Deutsche Bank Ignores Sub-Debt Pretend-Maturity

December 17th, 2008

The Financial Post reports:

Deutsche Bank’s decision to skip an opportunity to redeem €1-billion of subordinated bonds at the first scheduled call date because replacing them would be more expensive has rattled the bond market. Some suggested the European investment bank’s move, which surprised both investors and experts, has transformed the subordinated debt market. They fear that other banks will follow, which could threaten their relationships with investors and trigger losses.

Deutsche Bank is the first major bank not to call a Lower Tier 2 issue, which rank just below senior bonds. The move has implications for the wider subordinated debt market was well as for extension risk of Tier 1 securities, Mr. Adamson. said.

I, for one, am very happy with this move. As I wrote in A Vale of Tiers:

Investors tend to trade sub-debt as if it will definitely mature on their step-up date – dealer quotations will often reflect a spread to a Canada bond maturing on the step-up date. However, while one may count on them being called, as expected in good times, this will not necessarily be the case in times of trouble. In times of trouble, three-month BAs + 100bp might look awfully skimpy! Investors should tread very carefully when purchasing debt of this nature.

For years, pseudo-managers have been able to outperform actual bonds simply by purchasing sub-debt and Innovative Tier 1 Capital, justifying these moves on the grounds that the tiered structures are included in the Scotia (now DEX) index. The largest corporate holding in XBB, for instance, is RBC Trust Subordinated Notes, with a pretend-maturity of 2012-4-30.

Sub-Debt has been discussed on PrefBlog, particularly in the posts Cracks Appear in European Sub-Debt Market and Banks and Subordinated Debt.

Update, 2024-9-6: There was quite an aftermath to this, as I was reminded when responding to an unrelated comment many years later.

There was material repricing of sub-debt globally:

Broader market implications from Deutsche Bank’s (DB) unexpected decision to extend €1-billion of its lower-Tier 2 debt beyond the first scheduled call date has forced RBC Capital Markets to downgrade its ranking on the subordinate debt of several of Canada’s largest financial companies.

The changes move Toronto-Dominon Bank (TD), Sun Life Financial Inc. (SLF) and Great-West Lifeco Inc.’s (GWLOF.PK) sub-debt ratings from “outperform” to “sector perform,” the same level as Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS), CIBC (CM) and National Bank. RBC rates Bank of Montreal’s sub-debt at “underperform.”

Analyst Altaf Nanji told clients:

We believe Deutsche Bank’s decision to extend its LT2 debt beyond the short redemption date will have repercussions for all debt securities with a step feature – particularly older vintage securities with steps that are well out of the money.

While he expects that Canadian banks and lifecos will continue to redeem these securities on their short date, the same cannot be said for other markets and international developments could hurt all valuations.

“The decision caused material spread widening in the Canadian sub-debt market,” the analyst said, suggesting that Deutsche Bank may have opened up a Pandora’s Box.

… and a buyer’s strike was threatened:

Investors in bank debt are threatening to boycott lenders that follow Deutsche Bank in breaking an unwritten rule and failing to exercise a call option on subordinated debt.

In a co-ordinated action, angry bond investors are writing to bank treasurers and investor relations heads telling them that any failure to exercise a call option will be considered a breach of trust that could cause all the issuer’s debt to be shunned.

Deutsche stunned the debt market last week by choosing not to redeem €1bn (£932m) of subordinated lower tier 2 bonds because to do so was cheaper than refinancing. But though the move saved Germany’s biggest bank up to €150m, it caused fury among buyers of the debt who worked on the assumption that bonds would always be redeemed at their first call date.

The letter, seen by The Independent, said a bank’s decision not to call debt would be taken to mean “the institution is in such difficulty that it is an impossibility to call the instrument or the institution feels that it is in such a strong position that it can afford to alienate itself from the support of a wide portion of the fixed-income institutional investor community”.

Bank of China, a major buyer of bank debt, has gone further in its communication with issuers. The giant Chinese lender’s Hong Kong operation has told banks that “any non-call by a given institution will result in that institution’s debt (not just lower tier 2 but senior and tier 1 as well) being ineligible for future investment consideration”.

December 16, 2008

December 17th, 2008

Next step, quantitative easing! The FOMC announced:

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent.

As previously announced, over the next few quarters the Federal Reserve will purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand its purchases of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities as conditions warrant. The Committee is also evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities. Early next year, the Federal Reserve will also implement the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses.

In a related action, the Board of Governors unanimously approved a 75-basis-point decrease in the discount rate to 1/2 percent. In taking this action, the Board approved the requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of New York, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Minneapolis, and San Francisco. The Board also established interest rates on required and excess reserve balances of 1/4 percent.

The Fed also announced:

The federal banking and thrift regulatory agencies today approved a final rule that would permit a banking organization to reduce the amount of goodwill it must deduct from tier 1 capital by any associated deferred tax liability.
Under the final rule, the regulatory capital deduction for goodwill would be equal to the maximum capital reduction that could occur as a result of a complete write-off of the goodwill under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The final rule is in substance the same as the proposal issued in September. The final rule will be effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register. However, banking organizations may adopt its provisions for purposes of regulatory capital reporting for the period ending December 31, 2008.

The final rule was approved by the Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision. The draft Federal Register notice is attached.

The uninformed reporting of this rule change was discussed by PrefBlog when the rule was proposed.

In a sign of the times, redemptions on a real-estate seg fund have been suspended:

The Great-West Life Assurance Company today announced a temporary moratorium on redemptions from its Canadian Real Estate Investment Fund No. 1 effective close of business (4:00 p.m. EST) December 15, 2008.

The Great-West Life Real Estate Fund is a Segregated Fund which holds a diversified portfolio of high-quality income producing properties. Given the current economic environment, redemption requests have recently increased. Real estate assets are generally less liquid than other major asset classes and cannot be rapidly liquidated. Therefore, in accordance with the terms of
the Information Folder governing the Fund, it has been determined that a temporary moratorium on redemptions is necessary to ensure equitable treatment for all investors in the Fund.

I have a good illustration of why preferreds in general and BAM in particular are down so much this year. It’s in a post on Financial Webring Forum:

I am continuously amazed at the prices for BAM retractables. Forgetting the dividend for a moment, the O series are priced to return a 52% capital gain by August 2013 (assuming a $25 payout). That’s 9.4% annualized, and that’s just the capital gain. The YTW which James calculated yesterday is 16.65% based on a price of $16.

That’s ifBrookfield Assets Management can pay up in 2013, right ? And if Brookfield is still in business in 2013.

I hate to sound like the voice of doom, but these days anything can happen, and often does.

Voice of doom? Voice of ignorance is more like it. Look at that post: ZERO discussion, ZERO analysis, ZERO accountability. The quoted poster has a bright future ahead of him in the financial services industry, because he’s got the sales pitch down pat.

If somebody does an analysis of BAM and doesn’t like it, that’s fine. Maybe they’ve got too much exposure to real estate. Maybe they’ve got too much debt. Maybe … you name it, we can think about it and discuss it.

On the other hand, maybe somebody does an analysis of BAM, takes a view on what yield it should have, compares it to the yields available elsewhere with similar risk profile, and says Holy Smokes! Buy! Maybe the exposure to real-estate isn’t the totality of the company. Maybe the real-estate assets can be jettisoned (BAM has, effectively, a put on BPO. BPO has a put on the individual properties) with damage done, to be sure, but not life-threatening. Maybe since all that debt is secured by individual properties with no recourse and with well staggered maturities, it’s not as scary as it looks at first. Maybe … you name it, we can discuss it.

And if you like it, you can plunk a little money down (not too much because you might be wrong) and if you’ve done your homework properly you’ll make a good return – not necessarily on every investment, but on the totality of your portfolio.

Because, contrary to the ravings of efficient market zealots, the market is not efficient. The market is not comprised solely of highly intelligent people who work hard. The market is comprised of guys like the Mr. Voice of Doom quoted above – and poor performance does not weed them out. They just come back with a new line of patter and a new client list. Markets are moved by salesmen, not analysts.

Another down day on very heavy volume – but PerpetualDiscounts are still a little ahead on the month-to-date. SplitShares seem to be hesitantly recovering, and BNA activity appears to be dominated by retractors.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 7.96% 8.34% 123,030 12.24 7 +0.7086% 661.3
Floater 9.34% 9.41% 81,910 10.10 2 +0.9429% 346.6
Op. Retract 5.51% 6.53% 155,761 3.95 15 -0.1060% 985.6
Split-Share 6.72% 12.51% 89,541 3.94 15 +1.6721% 916.6
Interest Bearing 9.76% 20.56% 55,265 2.76 3 +2.1727% 757.8
Perpetual-Premium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Perpetual-Discount 7.98% 8.11% 225,316 11.30 71 -0.5672% 695.0
Fixed-Reset 6.01% 5.36% 1,188,072 13.87 18 +0.1118% 1,004.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
NA.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -9.0186% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.69% based on a bid of 17.15 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 17.15-18.22 (!), 3×1. Day’s range of 17.56-18.99.
BAM.PR.J OpRet -5.8908% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 15.19% based on a bid of 13.10 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 15.19%. Closing quote of 13.10-73, 1×6. Day’s range of 12.75-97.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -4.4275% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.91% based on a bid of 18.78 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 17.15-18.22 (!), 3×1. Day’s range of 17.56-18.99.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -4.1825% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.89% based on a bid of 12.60 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 12.60-70, 14×29. Day’s range of 12.55-39.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -4.1801% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 13.44% based on a bid of 8.94 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 8.93-00, 3×1. Day’s range of 8.74-60.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -4.1667% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 13.39% based on a bid of 8.97 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 8.97-24, 3×5. Day’s range of 8.95-41.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -4.1198% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.85% based on a bid of 12.80 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 12.80-00, 6×4. Day’s range of 12.66-26.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -3.9786% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.93% based on a bid of 12.55 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 12.55-97, 5×5. Day’s range of 12.55-30.
BCE.PR.F FixFloat -3.4483% Huh. I add it to the database and this is the thanks I get.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -3.4483% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.74% based on a bid of 14.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.00-30, 51×5. Day’s range of 14.00-44.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -3.0573% Asset coverage of 1.7+:1, based on BAM.A at 17.94 and 2.4 BAM.A per preferred. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 21.84% based on a bid of 7.61 and a hardMaturity 2019-01-10 at 25.00. Closing quote of 7.61-79, 4×1. Day’s range of 7.31-10.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat +3.1507%  
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +3.7647% Asset coverage of 0.8-:1 as of December 12, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a (currently dubious) yield of 23.74% based on a bid of 4.41 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at (a currently dubious value of) 10.00. Closing quote of 4.41-66, 3×3. Day’s range of 4.27-50.
BAM.PR.K Floater +3.8519%  
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +4.7312% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.71% based on a bid of 14.61 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.61-00, 10×3. Day’s range of 13.97-80.
PPL.PR.A SplitShare +4.9936% Added to database today. Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 10.78% based on a bid of 8.20 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 8.20-39, 20×1. Day’s range of 7.66-24.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +5.4896% Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.41% based on a bid of 7.11 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.11-49, 45×3. Day’s range of 6.87-25.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +5.8901% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.86% based on a bid of 16.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.00-49, 21×21. Day’s range of 15.10-49.
DF.PR.A SplitShare +7.5817% Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.31% based on a bid of 8.23 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 8.23-74, 1×23. Day’s range of 7.91-75.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +7.6923%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 178,223 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.77% based on a bid of 14.61 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 129,071 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 23.77% based on a bid of 19.01 and a hardMaturity 2010-9-30 at 25.00
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 383,419 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.57% based on a bid of 15.50 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 74,220 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.31% based on a bid of 13.63 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 73,012 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.78% based on a bid of 14.75 and a limitMaturity.

There were ninety-five index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today

BCE.PR.F & PPL.PR.A Added to HIMIPref™ Database

December 16th, 2008

I have bowed to overwhelming popular demand and added the captioned issues to the database.

BCE.PR.F is a FixedFloater, paying $1.10 annually (paid quarterly) until 2010-2-1, at which point the rate gets reset and it becomes exchangeable with BCE.PR.E. Exchange Dates recur every five years thereafter. For analytical purposes, it is assumed that the conversion to ratchet rate is automatic – this is a valid worst-case assumption, since BCE has the discretion to set the five-year rate to a very low value. It is callable on exchange dates at 25.00 and (when ratcheting) at 25.50 at other times. For analytical purposes this is simplified to two calls at $25.00, on 2010-2-1 and 2015-2-1. Dividends are cumulative. There is no retraction.

PPL.PR.A is a split share based on Canadian banks, paying dividends at a rate of Prime, capped at 7%, collared at 5%. It matures 2012-12-1 at $10.00. There is a special monthly retraction provision with the formula 96%(NAV – C). Dividends are cumulative and paid monthly. Current NAV is $16.08 according to the company. Income coverage, according to May’s semi-annual report is a hair over 1.0:1. Maturity is 2012-12-1; there are no embedded redemptions. Distributions to Capital Units will be halted if the NAV falls below 15.00 (asset coverage of 1.5:1).

What is the Yield on BCE.PR.Y?

December 16th, 2008

I was recently taken to task for a claim that the yield on BCE.PR.Y was 8.18% based on a dividend of $1.05715 and an end value of $25.00 – my correspondent stated – quite rightly – that:

the most recent monthly dividend, declared Oct 28, 2008, was $0.8333 or $1.00 per year. Also Prime has dropped to 3.5% from 4% earlier this month, (according to the BOC website), indicating a further cut in the dividend in the near future. Even at the rates and prices you quote I make the yield out to be 7.3%.

My defense is as follows:

They system estimates the average future rate of prime by looking at the past. If we stay at 3.5% prime for long enough, the estimated future rate will drop to this level, but for now it’s higher.

Additionally, the system estimates the end-value (a “limitMaturity” is treated as thirty years, remember) by determining the price at which the instrument is fairly valued; determining fairness by comparison with other floating-rate dependent issues. This was the result of some experimentation and proved to be a better predictor than assuming a constant price (as is done with fixed-rate perpetuals).

Basically, the assumption is that an Investment Grade issue will not pay 100% of prime forever. There will be shocks, of course, and every now and then such an issue will be downgraded and quite properly pay 100% of prime; but over the long term such a rate is not sustainable.

I will admit that this analytical framework was formulated when deviations were relatively small; an investment grade issue paying (25.00 / 14.25) = 175% of prime is not something that happens often enough to permit testing!

All the above is not very satisfactory, I know: but there are a lot of moving parts in the analysis of these ratchet rate issues and the framework was determined empirically. In some cases, to my chagrin, the results are not even internally consistent (e.g., I might be estimating a ratchet yield of less than 100% of prime with end values well below par).

All I can say is that the empirically derived system, while having theoretical holes in it, does have a statistical ability to rank the various issues with significantly better-than-random accuracy, which is all I ever wanted it to do.

Now lets do the cash flow analysis! I have uploaded the full HIMIPref™ output; the last part is:

2038-12-16 MATURITY 25.00 0.080242 2.01

Total Cash Flows 56.6052
Total Present Value 13.5028
Discounting Rate 8.5887 % (Annual rate compounded semi-annually)

So for starters, we see that the the discounted present value of the $25.00 maturity is only $2.01. It’s not a particularly important variable.

But compare four bonds priced at par, each one paying $12 p.a., but with differing frequencies (annual, semi-annual, quarterly, monthly). Each one is described by fixed income convention as having a yield-to-maturity of 12%. Which would you rather have? Obviously, the monthly payer, since then you get your money faster … and this is borne out when we look at the annualized internal rate of return for the four bonds: 12.00%, 12.36%, 12.55% and 12.69%, respectively. The limiting case is an infinite number of infinitesimally small payments totalling $12 and has an IRR of exp(0.12) – 1 = 12.75%.

We note from the HIMIPref™ report that the 30-year discounting factor is 0.080242 so
1 / (1 + I)^30 = 0.080242
(1 + I)^30 = 1 / 0.080242 = 12.4623
I = 8.7727%

To convert this annual value to semi-annual, bond-equivalent yield, we note:
1+I = (1+i)*(1+i)
(1+i) = 1.042942
i = 4.2942
and therefore, the bond-equivalent yield is 2*i = 8.5884%, which is slightly different from the quoted figure, but we’ll attribute that to rounding.

But how to calculate this ourselves? The “ratchet yield” is 4.1997% of par, which implies total payments of $1.049925. These are made monthly, so monthly payments are $0.087494, which has been shown as a rounded value of $0.09 in the HIMIPref™ report.

The normal quick-n-dirty calculation is:
i = [Annual Income + Annual Capital Gain]/[Average of Beginning and Ending Price]
Annual Income = oh hell, let’s just call it $1.05, shall we?
Annual Capital Gain = Total Capital Gain / Term = (25.00 – 13.50) / 30 = $0.38333
Average of Beginning and Ending Price = (25.00 + 13.50) / 2 = 19.25

resulting in a quick-n-dirty estimate of (1.05 + 0.3833) / 19.25 = 7.45%.

It’s a lousy estimate. Terrible. Why?

Mainly because the beginning and ending prices are so different. The calculation assumes that the capital gain is realized in a linear fashion … but in fact, if it accrues at a constant rate, nearly twice as much is accruing at the end of the period as at the beginning. Conversely, the $1.05 income is much more interesting at the beginning of the period (current yield = 1.05 / 13.50 = 7.78%) than at the end (current yield = 1.05 / 25 = 4.20%.

When the capital gain through the period is massive, simple methods become simplistic. Such is life! Fortunately, yield calculators and Excel Spreadsheets will be readily available to most people.

Related discussions may be found in the posts regarding Research: Modified Duration and Research: Yield from on-line Calculator.

Listen, take it from an old bond guy: if anybody ever tells you yield is simple, don’t listen to him!

Liquidity has Value!

December 16th, 2008

The Bank of Canada has released a working paper on the value of debt liquidity, How Important is Liquidity Risk for Sovereign Bond Risk Premia? Evidence from the London Stock Exchange:

This paper uses the framework of arbitrage-pricing theory to study the relationship between liquidity risk and sovereign bond risk premia. The London Stock Exchange in the late 19th century is an ideal laboratory in which to test the proposition that liquidity risk affects the price of sovereign debt. This period was the last time that the debt of a heterogeneous set of countries was traded in a centralized location and that a sufficiently long time series of observable bond prices are available to conduct asset-pricing tests. Empirical analysis of these data establishes three new results. First, sovereign bonds with wide bid-ask spreads earn 3-4% more per year than bonds with narrow bid-ask spreads, and the difference is reflected in greater sensitivity to innovations in market liquidity. Second, small sovereign bonds, as measured by market value, earn 1.8-3.5% more per year than large sovereign bonds, and the difference is also reflected in their exposure to innovations in market liquidity. Third, market liquidity is a state variable important for pricing the cross-section of sovereign bonds. This paper thus provides estimates of the quantitative importance of liquidity risk as a determinant of the sovereign risk premium and underscores the significance of market liquidity as a nondiversifiable risk.

December 15, 2008

December 16th, 2008

A House of Congress committee head announced today that he wants the heart of the financial world to move to Dubai:

Credit-default swap clearing would become mandatory under legislation slated to be introduced next month by House of Representatives Agriculture Committee Chairman Collin Peterson.

Peterson of Minnesota, the Democratic chairman of the committee, said in an interview today he had Republican support to proceed with a comprehensive bill. The committee oversees the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the U.S. futures exchanges it regulates.

“It’s hard for me to understand what useful purpose these things are serving,” Peterson said, referring to CDS contracts. “I’m not out to get Wall Street, but what’s gone on there is jeopardizing the entire global economy.”

Apparently the current moves to reduce systemic risk aren’t good enough, which is one in the eye for the Treasury Secretary designate.

it has been reported that Royal Bank placed client money with Madoff:

Royal Bank of Canada (TSX: RY.TO) says some of its clients have less than $50 million in exposure to alleged US$50-billion Ponzi scheme run by Wall Street investment manager Bernard Madoff.

In a statement issued Monday, the bank said it doesn’t have any direct exposure to the investments, which has left the U.S. financial industry reeling.

I will admit I look forward with some fascination to the various determinations of due-diligence with respect to the Madoff funds.

The market was down again today on continued high volume.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 8.08% 8.42% 97,997 12.16 6 -4.0054% 656.6
Floater 9.42% 9.48% 78,194 10.02 2 -4.8855% 343.3
Op. Retract 5.51% 6.56% 152,931 3.97 15 -0.0397% 986.7
Split-Share 6.86% 13.01% 79,172 3.96 14 +0.2541% 901.6
Interest Bearing 9.89% 21.93% 54,767 2.73 3 -0.9315% 741.7
Perpetual-Premium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Perpetual-Discount 7.93% 8.06% 220,520 11.36 71 -0.7821% 699.0
Fixed-Reset 6.02% 5.37% 1,202,281 14.48 18 +0.6126% 1,003.8
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -7.2753%  
BCE.PR.Y Ratchet -6.2456%  
BCE.PR.S FixFloat -6.1806%  
BAM.PR.B Floater -6.1562%  
BCE.PR.A FixFloat -5.8672%  
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -5.8659% Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 13.56% based on a bid of 6.74 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 6.74-00, 45×18. Day’s range of 6.99-20.
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat -5.7534%  
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -4.7587%  
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -4.3077% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.86% based on a bid of 9.33 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 9.33-60, 1×12. Day’s range of 9.50-09.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -4.2793% Asset coverage of 0.8-:1 as of December 12, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a (currently dubious) yield of 24.63% based on a bid of 4.25 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at (a currently dubious value of) 10.00. Closing quote of 4.26-37, 4×4. Day’s range of 4.43-44.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -4.1612% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.45% based on a bid of 14.51 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.51-00, 4×2. Day’s range of 14.51-30.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -3.7931% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.14% based on a bid of 13.95 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 13.95-24, 20×15. Day’s range of 13.90-79.
BAM.PR.K Floater -3.7090%  
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -3.6810% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1, based on BAM.A at 16.96 and 2.4 BAM.A per preferred. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 21.28% based on a bid of 7.85 and a hardMaturity 2019-01-10 at 25.00. Closing quote of 7.85-04, 1×3. Day’s range of 7.80-50.
BCE.PR.C FixFloat -3.6545%  
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -3.3033% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.27% based on a bid of 16.10 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.10-44, 4×5. Day’s range of 16.00-95.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -3.1410% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.33% based on a bid of 15.11 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.11-68, 5×2. Day’s range of 15.00-16.40.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -3.1017% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.49% based on a bid of 16.87 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.87-96, 4×1. Day’s range of 16.84-51.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -3.0529% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.45% based on a bid of 14.29 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.29-38, 2×4. Day’s range of 14.10-00.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -3.0046% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.60% based on a bid of 14.85 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.85-20, 5×20. Day’s range of 15.10-58.
TD.PR.S FixedReset +3.7598%  
BNA.PR.B SplitShare +4.0526% See BNA.PR.C, above. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.71% based on a bid of 19.00 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Closing quote of 19.00-89, 15×1. Day’s range of 18.26-19.90. Now trading substantially through BAM OpRets, indicating that at least some players are looking at the retraction.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -4.9679% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.55% based on a bid of 19.65 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 19.65-80, 5×4. Day’s range of 19.49-00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
RY.PR.N FixedReset 121,178 National crossed 56,800 at 25.26.
BAM.PR.O OpRet 88,600 TD bought two blocks (one of 10,000, one of 20,000) at 16.25 from Scotia. CIBC crossed 12,300 at 16.01. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 16.65% based on a bid of 16.00 and optionCertainty 2013-6-30 at 25.00.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 64,450 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.28% based on a bid of 14.50 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 58,798 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.46% based on a bid of 14.51 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 52,005 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.36% based on a bid of 13.55 and a limitMaturity.

There were seventy-eight index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today

BIG.PR.B Offering Closes

December 15th, 2008

Big 8 Split Inc. has announced:

that it has completed its public offering of 1,204,980 Class B Preferred Shares, Series 1 (“Class B Preferred Shares”) raising approximately $14.5 million. The Class B Preferred Shares were offered to the public by a syndicate of agents led by TD Securities Inc and Scotia Capital Inc., and including BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., National Bank Financial Inc. and Dundee Securities Corporation. In addition, the Company has redeemed all of its outstanding Class A Preferred Shares and 1,052,334 of its Class A Capital Shares. Holders of 1,204,980 Class A Capital Shares did not retract their Class A Capital Shares pursuant to the special retraction right created in accordance with the capital reorganization approved by holders of the Class A Capital Shares on November 21, 2008.

The Class B Preferred Shares were offered in order to fund in part, the redemption of Class A Capital Shares tendered under the special retraction right and all of the Class A Preferred Shares and to maintain the leveraged “split share” structure of the Company.

BIG.PR.B will not be tracked by HIMIPref™ due to the issue’s small size. The issuance and related redemption of BIG.PR.A has been previously discussed on PrefBlog.

CYC.PR.A Redeemed

December 15th, 2008

Cyclical Split NT Corp has announced that it:

today redeemed all of its outstanding Capital Shares and Preferred Shares as previously disclosed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares is $25.00 per Preferred Share, and the redemption price for the Capital Shares is $118.36821 per Capital Share for those holders of Capital Shares who elected a cash redemption rather than an in-kind redemption.

The Company’s Capital Shares and Preferred Shares were delisted from the TSX following the redemption.

The last mention of CYC.PR.A was in conncection with last year’s partial redemption. CYC.PR.A was not tracked by HIMIPref™.

December 2008 PrefLetter Released!

December 15th, 2008

The December, 2008, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the December, 2008, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the January, 2009, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close January 9 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on January 12.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Should you have a similar problem, I will:

  • eMail you another copy
  • place it on a website for download without eMail
  • try to get it to you as an image file
  • Fax you a copy
  • Mail the damn thing!

Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note, 2008-12-25: In the discussion of one of the recommendations, I referred to PWF.PR.E with a typographical error on the dividend rate. The correct rate is $1.375 p.a. This did not affect the analysis. The Assiduous Reader who brought this to my attention has had his subscription extended by one issue.

BMO Issues Cumulative Tier 1 Capital

December 13th, 2008

BMO has announced:

that BMO Capital Trust II (the “Trust”), a closed-end trust wholly-owned by the Bank, will issue $450 million of BMO Tier 1 Notes – Series A due December 31, 2107 (the “Notes”). The Notes are expected to qualify as Tier 1 capital of the Bank for regulatory purposes. The Trust intends to file a final prospectus with the Canadian securities regulators today, and anticipates that a receipt for the prospectus will be issued on Monday, December 15, 2008.

Interest on the Notes is payable semi-annually. From the date of issue to but excluding December 31, 2018, the rate of interest on the Notes will be fixed at 10.221% per annum. Starting on December 31, 2018, and on every fifth anniversary after such date, the rate of interest on the Notes will be reset as described in the prospectus filed by the Trust and the Bank.

On or after December 31, 2013, the Trust may, at its option and subject to certain conditions, redeem the Notes, in whole or in part.

In certain circumstances, the Notes or interest thereon may be automatically exchanged or paid by the issuance of Class B non-cumulative preferred shares of the Bank.

The transaction is expected to close on December 18, 2008 and the net proceeds will be used by the Bank for general corporate purposes.

This is the first issue I know of that takes advantage of OSFI’s recent reckless rule change to allow Tier 1 Capital with a stated maturity and cumulative income payments.

Existence of these notes will not directly affect the critical Equity/RWA ratio that was most recent review of BMO’s capital on PrefBlog. They do, however, represent a method of bumping up the Tier 1 Capital ratio with issues effectively senior to the preferreds, which certainly shouldn’t give preferred shareholders any cause for celebration.

Update, 2008-12-15: Preferred shareholders can, however, take heart from a $1-billion equity issue:

Bank of Montreal (TSX, NYSE: BMO) today announced an offering of 33,340,000 common shares at CDN$30.00 per share for total gross proceeds of approximately CDN$1.0 billion. The offering will be underwritten on a bought deal basis by a syndicate of underwriters. The Bank has granted to the underwriters an over-allotment option to purchase, on the same terms, up to a further 3,334,000 common shares. The option is exercisable, in whole or in part, up to 30 days after closing. The maximum gross proceeds raised under the offering will be approximately CDN$1.1 billion if the option is exercised in full.

The anticipated closing date of the offering is December 24, 2008. The net proceeds from the offering will be used by the Bank for general corporate purposes. The issue will qualify as Tier 1 capital.

The Bank’s Tier 1 capital ratio was 9.77% as of October 31, 2008. On a pro-forma basis, adjusting for the issuance of CDN$1.0 billion of common equity, the issuance of the CDN$150MM Series 18 Preferred Shares, the issuance of the CDN$450MM BMO Tier 1 Notes – Series A, the redemption of the CDN$250MM Series 6 Preferred Shares and the November 1, 2008 implementation of a new Basel II requirement, the Tier 1 ratio would be approximately 10.4%.

Update, 2008-12-16: The prospectus is now available on SEDAR – Issuer is BMO Capital Trust II, date is December 12:

Starting on December 31, 2018 and on every fifth anniversary of such date thereafter until December 31, 2103 (each such date, an ‘‘Interest Reset Date’’), the interest rate on the BMO Tier 1 Notes—Series A will be reset at an interest rate per annum equal to the Government of Canada Yield (as defined herein) plus 10.50%.

Government of Canada Yield means, on any Interest Reset Date, the average of the annual yields as at 12:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on the third Business Day prior to the applicable Interest Reset Date as determined by two Canadian registered investment dealers, each of which will be selected by, and must be independent of, the Bank and the Trust, as being the annual yield to maturity on such date which a non-callable Government of Canada bond would carry, assuming semi-annual compounding, if issued in Canadian dollars in Canada at 100% of its principal amount on such date with a term to maturity of five years.

On or after December 31, 2013, the Trust may, at its option, with the prior approval of the Superintendent, on giving not more than 60 nor less than 30 days’ notice to the holders of the BMO Tier 1 Notes — Series A, redeem the BMO Tier 1 Notes — Series A, in whole or in part. The redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of BMO Tier 1 Notes — Series A redeemed on any day that is not an Interest Reset Date will be equal to the greater of par and the Canada Yield Price, and the redemption price per $1,000 principal amount of BMO Tier 1 Notes — Series A redeemed on any Interest Reset Date will be par, together in either case with accrued and unpaid interest to but excluding the date fixed for redemption, subject to any applicable withholding taxes.

The Class B Preferred Shares Series 20 will pay fixed quarterly Shares Series 20: non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors, subject to the provisions of the Bank Act, at the applicable Perpetual Preferred Share Rate on each quarterly dividend payment date, subject to any applicable withholding taxes.

Perpetual Preferred Share Rate means the rate per annum equal to the Thirty Year Canada Yield prevailing: (i) in the case of the Class B Preferred Shares Series 20, at the time of the Automatic Exchange; or (ii) in the case of the Class B Deferral Preferred Shares, on the date of issuance of each series of Class B Deferral Preferred Shares, plus, in each case, 3.49%.