Archive for April, 2008

MAPF : Preferred Share Fund 2007 Financials Posted

Sunday, April 6th, 2008

The audited financial statements for my pooled fund, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, for 2007, have been posted, together with a full statement of transactions in 2007.

The monthly, quarterly, annual and annualized performances to the end of the first quarter, 2008, have also been published. A commentary on the performance for March 2008 is in preparation.

While the year to March 31 was disappointing in terms of absolute return, I was very pleased to see that the fund handily outperformed its benchmark during a vicious downturn – the causes of this downturn have been previously discussed. Large market moves are, in general, good for the fund’s relative performance because individual issues will become out of alignment with their peers, which allows trading opportunities. Unitholders can be assured that I work constantly to ensure that the fund’s outperformance will be maintained in the future, in both up and down markets.

Full information regarding the fund is available at the fund’s main page, where subscription information is also available.

April 4, 2008

Friday, April 4th, 2008

There’s a wonderful article on risk models by Avinash Persaud at VoxEU:

Alan Greenspan and others have questioned why risk models, which are at the centre of financial supervision, failed to avoid or mitigate today’s financial turmoil. There are two answers to this, one technical and the other philosophical.

The technical explanation is that the market-sensitive risk models used by thousands of market participants work on the assumption that each user is the only person using them.

In today’s flat world, market participants from Argentina to New Zealand have the same data on the risk, returns and correlation of financial instruments, and use standard optimisation models, which throw up the same portfolios to be favoured and those not to be.

observation that market-sensitive risk models, increasingly integrated into financial supervision in a prescriptive manner, were going to send the herd off the cliff edge was made soon after the last round of crises.

If the purpose of regulation is to avoid market failures, we cannot use, as the instruments of financial regulation, risk-models that rely on market prices, or any other instrument derived from market prices such as mark-to-market accounting. Market prices cannot save us from market failures. Yet, this is the thrust of modern financial regulation, which calls for more transparency on prices, more price-sensitive risk models and more price-sensitive prudential controls. These tools are like seat belts that stop working whenever you press hard on the accelerator.

There are certainly a lot of advisors out there calling themselves quants without deserving the title! Pseudo-quants are entirely capable, I assure you, of producing a system that outputs a simple buy/sell signal, with no allowance for buy price and sell price.

“Cliff Risk” was referred to by BoC governor Carney in his speech to the Toronto Board of Trade that has been reviewed on PrefBlog. He was referring to credit ratings and changes thereof, but the principle is the same:

Finally, it appears possible that the incentives provided by a series of regulations may have encouraged crowded trades. The so-called “cliff risk” created by the mandated use of ratings is one example. A paradox of the current turbulence is that a desire to shelter in the perceived safety of AAA-rated assets led to a dangerous explosion in the supply of synthetically created AAA-rated assets. Since many of these assets were financed by excessive leverage and many participants were constrained by mandates to sell on downgrades, the rush to the exits has proven extremely destabilizing.

Frankly, while I’m willing to believe Professor Persaud’s characterization of the modelling environment, I want to see more detail before I endorse his views unreservedly. If all preferred share market participants blindly followed HIMIPref™, for instance, then all issues would trade within a band, within which all participants would be indifferent to holding or not holding the issue. There would be some cliff risk upon changes in credit rating, but not really all that much.

My hypothesis until then is that models have acted far to quickly to promulgate contagion. KVM pricing models for bond defaults have made the corporate bond market far too sensitive to changes in common stock price (see references in the PrefBlog CDS Primer); while the common stock price has become hugely sensitive to the procyclical change engendered by mark-to-market accounting.

And it’s not at all clear that crowded trades can be blamed exclusively on quant models anyway … right on cue, Bloomberg reports that Buy Wal-Mart, Sell Goldman Becoming Easiest Trade … typical stockbroker tell-me-a-story pablum.

In the end, it doesn’t matter, does it? Andrew Willis of the Globe asserted yesterday that:

In 2007, the Teachers fund was up 4.5 per cent, compared with the composite benchmark’s 2.3-per-cent return.

In the past, critics have taken issue with the fact that Teachers executives earn the same pay as private sector peers, without having to actually go out and raise the money they invest.

I’d be a lot happier if there were names and references attached to the “critics”, but that is the mindset of the industry. What is paid for is the ability to bring in money. Performance is a flat fee, to be enjoyed by anybody who hangs up his shingle. How many of these so-called critics have a performance track record anywhere close to that enjoyed by Teachers’? And why doesn’t it matter?

Updating my posts on the David Berry situation brought to mind one of the allegations against him:

Market participants had no knowledge of Berry and McQuillen selling shares in the new issue to clients once the shares opened for trading. They only saw Berry and McQuillen buying the shares, which is consistent with an accumulation strategy. This had the potential to mislead other market participants as to the true nature of the demand for the stock, and affect their subsequent investment decisions.

In other words, RS sees as one of its purposes the encouragement of cliff trades. Scotia’s accumulating? Holy smokes, we’d better jump right in! Fundamentals be damned, cries RS!

Naked Capitalism republishes an article on foreclosure rates … the foreclosure process is now a bottleneck:

The number of borrowers at least 90 days late on their home loans rose to 3.6 percent at the end of December, the highest in at least five years, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association in Washington. That figure, for the first time, is almost double the 2 percent who have been foreclosed on.

Lenders who allow owners to stay in their homes are distorting the record foreclosure rate and delaying the worst of the housing decline, said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Economy.com, a unit of New York-based Moody’s Corp. These borrowers will eventually push the number of delinquencies even higher and send more homes onto an already glutted market.

“We don’t have a sense of the magnitude of what’s really going on because the whole process is being delayed,” Zandi said in an interview. “Looking at the data, we see the problems, but they are probably measurably greater than we think.”

Lenders took an average of 61 days to foreclose on a property last year, up from 37 days in the year earlier, according to RealtyTrac Inc., a foreclosure database in Irvine, California. Sales of foreclosed homes rose 4.4 percent last year at the same time the supply of such homes more than doubled, according to LoanPerformance First American CoreLogic Inc., a real estate data company based in San Francisco.

The US Jobs number came out today and the bad news was good for bonds, albeit with something of a lag. Econbrowser‘s Menzie Chinn was more interested in the revisions.

Remember SIVs? There was some news about the Sigma SIV today:

Gordian Knot Ltd.’s $40 billion Sigma Finance Corp. had its Aaa credit rating cut five levels by Moody’s Investors Service as the value of its assets fell, increasing the risk the credit fund may have to be wound down.

Moody’s downgraded Sigma’s long-term debt to A2, the ratings company said in a statement today. The investment company’s short-term debt rating was lowered to Prime-2 from Prime-1. The downgrades affect $23 billion of debt.

Sigma must refinance $20 billion of debt by September, Moody’s said. The company has been funding itself by borrowing through repurchase agreements, selling holdings and swapping assets with bond investors, Moody’s said.

The credit fund has $14 billion of repurchase agreements, contracts that allow it to raise cash by pledging collateral it agrees to buy back at a later date. Sigma has exchanged $4 billion of assets with investors in so-called ratio trades and sold $9.5 billion of its holdings into the market, Moody’s said.

Something of a sleepy day for the preferred market – little volume and little movement, although there was the usual quota of outliers to keep things interesting.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.21% 5.25% 29,210 15.17 2 -0.0406% 1,089.0
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 5.43% 60,867 14.98 8 +0.0404% 1,028.9
Floater 4.99% 5.02% 71,873 15.43 2 +0.0543% 835.1
Op. Retract 4.86% 4.16% 81,376 3.34 15 -0.1402% 1,045.3
Split-Share 5.39% 6.01% 91,708 4.10 14 -0.2918% 1,025.8
Interest Bearing 6.19% 6.27% 65,510 3.92 3 +0.0683% 1,094.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.92% 5.33% 214,851 5.54 7 +0.0034% 1,016.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.69% 5.71% 307,319 14.14 63 +0.0812% 915.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -1.9588% Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of April 3, according to TD Securities. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.38% based on a bid of 9.51 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.1783% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 19.75 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.7079% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.76% based on a bid of 21.87 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.6851% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 22.17 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.6614% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 24.86 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.44% to 2012-3-30) and BAM.PR.I (4.55% to call 2010-7-30 at 25.50)
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.4141% Asset coverage of 1.9+:1 as of March 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.74% based on a bid of 9.76 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -1.0526%  
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.0127% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 19.95 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.0228% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 19.95 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +1.0587%  
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.2376% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 20.45 and a limitMaturity.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.6497% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 20.95 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount 230,509 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 23.68 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 55,795 New issue settled April 2. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.90% based on a bid of 24.70 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.K OpRet 37,889 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.51% based on a bid of 25.18 and a call 2008-5-4 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount (for now!) 31,500 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 25.20. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.80% based on a bid of 25.01 and a call 2011-8-16 at 25.00
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 23,100 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.04 and a limitMaturity.

There were seven other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

David Berry Wins a Round

Friday, April 4th, 2008

I have previously reported an OSC hearing held into the David Berry contractual dispute.

Regulation Services has acknowledged receipt of the resultant OSC order:

1. Subject to clause 3 below, RS shall provide Berry’s counsel access to the Settlement Materials and, if requested, copies thereof for purposes relating to Berry’s defence in the RS Proceeding.

2. Disclosure and use of the Settlement Materials will be on the basis that:
(a) Berry and his counsel will not use the Settlement Materials other than in connection with Berry making full answer and defence to the allegations against him in the RS Proceeding;

(b) any use of the Settlement Materials other than in connection with Berry making full answer and defence to the allegations against him in the RS Proceeding will constitute a violation of this Order;

(c) RS shall maintain custody and control over the Settlement Materials so that copies of the Settlement Materials are not disseminated for any purpose other than as contemplated in clause 1 above;

(d) the Settlement Materials shall not be used for any collateral or ulterior purpose; and

(e) Berry and his counsel shall, promptly after the completion of the RS Proceeding and any appeals, return all copies of the Settlement Materials to RS or confirm that they have been destroyed.
3. The foregoing Order is subject to any claim by RS of solicitor-client privilege, or litigation “work product” privilege, and if asserted, the particulars of such a claim shall be set out by RS in a written list and provided to Berry’s counsel with the Settlement Materials.

As may be seen from all the restrictions, the regulatory authorities are required to maintain the pretense that the affair has something to do with regulation; Berry is forbidden to use the materials in his unjust dismissal lawsuit.

However, it is Berry’s position, summarized in the OSC order that:

Berry takes the position that:

(1) his conduct did not result in Scotia contravening UMIR, but that if breaches of UMIR did occur, they were the result of Scotia’s own compliance failures (the “Scotia Defence”); and

(2) Scotia:
(i) was responsible for supervising his trading and educating him about securities regulatory requirements;

(ii) was directly aware of Berry’s trading practices in general, and of the very trades in issue; and

(iii) expressly advised Berry that the impugned trading was not considered improper;

Scotia excused its conduct in firing Berry with the Barings/SocGen principle: we are shocked – shocked! – to suddenly learn how you made us so much money while employed and supervised by us.

Demand Brisk for NA 6.00% Perps?

Friday, April 4th, 2008

Andrew Willis of the Globe has reported:

National Bank sold $150-million of perpetual preferred shares with a 6 per cent yield, and underwriters, led by National Bank Financial, reported brisk demand.

Mr. Willis speculates that RY will be next up. We will see!

As previously reported on PrefBlog the closing date for the new issue is April 16; the underwriters’ greenshoe is not exercisable until then.

April 3, 2008

Thursday, April 3rd, 2008

Accrued Interest notes that he’s hearing some chatter about credit markets finally troughing, and urges caution:

Anyway, as much as I’d like to believe in a bottom in credits, we need to get through mid April with some strength. April is going to be a key month for bank/finance earnings (translation, writedowns) Here are some earnings dates to mark on your calendar.

I’ll add my caution to his. Remember, it is in the interest of the sell-side to convince clients that a turning point has been reached and therefore that a rejigging of portfolios is in order. It is in the interest of the press to convince readers that right now this minute is quite possibly the most exciting time in the history of markets.

Be skeptical and remember Rule #1: Things are always less exciting than they seem. And if you take the view that things are getting worse, you can find big name support for that idea.

Felix Salmon reviewed the CDS market after an article in the NYT. Reasonable enough reviews; the NYT article made the point I’ve been making about the credit crunch:

But many speculators, particularly hedge funds, have flocked to these instruments to bet on a company failure easily. Before the insurance was developed, such a bet would require selling short a corporation’s bond and going into the market to borrow it to supply to the buyer.

The market’s popularity raises the possibility that undercapitalized participants could have trouble paying their obligations.

“The theme had been that derivatives are an instrument that helps diversify risk and stabilize risk-taking,” said Henry Kaufman, the economist at Henry Kaufman & Company in New York and an authority on the ways of Wall Street. “My own view of that has always been highly questionable — those instruments also encourage significant risk-taking and looking at risk modestly rather than incisively.”

I will not attempt to quantify the effect of the ability to short corporate debt easily has had in intensifying the damage of the credit crunch. But it’s there! This is not necessarily a bad thing, though; one of the great attributes of financial markets in general is that they tend to anticipate and intensify pain, thereby getting it over with more quickly so we can go back to work.

Stephen Cecchetti’s idea of forcing CDS trading onto exchanges (noted on PrefBlog on November 19 has found support from George Soros:

There is an esoteric financial instrument called credit default swaps. The notional amount of CDS contracts outstanding is roughly $45,000bn. To put it into perspective, that is about equal to half the total US household wealth and about five times the national debt. The market is totally unregulated and those who hold the contracts do not know whether their counterparties have adequately protected themselves. If and when defaults occur, some of the counterparties are likely to prove unable to fulfil their obligations. This prospect hangs over the financial markets like a sword of Damocles that is bound to fall, but only after some defaults have occurred. That must have played a role in the Fed’s decision not to allow Bear Stearns to fail. One possible solution is to establish a clearing house or exchange with a sound capital structure and strict margin requirements to which all existing and future contracts would have to be submitted. That would do more good in clearing the air than a grand regulatory reorganisation.

Sounds nice, but I’m not certain that there’s enough volume in the off-the-run CDSs to justify an exchange. And I’d really like to know who’s going to pay for it! I will admit that the notion of controlling counterparty risk by such a mechanism does have its attractions … but I suspect that most of the trouble in this department is coming from the esoteric swaps on sub-prime paper, of which maybe one or two will exist world-wide for any given tranche.

Several exchanges were reported in 2006 to be gearing up to trade CDSs:

Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank AG and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. risk losing their hammerlock on the most lucrative financial market when exchanges begin offering credit derivatives next year.

Paris-based Euronext NV, which is being bought by NYSE Group Inc., plans to create contracts based on credit-default swaps, making them cheaper to trade and easier to understand than the derivatives sold by banks. Credit-default swaps, used to speculate on credit quality, also top the product list for Chicago Mercantile Exchange Holdings Inc., the largest U.S. futures market, the Chicago Board Options Exchange and Frankfurt- based Eurex AG.

I don’t know why this initiative foundered – it may be fear of trying something new during a crunch, of course – but the NYSE is now promoting a service to report prices of such illiquid securities, presumably in competition with Markit.

There were further indications of skullduggery in the BSC implosion today:

The SEC opened probes last month into whether hedge funds and other investors spread false rumors in seeking to profit from declines in stocks of companies including Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., people familiar with the inquiries said at the time.

“It looked like more than just fear, it looked like people wanted to induce a panic,” Bear Stearns Chief Executive Officer Alan Schwartz told the Senate panel today. “The minute we got a fact out, more rumors started or there was a different set of rumors.”

The SEC can’t yet say whether market manipulation was responsible for the run, Cox told the Senate committee. During the week it occurred, the Fed passed along “extremely helpful information” on rumors from a “variety of market sources,” he noted.

New York Fed President Timothy Geithner testified regarding the BSC / JPM deal today to the Senate Banking Committee today. Of most interest was the information regarding the BSC collateral:

The New York Fed presented a one-page description of the portfolio. The assets include investment-grade securities and residential and commercial mortgage loans, all of which were current on principal and interest as of March 14.

The portfolio also holds collateralized mortgage obligations, most of which are bonds of government-sponsored enterprises such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The holdings include asset-backed securities, adjustable-rate mortgages, commercial mortgage-backed securities and collateralized mortgage obligations issued by companies other than government-chartered companies.

The (rather general) statement of collateral and the full testimony is available from the NY Fed. His main point is that action was necessary to break the cycle:

What we were observing in U.S. and global financial markets was similar to the classic pattern in financial crises. Asset price declines—triggered by concern about the outlook for economic performance—led to a reduction in the willingness to bear risk and to margin calls. Borrowers needed to sell assets to meet the calls; some highly leveraged firms were unable to meet their obligations and their counterparties responded by liquidating the collateral they held. This put downward pressure on asset prices and increased price volatility. Dealers raised margins further to compensate for heightened volatility and reduced liquidity. This, in turn, put more pressure on other leveraged investors. A self-reinforcing downward spiral of higher haircuts forced sales, lower prices, higher volatility and still lower prices.

Pity the Fed! It’s a thankless task at the best of times, second-guessed by every granny who buys a short-term bond, but the worst part must be having to tolerate grandstanding politicians.

Lehman doesn’t want to follow the path of the Bear! They’ve raised $8-billion in two weeks, helped by securitizing a package of LBO debt.

Volume was light today, but prices were up nicely. Interestingly, the S&P/TSX Preferred Share index (and the NAV of CPD) was down, as closing bids (used by the HIMIPref™ indices) and closing prices (used by a few small outfits) moved in opposite directions.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.23% 5.26% 29,473 15.15 2 0.0407% 1,089.5
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 5.46% 61,441 14.96 8 -0.5591% 1,028.5
Floater 4.99% 5.02% 72,571 15.42 2 -0.4229% 834.7
Op. Retract 4.85% 4.23% 80,494 3.34 15 -0.0196% 1,046.8
Split-Share 5.37% 5.95% 92,517 4.10 14 +0.4498% 1,028.8
Interest Bearing 6.19% 6.19% 65,834 3.92 3 +0.1364% 1,094.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.91% 5.28% 222,891 5.52 7 +0.1309% 1,016.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.69% 5.72% 311,405 14.13 63 +0.2206% 914.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.4054%  
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.1783% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 19.75 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.2301% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 19.75 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.2975% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.88% based on a bid of 22.64 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.5385% Asset coverage of 1.9+:1 as of March 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 9.90 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare +1.6162% Asset coverage of 2.8+:1 as of February 29, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.48% based on a bid of 20.12 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.77% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.C (7.52% to 2019-1-10).
FBS.PR.B SplitShare +2.1053% Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of March 27, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.77% based on a bid of 9.70 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +2.4873% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 22.25 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet 105,155 CIBC crossed 93,600 at 25.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.29% based on a bid of 25.28 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.21% to 2012-3-30) and BAM.PR.I (4.63% to call 2010-7-30 at 25.50)
BMO.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 96,280 New issue settled yesterday. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.90% based on a bid of 24.70 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount 46,505 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 24.86 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.N OpRet 42,400 Desjardins bought 15,000 from Nesbitt at 26.25, then crossed the same amount at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.84% based on a bid of 26.22 and a softMaturity 2014-1-30 at 25.00. Compare with TD.PR.M (3.84% to 2013-10-30).
NA.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 24,850 TD crossed 20,500 in two tranches at 24.80. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.01% based on a bid of 24.70 and a limitMaturity.

There were eight other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

BMO.PR.L Drops Onto Market

Wednesday, April 2nd, 2008

BMO.PR.L, the 5.80% perp announced March 25 commenced trading today to less than rapturous applause, but enough volume to indicate that the underwriting was a modest success. Modest? Their press release indicated:

The Bank has granted to the underwriters an option to purchase up to an additional $50 million of the Preferred Shares exercisable at any time up to two days before closing.

… and I don’t see a press release on their site indicating that the option was picked up, nor is there anything on SEDAR.

On the ‘new issue’ post there was a question about the relative levels of the TD and BMO prefs … so here’s a table, as of the close 4/2:

BMO / TD Perpetual Comparison
Issue Dividend Quote, 4/2 Pre-Tax
Bid-YTW
Curve Price
BMO.PR.J 1.125 19.95-05 5.72% 20.65
BMO.PR.K 1.3125 22.35-40 5.95% 23.57
BMO.PR.H 1.325 23.23-39 5.74% 23.72
BMO.PR.L 1.45 24.75-79 5.89% 25.12
TD.PR.O 1.2125 22.80-00 5.41% 22.29
TD.PR.P 1.3125 23.95-00 5.57% 23.56
TD.PR.Q 1.40 25.11-15 5.67% 24.58
TD.PR.R 1.40 24.86-88 5.68% 24.50

Internally, the TD issues look well behaved … the yield spread between the discount issues and the near-par ones is not quite the 15bp I have previously suggested as a rule of thumb, but it’s close enough for horse-shoes. Note that TD.PR.Q, despite its 25.11-15 quote, may legitimately be considered a discounted issue because it’s full of dividend … a dividend of $0.35 goes ex on April 4. The BMO issues, internally, are less in accord with the rule, with BMO.PR.K looking about 20bp cheap to its peers.

If we mentally adjust the BMO.PR.K issue, we can see that BMO is trading to yield about 30bp more, pre-tax, than TD across the curve. This may be contrasted with the best available bond comparison, sub-debt, the recent BMO issue, trading with a presumed call in 2018, is quoted at 261bp over Canadas, while a TD issue trading to a presumed call in 2017 (5 years prior to maturity), is at 245bp over Canadas. So that’s 16bp over, pre-tax, for 10-year sub-debt, which makes a 30bp pre-tax spread on preferreds seem plausible.

Looking at a Pfd-1(low) issuer: NA.PR.K yields 5.98%, NA.PR.L yield 5.96 (no allowance for convexity here!) with a new issue currently being flogged at a 6.00% yield. The BMO issues are at least trading through the NAs.

All in all, given the preferred share quotes, and supported by evidence from the sub-debt market, I’d say the differences between BMO and TD preferred yields are well explained by a presumption of credit quality.

April 2, 2008

Wednesday, April 2nd, 2008

Sorry folks! Today’s commentary is greatly abridged … but I did post some commentary on Financial Stability and MAPF Portfolio Composition.

Not much price movement in the preferred share market today, and volume eased off.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.24% 5.28% 30,633 15.12 2 0.0000% 1,089.0
Fixed-Floater 4.82% 5.43% 62,485 14.98 8 -0.4081% 1,034.3
Floater 4.97% 5.00% 75,931 15.55 2 -0.6667% 838.2
Op. Retract 4.85% 4.19% 80,374 3.34 15 +0.0590% 1,047.0
Split-Share 5.40% 6.04% 93,280 4.10 14 +0.1961% 1,024.2
Interest Bearing 6.20% 6.17% 66,061 3.91 3 -0.2021% 1,092.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.92% 5.64% 225,675 4.31 7 -0.2707% 1,014.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.70% 5.73% 274,855 14.11 62 -0.0942% 912.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -4.1667%  
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -2.1963% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 21.82 and a limitMaturity.
CL.PR.B PerpetualPremium -1.7334% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 25.51 and a call 2011-1-30 at 25.00.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount -1.5583% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 22.11 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.4146% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 20.21 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K OpRet -1.4014% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 21.81 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.3941% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.51% based on a bid of 18.39 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.3333%  
TCA.PR.X PerpetualDiscount -1.1418% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 49.35 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.0596% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.72% based on a bid of 22.41 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.0907% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.90% based on a bid of 20.39 and a limitMaturity.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare +1.2916% Asset coverage of just under 1.5:1 as of March 27, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.50% based on a bid of 14.90 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.3829% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 23.46 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 264,750 New issue settled today. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.89% based on a bid of 24.75 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 216,871 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
FAL.PR.B FixFloat 61,920  
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 32,850 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.11 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 31,010 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 20.15 and a limitMaturity.

There were twelve other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

DBRS: CIBC Credit Ratings on Negative Trend

Wednesday, April 2nd, 2008

DBRS has announced that it:

has today revised the ratings trend of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC or the Bank) and related entities to Negative and removed the Bank from Under Review with Negative Implications, where it was placed on December 19, 2007. DBRS is confirming all the ratings of CIBC, including the Bank’s Deposits & Senior Debt at AA and Short-Term Instruments at R-1 (high).

The Negative trend reflects DBRS’s concerns about the effectiveness of the Bank’s risk management processes, especially in the context of managing risk to generate consistent and sustainable performance. Weaknesses surfaced in Q4 2007 and Q1 2008 following charges and losses associated with the deterioration of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market.

DBRS believes successful execution by the new senior management team to address risk management issues will be instrumental in removing the Negative trend over the next year, as it is currently too early to determine the effectiveness of these actions.

The DBRS credit review was noted on PrefBlog in December.

CIBC has the following preferred share issues outstanding: CM.PR.A CM.PR.D CM.PR.E CM.PR.G CM.PR.H CM.PR.I CM.PR.J CM.PR.P and CM.PR.R

S&P rates the preferreds P-1(low) with no outlook or watch.

Moody’s does not rate the preferreds, but has Senior Unsecured or Equivalent at Aa2. They changed the outlook to Negative on December 7, 2007.

Fitch lists the long term debt as AA- with “Rating Watch On” and “Rating Watch Negative”.

MAPF Portfolio Composition : March 2008

Wednesday, April 2nd, 2008

There was a good level of trading in March, almost all within the perpetualDiscount sector.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2008-3-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 3.1% (-7.4) 5.59% 3.48
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.4% (+0.1) -7.63% 0.08
PerpetualDiscount 101.2% (+4.8) 5.95% 14.00
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash -4.7% (+2.5) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.17% 14.29
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2008-3-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 53.2% (-0.3)
Pfd-1(low) 20.5% (+13.3)
Pfd-2(high) 11.7% (0)
Pfd-2 2.4% (-7.4)
Pfd-2(low) 17.0% (-8.0)
Cash -4.7% (+2.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2008-3-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 12.4% (+11.4)
$50,000 – $100,000 3.4% (-19.5)
$100,000 – $200,000 0.0% (0.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 26.1% (+4.6)
>$300,000 62.9% (+1.1)
Cash -4.7% (+2.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

As noted above, there was a fair bit of intra-sectoral trading this month. I’ll highlight one sequence that was not just intra-sectoral, but intra-issuer.

Simplified Trading Sequence
Issue CM.PR.J CM.PR.E CM.PR.H
March #1 Sold
$20.25
Bought
$24.05
 
March #2 Sold
$20.10
  Bought
$21.00
Dividend
ex-date
after
all
trades
$0.28125 $0.35 $0.30
Bid
3/31
$19.26 $23.19 $20.18
Change
From
March #1
-3.50% -2.12%  
Change
From
March #2
-2.78%   -2.48%

So, yes, there were losses, but at least these were mitigated somewhat by trading.

Performance for the fund will be available on the weekend. I regret the delay – it’s due to being on-site at a client’s office. March’s performance was, frankly, not very good: about -4.75% for the month. Unfortunately, you can’t win them all; but a performance of -4.75% for the month will result in a return for the quarter of -0.04%. The market has gone down – but the actively managed fund will have handily out-performed the passive benchmarks for the quarter. Eventually the tide will turn as the high level of dividends overwhelms the overall market decline.

International Report on Risk Management Supervision

Wednesday, April 2nd, 2008

The Financial Times reported on a paper by the Financial Stability Forum titled Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence, with a related Options paper.

I haven’t read the paper yet, but I will tomorrow. Hat tip Naked Capitalism … but NC, when they’re talking about simultaneous disclosure, they do indeed mean simultaneous public disclosure. The regulators have that information, but it is currently considered confidential.

I’ll write more on this paper when I’ve read it properly. A quick skim is very encouraging.

Update, 2008-4-2: The paper begins by differentiating between those firms that are performing (relatively!) well during the crunch and those that are getting hit. There are details, of course, but the basic conclusion to be drawn is that the firms performing well have managers who talk to each other and think about what they’re doing.

Write that down, get an MBA. You read it on PrefBlog!

However, “Please don’t be dorks” is not a suitable supervisory injunction, so there are more details:

First, we will use the results of our review to support the
efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to
strengthen the efficacy and robustness of the Basel II capital
framework by:
• reviewing the framework to enhance the incentives for firms to develop more forward-looking approaches to risk measures (beyond capital measures) that fully incorporate expert judgment on exposures, limits, reserves, and capital; and
• ensuring that the framework sets sufficiently high standards for what constitutes risk transfer, increases capital charges for certain securitized assets and ABCP
liquidity facilities, and provides sufficient scope for addressing implicit support and reputational risks.

This looks very good. The first step is extremely tricky … how does one determine whether expert judgment has been fully incorporated or not? There’s a big danger that this could turn into a box-ticking exercise.

I have been harping on the definition of risk transfer and ABCP liquidity facility capital charges for a long time. It seems quite clear, for instance, that Apex / Sitka were not quite far enough off BMO’s balance sheet for risk transfer to have been deemed complete; it also seems clear that the capital charges for liquidity lines on ABCP inter alia need to be increased to reflect the fact that when bad stuff happens, it happens all at once. Thus, as I have written previously:

If the risk weights applied to, for instance, the provision of a global liquidity line to a SIV have been shown to be inadequate (and this has not been documented, although I suspect that it is the case) … increase the risk weight of the line! Currently it’s at a flat 10% … I suggest that a tiering be considered, so that a bank with $10-billion of tier 1 capital can extend such a line for $10-billion at the 10% rate, but the next ten billion is charged at a 20% rate, etc.

The report continues:

Second, our observations support the need to strengthen
the management of liquidity risk, and we will continue to work directly through the appropriate international forums (for example, the Basel Committee, International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the Joint Forum) on both planned and ongoing initiatives in this regard.

Can’t say much more about this without detail!

Third, based on our shared observations from this review, individual national supervisors will review and strengthen, as appropriate, existing guidance on risk management practices, valuation practices, and the controls over both.

Motherhood.

Fourth and finally, we will support efforts in the appropriate forums to address issues that may benefit from discussion among market participants, supervisors, and other
key players (such as accountants). One such issue relates to the quality and timeliness of public disclosures made by financial services firms and the question whether improving disclosure
practices would reduce uncertainty about the scale of potential losses associated with problematic exposures. Another may be to discuss the appropriate accounting and disclosure
treatments of exposures to off-balance-sheet vehicles. A third may be to consider the challenges in managing incentive problems created by compensation practices.

More public disclosure would be appreciated, but I’m not sure how much good it will do. There’s more disclosure now than anybody reads. A review of off-balance-sheet vehicles is appropriate because, as noted above, a lot of them weren’t as far off the balance sheet as they should have been.

The last point in this section is a little troubling. First, it’s so carefully hedged it doesn’t actually say anything; but the fact that it is considered worthy of mention in such a document makes me a little fearful. If, for instance, I join a big bank as a pref trader, I don’t want my compensation to be influenced by whether some dork in government finance lent $20-billion to Argentina. I want my compensation determined by things I have control over – my own trading, or, should I become Head of Fixed Income, the trading of the guys working for, and accountable to, me.

Second, if in my role as pref trader, I strap on Nortel prefs with 20:1 leverage, surely the risk to the bank is due to the holdings of Nortel prefs with 20:1 leverage, not the timing of my bonus for the enormous profits such a position will surely bring.

Against this is the evaluation of risk and the up-front income. For instance, if I had sold a massive position of five-year credit default swaps then, while the profitability of this position is marked to market daily, the actual profit on the whole position is not known until they expire five years later. Regulators rely on the individual firms to make good judgements; they do not and should not second-guess every little thing. If that judgement is biased by a risk/reward profile for the decision maker / risk assessor that is different from the profile appropriate for a firm with continuing operations, this is in fact a regulatory concern.

I suggest that the most appropriate way to address this issue is to ensure that the risk management and accounting functions are independent, objective and senior to the traders. Trouble is, that’s a very, very hard thing to ensure when, for instance, so much of the risk depends on whether Joe Subprime will be able to refinance his mortgage in five years. Pick a number! Why is it better than another number?

More later.

Update, 2008-4-3: Well … not a lot more! Most of the paper is a simple review of the general types of actions taken by management of firms that are coming through this ordeal successfully, compared to … er … less successful companies.

There are many examples given, across all the business lines that the Large Complex Financial Institutions are involved in but, oddly enough, the situations boils down to the same thing. At successful companies, managers:

  • think about what they’re doing
  • talk to each other