Archive for August, 2007

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : 2000-03-31

Friday, August 24th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-03-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,392.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,802.3 9 1.88 6.46% 13.4 247M 5.66%
Floater 1,311.3 2 2.00 7.17% 12.3 131M 6.95%
OpRet 1,343.0 35 1.26 5.44% 3.8 90M 6.32%
SplitShare 1,352.4 4 1.75 6.50% 5.1 74M 5.87%
Interest-Bearing 1,443.7 7 2.00 8.50% 10.6 261M 8.51%
Perpetual-Premium 994.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,018.1 12 1.57 6.53% 13.2 119M 6.64%

Index Constitution, 2000-03-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-03-31, Post-rebalancing

Errata, 2007-08-24: The credit rating of IQI.PR.A in the Fixed-Floater index is reported incorrectly; it should not have been included in the index as the actual DBRS rating on this date was Pfd-3(high). 

ABCP, Sub-Prime, Coventree

Friday, August 24th, 2007

There has been some slight readjustment in the market lately at the intersection of the three titled subjects, and I’ve received some queries regarding how it all works.

So, for those who don’t wish to read Moody’s explanation of the market (hat tip: Financial Webring Forum) or the Federal Reserve’s Examiners’ Supervision Manual, here’s a stripped down version of how it all came together. Please note that I have no inside information whatsoever regarding the specifics of the holdings or clients of Coventree’s trusts; also note that I am recklessly making up the numbers with a view to showing how the system works, not with a view to calculating actual profits:

(i) A hedge-fund guy (HF) has $100 he needs to invest.

(ii) HF is offered some 6% 30-year sub-prime paper and decides that it’s a good investment.

(iii) HF buys $1,000 of this 6% paper and borrows $900 on margin at 7% to pay for it. At this point he has negative carry, which is a Bad Thing.

(iv) Coventree offers to lend him $900 at 5% for ten years against the assets, provided he over-collateralizes. HF borrows the $900 from the Coventree trust at 5% for a ten year term and uses these proceeds to repay his margin debt. The loan is secured by a pledge of the $1,000 worth of 30-year 6% sub-prime paper.

(v) Coventree then issues $900 of three-month paper to yield 4%. The buyer is … Investor Guy (IG), who needs a liquid investment but doesn’t want to buy T-Bills yielding 3%.

So at this point, everybody’s happy:

(a) The ultimate financer has $900 worth of three-month paper yielding 4%

(b) Coventree’s trust is borrowing $900 at 4% and lending $900 at 5%, for projected profit of $9 annually.

(c) HF is levering his $100 capital into a $1,000 investment which pays $60 interest annually and financing $900 at 5%, paying $45 annually. HF thus has a positive carry of $15 annually on an investment of $100 and has a chance at a capital gain … if the market goes his way, he can sell the sub-prime paper and collapse the loan.

Everybody’s happy. Coventree is confident they’ll be able to issue three month paper for the next ten years; HF is confident he’ll be able to take out 10-year loans for the next thirty years. The ratings agencies poke around inside Coventree and say, hey! There’s over-collaterallization here, and positive carry on the underlying investment. No problems. Until step six:

(vi) IG reads in the paper that sub-prime paper is worthless. All of it! Not only are all those deadbeats going to default on their mortgages, but the houses won’t be worth anything after foreclosure.

(vii) IG gets a note telling him that Coventree trusts have sub-prime paper in them – something like that disclosed by Coventree in their latest MD&A:

Management continues to believe in the high quality of those underlying assets. Coventree-sponsored conduits have limited exposure to U.S. subprime mortgages – less than 4% of the total assets in Coventree-sponsored conduits are backed by assets related to U.S. subprime mortgages. Those assets continue to perform within the range of initial expectations and, as such, continue to be rated AAA, and are not expected to be materially affected by the recent increase in delinquencies and losses in that asset class.

(viii) IG just wants a really safe Money Market investment. He doesn’t like headlines. He therefore does not buy any more Coventree-sponsored paper.

(ix) Coventree-sponsored trusts can no longer operate since they’re unable to repay the money market notes as they come due.

(x) The Montreal Proposal is made; notes will be issued to reflect the underlying trust asset; thus, there will be a conversion of the overnight paper into a ten-year note, secured by Coventree’s ten-year loan to HF.

 

In short: Coventree was doing a classic bank thing: borrowing short and lending long, making money on the term spread and the quality spread.

They ran into the other classic bank thing: a run.

Update, 2007-08-24 : Tom Graff has explained a variation on the theme

Update, 2007-08-24 : The issuers of the short term paper did anticipate that a run might happen and set themselves up with one of two defenses:(i) Extendible Notes … if the paper can’t be rolled, they can just extend the maturity by a period of time, which gives them some breathing space.

(ii) Back up Liquidity – in the example above, they’ve got $9 net interest income. They can enter into a contract with a bank, whereby they pay the bank $1 annually for an emergency borrowing facility. The trouble starts when the word “emergency” is defined, as noted by DBRS:

During the weeks of August 13 and August 20, 2007, DBRS noted that while many ABCP issuers continued market issuance activities in the normal course, a number of ABCP issuers were unable to roll their ABCP maturities. In these instances, backup liquidity facilities were drawn upon and while liquidity was advanced in several cases, in others they were not. In cases where liquidity was not advanced, investors may now be exposed to mark-to-market risk in the underlying assets.

In further comments,

During the last two weeks, DBRS noted, a number of issuers of asset backed debt, also known as ABCP, were unable to roll over – or find buyers for – debt as it matured.

The situation was made worse when the issuers couldn’t get cash under liquidity provisions set up as a sort of safety net in case of market disruptions.

[DBRS group managing director Huston] Loke said this is one area that DBRS is looking at, since its rating system hasn’t previously looked at the reliability of the liquidity agreements put in place between the issuers and their financial institutions.

He noted that some financial institutions provided liquidity when requested by ABCP issuers and others did not, even though the contracts were worded similarly.

“I think that’s something we would need to look at in terms of our revisions to criteria,” Loke said.

Update, 2007-08-24: Coventree uses the term “credit arbitrage” to describe its process; Fabrice Taylor made fun of this term:

Coventree earns fees and spread income from trusts that buy assets like mortgages, leases and other receivables that earn interest income. They then issue shorter-term debt to investors on which they pay interest, hopefully earning a spread. The company calls this spread revenue “credit arbitrage,” which is a misnomer because, by definition, arbitrage is supposed to be a risk-free profit.

Fabrice Taylor’s track record was not disclosed. According to the Moody’s primer linked above:

Credit arbitrage programs are bank-sponsored programs that invest in securities rated Aa3 or higher. The programs are similar to a cash flow CDO, but funded with short-term liabilities instead of term debt. They generally have no credit enhancement because the securities are highly-rated and the program administrator must sell the securities or provide credit enhancement if the assets are downgraded. The liquidity facility is sized at the face amount of ABCP outstanding and purchases assets at book value, implicitly protecting investors from market value risk. These programs exist largely because the initial BIS regulatory capital regulations for commercial banks do not distinguish between highly-rated and lower-rated securities. By funding off-balance sheet, banks obtain regulatory capital relief. The program also serves to diversify the bank’s sources of financing.

And according to Coventree:

Credit arbitrage transactions closely resemble derivative transactions which are designed to transfer risk from one highly sophisticated financial institution to another. Coventree’s revenues for credit arbitrage transactions consist of the spread between the return on the underlying investment and the conduit’s cost of funds.

HIMIPref Data Change: IQI.PR.A DBRS Credit Rating, 1999-10-01 to 2000-04-28

Friday, August 24th, 2007

An error has been found in the HIMIPref™ database and has now been corrected.

The security IQI.PR.A, Quebecor Printing Inc. 5% Cum Rdm Exch 1st Pr Ser 5, was downgraded by DBRS after the close of business on 1999-09-30, from Pfd-2(low) to Pfd-3(high).

The creditRatings table in the HIMIPref™ database has now been corrected to reflect this change; the securityCode is A48840.

The HIMIPref™ Indices for FixedFloaters for the captioned period will be marginally affected by the changed information, but will not be recalculated at this time.

BCE.PR.A / BCE.PR.B Conversion Results

Friday, August 24th, 2007

BCE has announced:

that 9,918,414 of its 20,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AA (“Series AA Preferred Shares”) have been tendered for conversion, on a one-for-one basis, into Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AB (“Series AB Preferred Shares”). Consequently, BCE will issue 9,918,414 new Series AB Preferred Shares on September 1, 2007. The balance of the Series AA Preferred Shares that will not have been converted will remain outstanding and will continue to be listed on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol BCE.PR.A.
    The Series AA Preferred Shares will pay on a quarterly basis, for the five-year period beginning on September 1, 2007, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE, a fixed dividend based on an annual dividend rate of 4.800%.
    The Series AB Preferred Shares will pay a monthly floating adjustable cash dividend for the five-year period beginning on September 1, 2007, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE. The Series AB Preferred Shares will be listed on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol BCE.PR.B and should start trading on a when-issued basis at the opening of the market on August 28, 2007.

Under and subject to the terms of the definitive agreement, as amended, the investor group has agreed to acquire all of the outstanding Series AA Preferred Shares at a price of $25.76 per share and all of the outstanding Series AB Preferred Shares at a price of $25.50 per share, together, in each case, with accrued but unpaid dividends to the Effective Date (as such term is defined in the definitive agreement).

I previously recommended conversion into the AB shares … the difference in take-over price is minimal after accounting for interim dividends and the difference in expected dividends should the deal not go through is enormous.

The results of this conversion are excellent for traders, should the BCE prefs survive … two very large issues that convert into each other every five years should provide ample opportunity for arbitrage.

August 23, 2007

Friday, August 24th, 2007

At last, a normal, quiet day in the summer! I had almost forgotten what those were like!

The big news, as far as I’m concerned, is the release of Fed statistics that illustrate the continued delevering of the financial system; the amount of outstanding US ABCP down over 4% on the week:

More than half of the $1.1 trillion in outstanding asset- backed paper comes due in the next 90 days, according to the Federal Reserve. Unless they find new buyers, hundreds of hedge funds and home-loan companies will be forced to sell $75 billion of debt, according to Zurich-based UBS AG, Europe’s largest bank.  

Those sales would drive down prices in a market where investors have already lost $57 billion, based on Merrill Lynch & Co.’s broadest index of floating-rate securities backed by home- equity loans. That may hurt the 38.4 million individual and institutional investors in money market funds, the biggest owners of commercial paper. Top-rated commercial paper is one of the world’s safest assets.

In Europe, the asset-backed commercial paper market is almost closed, Reynold Leegerstee, team managing director for Moody’s Investors Service, said on a conference call today.

My guess is that we’re going to see some more blow-ups, perhaps even large and exciting blow-ups. Paribas is re-opening the redemption window for the famous three funds that accellerated the panic; but there will be redemptions on the order books now for many funds and more to come when investors get their statements.

The lock-up in the ABCP markets is going to lead to exciting times (and bargains!) as financing intermediaries are forced to dump their holdings on the market for whatever they can get; such are the perils of leverage and term mismatching and the Fed’s pushing of the discount window (and other techniques, such as a lifting of the cap on Citigroup’s loans to customers via Citigroup Global Markets) is intended only to ensure that there is a market; they don’t care whether or not it’s a good and friendly market.

But so far, I’d say, so good. The damage has largely been confined not just to the financial system, as opposed to the real economy, but to hedge funds – and it is their function to absorb risk and trade it for return. It’s far too early to celebrate – assuming that the worst is over, effects won’t show up until Christmas – but right now we’re hearing of hedge fund redemptions being stopped and large financial institutions taking write-downs; we’re not learning of huge corporations bouncing their payroll cheques. But we’ll see! Things can always get worse and there’s still a lot of tension in the corporate bond market.

TD Bank released its results today and claimed that its underwriting of the BCE / Teachers deal is a really good piece of business. Well gee, if the salesman says it’s good, maybe we should all rush out and buy some, eh? There’s another one that we’ll just have wait and see about … at today’s close of 39.67, BCE common is still 7.2% below deal price, so those who are confident the deal will get done as described still have lots of chance to make some good money … at a higher yield than ABCP paper!

In other news we have another argument that it’s all Greenspan’s fault; an explanation of Countrywide’s financing requirements; and a discussion of Treasury’s problems with the IMF.

US equities were quiet, as were their Canadian counterparts. Treasuries barely moved and Canadas were boring, although some flattening was seen, reversing some recent trends. A quiet summer day, in fact.

Things were just as quiet in the preferred share market at it drifted up in lazy trading. Just how much up and how lazy is, however, something you’re going to have to wait for, since I’ve run out of time and will have to update the tables tomorrow.

Update, 2007-08-24

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.76% 4.80% 23,114 15.91 1 +0.0000% 1,045.9
Fixed-Floater 5.00% 4.85% 114,125 15.80 8 -0.1063% 1,018.7
Floater 4.95% 1.83% 74,084 7.91 4 +0.0820% 1,032.4
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.04% 80,765 3.12 16 +0.0493% 1,022.4
Split-Share 5.09% 4.97% 97,737 4.21 15 +0.1865% 1,039.9
Interest Bearing 6.21% 6.63% 66,933 4.59 3 +0.7707% 1,039.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.53% 5.18% 95,674 5.78 24 +0.0849% 1,023.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.12% 5.16% 278,566 15.23 39 +0.1229% 969.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -1.0309%  
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.0593% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 23.85 and a limitMaturity.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare +1.1639% Asset coverage of just under 2.4:1 according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.58% based on a bid of 10.43 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1685% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.96% based on a bid of 22.51 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +2.6059% Asset coverage of about 1.75:1 as of August 17 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.20% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.45 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 28,010 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.04% based on a bid of 22.44 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 21,300 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.07% based on a bid of 19.91 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 18,527 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 23.10 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 14,585 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.96% based on a bid of 24.62 and a limitMaturity.
ALB.PR.A SplitShare 12,019 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.65% based on a bid of 24.67 and a limitMaturity.

There were four other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : February 29, 2000

Thursday, August 23rd, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-02-29
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,374.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,747.9 8 2.00 6.45% 13.3 229M 5.69%
Floater 1,294.4 2 2.00 6.89% 12.7 100M 6.79%
OpRet 1,342.7 34 1.27 6.10% 4.1 86M 6.49%
SplitShare 1,339.0 4 1.76 6.55% 5.9 53M 5.88%
Interest-Bearing 1,385.3 7 2.00 8.72% 10.2 314M 8.71%
Perpetual-Premium 955.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 977.9 12 1.57 6.79% 12.8 126M 6.84%

Index Constitution, 2000-02-29, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-02-29, Post-rebalancing

Errata, 2007-08-24: The credit rating of IQI.PR.A in the Fixed-Floater index is reported incorrectly; it should not have been included in the index as the actual DBRS rating on this date was Pfd-3(high).

August 22, 2007

Wednesday, August 22nd, 2007

Well, the press is certainly champing at the bit to announce a return to normalcy!

In the best news of the day HSBC Canada issued a press release that included the paragraph:

HSBC Investment Funds (Canada) Inc., manager of the HSBC Mutual Funds, and HSBC Investments (Canada) Limited, manager of the HSBC Pooled Funds, confirm that there is no exposure to third party asset backed commercial paper within any of these Funds.

Finally! Some explicit recognition in all this mess that there is a difference between the corporation’s interest and the subsidiaries fiduciary function. It isn’t much and it isn’t any kind of proof that all is well with separation of function at HSBC Canada (any more than the press releases that aroused my ire in the past two days are any kind of proof that there’s anything wrong at National Bank and Industrial Alliance) … but the more that such a distinction is mentioned in public, the more willing I am to believe that the distinction is part of corporate culture.

All this Independent Review Committee stuff has to be good for something, right?

In Canadian ABCP news, NAV Canada (beloved of all those who pay for airline tickets) announced that it:

holds approximately $368 million of non-bank R-1 (high) rated ABCP allocated among its reserve funds and accounts required by its debt indentures.  The Company has approximately $130 million of cash and cash equivalents not affected by the problems in the non-bank ABCP market.

It is, of course, cheap and easy to point out investment mistakes in hindsight, so I’ll try to show a little restraint … but that means about three-quarters of their cash is held in non-bank Canadian ABCP. They may wish to review their diversification policies.

Amidst fears that liquidity infusions are being hoarded by the top-tier banks four major banks were jawboned by the Fed into using the discount window and letting the credit trickle down. Bernanke is using a more targetted approach than Greenspan used for the 1998 LTCM crisis … we shall see how it all turns out! If he can get away with it, there will be less bleeding of easy credit into the real economy and less chance of a renewed asset bubble. At present, the Fed appears to be defending a 5% Fed Funds rate but Bernanke’s got lots of time to decide whether or not to make the de facto easing de jure. The futures traders appear to believe in a three month ease, then back to the anti-inflation grind.

There is still a lot of stress in the global system despite a pause for breath in US markets. Investors should remember the Fed doesn’t really care about them. We can only hope that the politicians do not succeed in getting the Fed to bail out mortgagors, but it is election time in the US, after all, so there’s bound to be a lot of showboating.

Meanwhile, the default statistics on securitized loans mentioned yesterday are being confirmed by statistics on mortgages held directly. Lenders are reacting ruthlessly to the changed climate, with three lenders firing 3,700 employees. Remember “creative destruction”? This is the nasty second part, and we’ve only just begun:

two European mortgage-securities funds had their credit ratings slashed to junk from AAA by Standard & Poor’s because debt market turmoil curbed access to short-term financing.

Even more seriously, Wall Street bonuses are threatened. On the other hand, in late-breaking news it was announced that Bank of America’s putting $2-billion into Countrywide. So things are – very slowly and jerkily – working as they should.

At least one hedge fund is experiencing knock-on effects of the credit crunch. Stratus has 25% of its assets in Sentinel, which suspended client redemptions on August 14 – which may, in fact, have more to do with fraud than liquidity.

The Chinese have bought up a huge amount of high-quality housing debt over the past few years.

Here’s a good question to ask your friendly neighborhood US Equity Quant: “how do you distinguish between the various levels of financial instrument valuation“? Without having to gain access to the quantitative code and other trade secrets, you should be able to come to a reasonable judgement of skill level by the answer to that question!

US Equities had a very good day as traders decided the world might still exist at the time today’s trades settle. Canadian equity roared upwards, but is still down a bit more than 7% from the July peak. We shall see what happens if Tom Graff’s musings on the potential for re-pricing of as-yet unsettled private equity takeovers should prove to be prophetic with respect to the Teachers’ / BCE deal.

Treasuries fell, with the 2-10 spread flattening 6bp. Some investment grade issuers raised funds, reducing reliance on short term credit, for instance:

XTO Energy Inc. reopened a bond sale yesterday, raising $1 billion to pay down commercial paper, according to a regulatory filing. Fort Worth, Texas-based XTO yesterday sold five-year, 10- year and 30-year bonds.

After all … look at the alternative:

Asset-backed commercial paper yields rose to the highest in almost seven years after H&R Block Inc., the biggest U.S. tax preparer, said a unit tapped $850 million in credit lines because it couldn’t sell the short-term debt.

Canadas fell, with the 2-10 spread flattening by 7.4bp, in what was hailed as an indication that the market has been pricing in too catastrophic a disaster.

It was a quiet and calm, but none-the-less positive day for Canadian preferreds. There was good volume and a confluence of prices with BAM.PR.M / BAM.PR.N, so it may be that those issues are normalizing after recent wild oscillations … subject to “normalizing” being a meaningful word, that is!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.75% 4.79% 24,084 15.93 1 +0.6173% 1,045.9
Fixed-Floater 4.99% 4.85% 116,723 15.80 8 +0.1363% 1,019.8
Floater 4.96% 2.14% 75,681 7.91 4 +0.0615% 1,031.5
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.05% 80,939 3.12 16 -0.0498% 1,021.9
Split-Share 5.10% 5.07% 97,447 4.21 15 +0.0755% 1,038.0
Interest Bearing 6.25% 6.78% 67,043 4.58 3 -0.9957% 1,031.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.54% 5.19% 96,479 6.92 24 +0.0654% 1,022.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.13% 5.17% 281,437 15.23 39 +0.0303% 968.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -3.1546% Ouch! Asset coverage is now about 1.75:1, according to Brookfield Funds – down from 2:1 in late May. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.64% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.21 and a hardMaturity 2015-03-31 at 10.00.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0989% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.07% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.1161% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 22.65 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 59,880 Closed at 20.10-15, 1×10, compared to BAM.PR.N at 20.00-06, 20×1. Finally, comparability! And heavy volume! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.01% based on a bid of 20.10 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 53,680 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 23.85. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 23.79 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 33,300 See BAM.PR.M, above. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.04% based on a bid of 20.00 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.A OpRet 22,485 TD crossed 15,000 at 26.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.75% based on a bid of 26.01 and a call 2007-11-30 at 25.75. Worst than T-Bills, even after tax, that is. Perhaps people can’t believe the first call is at 25.75.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 16,840 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.02% based on a bid of 22.15 and a limitMaturity.

There were nine other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

The Discount Window: Good or Bad?

Wednesday, August 22nd, 2007

The WSJ blog noted some arguments regarding the Fed’s discount window, which the Fed has encouraged the big banks to use, with some obviously orchestrated success.

A very interesting article by Anna J. Schwartz addresses historical misuse of the discount window to prop up insolvent institutions rather than simply provide emergency liquidity. She argues that the discount window should be eliminated … for all my laissez-faire ideals, I find that a little hard to swallow. Her argument rests on the footnoted phrase:

Credit-worthy banks can borrow at market rates, large ones in the Fed Funds market, small ones from their correspondent banks.

That sounds to me like an overgeneralization. When fear takes over, I am more inclined to agree with Larry Neal and his diagnosis of informational asymmettry exemplified, he says, in the Panic of 1825. Few lenders even have the desire to determine creditworthiness – especially if they have potential obligations that they may have to meet – and those few that do may set the “creditworthy” bar uneconomically high.

I agree with her whole-heartedly, however, when she decries the extended provision of credit to an insolvent institution.

HIMIPref™ Indices : January 31, 2000

Wednesday, August 22nd, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-01-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,446.3 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,764.3 8 2.00 6.09% 13.8 242M 5.61%
Floater 1,361.8 2 2.00 6.38% 1.2 77M 6.16%
OpRet 1,332.9 32 1.22 6.17% 4.2 78M 6.51%
SplitShare 1,317.8 3 1.66 6.93% 6.3 57M 5.99%
Interest-Bearing 1,343.3 7 2.00 9.07% 10.2 361M 8.98%
Perpetual-Premium 950.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 972.7 12 1.58 6.88% 12.7 150M 6.86%

Index Constitution, 2000-01-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-01-31, Post-rebalancing

Errata, 2007-08-24: The credit rating of IQI.PR.A in the Fixed-Floater index is reported incorrectly; it should not have been included in the index as the actual DBRS rating on this date was Pfd-3(high).

August 21, 2007

Tuesday, August 21st, 2007

Another nervous day

Continuing the recent pattern, Yvon Charest, Industrial Alliance’s President and Chief Executive Officer, gave his portfolio managers a kick in the teeth by usurping their responsibilities. They’re just plain flat out buying the ABCP in their mutual funds – there is no indication as to whether the portfolio managers want to sell (and look, I know that’s a pretty good bet, OK? That’s not the point). Mr. Charest’s track record as a portfolio manager was not disclosed; we can expect unit-holders not to care until conflicts of interest are resolved in a way they don’t like and a newspaper headline tells them to care.

If Mr. Charest wants to play at “Portfolio Managers”, there is nothing to prevent him from issuing index-linked PPNs, and doing it all on his own balance sheet. But if there’s to be a separate balance sheet there has to be independence.

There is no indication as yet that anybody besides me thinks this is important; analyst independence is just so 2002.

On the sub-prime front, large bets are being made agains ResCap’s survival – and ResCap is a big player:

At the end of June, ResCap had tapped those [ABCP] markets for about $5.5 billion in financing, according to regulatory filings.

ResCap has about $18.5 billion in committed financing, CreditSights analyst David Hendler wrote in an Aug. 7 note.

Mortgage companies without any sub-prime on their books, such as Ottimo Funding LLC, are experiencing financing difficulties.

The default reports for July have been released and Fitch has placed $92.1-billion under review. Last month they reviewed $118-billion and downgraded $13-billion of it. There are more calls coming out for a review of the ratings agencies, as the politicians seem to have agreed on a convenient scapegoat. There are more calls for increased regulation of banks, as well.

Yves Smith has published a balanced review of the various critiques of Central Bank actions. Put me in the third camp: Realist (although I would prefer “Pragmatist”). The market is faced with a situation in which nobody will even look at riskier or more complicated debt. The central banks must first ensure that the commercial banks can, in fact, make investment decisions with reasonably assured financing. Then they must increase the spread between government and commercial paper to the point where real investors (as opposed to mere dealers) will at least be interested enough to look at it. Finally, once the normal routine of examining credit and making an actual decision between safe-but-low-yielding and riskier-but-higher-yielding securities has been re-established, we can get back to fighting inflation. And don’t worry, once people start looking at risk/reward with a more jaundiced eye, there will be plenty of losers. But if the credit markets lock up and everybody in the world has to dump assets on the market at give-away prices in order to de-lever, we’re talking deflation. And deflation is bad.

Tom Graff seems to be in so-far-so-good camp as well, while James Hamilton applauds the Fed’s methodology thus far.

There is some speculation that the liquidity crisis is over and we can all go home; fortunately there are cooler heads at the Fed:

“Financial market volatility, in and of itself, doesn’t require a change in the target federal funds rate,” [Richmond Fed President] Lacker said at a luncheon of the Risk Management Association of Charlotte. “Policy needs to be guided by the outlook for real spending and inflation.”

And, in boring news about the real economy, the Cleveland Fed reminds us that inflation, while still worrisome, is showing signs of responding favourably to the Fed’s policies of moderate restraint. 

True to form, however, US equities were up on takeover speculation, so it would seem that some are hopeful the whole episode was just a bad dream. Canadian equities followed.

Canadian banks re-affirmed their committment to providing credit support to their own Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) products. I can only imagine they’re having difficulty rolling the paper and are attempting to (i) reduce their conduit’s cost of borrowing, and (ii) keep the assets & liabilities off their own balance sheets. Given that their cost of funding, as measured by the September BAX on the Montreal Exchange has risen to about 4.6% (and I’ve seen them much higher), I’m sure they’re about ready to try anything. Note that the Canadian 3-month WI T-Bills are at 4.00% … that’s an amazing spread – according to RBC, the spread was 30bp on August 10, 62bp on August 17.

US 3-month T-Bills finally increased in yield but the 2-10 curve steepened anyway – so let’s not say it’s over just yet! The Canadian 2-10 spread steepened again and is now at 30.5bp. Hank Cunningham provides some historical context.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.77% 4.81% 23,975 15.90 1 +0.1649% 1,039.4
Fixed-Floater 5.00% 4.87% 116,675 15.77 8 +0.0225% 1,018.4
Floater 4.96% 2.76% 76,645 7.92 4 -0.2038% 1,030.9
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.13% 80,670 3.12 16 +0.0128% 1,022.4
Split-Share 5.10% 5.16% 98,642 4.21 15 +0.1800% 1,037.2
Interest Bearing 6.19% 6.61% 65,771 4.61 3 +0.5860% 1,042.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.54% 5.19% 97,368 6.93 24 +0.1428% 1,022.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.13% 5.17% 284,180 14.96 39 +0.1022% 968.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.7640% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.84% based on a bid of 10.26 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
MUH.PR.A SplitShare -1.0652% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.37% based on a bid of 14.86 and a hardMaturity 2008-2-1 at 15.00. Careful, though! At the ask of 15.04, the yield is only 5.57% – that’s the trouble with these very-short-term thingies.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.0342% There go yesterday’s gains! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 22.01 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.0148% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.96% based on a bid of 23.41 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.0118% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 23.96 and a limitMaturity.
MIC.PR.A PerpetualPremium +1.1765% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 25.80 and a call 2012-1-130 at 25.00.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1791% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 22.31 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.5119% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 23.50 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.7112% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.09% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.51 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare +1.7189% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 10.06 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-01 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.7259% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 20.04 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.8055% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 24.81 and a limitMaturity.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare +1.8664% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.69% based on a bid of 10.37 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BCE.PR.G FixFloat 37,500 TD crossed 35,000 at 24.40. Closed at 24.03-49, 9×30.
TD.PR.M OpRet 71,704 “Anonymous” bought 19,900 from Nesbitt at 26.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.88% based on a bid of 26.21 and a softMaturity 2013-10-30 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 17,900 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.97% based on a bid of 20.25 and a limitMaturity. Closed at 20.25-34, 20×10; virtually identical to BAM.PR.N, below.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 15,088 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 20.04 and a limitMaturity. Closed at 20.04-10, 21×10; virtually identical to BAM.PR.M, above.
BAM.PR.K Floater 14,253  

There were five other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.