Archive for February, 2008

IMF: Canadian Financial System is Well-Capitalized

Tuesday, February 19th, 2008

The International Monetary Fund Country Report on Canada (2008) has been released. Here are some highlights:

Canadian banks appear to be sound and resilient. The stress tests indicate that the five largest banks would be capable of weathering a shock about one-third larger than the 1990–91 recession, involving a contraction of the North American economy, an increase in interest rate risk premia, and lower commodity prices. This resiliency may in part reflect the fact that the Canadian banks are national in scope and thus able to benefit from regional and sectoral diversification.

There’s more detail available on this. Credit risk is the major risk factor; market risk and liquidity risk were determined to be less important risk factors.

Until recently, most Canadian liquidity protection could only be drawn in the event of a GMD, whereas conduits in Europe and the United States enjoy virtually unconditional “global-style” liquidity protection.12 This may have been, in part, an unintended consequence of OSFI’s Regulation B-5, which exempted only GMD-conditional liquidity support from bank regulatory capital requirements. For unconditional facilities up to one year, OSFI and the United States used national discretion (consistent with Basel rules) to apply a 10 percent credit conversion factor (CCF), whereas most European countries applied a zero CCF. Basel II will apply a zero CCF to GMD-conditional support, and 20 percent to unconditional facilities with maturities up to one year.

Note: The required regulatory capital on a liquidity facility is calculated on the product of the CCF and the highest risk weight assigned to any of the underlying individual exposures covered by the facility.

I hadn’t known that about the European banks’ zero CCF on unconditional liquidity support! No wonder they’re in so much trouble! The Fed Policy, and its change to match stricter Canadian standards, has been previously discussed.

The situation in the ABCP market is still evolving and continues to pose a risk to investor confidence. Stress tests performed by OSFI indicate that if banks were to put the assets in their sponsored conduits on their balance sheets, this would leave them with capital above the regulatory targets. While the problems in the third-party conduits may result in losses to some of the parties involved, it is not clear that the stability of the broader financial system will be materially affected. There is, however, the risk that continuing problems in the ABCP and money markets could lead to a wider loss of confidence. The precise form such an event would take is of course difficult to predict, as are its possible consequences.

Note: However, these stress tests do not seem to consider an interruption of financing, a decline in asset prices, or the cost of holding “bridge loans” that would have otherwise been financed in the money markets.

…which leaves one wondering just what was modeled by the OSFI stress tests!

The banking system also appears to remain fairly stable in terms of marketbased measures. The two-year probability of default of a single Canadian bank implied by Moody’s KMV data has increased to about 7 percent in mid-December, compared with 2 percent before the market turbulence began in August 2007, and remains well below the 14 percent seen in the United States. A banking stability index (BSI) defined in terms of the joint probability of default of the largest banks in the system has also increased commensurately.

I’m surprised that this paragraph didn’t draw more headlines! KMV is a Merton-style structural model of defaults – as such, if may be expected to overestimate default probability at times when the equity cowboys are panicky.

February 15, 2008

Friday, February 15th, 2008

I will admit to having felt a certain amount of schadenfreude when Accrued Interest brought to my attention what has to be one of the world’s worst bond funds. A loss of over 50% in a year in what was touted as a fund that would seek:

a high level of income by investing in intermediate maturity, investment grade bonds. The fund seeks capital growth as a secondary objective when consistent with the fund’s primary objective.

… must be something of a record. But this is the modern age! Faster, Stronger, Better! Citigroup’s Alternative Investments unit has brought new meaning to the word “Alternative”:

Falcon Plus Strategies, launched Sept. 30, lost 52 per cent in the fourth quarter, after betting on mortgage-backed and preferred securities and making trades based on the relative values of municipal bonds and U.S. Treasuries. Some collateralized debt obligations in the fund trade at 25 per cent of their original worth, the newspaper said.

OK, well, I think it’s funny! The WSJ had some more detail about the excellence of Citigroup’s risk-control procedures:

Mr. Pickett’s big order last June was for several hundred million dollars of leveraged loans that a group of banks was selling in a private auction on behalf of a German media company, according to people involved in the transaction. At the time, CSO had roughly $700 million in assets, meaning that Mr. Pickett wanted to commit more than half of the hedge fund’s assets.

Some investors in the fund contend that executives at Citigroup didn’t supervise Mr. Pickett closely enough. “I don’t understand…how it would have been possible for him to take on a position that was disproportionately large,” says one investor in CSO.

Citigroup defends its handling of the situation. Spokesman Jon Diat said CSO and similar funds “are subject to comprehensive internal fiduciary risk oversight, risk management practices and senior-level management supervision.”

The mention of collateralized debt obligations continues to resonate, since UBS says there’s a good chance of huge write-downs to come:

Writedowns for collateralized debt obligations and subprime related losses already total $150 billion, [UBS analyst Philip] Finch estimated. That could rise by a further $120 billion for CDOs, $50 billion for structured investment vehicles, $18 billion for commercial mortgage-backed securities and $15 billion for leveraged buyouts, UBS said. “Risks are rising and spreading and liquidity conditions are still far from normal,” the note said…..

And you’ve got to figure … a UBS analyst would know!

Monolines, monolines … Elliot Spitzer, best known for his efforts in singlehandedly saving the world from the horrors of a NY state governor who was not Elliot Spitzer, has made a bald threat to take over the monolines (well … MBIA, anyway) and split them:

During a recess, Mr. Spitzer told reporters that splitting the bond insurers’ businesses was a last resort. “The clear preference is a recapitalization of the companies,” he said. “Even if the deals don’t close, the sort of market comfort that would be needed to stabilize the marketplace could get there pretty quickly. We just have to wait and see what happens.”….

Turning up the heat yesterday on the banks’ discussions, he said in an interview that there are “some mechanisms” in the law that allow regulators to “force [the bond insurers] into what’s called ‘rehabilitation.'” During his testimony before the panel, he asked Congress for a $10 billion line of credit for the bond insurers, which he said could encourage banks to contribute capital.

There are claims that FGIC wants to be split up:

FGIC Corp., the bond insurer stripped of its Aaa rating by Moody’s Investors Service, asked to be split in two to protect the municipal bonds it covers, according to the New York Insurance Department.

FGIC, owned by Blackstone Group LP and PMI Group Inc., applied for a new license so it can separate its municipal insurance unit from its guarantees on subprime-mortgages, David Neustadt, a department spokesman, said in a telephone interview.

And was the regulator holding a gun to FGIC’s head at the time, or what? What’s the whole story? 

How can this possibly be legal? More to the point, how can it possibly be ethical? Those who purchased credit protection on sub-prime did so based on the strength of the whole company, not simply the post hoc selection of bad bits. Accrued Interest speculates that the so-called crisis might simply be political embarrassment:

But the refinancing won’t erase the embarrassment of having an auction failure. Governmental agencies, including the Port Authority, will start putting increasing pressure on the New York insurance regulators to resolve this matter once and for all.

But the combination of heavy political pressure and a viable private sector solution will be too difficult to ignore. A deal will be worked out to insulate the municipal bond market.

Perhaps more to the point, there is at least a little concern that the so-called crisis in Auction Rate Municipals is largely self-inflicted:

Banks including Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Citigroup Inc. allowed hundreds of auctions to fail this week after they were unable to attract bidders and decided to stop buying unwanted securities. A failed auction nearly doubled seven-day borrowing costs on $15 million of bonds sold by Harrisburg International Airport in Pennsylvania to 14 percent while a $100 million Port Authority of New York & New Jersey bond reset at 20 percent, up from 4.3 percent a week earlier.

“The problem with most auction bonds isn’t the bonds’ credit quality or default risk,” said Joseph Fichera, chief executive at Saber Partners, a New York-based financial adviser to local governments. “The problem is that there isn’t enough demand for the bonds because some issuers gave monopolies on the distribution to a few banks.”

Just to think … there are still some people in the world who believe that increased political involvement via regulation will save the world!

There has been an amusing twist to the increase in the allowed size of GSE mortgages, which was discussed on January 29. The effective infusion of new money into the jumbo mortgage sector will, in the absence of other factors, affect prices of existing securities:

If larger loans can be packaged into guaranteed securities that can trade in the TBA market, the difference between their rates and those on other prime mortgages would probably fall to between 4 basis points and 19 basis points, from more than 80 basis points today, New York-based Credit Suisse analysts Mukul Chhabra, Chandrajit Bhattacharya, and Mahesh Swaminathan wrote in a report last week. The rates offered on other prime mortgages would climb by a similar amount, they said.

So the trade association that regulates such matters is not allowing the GSE-jumbos to trade normally:

The larger home loans that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will temporarily be allowed to guarantee won’t be accepted into the main market for mortgage bonds, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association said.

The revised guidelines for the so-called To Be Announced market cover mortgages of more than $417,000 that the government- chartered companies are permitted to buy or guarantee under the $168 billion economic stimulus package signed into law this week, according to a statement today from the trade group in New York.

The exclusion of the larger loans should reduce the size of drops in jumbo mortgage rates that will result from the new law, according to analysts at Credit Suisse Group and Citigroup Inc. Including the loans would have hurt bondholders because their securities would have dropped in value.

A quiet day in the market – not much volume or price movement, probably due to intensive preparations for Bozo Day. With markets at current levels, and now that that $430-million in bank issuance seems to have been well-digested … it wouldn’t surprise me much to see a new issue first thing Tuesday morning, or sometime next week, anyway. Maybe one of the insurers will want some capital so they can go after AIG’s business in its weakened state? Who knows? I wouldn’t bet a dime on it, but I’d go so far as to put a nickel on a new Pfd-1 issue next week at 5.50%.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.56% 5.60% 43,180 14.5 2 -0.1852% 1,072.1
Fixed-Floater 5.00% 5.65% 76,953 14.72 7 +0.1486% 1,025.3
Floater 4.95% 5.00% 72,440 15.46 3 -0.5366% 854.4
Op. Retract 4.81% 1.91% 78,029 2.56 15 -0.1900% 1,047.4
Split-Share 5.27% 5.46% 98,540 4.22 15 -0.0568% 1,044.1
Interest Bearing 6.27% 6.55% 57,942 3.56 4 -0.6207% 1,075.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.72% 4.51% 375,855 4.56 16 +0.0302% 1,030.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.36% 5.39% 285,576 14.81 52 +0.0704% 959.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.I OpRet -2.7468% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.52% based on a bid of 26.20 and a call 2010-7-30 at 25.50.
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -2.4096 Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 as of February 14, according to TD Securities. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 9.72 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00. 
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -2.2822% Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of February 8, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.30% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.42 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.5818% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.91% based on a bid of 25.51 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.1529% Asset coverage of 3.3+:1 as of January 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.35% based on a bid of 19.72 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (5.86% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (7.32% to 2016-3-25).
SBN.PR.A SplitShare +1.2720% Asset coverage of just under 2.2:1 as of February 7, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.66% based on a bid of 10.35 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. 
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.3116% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.15% based on a bid of 22.40 and a limitMaturity
DFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.7442% Asset coverage of just under 2.5:1 as of January 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.45% based on a bid of 10.50 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 50,100 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 23.13 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium 33,500 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 25.45 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 33,039 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 21.80 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 18,202 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 24.62 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 17,100 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 21.73 and a limitMaturity.

There were ten other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : February 2006

Friday, February 15th, 2008

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2006-02-28
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,354.7 1 2.00 3.61% 18.3 59M 3.62%
FixedFloater 2,283.5 6 2.00 3.31% 17.6 92M 5.14%
Floater 2,076.1 4 2.00 -20.15% 0.1 38M 4.11%
OpRet 1,885.2 18 1.56 2.76% 2.9 84M 4.62%
SplitShare 1,949.0 16 1.94 3.52% 2.6 60M 5.06%
Interest-Bearing 2,316.6 8 2.00 5.26% 1.3 53M 6.68%
Perpetual-Premium 1,482.0 47 1.64 4.40% 5.8 113M 5.14%
Perpetual-Discount 1,613.3 3 1.34 4.54% 16.4 1,229M 4.57%

Index Constitution, 2006-02-28, Pre-rebalancing

ALB.PR.A : Partial Call for Redemption

Friday, February 15th, 2008

Allbanc Split Corp. II has announced:

that it has called 164,867 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on February 28, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 3.524% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 1,729,032 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on February 27, 2008 will have approximately 3.524% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $25.00 per share.

An annoyingly small redemption … big enough to turn board-lots into odd-lots, without providing (for most holders, I’m sure) a tradeable amount of cash.

ALB.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is a member of the SplitShares Index. It has been recently removed from the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index.

PAY.PR.A : Tax Treatment of May, 2007, Dutch Auction Tenders

Friday, February 15th, 2008

I love the use of the word “clarifies” in a press release. It invariably means that there’s been a monumental SNAFU and the issuing company is reversing its position.

High Income Principal and Yield Securities Corporation has issued a press release that “Clarifies Tax Treatment for Shares Tendered to Issuer Bid“:

proceeds received by former shareholders of PAY.pr.a who tendered their shares to the Dutch auction held in May 2007 should be treated as proceeds of disposition. The amount by which the proceeds of disposition exceed (or are less than) the shareholder’s adjusted cost base of the tendered shares will result in a capital gain (or loss) to the tendering shareholder.

This innocuous seeming press release, with its use of the word “clarifies” in the headline, led me to look up the April 20, 2007, Issuer Bid Circular on SEDAR, which stated:

Individual Shareholders who sell their Shares to the Company pursuant to the Offer will be deemed to receive a taxable dividend on the Shares equal to the amount by which the Purchase Price exceeds their paid-up capital for purposes of the Tax Act. The Company estimates that the paid-up capital per Share is approximately $18.20. This dividend will be subject to the gross-up and dividend tax credit rules applicable to taxable dividends received by individual Shareholders from taxable Canadian corporations, including the recently enacted enhanced dividend gross-up and tax credit where the deemed dividend has been designated as an eligible dividend by the Company. The Company will notify Shareholders, in accordance with the Tax Act, of the extent to which the deemed dividend is an eligible dividend.

In addition, such Shareholders will be considered to have disposed of each of their Shares for proceeds of disposition equal to the amount by which the Purchase Price exceeds the deemed dividend arising on the disposition. The Shareholder will realize a capital gain (or capital loss) on disposition of Shares equal to the amount by which the Shareholder’s proceeds of disposition, net of any reasonable costs of disposition, exceed (or are less than) the Shareholder’s adjusted cost base of the Shares sold to the Company pursuant to the Offer.

According to a May 31, 2007, Press Release:

Based on the final report provided by the depositary for the Offer, 224,644 preferred shares have been deposited and not withdrawn. Pursuant to the terms of the Offer, HIPAYS determined the purchase price to be $25.90 per preferred share (the “Purchase Price”) to put it in a position to take up the maximum number of preferred shares deposited to the Offer for an aggregate purchase amount of $5,818,279.60.

This buy-back was reported on PrefBlog at the time

Maybe I’m being a little mean about publicizing all this … I wouldn’t even have reported the press release if it hadn’t been for the word “clarifies”. Come on, guys! You screwed up! Show the grace to admit it!

US Bank Panics in the Great Depression

Friday, February 15th, 2008

The WSJ Economics Blog highlighted a paper by Mark Carlson of the Fed, titled Alternatives for Distressed Banks and the Panics of the Great Depression.

I must say that I don’t consider the conclusions too earth-shattering, but it’s always good to have hard data! The penultimate and conclusive sections read as follows:

One potential reason that restructuring may have been more difficult for banks that failed during panics is that the surge in the number of failing banks during panics increased the competition for new capital. It seems quite reasonable that, at least in the short run, the pool of resources available to investors to recapitalize banks is fixed. As the number of troubled institutions competing for those resources rose, only a small fraction might have been able to obtain them. Thus, even though some banks might have been able to attract capital during ordinary times, there were simply too many banks seeking that capital during panics.

A second reason that panics may have inhibited the ability of banks to pursue alternative resolution strategies is that the number of banks in trouble during panics may have made rescuing the banks more expensive or difficult. Allen and Gale (2000) show how interbank claims can cause losses to spread across banks. Diamond Rajan (2005) present a model in which illiquidity problems at one bank can reduce the liquidity of the banking system and cause problems for other banks. In these models the more banks affected in the initial state, the greater will be the problems for the other banks. Ferderer (2006) finds evidence that market liquidity did decline at times during the Depression. Donaldson (1992) also illustrates how that value of a bank can fall as the number of other banks in distress increases.

A third potential for the difficulty in attracting capital in crises might be an increased difficulty in valuing banks during a panic. Wilson, Sylla, and Jones (1990) noted that asset price volatility increases during panics. If investors had a more difficult time than usual valuing the bank, especially with risks likely tilted to the downside, they may not have been as willing to assist in restructuring the bank.

All three of these reasons could potentially contribute to a reduction in the ability of banks to recapitalize after suspending or to merge with another bank during a panic. The data used in this paper does not allow us to explore which, if any, of these reasons appears particularly important. This area may be fruitful ground for further research.

Section 5. Conclusion

The empirical literature on banking panics finds that banks that failed during panics were generally economically weaker than the ones that survived. The analysis here comes to a similar conclusion, but argues that this comparison provides an incomplete picture of the effects of panics on the banking system. Banks had alternatives to failing during regular times; they could either suspend and reorganize or merge with other banks. This study examines whether banks that failed during panics might, had the panic not occurred, have been able to pursue these other options. Through a series of comparisons, I find evidence that the balance sheets of banks that failed during panics were at least as strong as those of banks that were able to pursue alternative resolution strategies. These findings suggest that the panics may have played a role in preventing banks from suspending and reorganizing or from finding other banks to merge with, possibly due to the increase in the number of problem banks and uncertainty in pricing financial assets during panics.

The period of liquidation following bank failure caused assets to be taken out of the banking system and frozen for extended periods. During a bank merger, the assets stay in the banking system continuously. For banks that suspended temporarily, the median length of suspension in this sample was about 5 months. By comparison, Anari, Kolari, and Mason (2005) find that the average length of liquidation of a bank that failed in the early 1930s was about 6 years. The loss of the bank expertise and the freezing of bank assets and deposits have been found to have had negative effects on output (Bernanke 1983, Anari, Kolari, and Mason 2005}. Thus, to the extent that the panics prevented banks from pursuing less disruptive resolution strategies, then the panics of the early 1930s may well have played a role in prolonging and deepening the Great Depression.

A Better Credit Rating Solution?

Friday, February 15th, 2008

Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC was criticized in PrefBlog on February 8 for his apparent belief that what this world needs is more rules.

I was very happy to be alerted by Naked Capitalism to some remarks he has made that show a better appreciation of the problem:

So how would the SEC substitute — and diminish — the regulatory reliance on ratings?

Mr. Cox said “one means of substituting … would be to substitute the current definition of the rating currently provided by the rating itself.”

What that means is that the SEC is considering ways of setting criteria that gets away from the ratings but focuses instead on the underlying concept. For example, for some rules the SEC could require bonds to be liquid and then develop some measure by which to sort them other than a credit rating, says one person familiar with the matter.

I posted yesterday in Earth to Regulators: Keep Out! that there wasn’t much point in regulation. All the rules in the world won’t make anybody a better analyst … or, indeed, to avoid blow-ups of any kind in this uncertain world.

The problem the regulators face is that under Basel II there is a good chance that a pro-cyclical bias will be introduced to bank capital requirements:

Under Basel II, the capital requirements for the largest banks would be based on their current assessment of the probability of default of the borrower (ie rating) – Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2003). There is a live policy debate over whether different rating approaches adopted by the banks would lead to different procyclical outcomes and if they did which approach banks would choose to adopt. We find that less forward-looking bank rating systems, conditioned on the point in the economic cycle, could lead to a substantial increase in capital requirements in recessions. Looking at the 1990–1992 recession, ratings based on a Merton-type model, which reflect the point in the cycle through the use of current liabilities, lead to a 40% to 50% increase in capital requirements. In contrast, Moody’s ratings which are more forward looking, lead to little increase in capital requirements.

The new Accord which will be introduced in 2006 could, however, have a profound effect on the dynamics of bank minimum capital and lending in recessions. In contrast to the current Accord where, for a given quantum of lending to a particular set of borrowers, the capital requirement is invariant over time, under the new Accord the capital requirements will depend on the current assessment of the probability of default (PD) of those borrowers. If borrowers are downgraded by a bank in a recession, then the capital requirements faced by the bank will rise. This would be in addition to the possible reduction in the bank’s capital because of write-offs and specific provisions.

It’s amusing that the authors (Eva Catarineu-Rabell, Patricia Jackson and Dimitrios P. Tsomocos) of the quoted paper prefer the Ratings Agency style of attempting to rate “through the cycle” as opposed to the more dynamic Merton-style approach, but that’s beside the point for now.

There is only on legitimate reason that Credit Ratings might be of importance to regulators of any kind: the effect on bank capital requirements. And it should be noted that the only reason they have any effect on bank capital requirements is because the concept was written into the Basel Accords. And, of course, they were written into the Basel Accords because of the superb track-record (remember that concept? track record?) of the Credit Rating Agencies.

Not perfect, by any means. There are big blow-ups and minor whoopsees, but it’s an uncertain world dominated by human frailty. Get used to it.

So, I suggest, if the regulators wish to improve their legitimate regulation via new and improved credit ratings, it is only right and proper that they do it themselves, rather than imposed ludicrous constraints and requirements on private businesses in a horrific central planning exercise. Cox is on the right track.

Naked Capitalism takes a very dim view of the remarks:

Require bonds to be liquid?. That is the most deranged thing I have heard in a very long time, and this presumably coms from someone within the US’s top securities regulator. It confirms what I have long suspected: that the SEC is preoccupied with the equity market and knows perilous little about debt.

A simple illustration: just about all corporate bonds are illiquid. That’s one reason credit default swaps are popular. Investors can use CDS to create synthetic corporate bond exposures, which unlike the underlying bonds, can be readily traded. But Cox would have us write off the corporate bond market.

Corporate bonds are illiquid relative to, say, stocks. Sure. I discussed this on November 19, in relation to Prof. Cecchetti‘s desire to have all financial instruments traded on an exchange:

Looking at the topography of the financial system, we see several immediate candidates for migration to exchange trading.  I will mention two:  (1) bonds and commercial paper, and other fixed income securities; and (2) interest-rate swaps and other derivatives that are traded in large volume. Bonds as we know them have been around since at least 16th century.  And the quantities outstanding are substantial – in the United States there something like 4000 distinct corporate bond issues with a market value of roughly $10 trillion.  I can see no reason that these “fixed-income” instruments are not traded on an exchange.

How can we encourage the movement of mature securities onto exchanges?  The answer is through a combination of information and regulation.  On the information side, it is important that less-sophisticated investors realise the importance of sticking with exchange-traded products.  The treasurer who manages the short-term cash balances for a small-town government should not be willing to purchase commercial paper, or any security, that is not exchange traded.

However … there are degrees of illiquidity! Assiduous Readers of PrefBlog will be very familiar with the idea that, while the average trading value (however calculated!) of a particular preferred share might be only $100,000, it is generally possible (for MOST issues, MOST of the time) to call a dealer and trade a block worth $10-million … maybe not right away, but, say, within a week.

So, subject to problems with measurement and control that must be addressed, I’m entirely comfortable with the SEC (or other regulators) coming up with some kind of way in which liquidity will be measured and applying some kind of concentration penalty on banks who hold a position that is too large to be regarded as liquid. This would be a little easier in the case of the States, which already has the NASD TRACE system in place.

There is also the potential for so-called liquidity guarantees to be put in place at time of underwriting. So-called? Well, the European Covered Bond market association called for suspension of the agreement on November 21 and there are current problems with liquidity on Auction Rate Municipals, as mentioned yesterday. I’ve mentioned my own problems in not being able to get a bid for less than a million of good quality corporate paper. So, while I would not put too much faith in the ability of the private sector to provide a bottomless pit of liquidity for bonds in general, liquidity could be enhanced … central banks, for instance, could enter into “liquidity provider of last resort” agreements and accept corporate and other bonds as collateral on a routine basis.

I would not advocate formal liquidity guarantees. It’s too much central bank intervention in the economy … in times of stress, the private sector just ain’t gonna want to take long term debt onto its books, especially not if it’s esoteric. But liquidity could be measured and a capital penalty applied to instruments whose liquidity in times of stress was feared to be sub-normal. 

I’m not sure that I agree with Naked Capitalism‘s point about CDSs. They are sometimes more liquid, sure – it’s a lot easier to go long a CDS than it is to short a corporate bond, especially in size. But as I see it, the main attraction of CDSs has been that they make it a lot easier to lever up a portfolio, compared with taking a cash position (long or short) and (financing or borrowing it). That’s related to liquidity, but is not exactly liquidity.

The guts of the problem, however, is step 2 of Mr. Cox’s idea: and then develop some measure by which to sort them other than a credit rating.

Market prices won’t do it. I’ve posted elsewhere about market implied ratings and how dubious I am that such a system will prove to be a better indicator of credit quality than what we already have. The Fed is dubious too!

And, as noted, structural models such as Merton’s (equity implied ratings were briefly mentioned on October 18) (a) have a lot of problems, and (b) are pro-cyclical.

I’ve also noted that any quantitative system performs badly at trend changes … and it is at precisely the time of trend changes that stresses on the financial system become pronounced.

So what’s the Fed to do? The only answer is … if they want to come up with some way of defining credit risk, they’ll have to set up their own in-house credit rating service. Good luck with that!

February 14, 2008

Thursday, February 14th, 2008

The bond insurance story is just getting bigger and bigger!

Accrued Interest points out:

According to data from Thomson Financial, only about 28% of municipal bonds issued in January carried insurance from a monoline insurer. That’s down from 46% in 2007. Meanwhile, according to Merrill Lynch, new insurance was dominated by FSA and to a lesser extent, Assured Guaranty. FSA insured $3.8 billion of new issues, about 70% of all new issue munis which carried insurance. Assured picked up most of the remainder ($1.3 billion or 23% of new insured issuers).

The fact is that confidence in insurance has never been lower, and yet buyers continue to demand insurance at all tells you something. MBIA and Ambac may never be able to regain AAA levels of confidence, but municipal bond insurance as a concept will survive.

Yesterday‘s rumours that the New York insurance regulator would pursue a Good Insurer/Bad Insurer solution to the problem have been confirmed:

One part would operate the profitable municipal bond insurance business, while the other would handle so-called structured finance products, according to testimony prepared for Eric Dinallo, the New York State insurance superintendent. Dinallo is scheduled to address a U.S. congressional committee today.

“Our first priority will be to protect the municipal bondholders and issuers,” according to Dinallo’s testimony. “We cannot allow the millions of individual Americans who invested in what was a low-risk investment lose money because of subprime excesses. Nor should subprime problems cause taxpayers to unnecessarily pay more to borrow for essential capital projects.”

Naked Capitalism observes:

the priorities have been turned on their head. Before, the reason for a rescue was to prevent carnage on Wall Street. That objective has now been shunted aside as municipalities are hit by the seize-up in the auction rate securities market.

And yes, the Auction Rate Municipals market is getting worse by the day:

UBS AG won’t buy auction-rate securities that fail to attract enough bidders, joining a growing number of dealers stepping back from the $300 billion market, said a person with direct knowledge of the situation.

As much as $20 billion of auctions didn’t attract enough buyers yesterday, an 80 percent failure rate, based on estimates from Bank of America Corp. and JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Merrill Lynch is also cutting back its support. Auction Rate Municipals were introduced to PrefBlog readers on February 6. From esoteric trivia to world crisis in eight days! I feel certain that, like the Canadian ABCP market, this is all the fault of the credit rating agencies. Did you know they get paid by the issuers?

There’s another interesting piece of trivia about the insurers … apparently many brokerages considered them such stellar credits that they didn’t have to put up collateral on their CDS exposure:

Goldman Sachs has made plenty of canny decisions in relation to the credit crunch. One of the smartest might have been its treatment of MBIA, the world’s biggest bond insurer.

While many rivals have in recent years been cheerfully using bond insurers to hedge their structured credit bets, Goldmans has refused to do so due to concern about counterparty risk.

In taking $2bn and $3.1bn writedowns in hedges with insurers whose ability to honour those commitments is in doubt, CIBC and Merrill Lynch respectively have become the face of Wall Street’s nightmares.

It’s always the same thing, eh? Times are good and leverage increases, which only deepens the downturn when it finally arrives. Not just leverage, but also sector concentration of cowboys’ portfolios, witting or unwitting. The importance of correlation has been discussed before: briefly, for example, a husband and wife might each be in jobs that have a 10% chance of disappearing in any given year. A naive analysis (zero correlation) will assign a 1% chance to them both losing their jobs in a year … but if they both work for General Motors at a SUV plant, the chance of them both losing their jobs could be as high as the 10% risk they face individually.

Aleablog has noted in a post picked up and expanded by FT Alphaville that was linked by Naked Capitalism a story by Reuters [I love the Internet] that states:

Correlation on the five-year investment-grade Markit iTraxx Europe index — a measure of investor fears of a system-wide crash — reached new highs of 45 percent on Tuesday. Analysts said the figure had room to go higher still, but some said investors who are now trading based on high correlation could get burned if companies start to default.

Over the past six months, the credit crisis and a low corporate default rate have pushed correlation up, which means the equity tranche has gained relative to the triple-A tranches.Analysts at UBS, in a recent note to investors, said one reason was that banks and financial entities such as conduits, which accumulated billions of dollars of triple-A tranches of CDOs, have needed to unwind or hedge against those tranches.

“Now in a world where leverage has to come down, the pressure is on the piece that is the most leveraged, and that’s the super-senior tranches,” Charpin said.

UBS analysts said the latest rise in correlation may have come also from hedge funds’ needs to raise cash. “If you are a cash-strained hedge fund, that may be a cheap trick to get quickly money back in your pocket,” the analysts wrote. “This is all the more relevant in the last weeks as prime brokers are clamping down on hedge funds’ funding.”

This is where smart analysis is worth money. A mechanism is at work that is pushing up the price of one analytical variable (correlation) without [necessarily] having anything to do with the the actual value of that variable. Therefore, a thorough analysis might show that shorting that variable is a smart thing to do – subject, of course, to a host of risk-control measures. In the preferred share market, for example, I might determine (with the use of HIMIPref™ that convexity is cheap. I might not be able to buy convexity directly, but the valuations of each investible instrument will be adjusted to reflect that view. And, perhaps, a portfolio with an increased convexity might then become cheap enough to the current portfolio that a trade is signalled. And … sometimes it works!

Monoline woes are also spreading into the LBO market, as noted yesterday and on February 11. It seems that formerly reliable Negative Basis Trades are turning positive:

Banks’ exposures through bond insurers, or monolines, is far from limited to mortgage-related MBS and muni bonds. There’s a third big exposure – to leveraged buyout loans – that banks will have to deal with if monolines hit the rocks.

Negative basis trades have been around for a while. A bank buys a bond – say it’s AAA – and then it takes out a CDS against that bond with a monoline. Since spreads in the CDS market for such tranches have been typically much lower than in the cash market, the bank pockets the difference.

But as well as banks’ much-dissected CDO exposures, there have been two other big markets for that kind of trade: on infrastructure bonds and – most interestingly – in structured finance, on CLOs (collateralised loan obligations) – CLOs being the vehicle of choice in which to park massive buyout loans.

Monolines, of course, are no longer in a position to be writing new contracts for banks to use as one half of their negative basis trades. The consequence of that has been that banks have stopped buying AAA tranches of CLOs. Unable to sell those, CLOs have faltered and banks in turn, have found themselves with lots of big buyout loans stuck on their books. No new financing is available for private equity deals.

The monoline FGIC was downgraded by Moodys today, which won’t help things much. The last sentence of the quoted analysis might be of interest to BCE speculators! 

Meanwhile, with a continue plunge in US real-estate values, there are desperate pleas for a government bail-out:

One proposal, advanced by officials at Credit Suisse Group, would expand the scope of loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration. The proposal would let the FHA guarantee mortgage refinancings by some delinquent borrowers….

The risk: If delinquent borrowers default on their refinanced loans, the federal government would have to absorb the loss…

*Yawn*. Speaking of bail-outs, the German government bailout of IKB was mentioned yesterday. Willem Buiter is not happy:

If ever a bank was sufficiently systemically insignificant and small enough to fail by any metric except for the political embarrassment metric, it is surely IKB, the German small and medium enterprise lending bank that got itself exposed fatally to the US subprime crisis through a conduit (wholly owned off-balance sheet entity) devoted to speculative ventures involving instruments it did not understand.

I can think of no better way of encouraging more appropriate future behaviour towards risk by German banks than letting IKB go into insolvency now. The institution gambled recklessly and irresponsibly. It lost. Liquidation and sale of its assets would be the market-conform reward for its failures.

Light-ish trading again today, but holy smokes, this market is on FIRE! PerpetualDiscounts are up 2.84% month-to-date; I noticed yesterday that the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index (as proxied by CPD) had erased its post-new-issue losses to return to the level immediately prior to the BNS new issue announcement. And more today. So there.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.55% 5.58% 44,975 14.5 2 -0.6089% 1,074.1
Fixed-Floater 5.01% 5.65% 79,354 14.71 7 +0.3676% 1,023.8
Floater 4.92% 4.97% 74,607 15.51 3 +0.6897% 859.0
Op. Retract 4.80% 2.35% 79,212 2.59 15 +0.3751% 1,049.3
Split-Share 5.27% 5.41% 98,519 4.23 15 +0.2062% 1,044.7
Interest Bearing 6.23% 6.41% 59,486 3.58 4 -0.0248% 1,082.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.72% 4.53% 385,314 5.15 16 +0.0889% 1,029.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.36% 5.40% 289,567 14.81 52 +0.1013% 958.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.B Ratchet -1.4316% Closed at 23.41-15, 16×10, on zero volume. Nice, tight market, eh?
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -1.3530% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 24.06 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.1663% Asset coverage of 3.3+:1 as of January 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.20% based on a bid of 19.95 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (5.87% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (7.27% to 2016-3-25).
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.2417% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.87% based on a bid of 22.83 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.6173% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 22.62 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.C FixFloat +1.6518%  
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +1.9155%  
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +2.0690% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.80% based on a bid of 20.72 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.I OpRet +2.8244% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.57% based on a bid of 26.94 and a call 2009-7-30 at 25.75.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 60,915 RBC crossed 50,000 at 21.70 … finally able to find a block buyer to match his seller and make Assiduous Reader madequota a little happier! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.14% based on a bid of 21.67 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium 59,975 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 25.55 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 52,232 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 22.14. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 22.01 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 40,621 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 25.59 and a call 2017-3-2 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 33,850 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.44% based on a bid of 18.75 and a limitMaturity.

There were fifteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Earth to Regulators: Keep Out!

Thursday, February 14th, 2008

Willem Buiter’s excellent blog, Maverecon, brings to my attention two reports prepared in the UK:

Willem Buiter is frequently mentioned in PrefBlog: he has, for example, prepared a very good summary of Lessons from the 2007 Financial Crisis. I sharply disagreed with his prescription for reform of the Credit Rating Agencies and also with his current statement:

The Report also mentions the need to improve the functioning of securitisation markets, including improvements in valuation and credit rating agencies but offers very little beef in these areas. It is clear that the credit rating agencies will have to be ‘unbundled’, and that the same legal entity should not be able to sell both ratings and advice on how to structure instruments to get a good rating. The conflict of interest is just too naked. Rating agencies will have to become single-product firms, selling just ratings.

… but for now I’ll let that go. In this post I will discuss the Official Position.

Section 2.61 of the Financial Stability report states:

The Authorities believe that the preferred approach to tackling such issues is through market action, and where appropriate through changes to the IOSCO Code of Conduct on Credit Rating Agencies. However, it is important to recognise that prudential credit ratings are a regulatory tool, in that supervision within the CRD/Basel II framework places reliance on the use of rating opinions to determine risk weightings for capital purposes. Therefore regulators have a strong interest in ensuring that ratings are viewed as reliable and that the information content of ratings is sufficient. If the issues summarised above are not adequately addressed by the markets, alternative measures to remedy these issues should be considered.

… while Section 2.62 continues:

Investors also need to learn lessons from recent events. In particular, investors need to develop a more sophisticated use of ratings. Market participants that consider investing in new asset classes, such as structured products, should not use ratings as a substitute for appropriate levels of due diligence, nor draw – potentially misplaced – inferences from ratings that the behaviour of structured securities share the same characteristics, including liquidity characteristics, as more familiar comparably-rated corporate securities. Recent losses and illiquidity in such asset classes have ensured these issues are in the forefront of investors’ minds, and market practice is already adapting rapidly in response. There will be a role for coordinating bodies – such as industry groups and international fora – in clarifying and codifying new practice.

And, finally, I note that the authorities are requesting, inter alia, the following feedback:

2.6) Have the Authorities correctly identified the issues on which international work on credit rating agencies should focus?

2.7) Do you agree with the Authorities’ proposals to improve the information content of credit ratings?

2.8) Do you agree with the Authorities that the preferred approach to restoring confidence in ratings of structured products is through market action and, where appropriate, changes to the IOSCO Code of Conduct on Credit Rating Agencies?

First, let’s look at a little history. Remember the Panic of 1825? I will remind Assiduous But Sometimes Forgetful Readers of the bailout of the banking house of Sir Peter Pole, as related and analyzed by Larry Neal, professor of economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign:

The first mention of the crisis occurs on December 8, 1825, when “The Governor [Cornelius Buller] acquainted the Court that he had with the concurrence of the Deputy Governor [John Baker Richards] and several of the Committee of Treasury afforded assistance to the banking house of Sir Peter Pole, etc.”44 This episode is described in vivid detail by the sister of Henry Thornton Jr., the active partner of Pole, Thornton & Co. at the time. On the previous Saturday, the governor and deputy governor counted out £400,000 in bills personally to Henry Thornton, Jr., at the Bank without any clerks present.45 All this was done to keep it secret so that other large London banks would not press their claims as well. A responsible lender of last resort would have publicized the cash infusion to reassure the public in general. Instead, the run on Pole & Thornton continued unabated, causing the company to fail by the end of the week. Then the deluge of demands for advances by other banks overwhelmed the Bank’s Drawing Office.

The analysis makes perfect sense to me. The lender of last resort should enjoy the utmost confidence of the investing public, with an unparalleled reputation for probity and bottomless pockets.

However, the Treasury Committee report on Northern Rock referenced above provides extensive detail about the urge of the lender of last resort to provide covert assistance only and why it was finally decided that any support had to be made public (paragraphs 123-142, inclusive). Paragraph 165 states as a conclusion of the committee:

We accept that the consequences of an announcement of the Bank of England’s support operation for Northern Rock were unpredictable. There was a reasonable prospect that the announcement would have reassured depositors rather than having the opposite effect, particularly prior to the premature disclosure of the operation. However, after the premature disclosure of the support, and against the background of the market reaction to Barclays use of lending a fortnight earlier, it seems surprising that the issues were not urgently revisited. It is unacceptable, that the terms of the guarantee to depositors had not been agreed in advance in order to allow a timely announcement in the event of an adverse reaction to the Bank of England support facility.

In this case it was the announcement that the Lender of Last Resort had been called upon that actually caused the run.

I will also note the acknowledgement of Prof. Buiter in Paragraph 164:

Professor Buiter took a rather different view:

If [the Tripartite authorities] were not quite convinced that the public would believe them—and in these days you cannot be sure of that—then the immediate creation of a deposit insurance scheme that actually works and is credible would have been desirable. To wait three days was again an unnecessary delay.

In other words, there is good agreement that the authorities have squandered the trust of the public. The quote seems to have been lost in a revision, but I recall reading at the time that one woman queuing up for her money at a Northern Rock branch told a reporter at the time – who was puzzled as to why she was concerned – that ‘they lied to us about Iraq. Why shouldn’t they lie to us now?’

My thesis can be stated very simply: given that distrust of regulatory and other official bodies is so deeply ingrained into the public psyche, how can there be any contemplation of the idea that increased regulation and official oversight of the Credit Rating Agencies will improve public trust in the ratings?

The proponents of increased regulation also appear to be completely unable to provide any evidence that a credit rating analyst required to fill in forms and tick off boxes will provide estimates and advice that are any better than he would have produced without filling in forms and ticking off boxes.

Sadly however, those investment advisors, both licensed and unlicenced, who persuaded clients/employers/investors that the ability to write a big cheque equated to investment management skill desperately need someone to blame, now that their delusions have blown up in their clients faces. There is also pressure from subscription-based agencies for the regulators to get them more clients. And, of course, the supreme test of one’s ability as a regulator is total faith in the proposition that everything be regulated by a wise regulator.

So … there’ll be changes, for sure. Mostly cosmetic, assuredly costly, definitely useless. But after all, nobody must ever lose money on an investment, or take responsibility for their own actions, right?

And, sadly, once any plan is implemented it will meet its unstated purpose of creating a well-defined scapegoat for any blow-up. As Scotia is proving in the course of its battle with David Berry: if you want to get somebody, and are prepared to spend enough money on enough lawyers to check through things carefully enough, you can “get” anybody … and pretend to be shocked at what you’ve found.

February 13, 2008

Thursday, February 14th, 2008

MGIC, the US Mortgage Insurer, announced a huge loss today and is seeking capital:

MGIC Investment Corp., the largest U.S. mortgage insurer, fell the most in a month after posting a record quarterly loss of $1.47 billion and said it hired an adviser to raise capital.

MGIC’s fourth-quarter net loss was $18.17 a share, compared with a profit of $122 million, or $1.47, a year earlier, the Milwaukee-based company said in a statement today. Excluding investment losses, the insurer lost $18.09 a share, worse than the $8.13 average loss estimate of seven analysts compiled by Bloomberg.

They’ll have to pay up for capital in this environment!

Buffet’s municipal bond re-insurance offer, mentioned yesterday, attracted some comment at Naked Capitalism amid rumours that it is merely a stalking horse for regulatory action:

This seems to be a misguided application of the “good bank-bad bank” approach used in the saving & loan workouts.

But consider the differences: the dead S&L’s landed in the FDIC’s lap. They had to figure out what to do with them, and they wanted to make a recovery on the payments they made in deposit insurance. So the Resolution Trust Corporation was set up. Note that a big issue was that the Federal government had to continue to fund the S&L’s working capital and also pay to keep some staffing going. That cost was considerable and controversial, and led the RTC to sell assets faster than it would have if it had wanted to maximize value.

The reason for segregating assets was simple: there were two different types of investors who might want to acquire them: banks that hadn’t been too badly damaged were interested in the “good bank” assets; distressed players and wealthy individuals went after the “bad bank” assets. The bad bank assets were going sufficiently on the cheap that even parties that had never dabbled in that sort of deal like Ron Perlman made acquisitions and did very well.

But what does a segregation achieve here? No one but an AAA rated party would make sense as a buyer/reinsurer of the muni portfolio. Buffett already having decided to enter the business on a de novo basis means the only interest another insurer is likely to have is reinsurance.

And who would buy the rest? The parties who best understand the CDO/CDS exposures and have reason to do a deal are already at the table. You aren’t going to have new parties materialize out of the blue. Private equity investors like TPG and Bain Capital predictably said no thank you, we don’t understand this stuff.

So a simple runoff of the portfolios would make the most sense. Any other activity appears to be for the benefit of lawyers and Perella Weinberg, not the policyholders.

As corporate spreads widen, there are fears that Fed cuts are pushing on a rope:

Companies are paying more to borrow now than before the Fed reduced its benchmark rate by 1.25 percentage point over nine days in January, based on data compiled by Merrill Lynch & Co. Rates on so-called jumbo mortgages, those above $417,000, have increased in the past month, making it tougher to sell properties and risking further price declines.

“It’s the clogging up of the credit markets that worries me most,” Harvard University economist Martin Feldstein said in an interview in New York. “The Fed has done a lot of cutting, the question is whether it’s going to get the traction that it did in the past.”

One example of this is the recent spate of Auction Rate Municipal auction failure. These auctions were last discussed – and explained! – on February 6. Another example is the market for Leveraged Buy-Out loans. Naked Capitalism provides an update to the commentary that was discussed February 11. Incidentally, there’s a new issue of CLO being touted:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Carlyle Group plan to sell a 2 billion-euro ($2.9 billion) collateralized loan obligation and invest their own funds in the riskiest portion, according to a person with direct knowledge.

The CLO will mostly hold loans used to finance European leveraged buyouts, purchasing directly from the managers of the transactions as well as loans traded in the market, the person said. Goldman is handling the CLO sale and Carlyle will manage the investments.

CELF Partnership Loan Funding 2008-1

Class Size Rating Reinvestment Initial terms

(euros) (M/SP)** Period (years)

A 1.47 bln Aaa/AAA 2 150 bp* B 85 mln Aa2/AA 2 350 bp* C 90 mln A3/A- 2 525 bp* D 70 mln Baa3/BBB- 2 750 bp* E 50 mln Ba3/BB- 2 1100 bp* F 80 mln B3/B- 2 1500 bp* Pref 55 mln 20 percent Sub 100 mln

* in basis points over Euribor ** Ratings are Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s

However, when I look at two Fed H.15 releases, for Feb. 11, 2008, and Feb. 12, 2007, I see that 30-year interest rate swaps are now at 4.83% to receive 3.20% LIBOR, vs. the year ago figures of 5.42% to receive 5.36% LIBOR. In Canada, long corporates hit 5.8%+ around the end of September and have been relatively stable since … and when we make a selection from the Fed’s easily accessible data, we see that the October 1 rates were 5.42% to receive 5.30% LIBOR. Note that Swaps were discussed briefly on PrefBlog in the context of synthesizing floating rate preferreds.

So maybe things are being transmitted quite as quickly as some might hope, but it certainly appears to me that there has been a bull steepening … at least as far as the swaps market is concerned! To the extent that arbitrage still exists – and friction has increased a lot in the last six months! – that should filter through to the cash bond market in the course of time.

It should also be noted that in Canada, long corporates and long Canadas are down (in price) roughly the same amount Year-to-Date, so all this fancy-pants Swap-Rate stuff should be taken with a grain of salt – at least as far as Canadian prospects are concerned.

Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary Paulson, fresh from his successes with the Hope Now Alliance and Super-SIV/MLEC is proposing new rules for securitization.

U.S. financial regulators will propose changes in the rules for packaging loans into bonds in the aftermath of the subprime credit collapse.

Paulson said it will be “a number of months” before the Presidential Working Group on Financial Markets announces its recommendations and that easing credit strains is the first “priority.”

In not entirely unrelated news, Moody’s has requested comment on the question “Should Moody’s Consider Differentiating Structured Finance and Corporate Ratings?”. There’s a survey! Log in RIGHT NOW and tell them that cosmetic differences are relevant solely to cosmeticians and bullshit artists!

The German government has bailed out IKB:

Germany will provide 1 billion euros in capital to the Dusseldorf-based lender, government officials told reporters in Berlin today. The country’s banks should help pay for the rest and talks on how to raise the remaining 500 million euros are continuing, the officials said.

An agreement on the bailout was necessary because IKB needed 500 million euros immediately to have sufficient capital to fulfill demands by German financial regulator BaFin to avoid insolvency, Scheel said. BaFin President Jochen Sanio threatened to close the bank last week if it didn’t quickly receive new capital, Handelsblatt newspaper reported.

I have been extremely annoyed about the emphasis on SocGen scapegoat Kerviel’s background as a back-office employee, most recently on January 30. My fears of a decline in career mobility appear to be justified:

Kerviel’s unauthorized trading at Societe Generale SA ruined the chances of French bank clerks getting promoted to the trading floor, headhunters say.

Kerviel, 31, became a trader at Societe Generale in 2005 after spending five years in the compliance and control section of the bank’s so-called middle office. Last month, the Paris- based bank blamed him for trading losses of 4.9 billion euros ($7.2 billion).

“The middle office won’t be a springboard to become a trader anymore,” said Gael de Roquefeuil, an adviser for financial industry headhunting at Korn/Ferry International in Paris. “Career bridges were already difficult and at least for the short term they are completely over.”

Great. So, especially in France, one of the primary qualifications in gaining promotion to a management position in trading is not having a clue about operations; such clues are gained only through experience. Expect more blow-ups over the next twenty years as competence and knowledge becomes even further divorced from authority than is already the case in financial services. Not to mention reduced profits even in the absence of problems if the major dealers wilfully reduce the size of their talent pool.

A very strong day for preferreds, with returns well-distributed within each asset class.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.51% 5.54% 46,030 14.61 2 -0.1837% 1,080.7
Fixed-Floater 5.03% 5.67% 79,948 14.70 7 +0.0300% 1,020.0
Floater 4.96% 5.01% 76,259 15.45 3 +0.5653% 853.1
Op. Retract 4.82% 3.17% 80,397 2.68 15 +0.1978% 1,045.4
Split-Share 5.28% 5.45% 98,451 4.22 15 +0.3168% 1,042.6
Interest Bearing 6.23% 6.40% 60,247 3.58 4 +0.2275% 1,082.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.73% 4.39% 387,693 5.20 16 +0.1448% 1,028.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.36% 5.40% 291,501 14.80 52 +0.4638% 957.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.C FixFloat -1.6250%  
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1984% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 22.26 and a limitMaturity
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.0200% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 22.78 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.0927 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 23.13 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.1029% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.1211% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.94% based on a bid of 22.55 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +1.1899% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 22.11 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.2414 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 22.02 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount +1.2414% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.16% based on a bid of 23.63 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +1.2582% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.23% based on a bid of 21.73 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount +1.4031 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.15% based on a bid of 23.85 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater +1.4870%  
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.5063% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 24.26 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.5661% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.7471% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.15% based on a bid of 22.13 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.I OpRet +1.7476% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.51% based on a bid of 26.20 and a call 2010-7-30 at 25.50. Compare with BAM.PR.J (5.32% to softMaturity 2018-3-30).
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 121,885 RBC crossed 110,000 at 23.15. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 23.15 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet 106,741 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.72% based on a bid of 25.89 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 83,815 RBC crossed 31,200 at 22.64. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 22.26 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 78,680 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 25.45 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 64,575 National Bank crossed 38,900 at 20.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.69% based on a bid of 20.86 and a limitMaturity.

There were fourteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.