Miscellaneous News

US TIPS: 5-Year Issue in Danger

As reported by Bloomberg, an advisory committee to the Treasury has recommended:

The Committee generally agreed that an increase of average maturity in the TIPS program would be best accomplished by reducing or eliminating 5-year TIPS issuance. There was general agreement that given the excess cost to date and the non-transient liquidity premium of TIPS, inflation indexed secruties over the past 10 years have proven to be a less efficient funding mechanism given Treasury’s objective of the lowest cost of borrowing over time. The Committee also reiterated its previous suggestion of moderating the growth of the program and eliminating 5-year TIPS issuance.

Director Ramanathan responded by stating that Treasury remained committed to the TIPS, but that a moderation in the growth of the program has occurred given the pace of issuance ver the past ten years relative to nominal issuance.

A detailed report is alluded to in the linked minutes, but … I can’t find it! Any help on this will be gratefully appreciated.

The discussion, as reported in the report and the minutes, seems to indicate a conclusion that the liquidity premium paid by Treasury outweighs the inflation risk premium recieved (or, more precisely, not paid) by Treasury. The importance of the liquidity premium is researched by the Cleveland Fed.

Sadly, I have not had a chance to read the BIS Quarterly Review article on inflation-indexed bonds with this conclusion firmly in mind.

Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: August, 2008

HIMI Index Changes, August 29, 2008
Issue From To Because
FAL.PR.B FixFloat Scraps Volume
PWF.PR.D OpRet Scraps Volume
ACO.PR.A OpRet Scraps Volume
TRI.PR.B Floater Scraps Volume

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during August 2008
Issue Action Index Because
RY.PR.K Delete OpRet Redeemed

It was a near-run thing … but despite the good performance of the PerpetualDiscount index, none of the issues made it over par and CL.PR.B remains the sole PerpetualPremium issue outstanding.

Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performers: August, 2008

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

August, 2008
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “August 29”)
BNA.PR.C SplitShare Pfd-2(low) -2.55% Asset coverage of 3.3+:1 as of July 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 9.34% based on a bid of 16.88 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.17% to call 2009-10-31) and BNA.PR.B (8.88% to 2016-3-25). See also a comparison with BAM perps.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare Pfd-2(low) -1.1520% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.88% based on a bid of 19.71 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. See above for comparators.
FTN.PR.A SplitShare Pfd-2 -0.8721% Asset coverage of just under 2.0:1 as of August 15 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 9.77 and a hardMaturity 2015-12-1 at 10.00.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare Pfd-2(low) -0.7751% Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of August 15 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 9.74 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.O OpRet Pfd-2(low) -0.2183% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.42% based on a bid of 22.85 and optionCertainty 2013-6-30. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.90% to 2012-3-30), BAM.PR.I (5.44% to 2013-12-30) and BAM.PR.J (6.27% to 2018-3-30).
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 [Trend Negative] +7.3690% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.53% based on a bid of 18.65 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) +7.6471% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.08% based on a bid of 20.13 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) +7.7452% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.87% based on a bid of 23.51 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 [Trend Negative] +8.3236% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.40% based on a bid of 18.61 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(high) +8.5523% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 21.07 and a limitMaturity.

Regulation

TD Capital to Issue Asset-Backed Tier 1 Paper

TD has announced:

that TD Capital Trust III, a subsidiary of TDBFG, and TDBFG have filed a preliminary prospectus with the securities regulatory authorities in each of the provinces and territories of Canada with respect to a proposed public offering of TD Capital Trust III Securities – Series 2008 (“TD CaTS III”). TDBFG anticipates the issuance of TD CaTS III to constitute Tier 1 Capital of TDBFG.

The preliminary prospectus (available on SEDAR) states:

The Initial Trust Assets will consist primarily of Co-Ownership Interests acquired by the Trust under the Sales, Pooling and Servicing Agreements and the Purchase Agreements (each as defined herein). The Trust Assets may consist of Residential Mortgages, Co-Ownership Interests, Mortgage-Backed Securities, Eligible Investments (each as defined herein) and contractual rights in respect of the activities and operations of the Trust (the “Eligible Trust Assets”).

Issue size and coupon has not yet been disclosed.

As with the National Bank issue:

So it’s ASSET-BACKED, not loan backed. This issue simply goes further to show that cumulative coupons to enable the issuance of Loan Based Tier 1 paper are not necessary; OSFI should rescind its ill-advised draft advisory, which rescues the loan-backed structure at the expense of non-cumulativity.

I have made OSFI aware of my views on this matter.

Regulation

Swiss Bank Regulator to Impose Assets-to-Capital Multiple Cap

Bloomberg has reported:

Switzerland’s Federal Banking Commission will go ahead with a plan to cap the amount of assets that UBS AG and Credit Suisse Group AG can accumulate in relation to their capital, Chairman Eugen Haltiner said.

“We are going ahead with the leverage ratio,” Haltiner said in an interview at a conference in Zurich today. The commission has received the banks’ replies to its proposal and is now discussing details, such as an exact definition of the ratio, he added. “We plan to introduce the new rules by the end of the year at the latest.”

Haltiner declined to say how high the new capital requirement may be. The U.K. Financial Services Authority may also be considering tighter capital requirements for banks, he said.

“We had a good dialogue with the FSA and their first reaction was that capital wasn’t the first priority because the problems of U.K. banks were on the liquidity side,” he said. “In the meantime, the FSA is also reconsidering capital requirements.”

Risk-weighted capital rules “made a mess in the end” because they didn’t require capital to be held against assets such as subprime mortgages, relying purely on bonds’ ratings, Haltiner said. UBS, which took more than $43 billion of subprime- related writedowns, had to raise almost $28 billion of capital from shareholders and investors in Singapore and the Middle East this year.

This is important. As far as I am aware, only Canada and the US currently impose an Assets-to-Capital Multiple Cap (in the US, it’s called the leverage ratio), but it now appears as if this belt-and-suspenders approach to bank regulation is catching on … at least a little bit.

The post Bank Regulation: The Assets to Capital Multiple includes a chart from the IMF showing just how extreme the leverage of UBS and Credit Suisse became.

This is a good policy move. At present there is no official information on the Swiss regulator’s website.

New Issues

New Issue: TD Fixed-Reset 5.00%+196bp

TD Bank has announced:

it has entered into an agreement with a group of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc. for an issue of 8 million non-cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series AA (the “Series AA Shares”), carrying a face value of $25.00 per share, to raise gross proceeds of $ 200 million.

TDBFG intends to file in Canada a prospectus supplement to its January 11, 2007 base shelf prospectus in respect of this issue.

TDBFG has also granted the underwriters an option to purchase, on the same terms, up to an additional 2 million Series AA Shares. This option is exercisable in whole or in part by the underwriters at any time up to two business days prior to closing. The maximum gross proceeds raised under the offering will be $250 million should this option be exercised in full.

The Series AA Shares will yield 5.00% annually, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of TDBFG, for the initial period ending January 31, 2014. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a level of 196 basis points over the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield.

Holders of the Series AA Shares will have the right to convert their shares into non-cumulative Floating Rate Class A Preferred Shares, Series AB (the “Series AB Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on January 31, 2014, and on January 31st every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series AA Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of TDBFG, equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 196 basis points.

The issue is anticipated to qualify as Tier 1 capital for TDBFG and the expected closing date is September 12, 2008.

Issue: Toronto-Dominion Bank (The) Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series AA

Size: 8-million shares (=$200-million), greenshoe for another 2-million shares (=$50-million prior to closing.

Ratings: DBRS, Pfd-1; S&P, P-1(Low); Moody’s, Aa2

Dividend: 5.00% p.a., paid quarterly, reset every exchange date to 5-Year Canadas +196bp.

Exchange Dates: January 31, 2014 and every five years thereafter.

Exchange: Exchangeable to and from Series AB, which pays 90-day T-Bills + 196bp, reset quarterly.

Redemption: Series AA (the fixed) are redeemable (at issuer’s option, remember!) every exchange date at $25.00. Series AB (the floater) are redeemable every exchange date at $25.00 and at $25.50 at all other times.

So now there are ten … and I will have to redeem my intention to add these Fixed-Reset thingies to the HIMIPref™ universe … this would have to happen at month-end! I’ll aim for next Monday, the 8th.

Interesting External Papers

BIS releases Quarterly Review

The Bank for International Settlements has released its September 2008 Quarterly Review, filled, as usual, with many fascinating graphs, analysis and informational tidbits.

Unfortunately, this was released at a time when I am buried up to my neck with month-end duties, so I cannot review the articles thoroughly at this time. I have, however, scanned Peter Hördahl’s The inflation risk premium in the term structure of interest rates, as well as The ABX: how do the markets price subprime mortgage risk? by Ingo Fender and Martin Scheicher. Good stuff – I might have time to review them thoroughly next week – I might not – read it yourselves!

Other features, of less personal interest to me are

as well as a review of international banking and financial market developments. In general terms, I heartily recommend reading these reports by international bodies because, unlike absolutely everybody else who will attempt to explain the financial world, these people are not trying to sell you anything – not even a copy of the daily newspaper. What bias they do have is limited to the occasional “regulation = good” reference.

Market Action

August 29, 2008

The Bank of China has cut its GSE holdings by 25%, according to a Financial Times piece passed on by Naked Capitalism:

The sale by China’s fourth largest commercial bank, which reduced its holdings of so-called agency debt by $4.6bn, is a sign of nervousness among foreign buyers of Fannie and Freddie’s bonds and guaranteed securities.

However, MBS spreads have narrowed over the past month:

The difference between yields on Fannie Mae’s current-coupon 30-year fixed-rate bonds and 10-year government notes narrowed 10 basis points this week to 197 basis points, data compiled by Bloomberg show, reducing the cost of new home loans. The spread fell from 215 basis points on Aug. 18, the widest since March, when the gap set a 22-year high of 238 basis points.

The MCDX index (of credit default swaps on US Munis; briefly mentioned May 23; aspersions were cast May 7) is being circled by vultures. Accrued Interest suggests a spread trade against corporates, but:

I think at some point, arbitragers will put this trade on, and it will expose a lack of deep liquidity in the contract. Talking to various traders, it looks like much of the trading in the MCDX has been macro hedgers, not betting on munis in particular, but using municipals as a means of hedging against a disaster event.

I’m not entirely convinced of the goodness of this hedge. Sure, there’s a positive carry. But there’s a big size-mismatch, which can be thought of as an enormous – infinite, actually, until you actually put some capital into the deal – duration mismatch. And I must say, I’m rather surprised that Accrued Interest did not pass on, or take a stab at estimating, the basis for this trade (which is to say, the spread vs. cash bonds). In the corporate arena, the basis is negative as often as not; with all the auction rate failures I would not be in the least bit surprised to learn that the basis is bigger … but I won’t go too far out on that limb, because Munis are easier to margin (I think; based simply on their risk-weight for banks).

Anyway, why would I want to sell protection? Why wouldn’t I just buy cash bonds?

If I were a betting man, I’d bet that Accrued Interest has such a great long weekend planned that he listened, first idly, then more seriously to one of the salesmen cowboys and wrote the post to help organize his thoughts. I note that according to Bloomberg, 5-year Munis yield 2.87%, while 5-Year AAA Banking & Finance paper yields 4.91%. AI states that the MCDX contract trades at 86.25bp and CDX IG [Corporate Investment Grade] at 144bp. Hmm… I’m going to have to think about this over the weekend myself, and try to figure out what the tax effects are doing!

It is perhaps not coincidental that this opinion was published on the same day that Jefferson County managed to stave off default for another month.

And another US bank went bust:

Integrity Bank, with $1.1 billion in assets and $974 million in deposits, was shuttered by the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Regions Financial Corp., Alabama’s biggest bank, will assume all deposits from Integrity, which was run by Integrity Bancshares Inc. The failed bank’s five offices will open on Sept. 2 as branches of Regions, the FDIC said.

Regions will buy about $34.4 million in assets and will pay the FDIC a premium of 1.01 percent to assume the failed bank’s deposits, the FDIC said. The FDIC estimates the cost of the Integrity failure to its deposit-insurance fund will be $250 million to $300 million.

And that’s another month done! Twenty trading days and PerpetualDiscounts were down on only four of them, returning a total of +3.91%. The total return index is now back to just below where it was on June 26 … but is still 4.90% below its May 30 level, which puts things in perspective a bit.

The weighted average pre-tax bid-YTW is 6.11%, equivalent to 8.55% interest at the standard 1.4x equivalency factor. Long Corporates were down on the month, with significant widening against Canadas; they now yield about 6.20%, so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread is now 235bp … still pretty wide!

The fund did quite well on the month. I have a back of an envelope calculation indicating that the portfolio’s gross return (before fees and expenses) was comfortably in excess of 5.50%, so I’m pretty happy about that. Turnover was a little in excess of 100% – take that, passive advocates! Commissions are significant, but market impact and spread costs can be … negative.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A
Fixed-Floater 4.60% 4.38% 57,812 16.40 7 -0.0346% 1,113.5
Floater 4.05% 4.09% 42.354 17.16 3 -0.3538% 911.6
Op. Retract 4.97% 3.92% 109,916 2.80 17 -0.0238% 1,054.4
Split-Share 5.35% 5.85% 54,962 4.36 14 -0.0009% 1,042.9
Interest Bearing 6.25% 6.62% 46,848 5.26 2 0.0510% 1,129.8
Perpetual-Premium 6.16% 5.41% 63,809 2.25 1 0.0000% 1,007.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.05% 6.11% 192,930 13.75 70 +0.3506% 881.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.0764%  
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.0357% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.06% based on a bid of 19.11 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.0309% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 19.60 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.0706% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.60% based on a bid of 20.77 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +2.0399% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.87% based on a bid of 23.51 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +2.0833% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 21.07 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +2.3200% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.05% based on a bid of 17.20 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +2.9573% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 18.80 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 106,267 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 18.80. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 18.81 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.O OpRet 31,526 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.42% based on a bid of 22.85 and optionCertainty 2013-6-30. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.90% to 2012-3-30), BAM.PR.I (5.44% to 2013-12-30) and BAM.PR.J (6.27% to 2018-3-30). Nice yield … nice volume. Could it be that the underwriters have finally found a clearing price for this issue?
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 31,120 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 18.77 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount 27,446 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.72% based on a bid of 24.75 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 27,000 Anonymous bought 10,000 from Nesbitt at 19.20. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.04% based on a bid of 19.20 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

ES.PR.B: Small Call for Redemption

Energy Split Corp. has announced:

that it has called 24,300 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on September 16, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 1.110% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 253,600 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on September 15, 2008 will have approximately 1.110% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $21.00 per share.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including September 16, 2008.

Payment of the amount due to holders of Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on September 16, 2008. From and after September 16, 2008 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any right in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

ES.PR.B was last mentioned on PrefBlog in connection with DBRS’s downgrade to Pfd-3(high) at this time last year, when asset coverage was 1.52:1. Asset coverage is 1.92:1 as of August 28 according to Scotia.

ES.PR.B is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Regulatory Capital

Bank Constraints: 3Q08

This updates a review of Canadian bank constraints for 2Q08.

Big-6 Bank Constraint Summary
3Q08
  Note RY BNS BMO TD CM NA
Equity Capital A 17,892 16,310 13,609 13,563 8,695 3,930
Tier 1 Cap B 24,150 22,075 18,047 17,491 11,626 5,534
Tier 2 Cap C 5,578 3,969 4,353 7,211 5,461 2,196
Total
Capital
D 29,728 26,044 22,400 24,702 17,087 7,730
Tier 1 Ratio E 9.5% 9.8% 9.9% 9.5% 9.8% 10.0%
Total Ratio F 11.7% 11.5% 12.3% 13.4% 14.4% 13.9%
Assets to
Capital
Multiple
G 19.4 17.8 15.9 17.9 17.7 15.7
RWA to
T1R = 7%
H +36% +40% +41% +36% +40% +43%
RWA to
TotR = 10%
I +17% +15% +23% +34% +44% +39%
Assets to
ACM = 20
J +3% +12% +26% +12% +13% +27%
Assets to
ACM = 23
K +19% +29% +45% +28% +30% +46%
A : See Bank Capitalization Summary : 3Q08
B, C, D, E, F: From Supplementary Packages

G: See source notes from Note A reference; some are my estimates
H: Percentage increase in Risk Weighted Assets that results in a Tier 1 Ratio of 7% [OSFI’s “Well Capitalized” benchmark]; = (E / 0.07 – 1) %
I: Percentage Increase in Risk Weighted Assets that results in a Total Capital Ratio of 10% [OSFI’s “Well Capitalized” Benchmark]; = (F / 0.10 -1) %
J: Percentage Increase in Assets that results in an Assets-to-Capital Multiple of 20x; = ((20 / G) – 1) %
K: Percentage Increase in Assets that results in an Assets-to-Capital Multiple of 23x; = ((23 / G) – 1) %
The limiting constraint is bolded.

In determining the limiting factor, it has been assumed that 23x is the actual limit for the Assets to Capital multiple; OSFI has stated that 23x is OK as long as they meet certain conditions and otherwise apply for permission. Given that OSFI maintains a veil of secrecy over the issue, it has been assumed that the 20x multiple is simply stated for decorative purposes.

It should also be noted that the calculation of the ACM has been recently revised by OSFI, with what I must say is rather weak justification.