Archive for October, 2007

October, 2007, Edition of PrefLetter Released!

Sunday, October 14th, 2007

The October edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the October, 2007 issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the November, 2007 issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close November 9 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on November 12.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

October 12, 2007

Friday, October 12th, 2007

There’s no commentary today, I’m afraid! What with PrefLetter production, seeing whether the IIF had anything interesting to say, admitting that I cannot time the markets and so on, I’m just running out of time!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.71% 4.66% 681,528 15.94 1 0.0000% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.89% 4.76% 104,131 15.85 7 -0.3002% 1,038.5
Floater 4.51% 4.20% 75,432 10.73 3 -0.0134% 1,041.0
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.99% 76,085 3.20 15 +0.0058% 1,028.9
Split-Share 5.15% 4.84% 84,493 4.27 15 -0.0135% 1,045.0
Interest Bearing 6.29% 6.37% 56,439 3.63 4 -0.0248% 1,051.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.66% 5.45% 95,481 8.25 17 -0.0404% 1,014.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.40% 5.44% 321,718 14.77 47 -0.0440% 931.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.6601% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 22.51 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.6264% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 22.38 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.1538% Asset coverage of 2.5+:1 as of September 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.84% based on a bid of 10.48 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-01 at 10.28.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.1384% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 22.58 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -1.0077%  
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium +1.1327% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 25.00 and a call 2012-1-19 at 25.00.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.6471% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.60 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 584,870 New issue settled today; it did better than I thought it would, closing at 24.81-82, 20×124. This may be due to the fact that it was the first of the recent bank 5.25% perps to be announced; together with the fact that BNS issues are relatively scarce, a fair amount of the new issue may have found its way into ‘real money’ accounts. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 24.81 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat 71,169 Scotia crossed 70,000 at 24.75.
PWF.PR.I PerpetualPremium 66,316 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 25.46 and a call 2012-5-30 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 38,650 DS crossed 35,000 at 23.62. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 23.62 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 33,900 Nesbitt bought 11,500 from DS at 21.35. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.29% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity.

There were nine other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : November 2001

Friday, October 12th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-11-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,593.5 1 2.00 4.07% 17.4 79M 4.05%
FixedFloater 1,888.0 9 2.00 4.26% 16.5 257M 5.53%
Floater 1,490.2 5 1.80 3.66% 17.4 46M 3.81%
OpRet 1,505.5 33 1.18 4.08% 2.1 104M 5.88%
SplitShare 1,536.3 8 1.87 5.74% 5.5 98M 6.26%
Interest-Bearing 1,750.6 8 2.00 6.81% 2.5 175M 7.78%
Perpetual-Premium 1,146.8 6 1.49 5.41% 5.7 111M 5.71%
Perpetual-Discount 1,323.5 10 1.49 5.56% 14.4 269M 5.62%

Index Constitution, 2001-11-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-11-30, Post-rebalancing

FAL.PR.A / FAL.PR.B / FAL.PR.H Upgraded by DBRS

Friday, October 12th, 2007

DBRS has announced:

DBRS has today upgraded the ratings of Xstrata plc, Xstrata (Schweiz) AG, Xstrata Capital Corporation A.V.V., Falconbridge Limited, and Xstrata Finance (Canada) Limited (collectively Xstrata or the Company) to A (low). The rating action results from the Company’s strengthening financial profile over the last twelve months, with Xstrata’s financial profile now brought in line with its business profile (which was strengthened substantially last year with the Falconbridge, Cerrejón and Tintaya acquisitions).

DBRS expects high commodity prices (driven by strong market demand/supply fundamentals) to allow the Company to continue generating strong cash flows from operations. Going forward, DBRS expects the Company to use its strong cash flows to finance its expansionary capex program, its acquisition program and possibly to continue to reduce its debt levels. The Company’s credit metrics are expected to remain at current levels for the mid term.

Falconbridge Preferreds continues to be rated P-2(low) by S&P.

As previously reported, Falconbridge’s dividends are “eligible”.

October PrefLetter is in Preparation!

Friday, October 12th, 2007

The markets have closed and the October edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The October issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!

Reflections on a Bull

Friday, October 12th, 2007

My bullish correspondent has been busy and gleefully siezed on my comment yesterday that:

There was good volume in the preferred share market today … and continued declines in the perpetual sector which, quite frankly, I am at a loss to understand.

rate, the steepening in the past three weeks is stupendous. This is really strange!

and says that he is interested in my comments on his view that:

this is due to  the Commercial paper/subprime scare ….

Well, for what it’s worth, Mr. Bull, I think you’re right. I think we are seeing the confluence of a lot of factors:

  • Retail is avoiding assets that they don’t understand – and retail, in general, doesn’t understand preferred shares very well.
  • Retail is avoiding volatile assets – and perpetuals have certainly been showing volatility in the past six months.
  • Retail is avoiding asset classes in which they have recently been burnt – there were a lot of new issues last spring, much of it probably sold to unsophisticated investors who watched the market prices tank before they’d even received their monthly statement
  • Retail is avoiding asset classes which have not performed well in recent memory – performance of preferreds in general and perpetuals in particular has not been stellar for the past year or so
  • Retail is attempting to time the market. They are waiting for the bottom, therefore they will wait until they’re sure that prices are going up, therefore, probably, they will miss most of any rally that happens.

But, Mr. Bull, I want you to pay particular attention to my caveat: For what it’s worth.

  • How can any of the above statements be proven? If I were to say that relatively high spreads recently were due to the Tri-Lateral Commission acting under the orders of the Illuminati, how would you prove me wrong?
  • What predictive value does any of those statements have? They explain everything, cannot be falsified, and predict nothing.

I think we can agree that spreads are relatively high. And given this view, I will agree that a rational investment allocation model – for instance, one that says that the proportion of preferreds in a portfolio will be within a certain range – should probably be on the over-allocation side while long corporate bonds should be on the under-allocation side.

But the world is chaotic. We can formulate a beautiful asset allocation strategy … and tomorrow little green men from Mars will arrive with the secret of unlimited safe energy, requiring only extract of squid’s brain to run, which will give rise to a bull market in seafood and bear markets almost everywhere else.

So I make a deliberate attempt to avoid calling the market. Not because I don’t think I’m smart enough, but because there are too many random factors, too many of Colin Powell’s Unknown Unknowns, to make such an exercise a useful expenditure of time. Instead, I concentrate on weighing small differences between the various preferred share issues … up, down, I don’t care what the market does, as long as I do a nickel better, I’m happy. I can compare apples to apples, and give you good advice as to which one will be better. I cannot compare apples to squid’s brains.

If anybody tells you differently … find out why. Chances are, they’ve got great explanations and poor results.

Update: As if by magic, Accrued Interest has posted on this theme today.

Sub-Prime! The IIF Weighs In

Friday, October 12th, 2007

My interest was attracted by an article in the National Post, Banking group slams asset-backed securities market; the print headline is “Banks ‘Asleep at Switch'”; neither headline appears to be reporting on the purported substance of the story, a letter from the IIF, addressed to the chairman of the International Monetary and Finance Committee, that has been released on their website.

OK – first question: Who is the IIF? It is the Institute of International Finance, Inc., which claims to be “the world’s only global association of financial institutions”. I can’t remember having heard of them before. According to their annual report, they have annual revenue of about $25-million; certainly enough to hire a few analysts and buy sandwiches for their meetings, but hardly heavyweight. By way of comparison, the CFA Institute, to which I belong and which is notable mainly for its lack of relevance to my life, has annual revenue of a little over $100-million.

Now to look at their recommendations (bolded) with my commentary (plain):

  • Going forward, market participants, including those currently not regulated, need to take the lead to enhance due diligence and strengthen credit discipline. Senior management of financial firms has a critical role to play in this context. As supervisors and central banks are also reviewing some of their approaches, we encourage them to do so in a focused manner so as to avoid possible overreaction. Meaningless.
  • ratings agencies should, in cooperation with market participants, review their approaches, including possible changes in ratings to clarify what is being assessed. Even after taking this into account, investors will be well advised to keep in mind that external ratings are just one component of a sound internal risk management system, not a substitute for it. Meaningless.
  • A top priority of market participants should be to develop conventions to value these complex financial instruments [structured credit], to ensure that the benefits of financial innovation for the efficiency of markets are fully realized.. This is more than just a little bit wierd. After implying that part of the problem was over-reliance on external credit ratings, they want to encourage reliance on external pricing? Let’s just have a little bit more cheerful anarchy in the markets and a little bit less reliance on Bloomberg’s analysis, shall we?
  • central banks should provide greater clarity about the modalities of the exercise of their role as lenders of last resort in times of crisis; expand the range of acceptable collateral and clarify policies as to haircuts; and increase the availability of cross-border collateralization. Recent events also suggest that central banks might consider the scope for better coordination of the timing and the maturities of their liquidity injections, while taking account of differences in market circumstances. I don’t know about this one. It strikes me that a little bit of uncertainty is good for the markets … let’s keep moral hazard to a minimum. Expanding the range of acceptable collateral – on a permanent basis, not just the temporary relaxation of recent times – is something that is often discussed; has been for years; probably since the start of central banking! I am comfortable with the current system that the central banks will accept only the highest quality, most liquid securities as collateral, with discretion to relax these rules whenever they feel like it. Central banks cannot and should not have the slightest concern about few speculators, overloaded with wierd stuff, going bankrupt; the concern should be restricted to the functioning of the overall market as chiefly expressed in the operations of a core group of strongly capitalized banks.
  • To minimize such problems in the future, disclosure practices [regarding banks exposures to structured credit and their credit line committments to customers] need to be improved so as to allow investors and other market participants to properly assess and price risk, thus effectively exercising market discipline. I don’t know about this one. It’s difficult to argue against such a motherhood issue as disclosure, but too much is enough, already! Presumably, the central banks have authority to require disclosure when disbursing emergency funds; I think it would be quite sufficient to ensure that banks have the ability to provide such disclosure if, as and when they feel like it, without actually making such disclosure mandatory.
  • [The IMFC should] explicitly encourage prompt but deliberative efforts involving official and private financial institutions to evaluate pragmatic approaches that will continue to support financial innovation, while reducing the risk of a recurrence of the current problems. Well, what’s to say? This may be code, encouraging the current IMFC to boldly go where no IMFC has gone before, but it may just be motherhood. In any event, this recommendation seems rather devoid of substance.
  • In view of current conditions and expectations, the IMFC, in its discussions of the global outlook, should stress the importance of central banks striking a delicate balance now Sounds good to me!
  • to reinforce the commitment to the coordination process in the achievement of agreed goals. Recent events have clearly demonstrated how market-driven adjustments in the face of excesses and imbalances can impose large and unexpected systemic costs. This should be a matter of concern to both leading industrialized and emerging market countries. They should have more meetings? Possibly sponsored by the IIF?
  • We believe that the IMF and the World Bank could play valuable roles in this area [of developing regulations for Sovereign Wealth Funds]. This looks like more political code. No comment until I’ve heard more.
  • Therefore, the IMF should reaffirm the importance of policy vigilance on the part of emerging market authorities as well as work closely with them to help implement needed structural reforms and further develop local capital markets. The identification and possible mitigation of risks associated with external borrowing in local banking and corporate sectors is an area that deserves attention. Greater transparency and strong investor relations programs, as emphasized by the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets, should also be encouraged. This appears to be a simple reiteration of motherhood statements.

All in all, rather a disappointing letter. My guess is that they felt they had to say something, but they had to say it without offending any of their members. I’m rather surprised that the National Post gave such prominence to it.

Update: Related to this story is news that the US Treasury is:

talking with Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and other banks about a plan to jump-start the asset-backed commercial paper market.

Policy makers are concerned that investors remain reluctant to purchase the paper even if the loans that back them are sound, said a U.S. government official, who declined to be identified.

The discussions over the past two weeks have focused on structured investment vehicles, the units set up by banks and hedge funds to finance purchases of assets including subprime mortgage securities, said the official and a banker with knowledge of the deliberations. One plan under consideration would involve setting up a consortium backed by several of the biggest financial companies, the banker said.

October 11, 2007

Thursday, October 11th, 2007

Willem Buiter is outraged at some aspects of the Northern Rock bail-out – specifically, the extension of deposit insurance to new money:

Why should the unsecured wholesale creditors of Northern Rock get any protection at all? There is no social justice (widows and orphans) argument to support this intervention, nor an efficiency argument – the wholesale creditors to Northern Rock should be expected to be able to pay the cost of verifying its financial viability. No public purpose is served by subsidising, through ex-post insurance, the ‘rate whores’ that are likely to make up the bulk of the wholesale creditors of Northern Rock. Municipalities, charities and professional and institutional investors that were happy to pocket the slightly above-market interest rates offered by Northern Rock should not be able to dump the default risk (whose anticipation/perception was the reason for the higher rates) on the tax payer. 

Meanwhile, the situation at Countrywide isn’t looking very pretty:

Overdue loans as a percentage of unpaid principal increased to 5.85 percent in September from 4.04 percent a year earlier, the company said in a statement. Foreclosures climbed to 1.27 percent from 0.51 percent. Mortgages funded by the Calabasas, California-based company last month declined to $21 billion.

Which appears to be a nationwide phenomenon:

U.S. home foreclosures doubled in September from a year earlier as subprime borrowers struggled to make payments on adjustable-rate mortgages, RealtyTrac Inc. said.

In related news, Moody’s downgraded a big batch of sub-prime today. From their press release:

Moody’s Investors Service today announced that it has downgraded $33.4 billion of securities issued in 2006 backed by subprime first lien mortgages, representing 7.8% of the original dollar volume of such securities rated by Moody’s. Of the $33.4 billion downgraded securities, $3.8 billion remain on review for further downgrade. Moody’s also affirmed the ratings on $258.6 billion of Aaa-rated securities and $21.3 billion of Aa-rated securities, representing 74.7% and 52.0% of the original dollar volume of such securities rated in 2006, respectively. In addition, another $23.8 billion of first-lien RMBS were placed on review for downgrade, representing 5.6% of the dollar volume of subprime first-lien securities rated in 2006, including 48 Aaa-rated and 529 Aa-rated securities.

The analysis driving today’s rating actions takes into account several key factors. First, Moody’s assumes that the severity of loss associated with loans that are now seriously delinquent will be 40%-50% on average. Second, based on its recent survey of subprime loan servicers, Moody’s analysis assumes that significant loan modifications that might mitigate future losses are not likely to occur in the near term.

There was continued decline in outstanding ABCP in the States; on a probably-not-entirely-unrelated note, bond issuance is massive this week.

There was good volume in the preferred share market today … and continued declines in the perpetual sector which, quite frankly, I am at a loss to understand.

I have uploaded a graph comparing the yield curves as of the June 12 trough in the PerpetualDiscount index; the September 19 peak, and today. Note that the graph shown plots AFTER-TAX SPOT YIELDS:

  • After Tax: The after tax yield received by an investor for an investment
  • Spot Yields: Every cash flow is discounted with its own yield. For a “30-year” perpetual (I make the approximation of “30 Years = Forever” in the analysis), there will be
    • 120 dividend payments
    • 30 tax payments
    • 1 return of principal

    making a total 151 cash flows, each of which gets its own yield in accordance with the yield curve. In traditional bond mathematics, a flat yield curve is assumed and all cash flows are discounted with the same yield

At any rate, the steepening in the past three weeks is stupendous. This is really strange!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.70% 4.64% 709,805 15.97 1 0.0000% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.87% 4.74% 105,214 15.87 7 +0.1586% 1,041.6
Floater 4.51% 4.20% 76,396 10.74 3 +0.5121% 1,041.1
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.85% 76,714 3.16 15 +0.1117% 1,028.8
Split-Share 5.15% 4.81% 85,547 4.27 15 -0.0982% 1,045.2
Interest Bearing 6.29% 6.41% 56,867 3.64 4 +0.0772% 1,051.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.66% 5.45% 95,701 8.26 17 -0.2561% 1,014.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.41% 5.44% 267,770 14.77 46 -0.3840% 931.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -2.0000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.8087% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 20.63 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.6386% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 20.41 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.3921% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.3889% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 23.43 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.3699% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 21.60 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.1628% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.1299% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 22.75 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.0738% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 22.11 and a limitMaturity.
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.0040% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 24.65 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0328% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 157,800 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 109,520 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 108,500 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.C FixFloat 75,100 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.86; DS crossed 50,000 at 24.95.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 62,833 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-four other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices: October, 2001

Thursday, October 11th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-10-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,531.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,880.0 12 2.0 4.63% 15.4 192M 5.62%
Floater 1,443.8 4 1.76 4.14% 16.0 57M 4.45%
OpRet 1,507.4 35 1.22 3.94% 1.7 67M 6.02%
SplitShare 1,525.1 8 1.87 5.60% 5.3 78M 6.14%
Interest-Bearing 1,791.3 7 2.00 4.87% 2.5 134M 7.60%
Perpetual-Premium 1,166.8 7 1.43 4.94% 5.6 117M 5.84%
Perpetual-Discount 1,355.1 7 1.57 5.64% 14.5 188M 5.59%

Index Constitution, 2001-10-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-10-31, Post-rebalancing

One Bull Checks In

Thursday, October 11th, 2007

As mentioned yesterday, I received some interesting correspondence recently:

Love your blog !

I have been buying preferred shares for the last 10 years and discovered your site last month…

My porfolio of pref ( middle six figures ) consist only of bank shares and Power Corp /Power Financial, all perpetual discount.

Sometime I  try to balance my portfolio with the ups and down of the market but I buy for the long term. 

But these days I do not understand the pref market : today I  bought PWF.PR.G 5,90 perpetual at par ( $25,06) ( in Qc X 1.35 : 7,965 % ), last week NA.PR.K 5,85 at par ( $25)(QC X 1,35 : : 7,90%) .

Meanwhile you are lucky if you get 5% on a 10 years municipal bond and 5,5% on a 20 years bonds ( ex: Greater Toronto Airport .) and the bank are signing 5 years morgage for 5,69%.

I understand the risks and the nature of the Pref , but   I wonder if I am missing something ( market disruption /Subprime /long term inflation )or if this is the buying opportunity of the decade ?
   
Thank you for your blog

Well, this is obviously a very sensible, wise and discerning correspondent – that’s obvious, because he likes the blog.

But let’s just take a VERY quick look at his question regarding “buying opportunity of the decade”. We’ll compare current yields with those of October 31, 2000, with help from the Bank of Canada’s yield look-up service, CanadianBondIndices, the HIMIPref™ Indices for October 31, 2000 and yesterday’s values:

Yield Comparisons
  2000-10-31 2007-10-10
Long Canada Yield 5.61% 4.80%
Long Corporate Yield 7.14% 5.90%
PerpetualDiscount Yield 6.03% 5.42%
Equivalency Factor 1.31 1.40
PerpetualDiscount Interest Equivalent 7.90% 7.59%
Canada Bond / Perpetual Discount
Spread
229bp 279bp
Corporate Bond / PerpetualDiscount
Spread
76bp 169bp

So … I have to agree with my correspondent that spreads look pretty attractive now!

Note that all this is very approximate. At some indeterminate time in the future, HIMIPref™ 2006 2007 2008 will be ready for testing. This new version of the programme will extend the analytics to bonds; enormous quantities of data will be purchased at ruinous expense; the analysis will allow for swaps between investment universes (although this feature might have to wait until HIMIPref™ 2009 is ready) and at that time, with lots of testing and data and controls to ensure that, for instance, there’s nothing fishy going on with the credit quality of the sampled universes, I will be much happier about saying whether spreads are wide.

But it does look pretty good, doesn’t it?