BCE Under Review-Developing by DBRS

December 13th, 2008

DBRS has announced:

has today placed its ratings of Bell Canada Under Review with Positive Implications and maintained its ratings of BCE Inc. (BCE or the Company) Under Review with Developing Implications. Additionally, DBRS has withdrawn its ratings of BCE Acquisition Inc.

DBRS’s review will focus on a re-evaluation of the credit profiles of BCE and Bell Canada. This will include the current business and financial risk profile of Bell Canada and any expected changes to these factors in the near to medium term now that the privatization of its parent, BCE, is not proceeding. This review will include DBRS’s view of the potential for further events over the near term.

In addition to the above, BCE announced that the BCE board will immediately following the termination of its Definitive Agreement address (1) a reinstatement of its common dividend (beginning with declaring its Q4 2008 dividend payable January 15, 2009) and (2) a return of capital to its shareholders through a normal course issuer bid (NCIB). DBRS was largely anticipating the reinstatement of its common dividend, although it is difficult to qualify the magnitude of its NCIB at this stage.

Should there be no significant changes in strategy, business mix or Bell Canada’s capital structure, DBRS believe its ratings could be moved to the A (low) to “A” range given its businesses that generate strong EBITDA margins (at or above 40%) and reasonable leverage with gross debt-to-EBITDA at 2.0 times or below. Concurrently, DBRS plans to remove its recovery ratings on Bell Canada, which will no longer apply. The long-term debt rating of Bell Canada is expected to serve as a reference for BCE’s long-term rating, which could be either one notch lower than Bell Canada’s due to structural subordination or possibly the same.

The NCIB was quantified somewhat in the BCE press release:

BCE will return capital to shareholders in the form of a Normal Course Issuer Bid (NCIB). To that end, BCE will repurchase up to approximately 5% of outstanding common shares, or about 40 million common shares. The NCIB is subject to approval by the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and will be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the TSX and applicable laws.

“A share buyback is the most efficient method of distributing capital to our shareholders, particularly given the current valuation metrics of the Company,” said Siim Vanaselja, Chief Financial Officer of BCE. “The share buyback will be accretive to earnings per share and cash flow. Our improving operational progress provides the Company with confidence in our ability to return value to shareholders now and into the future.”

I noted in the post regarding the death of the deal:

I’m afraid that in the absence of strong, credible statements from BCE regarding their capital structure going forward, BCE prefs remain rather more speculative than I like.

So I share DBRS’ caution! I will say, however, that the absence of dramatic moves by the board to support the stock price – a massive dividend, a massive buy-back – gives comforat and I now consider it more likely than not that BCE will retain its Pfd-2(low) rating.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.B, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.D, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

December Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation

December 13th, 2008

The markets have closed and the December edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share (two of them recently added); the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The December issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the December Issue.

December 12, 2008

December 13th, 2008

Volume continued heavy today, but should start slowing next week. Still, the deadline for tax-loss selling is Wednesday Dec 24, so we shall see!

PerpetualDiscounts now yield an average of 6.99% 7.99% pre-tax, equivalent to 9.79% 11.19% pre-tax interest at the standard 1.4x conversion factor. Long corporates are at 7.60%, so the Pre-Tax Interest-Equivalent spread is now 219bp 359bp.

Many thanks to Assiduous Reader Chris, who points out in the comments below that I am an idiot.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 7.75% 8.08% 97,994 12.50 6 -4.4604% 684.0
Floater 8.96% 9.01% 77,662 10.44 2 +4.3973% 360.9
Op. Retract 5.50% 6.79% 149,966 4.16 15 -0.1896% 987.1
Split-Share 6.88% 13.09% 77,994 3.98 14 +0.7681% 899.3
Interest Bearing 9.80% 21.65% 53,709 2.77 3 +0.2261% 748.7
Perpetual-Premium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Perpetual-Discount 7.86% 7.99% 218,843 11.44 71 -0.3034% 704.5
Fixed-Reset 6.05% 5.47% 1,228,142 14.37 18 +0.4038% 997.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -8.7833%  
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -6.6176% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.11% based on a bid of 12.70 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 12.70-19, 8×3. Day’s range of 11.99-13.60.
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -6.0000%  
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -5.9289% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.59% based on a bid of 9.52 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 9.52-76, 2×3. Day’s range of 9.60-13.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -5.7803% Asset coverage of 1.7-:1, based on BAM.A at 17.49 and 2.4 BAM.A per preferred. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 20.59% based on a bid of 8.15 and a hardMaturity 2019-01-10 at 25.00. Closing quote of 8.15-39, 2×1. Day’s range of 8.20-65.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat -5.4268%  
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -5.1881% Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of December 11 according to TD Securities. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 16.55% based on a bid of 7.31 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.31-45, 10×10. Day’s range of 7.20-71.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -4.4185%  
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -3.3315% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.68% based on a bid of 17.41 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 17.41-50, 4×20. Day’s range of 17.21-09.
BCE.PR.Y FixFloat -3.0612%  
BAM.PR.J OpRet -2.8452% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 14.07% based on a bid of 14.00 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 14.00-25, 10×10. Day’s range of 14.00-15.15.
TD.PR.S FixedReset -2.7078%  
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -2.5974% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.29% based on a bid of 9.75 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 9.75-84, 2×1. Day’s range of 9.51-00.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -2.5271% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.63% based on a bid of 13.50 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 13.50-71, 2×1. Day’s range of 13.50-71.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -2.5000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.06% based on a bid of 15.60 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.60-25, 5×4. Day’s range of 15.75-25.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -2.1449% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.93% based on a bid of 16.88 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.88-30, 4×7. Day’s range of 16.85-70.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.0423% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.24% based on a bid of 14.49 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.49-50, 1×38. Day’s range of 14.12-50.
BAM.PR.B Floater +2.1472%  
WFS.PR.A SplitShare +2.1879% Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of December 4 according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 15.29% based on a bid of 7.94 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.94-26, 50×22. Day’s range of 7.51-10.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +2.4320% Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.23% based on a bid of 7.16 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.16-32, 40×10. Day’s range of 6.74-25.
TD.PR.A FixedReset +2.8169%  
DFN.PR.A SplitShare +2.8249% Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.22% based on a bid of 9.10 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 9.10-19, 25×18. Day’s range of 8.89-10.
DF.PR.A SplitShare +2.9139% Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 10.49% based on a bid of 7.77 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.77-10, 4×5. Day’s range of 7.55-78.
LFE.PR.A SplitShare +3.0864% Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 10.57% based on a bid of 8.35 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 8.35-87, 22×1. Day’s range of 8.00-37.
BAM.PR.K Floater +6.5350%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TD.PR.C FixedReset 119,190 National crossed one block of 50,000 at 25.00 and another at 25.01.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 77,915 Nesbitt crossed 53,300 at 15.30. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.49% based on a bid of 15.30 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.N FixedReset 75,690 National crossed 43,200 at 25.21.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 74,964 Nesbitt crossed 53,300 at 15.30. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.48% based on a bid of 15.33 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 73,230 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from National at 24.99. New issue settled yesterday.

There were seventy-four index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today

BNS.PR.S Closes, sort-of

December 12th, 2008

BNS.PR.S is the new issue of BNS Fixed-Resets, 6.25%+384 that Scotia issued to SunLife as partial payment for CI.

Today Scotia had this to say:

Scotiabank (TSX/NYSE: BNS) today announced it has closed the Bank’s 37 per cent strategic investment in CI Financial Income Fund (“CI”; TSX: CIX.UN) and become CI’s largest single shareholder.

Scotiabank bought Sun Life Financial’s (“Sun Life” TSX/NYSE:SLF) stake of 104,609,895 CI trust units for $1.55 billion in cash, $500 million in common shares at $34.60 per share and $250 million in 6.25 per cent five year rate reset preferred shares. Going forward, Sun Life will continue its strong distribution arrangement with CI.

And SunLife chimed in with:

Sun Life Financial Inc. (TSX/NYSE: SLF) today announced that the previously announced sale of its 37% interest in CI Financial Income Fund to Scotiabank has closed. $1.55 billion of the $2.3 billion (Canadian) purchase price was paid in cash. The balance was paid in a combination of common and preferred shares of Scotiabank

Stockwatch advises:

2008-12-10 18:09 ET – Prospectus Approved

TSX bulletin 2008-1429

An application has been granted for the listing of 10 million non-cumulative, five-year rate reset preferred shares, Series 24, of the Bank of Nova Scotia.

The preferred shares, Series 24, are to be distributed at a price of $25 per share pursuant to the terms of a prospectus supplement dated Dec. 9, 2008, to the short form base shelf prospectus dated April 16, 2008, as amended by amendment No. 1 dated Dec. 3, 2008. The closing of the prospectus offering is expected to occur prior to the open on Dec. 12, 2008. In anticipation of such closing, the preferred shares, Series 24, will be listed at 5:01 p.m. on Dec. 11, 2008, and will be posted for trading at the open on Dec. 12, 2008.

Symbol: BNS.PR.S

Cusip No.: 064149 13 1

Trading currency: Canadian dollars

I have obtained data from the TSX confirming the symbol and that it is listed for trading today, 2008-12-12. I also have a quote: 25.00 bid, no offer; and volume: 0.

Accordingly, the issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database and incorporated into the Fixed-Reset sub-index. But I really wish one of the players would announce what happens next … bought deal? exchange offering? distribution to SLF shareholders? Who knows?

HPF.PR.A / HPF.PR.B : Normal Course Issuer Bid

December 12th, 2008

High Income Preferred Shares Corporation has announced:

that HI PREFS has commenced a normal course issuer bid to purchase a portion of the outstanding Series 1 Preferred Shares (TSX: HPF.PR.A) and Series 2 Preferred Shares (TSX: HPF.PR.B) on the TSX. Under the normal course issuer bid, HI PREFS intends to purchase up to 37,680 Series 1 Preferred Shares, representing approximately 10% of the public float and up to 65,396 Series 2 Preferred Shares, representing approximately 10% of the public float.

These purchases will be made in accordance with applicable regulations over a maximum period of 12 months commencing on December 16, 2008 and ending on the earlier of December 15, 2009 or on such date as HI PREFS completes its purchase under the normal course issuer bid or on such date as HI PREFS may otherwise determine. Series 1 Preferred Shares and Series 2 Preferred Shares purchased will be cancelled. Within the preceding 12 month period, HI PREFS
purchased 18,500 Series 1 Preferred Shares and 77,100 Series 2 Preferred Shares for cancellation. HI PREFS had 376,806 Series 1 Preferred Shares and 653,962 Series 2 Preferred Shares issued and outstanding as at December 5, 2008. HI PREFS will not purchase in any given 30 day period, in the aggregate more than 7,536 Series 1 Preferred Shares, being 2% of the issued and outstanding Series 1 Preferred Shares as at December 5, 2008 and in the aggregate more than 13,079 Series 2 Preferred Shares, being 2% of the issued and outstanding Series 2 Preferred Shares as at December 5, 2008.

PrefBlog has an informal policy of reporting Normal Course Issuer Bids only if they are highly accretive to NAV (e.g., when a SplitShare trades well below its NAV) or if the previous one has been executed to a meaningful extent.

HPF.PR.A & HPF.PR.B are tracked by HIMIPref™ and are included in the “Scraps” sub-index (rather than SplitShare) due to volume and credit concerns, respectively. HPF.PR.A & HPF.PR.B were mentioned on PrefBlog most recently in connection the DBRS affirmation and downgrade, respectively.

December 11, 2008

December 11th, 2008

JPMorgan, or one of their clients, wants to make a big bet on Collatteralized Loan Obligations:

JPMorgan Chase & Co., the largest U.S. bank, is seeking as much as $780 million of AAA rated portions of collateralized loan obligations, according to a list of securities the company circulated to traders and investors.

New York-based JPMorgan, which has received capital from the government and has obtained loans from the Federal Reserve, told traders it may be willing to accept yields of about 4 percentage points more than the three-month London interbank offered rate for dollars, three of the people said. That’s less than the spread of 5 percentage points that the securities typically trade at, according to JPMorgan’s research department.

The purchase may aid the $475 billion CLO market, where prices began falling after the July 2007 collapse of two Bear Stearns Cos. hedge funds that owned collateralized debt obligations.

CLOs, which are a type of CDO, repackage loans used to fund leveraged buyouts and other non-investment-grade, or junk, rated companies into new securities with varying ratings.

The world has gone mad and it has been a week of what Portfolio.com calls a trend of “Rich white men throwing it all away for nothing.”.

And they didn’t even mention the Sextant thing! The OSC has alleged:

15. At November 28, 2008, approximately 5% of the assets of the Sextant Fund were invested in a portfolio of cash, stocks and futures contracts, including stocks of private companies. The portfolio is held in accounts with Newedge Canada Inc. (“Newedge”), the custodian and prime broker for the Sextant Fund.

16. The balance of the assets in the Sextant Fund are invested in two private Luxembourg companies: Iceland Glacier Products S.a.r.l. (“IGP”) and Iceland Global Water 2 Partners SCA (“IGW”).

17. At November 28, 2008, 92% of the assets of the Sextant Fund were invested in IGP and 2.5% of the assets were invested in IGW. These investments are not recorded or valued on Newedge’s books and records.

18. IGP and IGW both purportedly own rights to glaciers in Iceland and intend to use those rights for the purpose of developing and selling bottled water. Neither IGP or IGW have earned any revenue and there are no indications that they will do so in the immediate future. Neither is currently operating.

19. Despite having earned no revenue and having no immediate prospect of doing so, IGP’s shares have purportedly increased in value from an initial average cost of €0.226 to €2.45, or approximately 984% since initial investment by the Sextant Fund. This has contributed to the increase in value of the Sextant Fund by 730.7% over the less than three years between its inception in February 2006 and November 28, 2008.

20. There are no third party valuation reports that support the monthly, material upward revisions in value of IGP, and therefore there is inadequate support for the claimed rate of return of the Sextant Fund.

21. Significant performance fees, in excess of $3 million dollars have flowed out of the Sextant Fund based entirely on its purported rate of return. Fees for the month of November 2008 alone were assessed at over $1.5 million.

22. IGP and IGW are owned almost entirely by the Sextant Fund, the Sextant Offshore Funds and Spork.

The Globe and Mail notes:

Mr. Spork also runs two offshore funds totalling $100-million (U.S.) – Sextant Strategic Hybrid2 Hedge Resource Fund Offshore Ltd. and Sextant Strategic Global Water Fund Offshore Ltd. – which do not have Canadian investors.

After his fund shot up 74 per cent in July alone, Mr. Spork was reluctant then to reveal how his commodities-focused strategy has been racking up stellar returns.

“We make our returns or business grow by having an edge that is not transparent,” Mr. Spork told The Globe and Mail at that time.

Just what the investors were receiving by way of disclosure is not clear. And I am not an expert in the exciting new field of glacier investing. But it seems to me that before I wrote a large cheque – especially to buy large ice-cubes – I would want to know a little more about the non-transparent edge.

Then today after the markets closed the SEC released allegations against Bernard Madoff:

alleged that Madoff yesterday informed two senior employees that his investment advisory business was a fraud. Madoff told these employees that he was “finished,” that he had “absolutely nothing,” that “it’s all just one big lie,” and that it was “basically, a giant Ponzi scheme.” The senior employees understood him to be saying that he had for years been paying returns to certain investors out of the principal received from other, different investors. Madoff admitted in this conversation that the firm was insolvent and had been for years, and that he estimated the losses from this fraud were at least $50 billion.

According to regulatory filings, the Madoff firm had more than $17 billion in assets under management as of the beginning of 2008. It appears that virtually all assets of the advisory business are missing.

It’s not clear to me how the two figures cited are reconciled, but with numbers that big it doesn’t matter much does it? One wonders what his client list looked like and what the collateral damage tomorrow is going to be.

It’s not going to be the only headline, either! Carmakers won’t get bailed out:

Senate negotiations for a U.S. automaker bailout plan collapsed, in a blow to General Motors Corp. and Chrysler LLC, which may run out of cash early next year.

“It’s over with,” Majority Leader Harry Reid said on the Senate floor in Washington. “I dread looking at Wall Street tomorrow. It’s not going to be a pleasant sight.”

Connecticut Democrat Christopher Dodd, who was involved in the negotiations, said the final unresolved issue was a Republican demand that unionized autoworkers accept a reduction in wages next year, rather than later, to match those of U.S. autoworkers who work for foreign-owned companies, such as Toyota Motor Corp.

“More than saddened, I’m worried this evening about what we’re doing with an iconic industry,” Dodd said. “In the midst of deeply troubling economic times we are going to add to that substantially.”

Accrued Interest has a post about negative yields on US T-Bills, asking:

So when I heard that there were T-Bill trades occurring above par, I was more stunned that Princess Leia aboard the Tantive IV. Who bought T-bills above par? Why would you enter into that trade with a certain loss when you can simply hold currency at no loss?

Currency? How currency? Put it in a bank, it’ll go bust. Put it under your mattress, you’ll get robbed. Put it into actual folding paper in a safe deposit box, you’ve got transaction costs out the wazoo, what with money laundering laws and safekeeping fees, not to mention a certain risk of your employees robbing you. How currency?

There are some good comments to that post. I’ll suggest that the commenter Oregon Guy has the right of it:

Say you have a $2,000,000 CD maturing. You can deposit the proceeds in a money market account with FDIC insurance, but the insurance won’t cover the $2,000,000 and you don’t want the bother of opening a plethora of accounts. Treasuries are bubble-priced, so you don’t want to go there. Corporates are shaky because defaults are high and you’re risk adverse. You can roll-over the CD, but that opens up the possibility of uninsured loss again.

I will suggest the additional mechanism of segmentation. There are a LOT of T-Bill funds out there, and a lot more private-manager mandates that will only allow T-Bills. They HAVE to buy bills – they don’t even have the currency option.

Volume continued heavy today, but the market was down this time.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30.
The Fixed-Reset index was added effective 2008-9-5 at that day’s closing value of 1,119.4 for the Fixed-Floater index.
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 7.40% 7.73% 97,057 13.18 6 +1.5009% 716.0
Floater 9.35% 9.40% 73,019 10.08 2 -6.8016% 345.7
Op. Retract 5.49% 6.76% 148,229 4.17 15 -0.1952% 988.9
Split-Share 6.92% 13.31% 75,553 3.98 14 +0.6130% 892.4
Interest Bearing 9.82% 21.50% 54,396 2.75 3 -1.2438% 747.0
Perpetual-Premium N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Perpetual-Discount 7.84% 7.96% 215,098 11.46 71 -0.4579% 706.6
Fixed-Reset 6.07% 5.45% 1,168,186 14.39 17 +0.2100% 993.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -8.8639%  
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -6.1250% Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of December 4 according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.42% based on a bid of 7.51 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.51-79, 4×1. Day’s range of 7.51-00.
NA.PR.N FixedReset -5.9889%  
NA.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -5.0769% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.24% based on a bid of 18.51 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 18.51-74, 7×2. Day’s range of 18.25-20.98 (!).
BAM.PR.B Floater -4.7204%  
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing -3.7433% Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of December 4, based on Capital Unit NAV of 0.39 according to Faircourt and 0.71 Capital Units per preferred. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 20.30% based on a bid of 5.40 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-31 at 10.00. Closing quote of 5.40-60, 6×2. Day’s range of 5.21-70.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -3.5862% Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 12.74% based on a bid of 6.99 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 6.99-38, 1×3. Day’s range of 7.25-40.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -3.3562% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.14% based on a bid of 14.11 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 14.11-30, 5×4. Day’s range of 14.00-67.
CU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -2.8856% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.52% based on a bid of 19.52 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 19.52-74, 4×1. Day’s range of 19.52-36.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.6163% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.23% based on a bid of 16.75 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.75-00, 4×6. Day’s range of 16.70-47.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -2.3788% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.85% based on a bid of 16.00 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.00-24, 16×1. Day’s range of 15.50-16.70.
BNS.PR.P FixedReset -2.2727%  
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -2.2350% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.49% based on a bid of 15.31 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.31-54, 10×3. Day’s range of 15.25-80.
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualDiscount -2.1463% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.10% based on a bid of 40.12 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 40.12-95, 1×6. Day’s range of 40.11-41.19.
BNS.PR.R FixedReset -2.1176%  
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -2.0328% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.24% based on a bid of 17.35 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 17.35-49, 5×4. Day’s range of 17.32-92.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.1698% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.03% based on a bid of 16.01 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 16.01-24, 4×3. Day’s range of 16.01-24.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +2.2222% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.20% based on a bid of 13.80 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 13.80-00, 20×3. Day’s range of 13.50-93.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +2.3748% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.14% based on a bid of 15.95 and a limitMaturity. Closing quote 15.95-99, 2×19. Day’s range of 15.59-99.
RY.PR.I FixedReset +2.6128%  
DF.PR.A SplitShare +3.0014% Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 11.09% based on a bid of 7.55 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.55-60, 60×14. Day’s range of 7.50-51.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare +3.6932% Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of December 11 based on BAM.A at 17.46 and 2.4 BAM.A per unit. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 10.41% based on a bid of 18.25 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Closing quote of 18.25-19.99, 5×1. Day’s range of 17.75-50.
FTN.PR.A SplitShare +7.9460% Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of November 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 11.28% based on a bid of 7.20 and a hardMaturity 2015-12-1 at 10.00. Closing quote of 7.20-28, 27×10. Day’s range of 6.50-28.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +9.7857%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 343,071 Six blocks totalling 114,500 shares. New issue settled today.
PWF.PR.D OpRet 110,456 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.93% based on a bid of 25.41 and a softMaturity 2012-10-30 at 25.00.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 62,988 Nesbitt crossed 15,000 at 16.95. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.30% based on a bid of 16.91 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 57,815 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.16% based on a bid of 15.01 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 45,158 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.48% based on a bid of 15.92 and a limitMaturity.

There were seventy-eight index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today

BMO.PR.N Closes Without Incident

December 11th, 2008

BMO’s new issue of Fixed-Reset 6.50%+383 announced November 25 closed today without incident.

Volume was good at 343,071 shares in a range of 24.86-05. The closing quote was 25.00-01, 44×10.

The issue was relatively small, only $150-million, but there was a greenshoe for $100-million. I am unable to determine whether any of the greenshoe was exercised.

The issue is tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been added to the Fixed-Reset Index.

Update, 2009-6-9: The TSX reports six million shares outstanding; therefore the greenshoe was not exercised.

NTL.PR.F & NTL.PR.G : DBRS Downgrades to "D"

December 11th, 2008

DBRS has announced that it:

has today downgraded its preferred share ratings of Nortel Network Limited to D from Pfd-5 (low). Nortel Networks Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nortel Networks Corporation (collectively, Nortel or the Company). This rating action follows the Under Review with Negative Implications status, where the ratings were placed November 10, 2008 (see press release dated November 10, 2008). Nortel’s long-term debt remains Under Review with Negative Implications.

This rating action results from Nortel suspending its dividend payments on its preferred shares. This suspension begins with its November 2008 dividends, which will not be paid on December 12, 2008. The last dividend the Company paid was on November 12, 2008, on its Series 5 preferred shares (cumulative) and its Series 7 preferred shares (non-cumulative) as originally declared on July 31, 2008.

DBRS notes that on November 10, 2008 Nortel released its Q3 2008 results, which were below DBRS’s expectations, and lowered its outlook for the year. Additionally, Nortel announced the suspension of its preferred share dividends in an effort to preserve its liquidity. Shortly after this announcement, DBRS placed all of Nortel’s ratings Under Review with Negative Implications.

Notes:
DBRS’s ratings on technology companies are primarily based on factors such as the product suite, the base of customers, the competitive landscape, research and development initiatives, gross operating margins and the financial profile.

These issues were last discussed on PrefBlog when Nortel announced its intention to default.

NTL.PR.F & NTL.PR.G are tracked by HIMIPref™. They would be included in the “Ratchet” index, but have been relegated to “Scraps” on credit concerns.

OSFI Loosens Rules on Innovative Tier 1 Capital

December 11th, 2008

OSFI has released Advisories on Innovative Tier 1 Instruments.

I have not yet reviewed the intricacies of the advisories, but it appears that the the draft advisory I thought was so appalling has been adopted in toto. Canadians can be, er, proud to declare that we are basically the only jurisdiction that allows cumulative Tier 1 Capital.

Update, 2008-12-15 From the Advisory on Innovative Tier 1 Instruments:

A new form of loan-based innovative instrument will now qualify for inclusion in Tier 1 capital. Under this structure, the special purpose vehicle (SPV) issuing the innovative instrument will issue a 99-year security to investors and the SPV will use the proceeds from such issuance to acquire an inter-company debt instrument from the FRE with maturity conditions that are the same as the public issue. Under specified circumstances to maintain cash resources in the FRE, and as a result of contractual obligations between the investors, the SPV and the FRE, the investors in the SPV securities will receive directly issued preferred shares of the FRE to satisfy interest and/or principal payments on the innovative instrument.

the risk premium (over the risk-free rate) reflected in the dividend rate on the Tier 1-qualifying preferred shares issued pursuant to an automatic conversion must be established at the time the innovative instrument is issued and must not exceed the risk premium (over the risk-free rate) reflected in the dividend rate of comparable shares as at that date (i.e. upon the original issuance of the innovative instrument).

innovative instruments can now include securities which mature in 99 years. These, however, will be subject to straight-line amortization for regulatory capital purposes beginning 10 years prior to maturity.

An innovative instrument is now permitted to be “share cumulative” where under specified circumstances to maintain cash resources in the FRE, and as a result of contractual obligations between the investors, the SPV and the FRE, deferred cash coupons on the innovative instrument become payable in Tier 1-qualifying perpetual preferred shares of the FRE2, subject to the following requirements:

  • Cash coupons on the innovative instrument can be deferred at any time, at the FRE management’s complete discretion, with no limit on the duration of the deferral, apart from the maturity of the instrument.
  • The preferred shares issued by the FRE will initially be held in trust and will only be distributed to the holders of the innovative instrument to pay for deferred coupons once the cash coupons on the innovative instrument are resumed or when the innovative instruments are no longer outstanding (e.g. maturity of the innovative instrument, conversion of innovative instrument into preferred shares of the FRE, etc.).

And, from the Innovative Tier 1 and Other Capital Clarifications:

The adoption and current interpretation of the Accounting Standards Board’s Accounting Guideline 15 (AcG 15) results in Canadian “loan-based” innovative Tier 1 SPVs no longer being consolidated with the sponsoring FRE that owns the common securities and the interpretation also results in certain Financing Entities used by FREs to issue Tier 2 capital instruments no longer being consolidated with the FRE.

OSFI has determined that:

  • For “loan-based” innovative Tier 1 instruments, the SPV will no longer be required to be consolidated as a precondition for the public issue to be treated as innovative Tier 1 capital of the FRE.


Principle #9(b) under the Interim Appendix to Guideline A-2 (Banks/T&L/Life), “Principles Governing Inclusion of Innovative Instruments in Tier 1 Capital” states that “the main features of innovative instruments, including those features designed to achieve Tier 1 capital status (for example, the triggers and mechanisms used to achieve loss absorption), must be publicly disclosed in the FRE’s annual report to shareholders.”
This disclosure requirement is even more important now that capital will include innovative Tier 1 capital instruments that do not appear on the FRE’s balance sheet. In future, regulatory approvals for the issuance of loan-based innovative Tier 1 instruments will be conditional on acceptable plans for adequate disclosure of the main regulatory capital features of these instruments in the annual report to shareholders.

So bank balance sheets just got even more difficult to understand. If the SPV is not consolidated, then something that looks like a loan will magically count as Tier 1 Capital. I don’t know who’s at fault here, but I don’t like it!

A FRE has recently approached OSFI regarding the inclusion of a “make-whole” provision in the terms and conditions of a Tier 2-qualifying instrument issued into a foreign market. The provision states that, if tax laws change such that the FRE is required to withhold or account for any present or future tax, assessment or governmental charge by any Canadian tax authority, the FRE will pay noteholders an additional amount needed so that the net amount received by the noteholders, after such a withholding, will equal the amount that would have been received had no such withholding been required.

OSFI has assessed this provision and determined that it will permit such “make-whole” provisions in Tier 2 capital.

Whoosh! That came out of the blue!

BoC Releases December 2008 Financial System Review

December 11th, 2008

The Bank of Canada has released its December 2008 Financial System Review.

An interesting comment was:

Further improvements by some Canadian banks would be desirable to align disclosure standards, particularly regarding valuation techniques, more closely with the best practices of leading foreign banks. On the issue of transparency of structured products, progress in implementing the [Financial Stability Forum] recommendations has been slow to materialize, and there is a role for provincial securities commissions to advance this initiative.

… which seems to be a nice way of saying the banks here are falling behind. The Financial Stability Forum has been discussed on PrefBlog.

Also of interest was a short section on revision of bank capital rules to reduce the procyclicity inherent in the current rules:

These concerns have motivated proposals that argue that systemic risks can be mitigated if macroeconomic conditions are taken into account in the design of capital regulations. Under these proposals, banks would be required to build up a capital buffer during the boom part of the cycle—thereby strengthening their balance sheets and reducing the risk that financial imbalances will develop from excessive easing of financial conditions. During a downturn, banks would be allowed to draw down these buffers, which would alleviate the need to liquidate assets or restrict loan growth at a time when credit conditions and asset prices are already under stress. Thus, minimum capital requirements would move procyclically—the reverse of what happens under the current Basel II framework— and would help moderate cyclical fluctuations in the economy. This strategy could be implemented by linking capital requirements to movements in macroeconomic indicators of the state of the credit cycle, such as loan growth and asset prices.

Another question is whether there should be a rules-based approach linking capital requirements in a predetermined way to observable variables such as loan or asset growth, or whether discretion should be used to adjust the minimum capital ratios. In a system with discretion, it would be necessary to define the appropriate roles for the prudential regulator and for other agencies (such as the central bank) that have a broader macroeconomic perspective.

I like the last bit – ‘Give us the work, not OSFI!’

Longer-term credit markets have also deteriorated since the publication of the June FSR, as perceived default risk rose and the dysfunction in short term funding markets spread to longer-term debt markets. With the cost of financing trading positions higher and more uncertain, the liquidity premium demanded by agents also increased. This, in turn, contributed to the widening of credit spreads relative to government securities beyond what would be expected solely from the increase in default risk and expected losses. Yield spreads on corporate bonds around the globe rose to all-time highs in both the secondary bond and credit default swap markets, with the increase being particularly significant for high-yield and lower-rated issuers, reflecting an increasing degree of credit tiering (Chart 11).

There is a very topical note on DB Pension Funding:

Firms that sponsor defined-benefit (DB) pension plans are facing additional pressures. The funding condition of DB plans in Canada has deteriorated sharply in recent months as a consequence of the severe sell-off in equity markets. Chart 19 presents the trend in Mercer’s Pension Health Index, which incorporates indexes of the assets, liabilities, and funding positions (assets less liabilities) of a representative DB plan in Canada. Note that assets have recently been falling, whereas liabilities have continued to rise. Firms are required to make special contributions to eliminate deficits over a time period specified by the pension regulators. These contributions adversely affect the
earnings and cash flow of the sponsoring corporation.

Bank asset quality is always of interest:

Profits and return on equity for the major Canadian banks have been on an improving track since the apparent trough in the first quarter of 2008, when writedowns seem to have peaked (Chart 29). Since the start of the turmoil, the major banks have reported cumulative capital market writedowns of almost $12 billion on a pre-tax basis. For the fourth quarter, five banks have pre-announced additional writedowns totalling around $2 billion.

As discussed, the volatility in the value of the securities portfolios of financial
institutions has continued (through the requirements of fair value accounting) to adversely affect their earnings.20 Recently, changes were announced by the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB), which mirror recent changes in International Accounting Standards (IAS). These modifications permit financial institutions, in some cases, to reclassify assets from the “held for trading” account to the banking book. This change is expected to reduce future volatility in the earnings of some banks. Several banks have since reclassified assets under these guidelines.

Of particular interest to preferred share investors is the banks’ “Distance to Default”, which is based solely on market prices – not on any fundamental analysis:

An assessment of overall default risk derived from market data, the distance to default for major Canadian banks, suggests a deterioration in their perceived credit quality since the June 2008 FSR (Chart 34). Driven by continued volatility in bank share prices, this measure has, in fact, reached its
lowest point on record.

And finally, given the recent MFC fiasco:

While the level of disclosure at life and health insurance companies has improved in recent years, it is generally not as detailed as that of banks, and recent events have underlined the need for further enhancements. For example, it would be desirable for life and health insurance companies to provide more information about the consolidated capital position of the enterprise as a whole, not just at the unconsolidated operating company level.

Thats the review section. There are also articles titled:

  • Credit, Asset Prices, and Financial Stress in Canada
  • Fair Value Accounting and Financial Stability
  • The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on the International Financial System
  • Liquidity Risk at Banks: Trends and Lessons Learned from the Recent Turmoil
  • A Model of Housing Boom and Bust in a Small Open Economy
  • The Role of Bank Capital in the Propogation of Shocks
  • Good Policies or Good Fortune: What Drove the Compression in Emerging-Market Spreads?