HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : July, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-07-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,589.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,907.1 12 2.0 5.39% 9.8 161M 5.78%
Floater 1,498.0 4 1.75 4.95% 13.8 68M 5.56%
OpRet 1,462.2 36 1.22 4.40% 1.8 62M 6.20%
SplitShare 1,493.4 8 1.87 5.78% 6.9 69M 6.19%
Interest-Bearing 1,724.5 7 2.00 6.22% 2.7 127M 7.77%
Perpetual-Premium 1,130.0 4 1.25 5.01% 5.6 226M 5.70%
Perpetual-Discount 1,285.5 10 1.60 5.78% 14.2 134M 5.75%

Index Constitution, 2001-07-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-07-31, Post-rebalancing

Data Changes

BNS New Issue : 5.25% Perpetual

Scotia has announced:

a domestic public offering of 12 million, 5.25% non-cumulative preferred shares Series 16 (the “Preferred Shares Series 16”) at a price of $25.00 per share, for an aggregate amount of $300 million.
    The Bank has agreed to sell the Preferred Shares Series 16 to a syndicate of underwriters led by Scotia Capital Inc. on a bought deal basis. The Bank has granted to the underwriters an over allotment option to purchase up to an additional $45 million of the Preferred Shares Series 16 at any time up to 30 days after closing.
    Closing is expected to occur on or after October 12, 2007. This domestic public offering is part of Scotiabank’s ongoing and proactive management of its Tier 1 capital structure.

This will get the money into Tier 1 prior to Scotia’s year-end on October 31. I certainly don’t think Scotia’s in any trouble, but I suspect that all the banks will have seen their balance sheets bulk up over the past six weeks (as their sometime customers find it more difficult or too expensive to borrow on the money market) and who knows? We might even see some more issuance from those banks that have the room.

Come on TD! Let’s see a good big batch of TD Perps!

Anyway:

Size: 12-million shares (= $300-million), underwriters’ option for additional 1.8-million shares (= $45-million)

Issue Price: $25.00 

Dividend: 5.25% = $1.3125 p.a.  Paid on third-last business day of Jan, April, July, Oct. Long first dividend of $0.39195 anticipated, to be paid Jan 29.

Redemption: Redeemable commencing third-last business day in January, 2013, at $26.00. Redemption price declines by $0.25 p.a. until January 27, 2017; redeemable at $25.00 thereafter.

Seniority: On parity with all other preferred shares, senior to common, junior to everything else.

On the whole, the issue looks pretty good and I suspect that it will trade at an immediate premium:

Comparables
Issue Fair Value
Estimated
by HIMIPref™
Quote 9/24
BNS.PR.J 26.05 26.01-10
BNS.PR.K 24.29 24.67-73
BNS.PR.L 23.51 23.49-55
BNS.PR.M 23.51 23.51-57
Series 16 25.93 Not yet trading

The new issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database with the securityCode P50013.

Update, after close: What a difference a day makes! As briefly discussed in the September 25 Review, the new issue appears to have been the cause (or at least the trigger!) for a mass repricing of perpetuals. A revised table of comparibles is:

Comparables
Issue Fair Value
Estimated
by HIMIPref™
Quote 9/25
BNS.PR.J 25.40 25.41-60
BNS.PR.K 24.03 24.09-20
BNS.PR.L 23.10 23.03-24
BNS.PR.M 23.10 22.85-90
Series 16 25.45 Not yet trading

Update, 2007-10-10: As of the close today, fair value is estimated as $24.52.

Update, 2007-10-11: As of the close today, fair value is estimated at $24.43.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : June 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-06-29
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,592.5 1 1.00 5.38% 14.9 31M 5.35%
FixedFloater 1,909.1 13 2.0 5.43% 14.5 142M 5.76%
Floater 1,507.4 4 1.75 5.18% 13.7 66M 5.73%
OpRet 1,449.6 37 1.24 5.04% 1.8 63M 6.23%
SplitShare 1,481.2 8 1.87 6.08% 5.4 78M 6.20%
Interest-Bearing 1,692.4 7 2.00 6.92% 2.8 132M 7.92%
Perpetual-Premium 1,113.8 4 1.25 5.26% 5.7 104M 5.76%
Perpetual-Discount 1,264.3 10 1.60 5.75% 14.2 117M 5.84%

Index Constitution, 2001-06-29, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-06-29, Post-rebalancing

Market Action

September 24, 2007

The WSJ has reported on an interview of Greenspan by a German newspaper, in which the question of Credit Rating Agency regulation arose. The information given is too interesting to be simply reported here and too small to deserve its own post: I have updated a recent post with the new opinion.

Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has written a short op-ed piece on moral hazard, pooh-poohing those who feel it should be a major consideration when central banks take action.

Charles Goodhart of the LSE has written a summary of his recent research into the ever-popular topic of downward-sloping yield curves and recessions. He suggests that:

historically, the additional predictive power of the spread for future output growth –over and above that already encoded in other macroeconomic variables – often appeared during periods of uncertainty about the underlying monetary regime.

On the other hand, when the monetary regime becomes (at least partly) uncertain, an increased risk premium will have to be added to expectations of future short rates. According to this view, part of the cause of the subsequent output decline is not that the yield curve is negatively sloping, but that it is insufficiently so, i.e. long rates are above those consistent with the subsequent resolution of the uncertainty, thereby imparting additional downwards pressure on output.

He has found a counter-example in the Anglo-Saxon bloc of the early 2000’s, but suggests that there might be some other factor at work. It’s an interesting idea …

Brad Setser has a guest blogger with an interesting thesis:

It is a basic assumption on my part that globalization cycles, of which by my count there have been six in the past two hundred years, are driven largely by new developments or structural changes in the financial system that cause a significant increase in global liquidity and a concomitant increase in risk appetite. Because of rising risk appetite this newly-abundant capital flows into a variety of risky countries or ventures – financing canals in the 1820s, railroads in the 1860, long-distance communication media in the 1920, the internet in the 1990s – and sets off the growth in international trade, capital flows, technological development (and, for some reason, the rebirth of liberal economic theory) that we associate with globalization.

His first ‘real post’ provides some background on China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund. Such funds, usually abbreviated SWF to make me feel like I’m reading a personals ad, have attracted some controversy in recent times, with quite a few calls for their regulation. There will probably be some kerfuffle in the papers tomorrow about PrimeWest’s Abu Dhabi honeymoon*:

Abu Dhabi National Energy Co., the state-controlled power generator and oil producer, agreed to buy Canada’s PrimeWest Energy Trust for about C$4 billion ($4 billion) in the biggest-ever North American takeover by a United Arab Emirates company.

James Hamilton has commented on the monetary implications of the Fed Rate cut. He reviews the meaning of the term ‘printing money’ and the actual mechanisms involved to conclude:

This is not to insist that concerns about higher inflation are unfounded. But, if one wanted to motivate such concerns from a monetarist perspective, one could not point to money that has been printed so far. Instead, the story would have to be that, in order to achieve the path for the fed funds rate that the Fed is now likely to set for the following year, the Fed will eventually need to add more reserves that do end up as more cash in circulation. In this scenario, markets have been reacting to an anticipation of future money creation and not to something that has already happened.

There can be no more doubt regarding the motivation for Sarkozy’s hostility towards credit rating agencies and ECB President Trichet … his Prime Minister has let the cat out of the bag:

French Prime Minister Francois Fillon warned Monday that the country’s public finances were in a “critical” state and need drastic action to reduce worrying deficits.

Fillon urged France to “change its attitude” towards state spending two days before his centre-right government presents its 2008 draft budget, which is expected to show a deficit of 41.5 billion euros (58.5 billion dollars).

It was the second time in three times that he has sounded the alarm. On Friday, the prime minister said France was in a “situation of bankruptcy”.

France’s debt is over 60% of GDP, about the same as Canada’s, but their budget balance is headed in the other direction – fast. It will get faster:

But opposition Socialists said the budget had been aggravated by President Nicolas Sarkozy’s tax cuts — voted through after his May election — which is estimated to cost between 11 and 16 billion euros a year.

  It would appear that Sarkozy’s attempt to distract has the same motivation as that of an underperforming portfolio manager.

Things aren’t much better in Britain:

The U.K. had a larger budget deficit than economists forecast in August as spending jumped and revenue from profits fell, piling pressure on the government to save money as income from financial services dwindles.

The 9.1 billion-pound ($18.4 billion) shortfall was the highest for the month since records began in 1993, the Office for National Statistics said in London today. It exceeded the median 6.5 billion pounds forecast in a Bloomberg survey of 20 economists.

Debt stood at 36.7 percent of GDP in August.

The US Treasury is currently executing a three week test of pandemic preparedness:

One of the biggest challenges financial institutions will face is how to cope with absenteeism. In week one, the Treasury exercise directs the financial organizations to assume that 25 per cent of their work force is not coming to work, either because of illness or because of fear of being infected or because they are staying home to take care of children who can’t go to school because the schools have closed.

To decide who is absent, the Treasury directs the institutions to assume that everyone whose last name begins with certain letters, which could cover the bank president down to the local teller, cannot come to work. The 25 per cent absentee rate will jump to 49 per cent in week two.

Holy smokes! The mind boggles at the thought of 49% absenteeism across the entire financial sector … as, I guess, it’s supposed to do. Something on this level will definitely uncover a few weak links … let’s hope we never find out if they were all fixed.

Accrued Interest has posted a fascinating discourse on CDOs and I am very hopeful that the comments will help me understand what all the fuss is about. I’ve also referenced this post on my post about the IMF’s recommendation.

In one of the Harper government’s finest moments of leadership, Flaherty has announced a committee:

In his speech to a gathering of derivatives specialists, Flaherty also reiterated his call for the creation of a common securities regulator that would replace Canada’s 13 regulators.

Flaherty said he expects to name in the next two or three weeks members of an expert panel being created to advise the federal, provincial and territorial governments on how to address the issue. He would expect to hear recommendations from the panel within eight months of its creation.

I’m holding my breath, Mr. Flaherty! Please tell them to hurry!

US equities fell a bit which was blamed on the market’s astonishment that the credit crunch isn’t over yet. And it’s been going on for almost six weeks! Fortunately, the sad news did not reach the TSX.

Treasuries were quiet and Canadas were quieter.

Preferreds also had a quiet day but volume, while restrained, remained within normal boundaries.

*Senior moment alert! Does the phrase “Abu Dhabi Honeymoon” ring a bell with anybody besides me? I was convinced it was a movie title, but it’s not listed on IMDB. Maybe it was a fake movie that the Flintstones went to see, or something? Please help!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.75% 4.71% 1,151,159 15.82 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.78% 98,879 15.78 8 -0.1950% 1,031.2
Floater 4.47% 1.82% 83,411 10.78 3 +0.1914% 1,050.1
Op. Retract 4.83% 3.95% 75,702 3.04 15 -0.0168% 1,029.4
Split-Share 5.15% 4.86% 96,480 3.84 13 -0.0402% 1,044.3
Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.63% 65,200 4.26 3 +1.1958% 1,043.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.48% 5.13% 90,394 5.68 24 +0.0733% 1,030.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 242,321 15.33 38 -0.0528% 985.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixFloat -1.4845%  
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +3.0405% Asset coverage of slightly under 1.8:1 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.59% (almost all as interest) based on a bid of 9.15 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet 74,967 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.19% based on a bid of 26.40 and a call 2008-10-30 at 25.75.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 23,200 National Bank crossed 20,000 at 23.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.93% based on a bid of 23.12 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 21,150 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.85% based on a bid of 23.51 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount 20,400 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.90% based on a bid of 22.90 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 14,900 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.90% based on a bid of 22.80 and a limitMaturity.

There were nine other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

DW.PR.A, DC.PR.A Not Directly Affected by CI Financial Bid

CI Financial has announced an unsolicited bid for Dundee Wealth:

for a price equal to $20.25 per share, representing a premium of approximately $6.94 or 52% per common share based on today’s closing price of DundeeWealth of $13.31.

The preferred shares are not mentioned in the press release.

DW.PR.A soared on September 18, presumably on the grounds that the deal with Scotiabank made them a much better credit than their current Pfd-3 rating from DBRS.

DC.PR.A (which used to be DBC.PR.A) has not moved much in the past week, but that might change – Dundee (DC) owns 50% of Dundee Wealth (DW). Making a fat chunk of change on DW and monetizing the asset could possibly affect the current Pfd-3(low) [DBRS] credit rating on DC.PR.A.

Who knows? It’s certainly not the kind of thing I like to bet on, but the Credit Anticipation players will be sharpening their pencils tonight. The following language from the prospectus of DW.PR.A is interesting:

On and after March 13, 2007, the Company may, at its option, upon not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days prior written notice, redeem for cash the Series 1 Shares, in whole at any time or in part from time to time, at $27.25 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2007, but before March 13, 2008, at $27.00 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2008, but before March 13, 2009, at $26.75 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2009, but before March 13, 2010, at $26.50 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2010, but before March 13, 2011, at $26.25 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2011, but before March 13, 2012, at $26.00 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2012, but before March 13, 2013, at $25.75 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2013, but before March 13, 2014, at $25.50 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2014, but before March 13, 2015, at $25.25 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2015, but before March 13, 2016 and at $25.00 thereafter (each, a “Redemption Price”), plus, in each case, all accrued and unpaid dividends up to but excluding the date fixed for redemption, provided that any redemptions prior to March 13, 2012 shall be limited to circumstances in which the Series 1 Shares are entitled to vote separately as a class or series by law. Notice of any such redemption to occur prior to March 13, 2012 may be provided by the Company at any time and from time to time prior to a meeting of shareholders of the Company at which holders of Series 1 Shares are entitled to vote separately as a class or series and for which a record date has been established, and during the period of 10 days following the holding of such meeting. On and after March 13, 2007 and prior to March 13, 2017, the Company may, at its option, upon not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days prior written notice, subject, if required, to regulatory approvals, convert the outstanding Series 1 Shares into freely tradeable Common Shares, provided that any conversions rior to March 13, 2012 shall be limited to circumstances in which the Series 1 Shares are entitled to vote separately as a class or series by law.

I do not believe the preferred shareholders will be entitled to vote separately on anything that has been announced to date … but I am neither a lawyer nor a clairvoyant!

Issue Comments

S&P Downgrades BCE – Preferreds Unaffected

S&P has announced:

it lowered its long-term corporate credit ratings on Montreal, Que.-based holding company BCE Inc. and wholly owned subsidiary Bell Canada to ‘BB-‘ from ‘A-‘. The ratings on both companies remain on CreditWatch with negative implications where they were placed April 17, 2007.

The ratings on BCE’s C$2.77 billion preferred shares are also unchanged because we expect these to be redeemed as well. Once the tender is completed, we will withdraw these ratings. However, the ratings on these securities could
be lowered if they are not redeemed as planned.

In addition, we lowered the ratings on about C$4.9 billion of Bell Canada senior unsecured debentures outstanding (which we do not expect will be redeemed) to ‘BB+’ from ‘A-‘, reflecting what we think is the best possible outcome based on publicly available information on the LBO.

The multinotch downgrade reflects our view that BCE no longer possesses an investment-grade financial policy given the high degree of certainty that the LBO will be finalized shortly. On a pro forma basis, the company will have a highly leveraged capital structure, weakened credit measures, and significantly reduced cash flow-generating capability owing to its LBO and associated heavy interest burden.

S&P has had BCE on Credit Watch negative for quite some time. The BCE/Teachers deal was last reviewed here on August 10.

Regulation

IMF Calls for New Credit Rating Scale

As reported today by Bloomberg:

The IMF, which is charged with promoting global economic stability and lends to financially distressed nations, blamed the crisis on “benign economic and financial conditions” which “weakened incentives to conduct due diligence on borrowers and counterparties.”The fund also said the methodology of credit-rating companies, some of which gave high ratings to subprime mortgage securities that have plummeted in value, needs to be examined. The complexity of many of these securities may have made it difficult for investors to assess their worth based on the assigned ratings.

“In the case of complex structured credit products, investors need to look behind the ratings,” the report said.

Regulators and investors will have to work together to strengthen financial markets to prevent a recurrence, and develop ways to improve the spread of accurate and timely information to help markets assess risk, the report said.

Parts of this report are available at the IMF site. In Chapter 1 they urge:

The need for a differentiated scale of credit ratings has
again been made apparent.

The fallout in the mortgage market has drawn attention to the role of credit ratings agencies in structured credit markets. Less sophisticated investors, who were content to delegate the risk assessment of their positions to the credit ratings agencies, were negatively surprised by the intensity of downgrades. Previous GFSRs have pointed out that structured credit products are likely to suffer more severe, multiple-notch downgrades relative to the typically smoother downgrade paths of corporate bonds (IMF, 2006). The experience of the past year has underscored the need for further efforts to inform investors of these risks, but better still would be the introduction by ratings agencies of a more differentiated scale for structured credit products. For example, a special rating scale for structured credits could be introduced to highlight to investors that they should expect a higher speed of migration between ratings than on a traditional corporate bond.

The section (page 37 of the PDF) ends with some sound advice for institutional investors; sadly, it does not advocate that institutional investors who bought CDOs without understanding them seek retraining as ditch diggers. The closest they get to advocating this urgently needed market reform is elsewhere in the document:

Finally, credit ratings evaluate only default risk, and not market or liquidity risks, and this seems to have been underappreciated by many investors.

Which isn’t really very close, is it? Ah, well, perhaps someday.

Update: Accrued Interest has some explanations and suggestions for the CDO market.

Publications

Research : Yield from On-Line Calculator

Most readers will know about my article Yield Ahead, which I link in various places with:

In that article – and on this blog, right hand column, under “On-Line Resources” – I recommend Keith Betty’s On-Line Yield Calculator as a method whereby retail investors may quickly and easily calculate the yields to the various call dates for any given preferred issue, once they know its characteristics. I have published characteristics for the issues tracked by HIMIPref™ at PrefInfo.com:

Keith recently received a note from a market practitioner stating that “the formula in U105 should be =((1+((U104+1)^0.25-1))^4)-1 for the quarterly yield”, as opposed to the current formula, =4*((U104+1)^0.25-1) and asked what I thought.

To think about this, we first have to get rid of Excel Spreadsheet cell references. Let’s refer to the existing formula as (A) and the suggested formula as (B). We’ll also let the internal rate of return on the cash flows be “r”. Therefore:

(A) 4*((1+r)^0.25 – 1)

(B) ((1+((1+r)^0.25 -1))^4 – 1

It’s now easier to see that the expression (1+r)^0.25 appears in both expressions; this is the quarterly rate of return; we’ll set that equal to R, so:

(A) 4R

(B) (1+R)^4 – 1

Now we know what we’re talking about, which is always a pleasant state of affairs! Keith’s formula, (A), converts the quarterly value to annual without compounding (many, including myself, will refer to this as a simple yield), while the suggested formula, (B), converts the quarterly value to annual with compounding.

Once I had realized this, I basically shrugged my shoulders and drew my own conclusions, which I’ll explain at the end of this post. But I poked around in some reference material anyway and found, in Choudhry, Analysing and Interpreting the Yield Curve, Wiley Finance 2004, ISBN 9780470821251, page 22:

The market convention is sometimes simply to double the semi-annual yield to obtain the annualized yields, despite the fact that this produces an inaccurate result. It is only acceptable to do this for rough calculations. An annualized yield obtained by multiplying the semi-annual yield by two is known as a ‘bond equivalent yield’.

Well, I haven’t heard that definition of “bond equivalent yield” before, but if Choudhry has and wants to state it as a convention, I won’t complain.

Anyway … Keith’s point is that formula (A) ties in with material he gets from brokerage houses and that (i) he is therefore justified in referring to it as a market convention, and (ii) the spreadsheet will be more valuable to users if it is compatible with calculations shown by brokerages houses.

I agree with him; I also don’t think it matters very much.

All the math on the spreadsheet is accessible to the user; anybody sophisticated enough to ask the question can get the answer very easily and revise the spreadsheet for his own needs very easily. So as a practical matter, I don’t think it matters.

Additionally, it should be noted very carefully that the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) calculation assigns the same yield to every cash flow. This implies that (i) the yield curve is flat and (ii) all cashflows may be reinvested at this yield. Since it is known that these implications are both completely bogus, I take the view that worrying about the difference in presentation between formulae (A) and (B) is basically a waste of time.

And finally, another practical point: the purpose of the spreadsheet is to provide a tool for an apples/apples comparison between two sets of cash-flows. To the limits imposed by the calculation of IRR, that’s exactly what it does.

And, finally finally, I had a look at Bloomberg, on the grounds that nowadays the phrase “market convention” has an identical meaning to “the way Bloomberg does it”. What they refer to as “Actual” yield (as opposed to “S/A Street” yield) is pretty close to that given by formula (A), but not precisely. I looked at it for a while and, frankly, I don’t know how the $%##! they come up with their number.

Update: In looking at this again, I note that there are too many brackets in equation (B). It simplifies to:

= (1+((1+r)^0.25 – 1))^4 – 1

= (1+ (1+r)^0.25 – 1)^4 – 1

= ((1+r)^0.25)^4 – 1

= 1 + r – 1

= r

Update, 2007-10-28: This issue has reared its head again with respect to Modified Duration and is discussed in the post Research : Modified Duration.

It should also be noted that – in complete accordance with the convention that Keith has applied – a new issue preferred priced at $25.00 with an annual dividend of $1.20 paid quarterly is advertised as having a yield of 4.80%. If we were to use the IRR method suggested by Keith’s correspondent, we would be forced to advertise the yield as (1.012)^4 – 1 = 4.887% … and salesmen would be getting a lot of angry calls from clients.

Interesting External Papers

The Panic of 1907

I recently became embroiled in a discussion of the recent Fed Rate cut, in which a casual mention of J.P.Morgan and his role in resolving the Panic of 1907 became a surprisingly controversial issue.

I might put together a short piece at some point regarding the Panic – until then I will content myself with listing references:

Panic of 1907, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Tallman & Moen, 2007, Role of Clearinghouse Certificates

Moen & Tallman, 1999 Differentiation of 1907 Panic from others

Moen & Tallman, 1995, Comparison of New York vs. Chicago Clearinghouses in 1907

Wall Street, A History, Charles R. Geisst 1997, ISBN 0-19-511512-0

Update, 2007-10-15:

Tallman & Moen, 1990, Lessons from the Panic of 1907

The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market’s Perfect Storm, R.F.Bruner & Sean D. Carr, ISBN 978-0-470-15263-8

Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919).  An Autobiography.  1913. (Appendix A deals with the US Steel takeover of Tennessee Coal & Iron, which apparently became a political football).

Update, 2007-10-16:

Football indeed! Richard Jensen claims:

In October 1911, Taft’s Justice Department charged US Steel with antitrust violations in the TCI deal–leaving TR’s integrity under a cloud. That was the last straw for Roosevelt, as he decided to challenge Taft for the Republican nomination for president.

Update, 2010-7-6: Mr Joseph S Tracy, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, suggests that the Credit Crunch be referred to as the “Panic of 2007”, given all the similarities in the trigger.

Market Action

September 21, 2007

More Teachers’ / BCE news! I don’t think anybody will be surprised to learn that:

The arrangement was approved this morning at a Special Meeting of shareholders by more than 97% of the votes cast by holders of common and preferred shares, voting as a single class, greatly exceeding the required 66 2/3% approval. Of the total outstanding common and preferred shares, 62.5% were voted at the meeting either in person or by proxy.

In a sign that things are starting to return to normal, junk bond indices hit a two-month high amidst signs that deals are starting to move off the dealers’ balance sheets. I should stress here that by “normal” I do not mean “good”. What I mean is that we are returning to an environment in which investors are willing to take a look at possible trades and price them according to normal risk/return forecasts, rather than simply sitting on cash, petrified by fear.

In what must be taken as a good sign of this, it looks like the buy-out of Harman International Industries is dead:

Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. abandoned their $8 billion takeover of Harman International Industries Inc., maker of Infinity and JBL audio equipment, citing a decline in the firm’s performance. 

Issuance is, in fact, picking up a bit:

R.H. Donnelley, the biggest independent publisher of Yellow Pages telephone directories, led the biggest week for junk bond sales since July after the Federal Reserve’s rate cut spurred demand for high-yield, high-risk debt.

Speculative-grade borrowers issued $1.83 billion of fixed- income securities, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Corporate bond sales totaled $28.2 billion, compared with $26.6 billion last week and the average this year of $23.4 billion. Cary, North Carolina-based R.H. Donnelley sold $1 billion of bonds to repay debt, increasing the offering from $650 million.

Junk-rated companies sold bonds for the first time in three weeks as the Fed’s half-percentage-point reduction in its benchmark rate on Sept. 18 helped lower the yield premium that companies pay to borrow over similar maturity Treasuries by the most in four years, Merrill Lynch & Co. index data show.

While in signs that nobody really expects a return to frenetic trading levels, RBC fired 40 US bond salesmen and HSBC is closing its sub-prime business, which will throw 750 out of work.

US equities rose, capping a fine week (send a thank-you not to Bernanke) as did those in Canada.

Treasuries managed a dead-cat bounce, as did Canadas

The pref market was unable to sustain yesterday’s volume increases, but put in a good solid performance. The perpetuals look a little uncertain – whether that’s worries over inflation or simply noise, I cannot begin to guess.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.78% 4.73% 1,199,037 15.79 1 +0.0816% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.84% 4.76% 99,084 15.81 8 +0.1900% 1,033.2
Floater 4.48% 1.82% 84,779 10.76 3 +0.2204% 1,048.1
Op. Retract 4.83% 3.95% 75,683 3.95 15 +0.0518% 1,029.5
Split-Share 5.14% 4.85% 97,022 3.85 13 +0.1336% 1,044.7
Interest Bearing 6.33% 6.81% 65,781 4.24 3 -0.5426% 1,030.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.49% 5.11% 90,557 6.04 24 -0.0623% 1,030.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 244,031 15.34 38 -0.0404% 985.8
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.9868% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of September 14, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.10% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 8.88 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +2.3245% Asset coverage of just over 3.8:1 according to the company. Today’s performance almost wipes out yesterday’s losses. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.86% based on a bid of 22.01 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BPO.PR.I Scraps (would be OpRet, but there are credit concerns) 299,105 Scotia crossed 297,900 at 25.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.59% based on a bid of 25.46 and a softMaturity 2010-12-31 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat 110,800 RBC bought 68,200 from MacDougall at 24.65, then crossed 38,200 at the same price.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 51,900 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 22.85. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.89% based on a bid of 22.80 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.H OpRet 51,000 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.88% based on a bid of 26.20 and a call 2008-10-30 at 25.75.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 28,694 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 24.47 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet 27,703 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.62% based on a bid of 25.88 and a call 2009-4-30 at 25.50.

There were nine other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.