Market Action

June 23, 2009

I mentioned the proxy battle over Trinorth Capital on June 11Management won. No concession or acknowledgement from the self-proclaimed Concerned Shareholders yet … I’m not holding my breath. However, management can now get back to doing what it does best: suspending dividends on their funds.

Speculation regarding Bernanke’s reappointment is mounting, with Larry Summers mentioned as a possible candidate. I can’t find great fault with Bernanke’s macro-economic handling of the crisis; it turned out that letting Lehman go was a mistake, but I, for one, didn’t forsee just how horribly things would turn out after that. Of greater concern is interference in private companies (the BAC/MER merger), but I think that one can be hung on Paulson.

Tara Perkins of the Globe passes on some speculation regarding the MFC/OSC Disclosure Kerfuffle:

The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) appears to be examining whether Manulife properly disclosed, prior to last fall, how much risk it would face if markets tanked, noted Genuity Capital Markets analyst Mario Mendonca. Before then, Manulife only disclosed what would happen to it if stock markets fell by 10 per cent. Markets dropped more than 20 per cent in the fourth quarter.

It’s possible, although it would be most unfair if MFC was singled out for this practice when the effects of a 10% drop is all that’s disclosed by any insurer. I’m not saying, mind you, that I am against such improved disclosure; the effect of equity market declines on guarantees can be decidedly non-linear.

Who says that Dealbreaker is all fun ‘n’ games? Today there’s a very informative, yet entertaining, essay on Credit Default Swaps in Kazakhstan:

Emerging Markets and derivatives are like alcohol and barbiturates: each on its own has attractions but create a recipe for choking on one’s own vomit when combined.

There’s always some crazy eventuality that an emerging market can generate that defies the most thoughtfully drafted contract.

Mark Carney showed Canadian regulators’ traditional contempt for investors with some selective disclosure in Washington:

Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney said his country’s recession is now as deep as in the U.S., according to a person who heard his remarks today in Washington.

Carney, 44, spoke at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. No cameras or recording devices were allowed at the event, according to organizers.

Debt-Decoupling, a moral hazard feature of Credit Default Swaps is complicating restructuring efforts:

In the cover story for the The Deal magazine published Monday, Richard Morgan tells about the dire situation Gannett Co. (NYSE:GCI) finds itself in after nearly three-quarters of bondholders, hedged with credit default swaps, declined an exchange offer that expired May 5. Thanks to the CDSs, they stand to get a better payoff if Gannett defaults.

Morgan followed that story up with a report on McClatchy Co. (NYSE:MNI) in The Deal Pipeline on Monday (subscription required). It too tried to do an exchange offer on some troubled bonds, but reported last week that only a small minority of holders went for the offer, valued at around 33 cents on the dollar. Thanks to their CDS hedges, the bondholders can expect 100 cents if McClatchy defaults.

It’s an incentive some call perverse, and also one that couldn’t have existed before the CDS market sprang up. As Morgan writes, CDSs began the decade as a $900 billion market but ended last year with a notional value of $42 trillion. That’s a lot bigger than the $25 trillion market for outstanding corporate bonds, municipal bonds and structured investment vehicles that CDSs were designed to reference.

Dealbreaker remarks:

One of the primary complaints about the CDS market was the use of CDS by market participants as purely speculative tools. In this case, the players that hold the debt are hedging their exposure through CDS and capitalizing on a negative basis play. If hedging debt exposure through CDS becomes the next true villain in the attack on derivatives, there is really no hope for this market.

The “negative basis” refers to the fact that a long-bond plus protection-buy position will yield more than available elsewhere in the market with equivalent risk – this is due to funding pressures, since it’s hard (risky, anyway) nowadays to lever up a physical bond position 10:1; you can only do that by selling CDSs, driving down the spread. The newspapers’ woes are similar to problems highlighted by the Lyondell bankruptcy:

The potential for dispute and complexity in workouts and bankruptcies by reason of the existence of CDS was illustrated recently in the U.S. bankruptcy proceeding of the U.S. subsidiary of LyondellBasell, the world’s third-largest petrochemicals group. The U.S. company, LyondellBasell Chemical Company, filed for bankruptcy in New York in January 2009 after attempts to restructure its $26 billion debt were unsuccessful.70 The bankruptcy triggered a “default” under LyondellBasell Chemical Company’s CDS (i.e. CDS naming this company as the reference entity), but because its European parent and affiliates were not in bankruptcy, CDS covering bonds of those companies were not triggered.

Creditors sought to sue LyondellBasell’s parent company in Europe on guarantees and other obligations. These creditors included bondholders, and the U.S. company believed that the bondholders were seeking to enforce claims with the goal of triggering protection payments under their credit default swap contracts, which could have led to other parts of the corporate group being pushed into insolvency in Europe. Ultimately, U.S.-based LyondellBasell Chemical Company was able to persuade the U.S. bankruptcy court that such actions in Europe could undermine the chances of completing a successful bankruptcy in the U.S. The bankruptcy court issued a 60-day injunction prohibiting enforcement actions in Europe.

“The threat of CDS holders trying to force companies into an insolvency in order to trigger their recovery rights against their CDS counterparty will almost certainly be an issue in the wave of debt restructurings this year,” predicted LyondellBasell’s attorneys.

Note that legal manoeuverings regarding LyondellBasell have been phrenetic:

LyondellBasell Industries announced that LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A. has been voluntarily added to Lyondell Chemical Company’s reorganization filing under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to protect the European holding company against claims by certain financial and U.S. trade creditors.

LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A. is a holding company incorporated in Luxembourg. It does not manufacture or sell products, and has no employees.

LyondellBasell is exercising an option available under U.S. law to prevent creditors from enforcing guarantees by LyondellBasell AF S.C.A. for pre-petition obligations of LyondellBasell’s U.S. businesses. It also prevents bondholders of Senior Notes due in 2015 from potentially pursuing remedies against LyondellBasell AF S.C.A. after an interest payment due on the notes in February was not paid. The company obtained a 60-day restraining order from the U.S. bankruptcy court in February to allow time for LyondellBasell to protect its European assets from these claims.

Extending Chapter 11 protection to LyondellBasell Industries AF S.C.A. is not an insolvency proceeding under any European law. No LyondellBasell manufacturing operation located outside of the United States has applied for or become involved in insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings in its respective home country.

… but they bought themselves enough time to get something done

The European Commission Monday cleared U.S.-based industrial holding group Access Industries and German investor Andreas Heeschen’s ProChemie Holding to create a joint venture to take over troubled chemical company LyondellBasell Industries.

Both parties will have a 50% stake in LyondellBasell, parts of which are currently under bankruptcy protection, through a new holding company called ProChemie GmbH.

LyondellBasell was previously wholly owned by Access industries.

… the moral of the story being “Holding company guarantees are not necessarily worth much.”

The market drifted down just a tad today, with volume continuing high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.2473 % 1,230.3
FixedFloater 7.09 % 5.53 % 34,655 16.27 1 0.0000 % 2,126.6
Floater 3.10 % 3.44 % 78,738 18.66 3 1.2473 % 1,536.9
OpRet 4.97 % 3.72 % 134,026 0.10 14 0.0564 % 2,194.8
SplitShare 5.81 % 6.32 % 63,733 4.21 3 -0.4550 % 1,877.7
Interest-Bearing 5.96 % 7.10 % 21,891 0.50 1 0.1992 % 1,999.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0327 % 1,734.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.34 % 6.36 % 163,312 13.37 71 -0.0327 % 1,597.3
FixedReset 5.68 % 4.81 % 508,451 4.34 40 -0.0724 % 2,010.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -3.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 19.02
Evaluated at bid price : 19.02
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.13 % Asset coverage of 1.9-:1 as of May 31, according to the company. This issue has been volatile ever since the five year refunding issue was announced.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.61
Bid-YTW : 10.85 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 18.88
Evaluated at bid price : 18.88
Bid-YTW : 6.64 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 23.02
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 18.26
Evaluated at bid price : 18.26
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 18.23
Evaluated at bid price : 18.23
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 19.78
Evaluated at bid price : 19.78
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 21.10
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 6.66 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 19.01
Evaluated at bid price : 19.01
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 17.83
Evaluated at bid price : 17.83
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 4.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 11.44
Evaluated at bid price : 11.44
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 167,895 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 154,555 RBC crossed 100,000 at 25.06; National bought 15,400 from Nesbitt at 25.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 24.98
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 80,170 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 79,961 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 18.42
Evaluated at bid price : 18.42
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 62,659 RBC crossed 40,000 at 16.90, then another 19,800 at 16.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 16.91
Evaluated at bid price : 16.91
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 57,990 National bought two blocks from Nesbitt at 25.00; of 11,000 and 12,500 shares.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-23
Maturity Price : 24.91
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 4.58 %
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Interesting External Papers

Developments in Business Financing

There’s a very good review of the impact of the Credit Crunch on markets and the law thereof, prepared by Theresa Einhorn of Haynes & Boone LLP, The Corporate Debt Market And Credit Derivatives.

Section headings are:

  • The Top Ten – Credit Crunch is #1
  • Rates are High and “Covenant Tight” Replaces “Covenant Light”
  • The Credit Markets are a Market and the Stock Market is a Sideshow
  • A New Risk for Borrowers – Defaulting Lenders Fail to Fund under Corporate Lines of Credit.
  • Survival Strategies During the Credit Crunch: Restructuring by Repurchase or Exchange of Debt
  • Credit Default Swaps Market Disruption Clauses in Credit Agreements
  • Market-Based Pricing for Loans – Pricing Based on CDS
  • Hybrid Securities
  • Investing in Distressed Debt and Other Distressed Assets
Market Action

June 22, 2009

In recognition of the fact that investors get so much regulatory paper from their brokers that they don’t read it, the Canadian Securities Administrators are requiring the delivery of more paper. I’ll bet a nickel that every year the “Fund Facts” gets enlarged ‘because Granny didn’t know she could lose money if so-and-so went bankrupt’, until about twenty years from now, when new “Fund Briefer Facts” becomes mandated and then lucky buyers get even more mail to throw away without reading. Still, it keeps the regulators busy and Proactively Working In The Best Interest Of Investors, and that’s what counts, right?

Julia Dickson gave a speech in Vancouver lauding financial oligopolies:

One lesson everyone is relearning is the importance of proper consolidated oversight and supervision of financial groups, especially systemically important financial groups. This lesson has arisen in the context of AIG, where the parent holding company was regulated, but not to the extent required of a systemically important group of its size.

Canada is relatively well placed in this regard as there is already considerable consolidated oversight and supervision of the Canadian financial sector. The large securities firms are owned by the big banks, which OSFI oversees, meaning that securities firms must meet the same prudential standards as their parent bank. As well, the general structural model for large financial services groups is that they are headed by a regulated financial institution, which is overseen by OSFI, versus the holding company structure commonly seen in other jurisdictions.

Having a regulated Canadian financial institution at the top of such organizations enhances our ability to understand the risks facing the conglomerate. Further, given OSFI’s regulatory authority at the top level, we can intervene and require action to be taken, no matter where in the group we may have identified potential problems.

As a regulator, you need to have knowledge of the financial status and risk profile of all affiliates within a financial group. Indeed, as demonstrated by the AIG case, small parts of big companies can be hugely problematic.

She did not go so far as to say she wished to see an elimination of the holding company structure for insurers, but she is clearly headed in that direction. It is very disappointing to see such regulatory hostility to the concept of a layered financial system: banks – securities dealers – hedge funds, that can work quite well provided there are clear lines between the layers.

Plain vanilla for everyone! That’s the Canadian way!

C-EBS has published a consultation paper on implementation of hybrid capital guidelines.

Christopher Whalen, head of International Risk Analytics, had some home-truths for the Senate today:

Trading in credit-default swaps should be banned, Christopher Whalen, managing director of Institutional Risk Analytics in Hawthorne, California, said in prepared testimony for today’s Senate hearing. Regulators are too cozy with the banks in the market to be counted on to make changes, he said.

“The views of the existing financial regulatory agencies, and particularly the Federal Reserve Board and Treasury, should get no consideration from the committee since the view of these agencies are largely duplicative of the views of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and the large OTC dealers,” he said in the remarks.

I can’t find the full text of his testimony, but they will probably be posted soon.

Equities got hit today after the World Bank warned of lower future growth. The only way out of this mess is to hire more regulators:

Global Development Finance 2009: Charting a Global Recovery, warns that the world is entering an era of slower growth that will require tighter and more effective oversight of the financial system.

Perhaps in sympathy, PerpetualDiscounts were off somewhat today; while FixedResets were also down the loss of the latter was negligible. Volume continued high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8682 % 1,215.1
FixedFloater 7.09 % 5.54 % 34,558 16.26 1 -1.0968 % 2,126.6
Floater 3.13 % 3.44 % 78,268 18.66 3 -0.8682 % 1,518.0
OpRet 4.97 % 3.65 % 134,539 0.10 14 0.0141 % 2,193.6
SplitShare 5.78 % 6.44 % 64,042 4.22 3 0.2890 % 1,886.3
Interest-Bearing 5.98 % 7.46 % 22,779 0.51 1 -0.1988 % 1,995.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3465 % 1,734.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.34 % 6.36 % 165,003 13.40 71 -0.3465 % 1,597.8
FixedReset 5.67 % 4.81 % 526,037 4.35 40 -0.0276 % 2,011.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -5.34 % Not a particularly meaningful decline, since only 3,500 shares traded and this was in a range of 11.50-75; the closing quote was 11.00-49, 1×5 after a trade with eight minutes left in the day took out the bid.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 11.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.00
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.43
Evaluated at bid price : 18.43
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -2.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 7.51 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 16.82
Evaluated at bid price : 16.82
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-07-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.25
Evaluated at bid price : 18.25
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 19.17
Evaluated at bid price : 19.17
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 16.69
Evaluated at bid price : 16.69
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.27
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.33
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.07
Evaluated at bid price : 18.07
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.42
Evaluated at bid price : 18.42
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.27 % Asset coverage of 1.9-:1 as of May 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.95
Bid-YTW : 10.54 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 15.25
Evaluated at bid price : 15.25
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 282,931 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.04
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 86,160 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 79,131 National crossed two blocks at 20.04, of 30,000 and 24,000 shares.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 19.96
Evaluated at bid price : 19.96
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 63,575 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 54,550 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 51,356 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.38
Evaluated at bid price : 18.38
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
There were 43 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

NTL.PR.F & NTL.PR.G Suspended from Trading

The Toronto Stock Exchange has announced:

SUSPENDED – Nortel Networks Limited (the “Company”) – The Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preferred Shares, Series 5 (Symbol: NTL.PR.F) and the Non-Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preferred Shares, Series 7 (Symbol: NTL.PR.G) will be suspended from trading effective immediately as a result of the Company’s June 19, 2009 news release. Further information will be forthcoming regarding the Company’s expected delisting application.

The last mention of these issues on PrefBlog occurred when the company requested restrictions on trading.

Both issues have been tracked by HIMIPref™, but are relegated to the “Scraps” index on credit concerns. Tracking will cease immediately.

Update, 2009-6-23: The TSX has announced:

CHANGES IN STOCK LIST Nortel Networks Limited (the “Company”) – Further to TSX Bulletin #2009-0795, at the request of the Company, the Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preferred Shares, Series 5 (Symbol: NTL.PR.F) and the Non-Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preferred Shares, Series 7 (Symbol: NTL.PR.G) (collectively the “Shares”) will be delisted at the close of market on June 26, 2009. Trading in the Company’s Shares will remain suspended.

Issue Comments

XCM.PR.A Refuses to Wind-Up

Commerce Split Corp. has announced:

The Company’s total net asset value is approximately $8.85 per unit as at June 18, 2009, consisting of less than 16% common shares of CIBC. The reduced exposure to CIBC will materially limit the future impact of price movements of CIBC shares on the net asset value of the Company and lower the ability of the Company to generate income from
dividends and its covered call option writing program.

The significant price decline of CIBC and the resultant implementation of the Priority Equity Protection Plan have made it extremely difficult to achieve the original stated objectives for both classes of shares. The Company established a normal course issuer’s bid which allows the Company to re-purchase units in the market when trading prices are at a discount to the net asset value.

Subsequent to the unsuccessful shareholder vote on February 5, 2009 of the reorganization proposal, the Company has continued to dialogue with certain larger shareholders to try and establish potential solutions for reorganizing the Company that would be suitable for all shareholders and result in a successful shareholder vote. Outside of certain larger shareholders, the remaining shareholders had voted overwhelmingly in support of management’s latest proposal.

The Company has received several shareholder requests to wind up the Company. In response to this request, the Company would like to remind all shareholders that all such reorganization proposals must receive a 66 2/3 favorable vote by both the Class A shareholders and the Preferred shareholders voting separately by class. This requirement is outlined in the Company’s prospectus and is part of the articles of incorporation of the Company. Under any kind of termination proposal at the current time, Class A shareholders would receive no value for their Class A shares since the net asset value per unit is below $10. The Class A shares have traded in a range between $0.36 and $1.84 since February 5, 2009 and closed at $1.02 on June 18, 2009. As such, the Company does not believe that this proposal is in the best interests of the Class A shareholders and any proposal that would provide no value to the Class A shareholders would ultimately never be approved by Class A shareholders.

The Company will continue to seek solutions that will balance and meet the interests of both Classes of shareholders and also result in a successful vote. The costs of holding a meeting are significant to the Company and, as such, the Company will only bring forward a proposal that has a high probability of being passed by the requisite majorities of each Class of shareholders.

Huh. Providing no value – indeed, taking away value – for the preferred shareholders didn’t seem to stop their last proposal from coming to vote.

XCM.PR.A is currently quoted at 7.20-31, while XCM is at 1.05-18. The company should buy the maximum permitted under its issuer bid when this can be done at or below NAV, remind shareholders of their retraction rights, and propose a wind-up that will pay the common shareholders a nominal sum. Waiving management fees, or a good chunk thereof, would be a good thing too, but I’m not holding my breath!

XCM.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

XMF.PR.A Refuses to Wind Up

M Split Corp has announced:

This sharp decline in Manulife has resulted in the Company’s net asset value being reduced significantly and as mentioned in previous updates, has required the Company to implement the Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan (the “Plan”) in accordance with the prospectus. As a result of implementing the Plan, the Company has been required to sell the vast majority of the Manulife common shares held in the Portfolio and acquire fixed income securities.

The Company’s total net asset value is approximately $8.37 per unit as at June 18, 2009, consisting of less than 1% common shares of Manulife. The reduced exposure to Manulife will materially limit the future impact of price movements of Manulife shares on the net asset value of the Company and lower the ability of the Company to generate income from dividends and its covered call option writing program.

The significant price decline of Manulife has made it extremely difficult to achieve the original stated objectives for both classes of shares. The Company established a normal course issuer’s bid which allows the Company to repurchase units in the market when trading prices are at a discount to the net asset value.

Subsequent to the unsuccessful shareholder vote on February 5, 2009 of the reorganization proposal, the Company has continued to dialogue with certain larger shareholders to try and establish potential solutions for reorganizing the Company that would be suitable for all shareholders and result in a successful shareholder vote. Outside of certain larger shareholders, the remaining shareholders had voted overwhelmingly in support of management’s latest proposal.

The Company has received several shareholder requests to wind up the Company. In response to this request, the Company would like to remind all shareholders that all such reorganization proposals must receive a 66 2/3 favorable vote by both the Class A shareholders and the Preferred shareholders voting separately by class. This requirement is outlined in the Company’s prospectus and is part of the articles of incorporation of the Company. Under any kind of termination proposal at the current time, Class A shareholders would receive no value for their Class A shares since the net asset value per unit is below $10. The Class A shares have traded in a range between $0.27 and $0.78 since February 5, 2009 and closed at $0.40 on June 18, 2009. As such, the Company does not believe that this proposal is in the best interests of the Class A shareholders and any proposal that would provide no value to the Class A shareholders would ultimately never be approved by Class A shareholders.

The Company will continue to seek solutions that will balance and meet the interests of both Classes of shareholders and also result in a successful vote. The costs of holding a meeting are significant to the Company and, as such, the Company will only bring forward a proposal that has a high probability of being passed by the requisite majorities of each Class of shareholders.

Huh. Providing no value – indeed, taking away value – for the preferred shareholders didn’t seem to stop their last proposal from coming to vote.

XMF.PR.A is currently quoted at 7.07-28, while XMF is at 0.36-50. The company should buy the maximum permitted under its issuer bid, remind shareholders of their retraction rights, and propose a wind-up that will pay the common shareholders a nominal sum. Waiving management fees, or a good chunk thereof, would be a good thing too, but I’m not holding my breath!

XMF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

MFC Disclosure under Review by OSC

A Globe & Mail story highlights a Manulife Financial Press Release that states:

On a separate matter unrelated to prior announcements made today by Manulife Financial Corporation, the Company stated that it received an enforcement notice from staff of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) this week relating to its disclosure before March 2009 of risks related to its variable annuity guarantee and segregated funds business. The OSC notice indicates that it is the preliminary conclusion of OSC staff that the Company failed to meet its continuous disclosure obligations related to its exposure to market price risk in its segregated funds and variable annuity guaranteed products. The Company has the opportunity to respond to the notice before OSC staff makes a decision whether to commence proceedings, and the Company intends to cooperate with OSC staff. The Company believes that its disclosure satisfied applicable disclosure requirements.

The prior announcements that the company is so anxious to emphasize are separate and unrelated are retirement of the CFO and Capital Update; the Capital Update trumpets MCCSR but makes no reference to the degree of double leverage inherent in the MFC holdco / insurance sub. structure. They never do, of course, but it is something that preferred shareholders in the holdco (MFC.PR.A, MFC.PR.B, MFC.PR.C, MFC.PR.D & MFC.PR.E) should bear firmly in mind at all times.

With respect to double-leverage, it is of interest to note that Manulife issued $1-billion of 5-Year MTNs at 4.896%, closing 2009-6-2, with the pricing supplement stating:

Approximately $730 million of the net proceeds to MFC from the sale of the Notes will be applied to reduce amounts outstanding under the Credit Facility and the balance of the net proceeds will be utilized for general corporate purposes of MFC.

There are – quite properly – no announcements regarding the enforcement notice regarding disclosure on the OSC website.

The MFC preferreds were last mentioned on PrefBlog when downgraded to A- [Negative Outlook] by Fitch.

DRIPs

SLF DRIP: Preferred Dividends into Possibly Discounted Common

Sun Life Financial has announced:

amendments to its Canadian Dividend Reinvestment and Share Purchase Plan (the “Plan”). The three major Plan changes are:

1. Subject to Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) approval, Sun Life may issue common shares from treasury at a discount to the average market price to dividend reinvestment participants. At this time and until further notice, the discount will be 2%. To date, common shares issued under the Plan have been purchased through the TSX with no discount to the average market price.

2. Canadian-resident preferred shareholders will be able to participate in the Plan by electing to have dividends paid on their preferred shares reinvested in common shares of Sun Life Financial Inc.

3. Sun Life has also agreed to pay, on behalf of Plan participants, all fees associated with the Plan, other than brokerage commission payable on the sale of common shares held through the Plan.

The changes will be effective starting with the dividends payable on June 30, 2009 to common and preferred shareholders of record on May 27, 2009. The revised Plan is contained in the Amended and Restated Offering Circular which is available at www.sunlife.com or www.cibcmellon.com.

Sun Life may amend or cancel the discount at any time, and Sun Life will continue to determine whether common shares will be purchased under the Plan through the TSX (in which case the discount will not apply) or be newly-issued from treasury. No discount will apply on common shares acquired by participants through optional cash purchases.

The FAQ section of the Amended and Restated Offering Circular states:

The Corporation will announce by press release whether purchases of common shares under the Plan will be made on the open market or through treasury and the applicable discount, if any, included in the Market Price for common shares issued from treasury on a dividend reinvestment.

… while Section E.5 of the

The price that will be paid for Common Shares under the Plan on any Dividend Payment Date (the “Market Price”) will be determined as follows:

For Treasury Purchases, the Market Price will be equal to the weighted average closing trading price of the Common Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange on the five trading days preceding the Dividend Payment Date, subject to a possible discount of up to 5% that may be applied on Treasury Purchases of Dividend Shares. No discount will apply on Treasury Purchases of Optional Cash Purchase Shares.

For Market Purchases of Dividend Shares and Optional Cash Purchase Shares, the Market Price allocated to each Plan Share, or fraction thereof, acquired by the Plan Agent under the Plan on each Dividend Payment Date will be the volume-weighted average of the applicable best efforts open market purchase price paid per Common Share by the Plan Agent for all Common Shares purchased on that Dividend Payment Date under the Plan.

The Corporation will announce by press release whether purchases of Common Shares under the Plan will be Market Purchases or Treasury Purchases and the applicable discount, if any, for Treasury Purchases of Dividend Shares.

This is, frankly, pretty useless information. I am unable to find one of the fabled press releases and suspect that they will be released only after the end of the registration period, making it impossible to plan.

I do not bother reporting reinvestment plans that do not include a discount to market price and was of two minds as to whether to report this one … but the potential is there – do with it as you see fit.

I recommend an eMail to Sun Life Shareholder Services demanding that, at the very least, the company commit itself one way or the other at time of dividend declaration.

The last mention of Sun Life preferreds in general on PrefBlog reported S&P’s one-notch bond-scale downgrade. These preferreds trade with the symbols SLF.PR.A, SLF.PR.B, SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D, SLF.PR.E & SLF.PR.F.

Interesting External Papers

DBRS: Bank Capital Levels Robust

DBRS has published a newsletter highlighting Canadian bank capital levels, which is interesting in the light of their Review-Negative of non-Equity Tier 1 Capital.

They make the following rather curious statement:

DBRS believes the bank’s ability to access the capital markets for funding in good and bad times is an importantconsideration in its capital profile.

Well… has the ability of the banks to access capital markets in bad times really been tested? “Challenging” times, OK. “Difficult” times, why not? But can the past two years really be described as “bad” for Canadian banks?

They note:

The mix, quality and composition of capital are other important considerations in the overall assessment of capital. Thequality of capital has been a key rating consideration in DBRS’s assessment of Canadian banks for an extended periodof time. DBRS has a preference for common equity over hybrids, as the first loss cushion for bondholders and othersenior creditors. On average, 17% and 14% of the regulatory Tier 1 capital is made up of preferred shares andinnovative instruments, respectively, which DBRS views as reasonable. DBRS expects the quality of capital to remainrelatively steady given the recent focus by the market on “core capital,” although OSFI does allow this percentage tonow go as high as 40%, up from 30% as of November 2008.


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