrade
Old
Rating
New
Rating
Fraction of
Portfolio
Pfd-1 Pfd-1(low) 24.4%
Pfd-1 Pfd-2(high) 2.5%

Of the remainder, a significant contributor was a series of trades in the FixedReset sector:

Trades Contributing to
the Shift from Pfd-1 to Pfd-1(low)
June, 2009
Date HSB.PR.E CM.PR.M BMO.PR.O MFC.PR.D
5/29
Bid
26.65 26.68 26.76 26.56
6/3 Sold
26.92
Bought
26.85
   
6/11 Sold
26.93
  Bought
27.02
 
6/25   Sold
26.93
  Bought
26.55
6/30     Sold
27.56
Bought
27.10
6/30
Closing Bid
27.36 27.00 27.44 27.01
Dividends
Ex-Date
0.3762
6/11
0.65445
6/25
   
This is an attempt to show fairly the effect of numerous trades in tabular form. The trades shown are not necessarily precise dollar-for-dollar swaps. Trade details will be released on the main MAPF web page shortly.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed. The overall credit quality of the portfolio is now superior to the credit quality of CPD at August month-end (when adjusted for the downgrades of BCE and the banks).

Claymore provides the following ratings breakdown:

Ratings Breakdown
as of 12/31/08
Pfd-1 61.15%
Pfd-2 23.26%
Pfd-3 15.60%

Two events have occurred since the Dec. 31 calculation date of CPD’s credit quality:

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2009-6-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 3.3% (+1.4)
$50,000 – $100,000 22.2% (+3.1)
$100,000 – $200,000 25.9% (-5.7)
$200,000 – $300,000 15.1% (-16.4)
>$300,000 33.5% (+18.0)
Cash +0.1% (-0.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on The Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 29. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is similar
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is similar

Best & Worst Performers: June 2009

July 2nd, 2009

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

June 2009
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “June 30”)
TRI.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) -10.91% Was the third-best performer in May, with a return of +31.15% last month.
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) -7.01% Was the best performer in May, with a total return of +35.13%
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) -6.29% Was the second-best performer in May, with a return of +34.25% in that month.
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -4.18% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.35% based on a bid of 18.35 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -2.52% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.52% based on a bid of 17.44 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.I OpRet Pfd-2(low) +5.62% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 24.95 and a softMaturity 2013-12-30 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) +7.69% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.68% based on a bid of 15.60 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(low) +9.11% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.56% based on a bid of 15.86 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) +9.55% This was the worst performer in May and the best performer in April. Notoriously volatile. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.61% based on a bid of 17.55 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare Pfd-2(low) +11.46% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 10.48% based on a bid of 16.05 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.

What can I say? The Floaters Index currently has three members. The top three spots in May were occupied by Floaters; the bottom three spots in June were occupied by Floaters.

RPB.PR.A Edges Closer to Default

July 2nd, 2009

Connor Clark has announced:

that Lear Corporation has reached agreement on a consensual debt restructuring under court supervision pursuant to a voluntary bankruptcy filing under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. This plan is expected to constitute a credit event under the credit linked note (“CLN”) issued by TD Bank to which the Company has exposure.

Given the unprecedented economic downturn and corresponding decline in global automobile production volumes, as well as continued difficult conditions in credit markets generally, Lear’s Board of Directors concluded that this action was the fastest and most effective way to de-lever its capital structure.

The recovery rate for ROC Pref III Corp. is fixed at 40%. As a result, the Lear credit event is expected to reduce the number of additional defaults that ROC Pref III Corp. can sustain before the payment of $25.00 per Preferred Share at maturity is adversely affected by 1.0 to 1.6.

They provide a table:

RPB.PR.A
Additional Reference
Defaults to
2012-3-23
Estimated RPB.PR.A
Maturity Value
1.6 or less $25.00
2.0 $20.09
3.0 $7.99
3.7 Zip Zero Zilch

There are 127 names in the reference portfolio, with 6.0 defaults as of 2009-3-31; on that date there were 17 non-defaulted junk names. The death watch continues.

RPB.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in connection with December’s credit event for Tribune Corp..

RPB.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

MST.PR.A Delisted, Redeemed in Full at Par

July 2nd, 2009

On May 27, Sentry Select announced:

that the units of Select 50 S-1 Income Trust, Sentry Select Focused Growth & Income Trust, Pro-Vest Growth & Income Fund and the capital units and preferred securities of the Multi Select Income Trust (collectively, the “Units”) will be voluntarily delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange at the close of business on Tuesday, June 2, 2009. The delisting of the Units is being done in preparation for the merger of each of the Funds into Sentry Select Canadian Income Fund (collectively, the “Mergers”), which are expected to occur on or about June 12, 2009.

… and on June 16 announced:

that the mergers of Sentry Select 40 Split Income Trust (“40 Split”), Pro-Vest Growth & Income Trust (“Pro-Vest”), Multi-Select Income Trust (“Multi-Select”), Sentry Select Focused Growth & Income Trust (“Focused Growth”) and Select 50 S-1 Income Trust (“Select 50”) (collectively the “Terminating Funds”) with Sentry Select Canadian Income Fund (the “Continuing Fund”) (the “Mergers”), became effective on June 12, 2009. The Mergers were approved at special meetings of unitholders of the Terminating Funds held concurrently on May 20, 2009.

The Terminating Funds transferred all of their assets to the Continuing Fund in exchange for Series A units of the Continuing Fund and the assumption by the Continuing Fund of all the liabilities of the Terminating Funds. Each unitholder of the Terminating Funds, except unitholders of 40 Split, received Series A units of the Continuing Fund having the same aggregate net asset value as their units of the Terminating Funds as of the close of business on June 11, 2009.

Each unitholder of Multi-Select received 0.3819 Series A units of the Continuing Fund in exchange for each unit of Multi-Select.

DBRS has announced that it:

has today discontinued the rating on the Preferred Securities issued by Multi Select Income Trust (the Trust). On June 12, 2009, the Capital Units issued by the Trust were merged along with units from other funds into the Sentry Select Canadian Income Fund. The Preferred Securities had been scheduled for final redemption on September 30, 2009, but were redeemed at the initial issue price of $10 per security on the date of the merger.

MST.PR.A was tracked by HIMIPref™ and was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was downgraded to Pfd-3(high) by DBRS. At the time of redemption it was in the “Scraps” index due to credit concerns.