November 9, 2007

November 9th, 2007

Well, there’s a day and a half!

US T-Bill yields plunged again and Fed Funds futures are now showing certainty of a cut to 4.25% in January, down from the current 4.5%. In what may be assumed to be related news, the Bank of Canada intervened to boost the overnight rate – presumably, there’s a lot of cash-equivalent money looking for a home.

There are alarming reports of gloomy consumers, but the direct catalyst is, as usual, more bad news from the banks. CIBC, ‘bank most likely to walk into a sharp object’, is taking a $463-million CDO/RMBS writedown, which offsets their gains from the VISA restructuring (TD has managed to hang on to its profit). Rumours that Barclays is looking at a big write-off triggered a temporary collapse of their share price, but they staggered back to more usual levels by the end of London’s trading day – Barclays’ CEO has stated “his refusal to comment on subprime writedowns indicates there is no truth to speculation about losses that wiped 29 percent off the bank’s market value in the past month”. Wachovia has disclosed $1.7-billion mark-to-market losses in October alone. Nouriel Roubini somewhat gleefully forecasts a total of $500-billion on a mark-to-market basis.

It’s almost a relief to see news of the first CDO liquidation:

Carina is the first CDO to begin unwinding after a slump in the credit worthiness of the underlying assets, S&P said. Thirteen others have informed S&P of an event of default, a precursor to liquidation. A widespread fire sale by CDOs, which package asset-backed securities and resell them in pieces, may further exacerbate declines in subprime-mortgage securities.

As these structures unwind it will become easier to sort out the winners from the losers … and easier for investors to price the assets!

On November 7 I made the comment:

Even worse, Citigroup has increased its exposure to CDO-issued CP, which has had the effect of ballooning the amount of Level 3 ‘Mark-to-Make-Believe’ assets. Citigroup’s cost of borrowing, as proxied through Credit Default Swaps, is skyrocketting.

I should make this more clear; banking & investment strategy is sometimes a little more complicated than can be summarized in a couple of casual sentences – particularly when discussing an institution that has more capital in the business than the Canadian Big Five-and-a-Half put together. It is not necessarily a Bad Thing for Citigroup to accumulate CDO paper and Level 3 assets. Panic has hit the markets and panics are the perfect time for an organization that has already done its homework to make an absolute killing taking unwanted assets off other people’s hands.

However, there are knock-on effects. If this same panic causes their borrowing costs (as proxied by CDS levels) to increase beyond the expected winnings, then the strategy becomes defunct. No matter how stupid the market is being in increasing the funding costs of such an investor. Blind fear in the marketplace can paralyze even a well-prepared investor.

What’s needed is for “real money” investors (those who will be perfectly happy holding on to the paper until maturity, like pension funds, retail investors and such, since they’re not completely at the mercy of mark-to-market; as opposed to “hot money” investors who want to flip it next week) to step up and buy the stuff. I suspect, however, that any pension fund manager who suggests such a plan at this stage of the game to an ordinary, unsophisticated pension board will get a blank stare and a chuckle instead of a mandate.

But at least one major player has gone bottom-fishing in the bond-insurers market:

MGIC Investment Corp. and PMI Group Inc., the two largest U.S. mortgage insurers, rose in New York trading after insurer Old Republic International Corp. disclosed it became the biggest investor in each company.

More news on the bond insurers’ front, as well. Fitch is reviewing the bond insurance industry, which may need to raise capital at one of the worst possible times to do so (typical!). Josef Ackerman, CEO of Deutsche, warns of a very strong impact on financial assets if a downgrade comes to pass, as has been previously stated by Accrued Interest. Naked Capitalism passes on the report that Fitch is outraged by the Financial Times misuse of technical terms in reporting the concerns … in times like this, when a misplaced comma in a Bernanke speech could cost billions, the technical guys want precision above all else! Two major municipal refinancings have been delayed due to market instability.

Naked Capitalism has a very good piece about Cuomo’s investigation of WaMu regarding possibly deliberately inflated appraisals of properties. I didn’t discuss it at the time, thinking it was just minor league grandstanding, but it seems more serious – especially since it appears Cuomo knows little about the business – or is disingenuously overstating his case. Lockhart’s letter, linked by Naked Capitalism, is priceless; Accrued Interest translates the refined prose into more every-day language.

However, I must take issue with Naked Capitalism’s characterization of the GSEs::

Cuomo astoundingly called the GSEs investment banks, and as the article points out, raises doubts about the value of their even though they are government backed. Huh? That is likely the basis for Lockhart’s “you may not understand remark.”

The last thing the securities market needs is doubts being cast on the creditworthiness of Freddie’s and Fannies’ paper.

GSEs are not, in fact, government backed. There is certainly a market perception that they are government backed … but if push comes to shove, Congress can let them rot. There is a very dangerous ambiguity in Fannie & Freddie’s status that should be clarified; they walk like banks, talk like banks and write cheques like banks – they should be regulated like banks. I often link to James Hamilton’s presentation to the Jackson Hole conference which addressed the issue: now I’ll link to it again. Speaking of Fannie Mae, they too aren’t doing too well in the current environment:

Fannie Mae, the biggest source of money for U.S. home loans, said its third-quarter loss more than doubled to $1.39 billion as a deepening housing slump increased mortgage delinquencies.

The net loss was caused by a $2.24 billion decline in the value of derivative contracts and $1.2 billion in credit losses among the $2.7 trillion of mortgage assets Fannie Mae owns or guarantees, the Washington-based company said today in a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filing.

Fannie Mae has a minimum capital requirement of $30-billion and maintains a 30% surplus over this figure. So say they’ve got twice the capital of Royal Bank (Fannie Mae is far more highly leveraged, due to the inadequacies of the legislation) … can you imagine the consternation if Royal Bank lost $700-million in a quarter?

A relatively calm day for preferreds, with good volume.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.87% 4.85% 178,816 15.71 2 0.0000% 1,046.0
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.82% 83,859 15.79 8 -0.0251% 1,046.4
Floater 4.49% 3.02% 65,567 10.66 3 +0.0441% 1,045.4
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.07% 76,109 3.64 16 +0.0294% 1,029.5
Split-Share 5.21% 5.18% 88,994 3.93 15 +0.2320% 1,035.5
Interest Bearing 6.30% 6.49% 61,650 3.54 4 -0.2005% 1,051.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.30% 80,477 5.95 11 +0.0191% 1,011.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.54% 5.57% 325,672 14.09 55 -0.0505% 912.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.1134% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 18.99 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet -1.5748% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.83% based on a bid of 25.00 and a softMaturity 2014-3-30 at 25.00.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.0753% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.66% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.20 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
DFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.0827% Asset coverage of over 2.9:1 as of October 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.84% based on a bid of 10.27 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.1241% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.59 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.A OpRet +1.2946% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.73% based on a bid of 25.82 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 218,007 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 20.53 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 123,295 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
FTN.PR.A SplitShare 102,500 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 10.07. Asset coverage of just over 2.7:1 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.79% based on a bid of 10.05 and a hardMaturity 2008-12-1 at 10.00.
EN.PR.A SplitShare 46,100 “Anonymous” bought 42,000 from E-Trade at 25.08. This one’s a little strange, so pay attention! Asset coverage is just over 1.8:1, according to Scotia Managed Companies. It is due for a hardMaturity at 25.00 on 2007-12-16. It currently pays $1.0628 annually, but this will reset to $1.25 if the proposed reorganization goes through. If the proposed reorganization goes through, the company will execute a partial redemption to get the coverage ratio up to 2.2:1. I’m not even going to TRY calculating a pre-tax bid-YTW!
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 39,700 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 24.27. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 24.27 and a limitMaturity.

There were eighteen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

EN.PR.A Dividend Rate Set at 5.00% … Maybe!

November 9th, 2007

As previously reported, the management of EN.PR.A is attempting to extend the term on this split-share corporation … why not, it’s a lot cheaper than having to underwrite a new one!

In accordance with the plan, Scotia Managed Companies announced today:

that pursuant to the Company’s reorganization the new fixed distribution rate on the ROC Preferred Shares is 5.00%. This represents an increase of 0.75% over the current fixed rate of 4.25% of the ROC Preferred Shares. If the reorganization is successful and based on the $25.00 issue price of the ROC Preferred Shares, holders of ROC Preferred Shares will be entitled to quarterly fixed distributions of $0.3125 effective December 16, 2007.

The new fixed distribution rate was determined based on a formula approved by holders of Capital Yield Shares and holders of ROC Preferred Shares at a special meeting held October 23, 2007. The formula provided for the rate to equal the greater of (i) 5.00% and (ii) the Government of Canada three year bond rate as at November 9, 2007 plus 0.75%, rounded down to the nearest 0.05%.

The reorganization will only be implemented if a minimum of 1,280,000 Capital Yield Shares remain issued and outstanding following exercise of the Special Retraction Right by holders on or before November 16, 2007. If this condition is not satisfied, the Company will redeem the Capital Yield Shares and the ROC Preferred Shares on December 16, 2007 as originally contemplated.

If the reorganization is implemented the ratio of Capital Yield Shares to ROC Preferred Shares will continue to be two-to-one and the asset coverage on the ROC Preferred Shares will be set at approximately 2.2 times to extend the current Pfd-2(low) rating. In order to achieve this, the Company may redeem ROC Preferred Shares which are not surrendered for retraction pursuant to the Special Retraction Right. The reorganization is not conditional on the rating being maintained.

So, now the preferred shareholders will know what they’re voting on, anyway! Frankly, 5% looks a little skimpy – not horrible, but a little skimpy – given the other three-year-ish split share paper that’s currently available.

EN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is not included in any of the indices due to low average volume. There are a mere 1,209,398 shares outstanding, according to the Toronto Stock Exchange.

HIMIPref™ and PrefInfo information will not be updated until it is known whether the reorganization has been effected. This should be announced on or just after November 16.

S&P to Time the Markets?

November 9th, 2007

It’s a short line in a short presentation … but it carries a lot of implications:

First, what can we do differently in the future? Self-reflection is the key. It is now clear that some of the assumptions we made with respect to rating U.S. RMBS backed by subprime mortgages were insufficient to stand up to what actually happened. In addition, some have questioned whether our detailed analytical processes led us to wait too long to react to data that suggested a deviation from the expected trends. So we are focusing on getting in place the data, analytics, and processes to enhance our ability to anticipate future trends and process information even more quickly. [emphasis added – JH]

This is a little bit scary. I’ve done a lot of quantitative modelling – my entire professional career has been spent doing quantitative modelling – and I can tell you two things:

  • Quantitative models do not do well when there is a trend change. This is because there is a lot more noise than signal in the market-place; a quant system will pick up the first one, two, three standard deviations as an exception that will revert before it changes the figure it takes as a base.
  • Ain’t nobody can predict a trend change with reproducible accuracy. At best, you can pick up on the stress on the system implied by your data and assign a probability to the idea that it’s a trend change … e.g., when housing prices decline by 2% in a quarter, there might be a 25% chance that it’s a trend change as opposed to a 75% chance that it’s just noise. Which is not to say that estimating the chances of a change in trend is not useful; but which does mean that assigning a lot of weight to the idea that house prices will continue to decline by 2%/quarter over the medium term is quite aggressive

I will have to see how S&P fleshes out this idea – and how much disclosure they make of their future projections as part of the credit rating process.

With respect to projecting trend changes, lets look at one of the more respective organizations in the business – the National Bureau of Economic Research. How well do they do in determining trend changes? As they say:

On November 26, 2001, the committee determined that the peak of economic activity had occurred in March of that year. For a discussion of the committee’s reasoning and the underlying evidence, see http://www.nber.org/cycles/november2001. The March 2001 peak marked the end of the expansion that began in March 1991, an expansion that lasted exactly 10 years and was the longest in the NBER’s chronology. On July 16, 2003, the committee determined that a trough in economic activity occurred in November 2001. The committee’s announcement of the trough is at http://www.nber.org/cycles/july2003. The trough marks the end of the recession that began in March 2001.

So it took the NBER over a year and a half to look at all the data and determine where the bottom was. And S&P – under pressure by thousands of bozos who could have predicted the credit crunch ever-so-much-better, except that nobody asked them to – is going to try and predict the future?

It’s a scary thought – I hope that the implementation of the plans outlined in the S&P presentation is very, very restrained.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : March 2003

November 9th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2003-3-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,355.4 2 2.00 4.78% 0.08 517M 4.10%
FixedFloater 1,990.6 9 2.00 4.11% 16.1 82M 5.51%
Floater 1,687.0 6 1.82 3.63% 17.4 105M 4.10%
OpRet 1,610.7 29 1.27 4.10% 2.6 130M 5.39%
SplitShare 1,586.3 9 1.78 4.39% 3.8 55M 5.65%
Interest-Bearing 1,910.4 9 2.00 6.88% 1.4 151M 7.99%
Perpetual-Premium 1,218.6 13 1.38 5.74% 6.6 225M 5.85%
Perpetual-Discount 1,339.8 15 1.59 5.92% 14.0 165M 5.82%

Index Constitution, 2003-03-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2003-03-31, Post-rebalancing

November 8, 2007

November 8th, 2007

Thursday! The day when the US Commercial Paper Outstandings get reported! The Fed reports that ABCP outstanding declined by $29.5-billion, a marked increase in pace over the past month, as deleveraging is quickly becoming a major issue in the States. Bloomberg provides a review.

Bernanke is clearly a reader of PrefBlog – his testimony to the Joint Economic Committe echoed what I’ve been saying about Super-Conduit:

So … if it works properly I think it would speed up the recognition of values in part because it would remove some of the risk of fire sales, of rapid drawing down of assets in some of these vehicles and allow the market to stabilize and begin to make a better longer term valuation of what these assets are worth.”

He added, “If that’s the way it works, and again it depends on execution, it would remove some overhang from the market, it would create a stable financing source for those assets and it ought not to be inconsistent with the price discovery process.”

Mainly, though, he just told the politicians on the committee to mind their own bees-wax. Good for him! He may have enough to worry about soon enough – there’s at least one analyst raising the spectre of 5% headline inflation as the Ghost of Christmas Present!

Despite this horrifying projection (noting that, gee, the projection for core inflation isn’t quite so bad), Treasuries were up on expectations of a Fed cut, as early indications point to a lousy Christmas for retailers

In SIV news that I missed yesterday … one of the SIVs affected by Moody’s mass review was Links Finance … proudly owned and operated by our very own Bank of Montreal:

Links Finance Corporation (US$1.9 billion of debt securities affected)

Mezzanine Capital Notes

New Rating: Aa2 on review for possible downgrade

Previous Rating: Aa2

Standard Capital Notes

New Rating: A3 on review for possible downgrade

Previous Rating: A3

Links Finance’s net asset value declined to 83% from 94% since Moody’s last review on September 5th. Moody’s review will focus on the potential for further market value deterioration.

Cheery, eh? There’s more:

Managers of structured investment vehicles don’t expect their business model to survive as the value of assets shrinks and the companies struggle to borrow, Moody’s Investors Service analysts said today.

Sic transit gloria mundi.

Apropos of nothing, I ran across a Ministry of Finance puff-piece today, which made the claim:

The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report for 2001-2002 ranked Canadian banks among the soundest financial institutions in the world (see Chart 5). The soundness of the Canadian banking industry has been demonstrated many times over the past several years. Canadian banks weathered the debt difficulties of the less developed countries in the early 1980s, the decline in real estate values a decade later, and the Asian crisis in the late 1990s without experiencing any systemic problems.

… which was kind of cool. Our second place finish has been repeated in the 2007-2008 Report, although you have to poke around a bit to verify that. (hint: Country Analysis / Balance Sheet).

And, as far as preferreds go … another day of entirely reasonable volume but disappointing returns. The long corporates index is now yielding just a hair under 5.8%. So let me think about this. You can get the same pre-tax yield with better quality owning GWO.PR.H, at the closing bid. Potential tax benefits – or potential capital gains when others recognize the potential tax benefits – are merely icing on the cake. If this makes sense to anybody, please let me know.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.88% 4.87% 195,800 15.69 2 -0.1019% 1,046.0
Fixed-Floater 4.82% 4.82% 84,428 15.80 8 -0.0450% 1,046.7
Floater 4.50% 4.53% 65,177 16.29 3 +0.0274% 1,044.9
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.01% 75,816 3.44 16 -0.1091% 1,029.2
Split-Share 5.22% 5.23% 87,953 3.93 15 -0.3404% 1,033.1
Interest Bearing 6.28% 6.50% 61,326 3.55 4 -0.3540% 1,053.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.44% 81,078 5.20 11 -0.1211% 1,011.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.53% 5.57% 328,877 14.32 55 -0.1159% 913.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.2634% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 23.75 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.7746% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.96% based on a bid of 20.48 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.4462% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare -1.1726% Asset coverage of over 1.7:1 as of October 31 according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 15.17 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00. OK, boys, over 7.50% interest-equivalent for well-secured three year paper. Whatever you say.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.1693% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.82% based on a bid of 21.13 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.1471% Asset coverage of over 3.8:1 as of July 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.22% based on a bid of 19.82 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. At an interest-equivalency factor of 1.4, this has now cracked the magic 10% interest-equivalent mark!
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.0346% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
ACO.PR.A OpRet -1.0101% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.65% based on a bid of 26.40 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.0194% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.81 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.5085% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.35% based on a bid of 20.86 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 62,215 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 20.66 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 44,290 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 21.80 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 23,850 On the one hand, I’m pleased to see good volume on this thing. On the other hand, why did it go down? BAM.A was up today, so it’s not necessarily a question of a sudden reassessment of credit quality. Or maybe these BAM.PR.Ns have been used as an equity substitute and people are now switching to the real thing? That’s way too sophisticated! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 23,477 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 23,145 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 20.88 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-three other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Update, 2007-11-09 Holy smokes! Yesterday I titled this “October 8” and have now changed it to, er, the right month. I had the day and year right! I must have been feeling nostalgic …

GWO.PR.E / GWO.PR.X Issuer Bid Update

November 8th, 2007

This has been rather a boring topic to update this year; in my last update I noted that there had been no purchases, unlike the good old days of substantial purchases.

GWO has recently released their Third Quarter Financials and, at last, we see some activity on this front, albeit not much.

In their Statement of Cash Flows, page 10 of the PDF, they have indicated that $1-million was spent to purchase and cancel preferred shares in the third quarter; note 12 to the financials, on page 25 of the PDF, indicates that this represents the cancellation of 40,400 shares of GWO.PR.E (so there’s obviously some rounding of the cash amount!).

Not much, perhaps, but we are reminded on page 24, Note 11(b), of the redemption of GWL.PR.L subsequent to quarter-end, which was worth $50-million.

MAPF Sustainable Income

November 8th, 2007

I received a call today from a client who is most concerned about the preferred share market in general and Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund in particular. It will not have escaped notice that the fund price has been declining in recent months – when will it end?

However, the most important thing about fixed-income investing – and an investment in preferred shares is, for broad asset allocation purposes, an investment in fixed income – is that it is represents an investment in fixed income. A very circular definition to be sure, but I hope my meaning will be made plain shortly.

From now on, I will report sustainable dividends per unit as part of my regular portfolio disclosures. This number will be calculated as follows:

SustDiv = NAVPU * PortYield / Leverage

where

  • SustDiv is the expected income per unit per year
  • NAVPU is the Net Asset Value Per Unit
  • PortYield is the Yield-to-Worst of the Portfolio
  • Leverage is the degree of leverage in the portfolio

First – I should emphasize that “Leverage” should not be taken as meaning that the fund is leveraged on a regular basis. The fund can often hold relatively large cash balances, either positive or negative, to facilitate trading. If I attempt to purchase one security and sell another, I might not get filled on both sides to the same extent. If I don’t, I won’t force the cash to zero, by buying or selling something at whatever price it takes … I’ll (generally) wait until the next day and patiently wait until the market cooperates. These cash positions are normally wiped out fairly quickly – but when they exist at month end, the fund reporting can look a little odd! Note that in the table below, most of the “Leverage Factors” are less than 1.0, indicating that the fund was holding cash until it could be invested advantageously.

While the figures for Sustainable Income have been worked out in a mathematically precise manner, I must caution investors that these amounts will not necessarily be paid out to them in four equal installments annually. As may be seen from the historical distributions recorded on the Quarterly Performance Reporting Page, distributions are ‘lumpy’. This results from several factors:

  • Sometimes, the market wants to capture the dividend a lot more than I want to keep it! Let us say that an issue is fairly priced at $25.00 (flat) and earns a $0.30 dividend tomorrow. The market price should be $25.30. Sometimes, the market really wants to capture the dividend, and the price goes up to $25.40. Why would I keep the issue? Why not just sell, and take $0.40 as a capital gain, instead of $0.30 as a dividend? I don’t have a good answer for that … so I sell. Naysayers may whine that this requires me to have a fairly good idea of what the “fair price” is … but that’s what I do!
  • Sometimes I want to capture the dividend more than the market wants to keep it. Perhaps, in the above example, the market price of the issue is only $25.20. Well – I’ll be trying to buy it! If I can get it at that price then I will earn a $0.30 dividend right away and be left with an issue fairly priced at $25.00 … which is good business!
  • The fund does not exclusively seek to maximize yield. I do not blindly purchase whatever yields the most.
    • I might, for instance, trade so that while I’m giving up yield, I’m picking up credit (e.g., I might wish to sell a Pfd-2(low) issue at a yield of 5.00% in order to buy a Pfd-1 issue at a yield of 4.80%).
    • There might be other instances whereby I can increase my ‘fair value’ while decreasing yield … I might wish to sell a perpetual at 5.00% in order to buy a retractible at 4.80%.

The first item on the above list will have the effect of reducing the dividend distribution, but increasing the capital gain distribution. The second item will have the opposite effect. The third item will not have a direct effect on distributions, but will reduce my reported portfolio yield. When the trades are successful, each will have the effect of ultimately putting more money in the unitholders’ pockets.

The fund is managed with an objective of maximizing fair value. I am indifferent as to whether this comes in the form of dividends or capital gains; I am indifferent as to whether the quarterly distributions of dividends are bigger or smaller than average.

From the above discussion, it should be understood that these calculations are a guide, intended to illustrate the idea that expected income per unit will be fairly constant. Successful trading – as has occurred in the past – will lead, eventually, to excess distributions and hence, more units.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Sustainable
Income
April, 2007 9.4083 4.52% 0.89 $0.4778
May 9.3259 4.59% 0.95 0.4506
June 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 0.4665
July 9.3627 5.10% 1.01 0.4728
August 9.3309 4.55% 0.89 0.4770
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 0.4995
October, 2007 8.8084 5.71% 1.00 0.5030

Many will observe that this is much like one’s attitude should be when holding a bond, preferred share, or other fixed income vehicle directly: in the absence of credit disasters, it keeps on paying its agreed rate.

The RY.PR.F issue, for instance, is now quoted at 20.73, down a lot from its issue price of $25.00, but it’s still paying the same dividend now as when it started: $1.1125 annually. It would have been a lot nicer to have bought that dividend stream for $20.73, of course, rather than having paid $25.00 … but I can’t time the markets and I don’t think anybody else can either (as I have discussed elsewhere). What I do think MAPF can do – and what MAPF has historically been able to do – is to trade between issues, selling them when they’re ten cents expensive in order to buy something else that’s ten cents cheap, and passing those gains through to unitholders.

November 7, 2007

November 7th, 2007

It looks like the Super-Conduit MLEC is having difficulty getting started even as SIVs are getting shakier by the day. Naked Capitalism reprinted a piece about a downgrade today by Moody’s of 16 SIVs representing about 10% of the market; but only two capital notes were actually downgraded; the senior paper and other capital notes are merely (!) under review according to Moody’s:

Moody’s Investors Service announced today that it has substantially completed another review of the Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV) sector following continued market value declines of SIV portfolios since our most recent review completed on September 5th of this year. As a result of this review, Moody’s has confirmed the short term ratings of the senior debt programmes of Kestrel Funding PLC and Kestrel Funding LLC (which hold approximately US$3 billion of debt securities) that were on review for possible downgrade. Moody’s also downgraded, or placed on review for possible downgrade, the ratings of 28 debt programmes of 16 SIVs (which hold approximately US$33 billion of debt securities) as described below.

The ongoing liquidity crisis facing SIVs has continued almost unabated since September 5th, when Moody’s completed its last review of the sector. The inability of some of the SIVs to issue sufficient Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) or Medium Term Notes (MTNs) over a prolonged period has led to the crystallisation of mark-to-market losses in some cases and the potential for such losses to be realised in others.

Moody’s has taken certain rating actions as a result of deteriorating credit and other market conditions. It seems clear that the situation has not yet stabilised and further rating actions could follow. As with previous actions, the rating actions Moody’s has taken today in response to the current situation are not a result of any credit problems in the assets held by SIVs, but rather a reflection of the continued deterioration in market value of SIV portfolios combined with the liquidity crisis.

SIV senior note ratings continue to be vulnerable to the unprecedented large and sustained declines in portfolio value combined with a prolonged inability to refinance maturing debt. SIV capital note ratings will be affected primarily by further deterioration in the market value of the portfolio. The risk of realised losses on capital and even senior notes is likely to increase significantly if the SIV is placed in a position where it must sell assets rapidly in a “fire sale.”

A lot of the problems are related to turmoil at Citigroup; its support of its SIVs (through the purchase of $7.6-billion in commercial paper) was discussed yesterday. Even worse, Citigroup has increased its exposure to CDO-issued CP, which has had the effect of ballooning the amount of Level 3 ‘Mark-to-Make-Believe’ assets. Citigroup’s cost of borrowing, as proxied through Credit Default Swaps, is skyrocketting.

They’re all in trouble! Latest estimates (which may have been padded to make them more interesting) are that Wall Street will take massive writedowns:

U.S. banks and brokers face as much as $100 billion of writedowns because of Level 3 accounting rules, in addition to the losses caused by the subprime credit slump, according to Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc.

It would appear that at least some of the money written-off is finding its way into the profits of hedge funds:

Hedge funds returned 3.2 percent on average in October, the biggest gain in almost two years, as managers profited from rising stock prices and declining values of debt tied to home mortgages.

The monthly increase brought the advance to 12.3 percent so far this year, according to a report today from Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research Inc.

It should be noted that the dollar figures in the above paragraphs are US Dollars, not real money:

The dollar is “losing its status as the world currency,” Xu Jian, a central bank vice director, told a conference in Beijing. “We will favor stronger currencies over weaker ones, and will readjust accordingly,” Cheng Siwei, vice chairman of China’s National People’s Congress, said at the same meeting.

Chinese investors have reduced their holdings of U.S. Treasuries by 5 percent to $400 billion in the five months to August. China Investment Corp., which manages the nation’s $200 billion sovereign wealth fund, said last month it may get more of the nation’s reserves to invest to improve returns.

Analyst reactions to these specific remarks are split between yawning and mocking, but years of fiscal profligacy in the US are inexorably coming home to roost.  Maybe they should cut taxes again, or something. Giancarlo Corsetti provides a review of some possible outcomes; one scenario is

In their well-known work, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2007) propose the following scenario. Closing the US external deficit to within 5% of the US GDP will require the US terms of trade to fall between 5% and 15% – a surprisingly contained movement. By contrast, the fall in the internal relative price should be 3 to 5 times larger, namely the relative price of nontradeables inside the US must get between 20% and 30% cheaper.

To translate these figures into the current macroeconomic stance, keep in mind that, over time, productivity growth is faster in manufacturing (producing most tradables) than in services (mostly nontradables). These productivity differentials across sectors mean that the price of manufacturing decline steadily in terms of services. Now, relative to these long-run trends, we should see the price of US services drop by about one third in terms of US manufacturing, as the US eliminates their current account deficit.

… while another is …

Results from numerical exercises developed in joint work with Martin, and Pesenti, suggests that closing the US current account deficit (from 5% of GDP to zero) could lead to a combination of lower US consumption (-6%), and higher US employment (+3%), relative to trend. This would then correspond to a rate of real dollar depreciation of the order of 20% – close to what we have experienced so far.

We shall see! I will admit to having something of a bias in favour of Rogoff’s work – but only because he’s a chess player. I will have to ensure that bias doesn’t affect anything else!

To keep things interesting, there are predictions of bond-insurer failure:

MBIA may lose $20.2 billion on guarantees and securities holdings, Sean Egan, managing director of Egan-Jones, said on a conference call today. ACA Capital may take losses of at least $10 billion; New York-based Ambac may reach $4.3 billion; mortgage insurers MGIC Investment Corp. and Radian Group Inc. may see losses of $7.25 billion and $7.2 billion, respectively, Egan said.

“There is little doubt that the credit and bond insurers face massive losses over the next few quarters and many will be capital challenged,” Egan said.

Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s will downgrade the ratings only after problems have become more obvious, Egan said.

Surprise!  Egan-Jones is a subscription-based rating service. Note that failure of an insurer could have serious knock-on effects in the US Municipals market.

Preferreds continued their recent showing of decent volume, but it seems like everybody was too busy financing their next trip to Buffalo by selling common shares to be fussed much about preferreds, which were … off a tad, but only technically.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.89% 4.88% 191,608 15.68 2 +0.1844% 1,047.1
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.82% 84,445 15.81 8 +0.0617% 1,047.1
Floater 4.50% 4.53% 63,970 16.29 3 +0.0137% 1,044.6
Op. Retract 4.87% 3.84% 75,327 3.55 16 +0.0324% 1,030.4
Split-Share 5.21% 5.16% 87,587 4.18 15 +0.0034% 1,036.6
Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.34% 61,870 3.56 4 +0.4343% 1,057.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.82% 5.40% 80,902 6.05 11 -0.1415% 1,012.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.53% 5.56% 332,539 14.33 55 -0.0391% 914.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.3773% Asset coverage of 3.83+:1 as of July 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.08% (!) based on a bid of 20.05 and a hardMaturity 2019-01-10 at 25.00.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.0776% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 22.95 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.3001% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of November 2, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.37% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.35 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount 244,100 Nesbitt crossed 232,500 at 23.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.69% based on a bid of 23.22 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 159,530 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 22.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 22.61 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 50,645 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 21.83. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 21.80 and a limitMaturity.
CU.PR.B PerpetualPremium 38,725 Nesbitt crossed 35,000 at 25.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.06% based on a bid of 25.90 and a call 2012-7-1 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 37,580 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-one other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : February 2003

November 7th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2003-2-28
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,406.2 3 2.00 4.28% 14.6 184M 4.67%
FixedFloater 2,006.3 10 2.00 4.22% 16.1 95M 5.68%
Floater 1,630.4 6 1.82 3.65% 17.5 66M 4.00%
OpRet 1,601.3 29 1.27 3.95% 2.4 128M 5.46%
SplitShare 1,573.4 10 1.70 4.77% 3.8 43M 5.73%
Interest-Bearing 1,922.5 9 2.00 6.20% 1.5 128M 7.80%
Perpetual-Premium 1,214.1 12 1.49 5.73% 6.3 279M 5.84%
Perpetual-Discount 1,358.7 16 1.55 5.78% 14.2 207M 5.84%

Index Constitution, 2003-02-28, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2003-02-28, Post-rebalancing

MUH.PR.A : Term Extension Proposal

November 7th, 2007

Mulvihill has announced:

MCM Split Share Corp. (the “Company”) announced today that its Board of Directors has approved a proposal to extend the life of the Company for an additional 5 years to February 1, 2013.
    The final redemption date for the Class A Shares and Preferred Shares of the Company is currently February 1, 2008 and the Company proposes to implement a reorganization (“Reorganization”) which will allow shareholders to retain their investment in the Company for up to an additional five years. As part of the Reorganization, the Preferred Shares will be renamed the “Priority Equity Shares” and the Company will adopt a portfolio protection plan for the benefit of the holders of such shares. The dividend entitlement of the shares will remain unchanged at 5.50% per annum (on the $15.00 original issue price).
Class A Shareholders will benefit from a unique, highly leveraged investment in a blue-chip portfolio, and will receive distributions initially set at approximately 10% per annum on the net asset value of the Class A Shares. The Company believes that the Reorganization will allow shareholders to maintain their investment in the Company for up to a further five years on a basis which will better enable it to meet its investment objectives for both classes of shares.
    Holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares will retain their annual and monthly retraction rights originally provided to them. In addition, if the Reorganization is approved, shareholders will be given a special retraction right to cause the Company to redeem their Class A Shares and/or Preferred Shares at net asset value on January 31, 2008.

A special meeting of holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares has been called and will be held on December 12, 2007 to consider and vote upon the proposal. Further details of the proposal will be outlined in an information circular to be prepared and delivered to holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares in connection with the special meeting. The Reorganization is also subject to all required regulatory approvals.

The shares are tracked by HIMIPref™ and are a constituent of the SplitShare Index. Asset coverage, which has been discussed before, is a pretty skimpy 1.5+:1 as of October 31, according to Mulvihill. DBRS hasn’t published a single word about the issue in over five years … they’re currently rated at Pfd-2, but according to me they’re Pfd-2(low) with a negative trend AT BEST and should probably be Pfd-3 or Pfd-3(high).