Archive for June, 2009

June 22, 2009

Monday, June 22nd, 2009

In recognition of the fact that investors get so much regulatory paper from their brokers that they don’t read it, the Canadian Securities Administrators are requiring the delivery of more paper. I’ll bet a nickel that every year the “Fund Facts” gets enlarged ‘because Granny didn’t know she could lose money if so-and-so went bankrupt’, until about twenty years from now, when new “Fund Briefer Facts” becomes mandated and then lucky buyers get even more mail to throw away without reading. Still, it keeps the regulators busy and Proactively Working In The Best Interest Of Investors, and that’s what counts, right?

Julia Dickson gave a speech in Vancouver lauding financial oligopolies:

One lesson everyone is relearning is the importance of proper consolidated oversight and supervision of financial groups, especially systemically important financial groups. This lesson has arisen in the context of AIG, where the parent holding company was regulated, but not to the extent required of a systemically important group of its size.

Canada is relatively well placed in this regard as there is already considerable consolidated oversight and supervision of the Canadian financial sector. The large securities firms are owned by the big banks, which OSFI oversees, meaning that securities firms must meet the same prudential standards as their parent bank. As well, the general structural model for large financial services groups is that they are headed by a regulated financial institution, which is overseen by OSFI, versus the holding company structure commonly seen in other jurisdictions.

Having a regulated Canadian financial institution at the top of such organizations enhances our ability to understand the risks facing the conglomerate. Further, given OSFI’s regulatory authority at the top level, we can intervene and require action to be taken, no matter where in the group we may have identified potential problems.

As a regulator, you need to have knowledge of the financial status and risk profile of all affiliates within a financial group. Indeed, as demonstrated by the AIG case, small parts of big companies can be hugely problematic.

She did not go so far as to say she wished to see an elimination of the holding company structure for insurers, but she is clearly headed in that direction. It is very disappointing to see such regulatory hostility to the concept of a layered financial system: banks – securities dealers – hedge funds, that can work quite well provided there are clear lines between the layers.

Plain vanilla for everyone! That’s the Canadian way!

C-EBS has published a consultation paper on implementation of hybrid capital guidelines.

Christopher Whalen, head of International Risk Analytics, had some home-truths for the Senate today:

Trading in credit-default swaps should be banned, Christopher Whalen, managing director of Institutional Risk Analytics in Hawthorne, California, said in prepared testimony for today’s Senate hearing. Regulators are too cozy with the banks in the market to be counted on to make changes, he said.

“The views of the existing financial regulatory agencies, and particularly the Federal Reserve Board and Treasury, should get no consideration from the committee since the view of these agencies are largely duplicative of the views of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and the large OTC dealers,” he said in the remarks.

I can’t find the full text of his testimony, but they will probably be posted soon.

Equities got hit today after the World Bank warned of lower future growth. The only way out of this mess is to hire more regulators:

Global Development Finance 2009: Charting a Global Recovery, warns that the world is entering an era of slower growth that will require tighter and more effective oversight of the financial system.

Perhaps in sympathy, PerpetualDiscounts were off somewhat today; while FixedResets were also down the loss of the latter was negligible. Volume continued high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8682 % 1,215.1
FixedFloater 7.09 % 5.54 % 34,558 16.26 1 -1.0968 % 2,126.6
Floater 3.13 % 3.44 % 78,268 18.66 3 -0.8682 % 1,518.0
OpRet 4.97 % 3.65 % 134,539 0.10 14 0.0141 % 2,193.6
SplitShare 5.78 % 6.44 % 64,042 4.22 3 0.2890 % 1,886.3
Interest-Bearing 5.98 % 7.46 % 22,779 0.51 1 -0.1988 % 1,995.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3465 % 1,734.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.34 % 6.36 % 165,003 13.40 71 -0.3465 % 1,597.8
FixedReset 5.67 % 4.81 % 526,037 4.35 40 -0.0276 % 2,011.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -5.34 % Not a particularly meaningful decline, since only 3,500 shares traded and this was in a range of 11.50-75; the closing quote was 11.00-49, 1×5 after a trade with eight minutes left in the day took out the bid.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 11.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.00
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.43
Evaluated at bid price : 18.43
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -2.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 7.51 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 16.82
Evaluated at bid price : 16.82
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-07-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.25
Evaluated at bid price : 18.25
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 19.17
Evaluated at bid price : 19.17
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 16.69
Evaluated at bid price : 16.69
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.27
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.33
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.07
Evaluated at bid price : 18.07
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.42
Evaluated at bid price : 18.42
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.27 % Asset coverage of 1.9-:1 as of May 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.95
Bid-YTW : 10.54 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 15.25
Evaluated at bid price : 15.25
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 282,931 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.04
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 86,160 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 79,131 National crossed two blocks at 20.04, of 30,000 and 24,000 shares.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 19.96
Evaluated at bid price : 19.96
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 63,575 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 54,550 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 51,356 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-22
Maturity Price : 18.38
Evaluated at bid price : 18.38
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
There were 43 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

NTL.PR.F & NTL.PR.G Suspended from Trading

Monday, June 22nd, 2009

The Toronto Stock Exchange has announced:

SUSPENDED – Nortel Networks Limited (the “Company”) – The Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preferred Shares, Series 5 (Symbol: NTL.PR.F) and the Non-Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preferred Shares, Series 7 (Symbol: NTL.PR.G) will be suspended from trading effective immediately as a result of the Company’s June 19, 2009 news release. Further information will be forthcoming regarding the Company’s expected delisting application.

The last mention of these issues on PrefBlog occurred when the company requested restrictions on trading.

Both issues have been tracked by HIMIPref™, but are relegated to the “Scraps” index on credit concerns. Tracking will cease immediately.

Update, 2009-6-23: The TSX has announced:

CHANGES IN STOCK LIST Nortel Networks Limited (the “Company”) – Further to TSX Bulletin #2009-0795, at the request of the Company, the Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preferred Shares, Series 5 (Symbol: NTL.PR.F) and the Non-Cumulative Redeemable Class A Preferred Shares, Series 7 (Symbol: NTL.PR.G) (collectively the “Shares”) will be delisted at the close of market on June 26, 2009. Trading in the Company’s Shares will remain suspended.

Research: FixedResets After One Year

Monday, June 22nd, 2009

The June edition of Canadian Moneysaver contained my essay reviewing the first year of trading for the FixedReset structure – and pointed out some peculiarities and pitfalls that are present at current market levels.

Look for the research link!

XCM.PR.A Refuses to Wind-Up

Monday, June 22nd, 2009

Commerce Split Corp. has announced:

The Company’s total net asset value is approximately $8.85 per unit as at June 18, 2009, consisting of less than 16% common shares of CIBC. The reduced exposure to CIBC will materially limit the future impact of price movements of CIBC shares on the net asset value of the Company and lower the ability of the Company to generate income from
dividends and its covered call option writing program.

The significant price decline of CIBC and the resultant implementation of the Priority Equity Protection Plan have made it extremely difficult to achieve the original stated objectives for both classes of shares. The Company established a normal course issuer’s bid which allows the Company to re-purchase units in the market when trading prices are at a discount to the net asset value.

Subsequent to the unsuccessful shareholder vote on February 5, 2009 of the reorganization proposal, the Company has continued to dialogue with certain larger shareholders to try and establish potential solutions for reorganizing the Company that would be suitable for all shareholders and result in a successful shareholder vote. Outside of certain larger shareholders, the remaining shareholders had voted overwhelmingly in support of management’s latest proposal.

The Company has received several shareholder requests to wind up the Company. In response to this request, the Company would like to remind all shareholders that all such reorganization proposals must receive a 66 2/3 favorable vote by both the Class A shareholders and the Preferred shareholders voting separately by class. This requirement is outlined in the Company’s prospectus and is part of the articles of incorporation of the Company. Under any kind of termination proposal at the current time, Class A shareholders would receive no value for their Class A shares since the net asset value per unit is below $10. The Class A shares have traded in a range between $0.36 and $1.84 since February 5, 2009 and closed at $1.02 on June 18, 2009. As such, the Company does not believe that this proposal is in the best interests of the Class A shareholders and any proposal that would provide no value to the Class A shareholders would ultimately never be approved by Class A shareholders.

The Company will continue to seek solutions that will balance and meet the interests of both Classes of shareholders and also result in a successful vote. The costs of holding a meeting are significant to the Company and, as such, the Company will only bring forward a proposal that has a high probability of being passed by the requisite majorities of each Class of shareholders.

Huh. Providing no value – indeed, taking away value – for the preferred shareholders didn’t seem to stop their last proposal from coming to vote.

XCM.PR.A is currently quoted at 7.20-31, while XCM is at 1.05-18. The company should buy the maximum permitted under its issuer bid when this can be done at or below NAV, remind shareholders of their retraction rights, and propose a wind-up that will pay the common shareholders a nominal sum. Waiving management fees, or a good chunk thereof, would be a good thing too, but I’m not holding my breath!

XCM.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

XMF.PR.A Refuses to Wind Up

Monday, June 22nd, 2009

M Split Corp has announced:

This sharp decline in Manulife has resulted in the Company’s net asset value being reduced significantly and as mentioned in previous updates, has required the Company to implement the Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan (the “Plan”) in accordance with the prospectus. As a result of implementing the Plan, the Company has been required to sell the vast majority of the Manulife common shares held in the Portfolio and acquire fixed income securities.

The Company’s total net asset value is approximately $8.37 per unit as at June 18, 2009, consisting of less than 1% common shares of Manulife. The reduced exposure to Manulife will materially limit the future impact of price movements of Manulife shares on the net asset value of the Company and lower the ability of the Company to generate income from dividends and its covered call option writing program.

The significant price decline of Manulife has made it extremely difficult to achieve the original stated objectives for both classes of shares. The Company established a normal course issuer’s bid which allows the Company to repurchase units in the market when trading prices are at a discount to the net asset value.

Subsequent to the unsuccessful shareholder vote on February 5, 2009 of the reorganization proposal, the Company has continued to dialogue with certain larger shareholders to try and establish potential solutions for reorganizing the Company that would be suitable for all shareholders and result in a successful shareholder vote. Outside of certain larger shareholders, the remaining shareholders had voted overwhelmingly in support of management’s latest proposal.

The Company has received several shareholder requests to wind up the Company. In response to this request, the Company would like to remind all shareholders that all such reorganization proposals must receive a 66 2/3 favorable vote by both the Class A shareholders and the Preferred shareholders voting separately by class. This requirement is outlined in the Company’s prospectus and is part of the articles of incorporation of the Company. Under any kind of termination proposal at the current time, Class A shareholders would receive no value for their Class A shares since the net asset value per unit is below $10. The Class A shares have traded in a range between $0.27 and $0.78 since February 5, 2009 and closed at $0.40 on June 18, 2009. As such, the Company does not believe that this proposal is in the best interests of the Class A shareholders and any proposal that would provide no value to the Class A shareholders would ultimately never be approved by Class A shareholders.

The Company will continue to seek solutions that will balance and meet the interests of both Classes of shareholders and also result in a successful vote. The costs of holding a meeting are significant to the Company and, as such, the Company will only bring forward a proposal that has a high probability of being passed by the requisite majorities of each Class of shareholders.

Huh. Providing no value – indeed, taking away value – for the preferred shareholders didn’t seem to stop their last proposal from coming to vote.

XMF.PR.A is currently quoted at 7.07-28, while XMF is at 0.36-50. The company should buy the maximum permitted under its issuer bid, remind shareholders of their retraction rights, and propose a wind-up that will pay the common shareholders a nominal sum. Waiving management fees, or a good chunk thereof, would be a good thing too, but I’m not holding my breath!

XMF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

MFC Disclosure under Review by OSC

Saturday, June 20th, 2009

A Globe & Mail story highlights a Manulife Financial Press Release that states:

On a separate matter unrelated to prior announcements made today by Manulife Financial Corporation, the Company stated that it received an enforcement notice from staff of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) this week relating to its disclosure before March 2009 of risks related to its variable annuity guarantee and segregated funds business. The OSC notice indicates that it is the preliminary conclusion of OSC staff that the Company failed to meet its continuous disclosure obligations related to its exposure to market price risk in its segregated funds and variable annuity guaranteed products. The Company has the opportunity to respond to the notice before OSC staff makes a decision whether to commence proceedings, and the Company intends to cooperate with OSC staff. The Company believes that its disclosure satisfied applicable disclosure requirements.

The prior announcements that the company is so anxious to emphasize are separate and unrelated are retirement of the CFO and Capital Update; the Capital Update trumpets MCCSR but makes no reference to the degree of double leverage inherent in the MFC holdco / insurance sub. structure. They never do, of course, but it is something that preferred shareholders in the holdco (MFC.PR.A, MFC.PR.B, MFC.PR.C, MFC.PR.D & MFC.PR.E) should bear firmly in mind at all times.

With respect to double-leverage, it is of interest to note that Manulife issued $1-billion of 5-Year MTNs at 4.896%, closing 2009-6-2, with the pricing supplement stating:

Approximately $730 million of the net proceeds to MFC from the sale of the Notes will be applied to reduce amounts outstanding under the Credit Facility and the balance of the net proceeds will be utilized for general corporate purposes of MFC.

There are – quite properly – no announcements regarding the enforcement notice regarding disclosure on the OSC website.

The MFC preferreds were last mentioned on PrefBlog when downgraded to A- [Negative Outlook] by Fitch.

SLF DRIP: Preferred Dividends into Possibly Discounted Common

Saturday, June 20th, 2009

Sun Life Financial has announced:

amendments to its Canadian Dividend Reinvestment and Share Purchase Plan (the “Plan”). The three major Plan changes are:

1. Subject to Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) approval, Sun Life may issue common shares from treasury at a discount to the average market price to dividend reinvestment participants. At this time and until further notice, the discount will be 2%. To date, common shares issued under the Plan have been purchased through the TSX with no discount to the average market price.

2. Canadian-resident preferred shareholders will be able to participate in the Plan by electing to have dividends paid on their preferred shares reinvested in common shares of Sun Life Financial Inc.

3. Sun Life has also agreed to pay, on behalf of Plan participants, all fees associated with the Plan, other than brokerage commission payable on the sale of common shares held through the Plan.

The changes will be effective starting with the dividends payable on June 30, 2009 to common and preferred shareholders of record on May 27, 2009. The revised Plan is contained in the Amended and Restated Offering Circular which is available at www.sunlife.com or www.cibcmellon.com.

Sun Life may amend or cancel the discount at any time, and Sun Life will continue to determine whether common shares will be purchased under the Plan through the TSX (in which case the discount will not apply) or be newly-issued from treasury. No discount will apply on common shares acquired by participants through optional cash purchases.

The FAQ section of the Amended and Restated Offering Circular states:

The Corporation will announce by press release whether purchases of common shares under the Plan will be made on the open market or through treasury and the applicable discount, if any, included in the Market Price for common shares issued from treasury on a dividend reinvestment.

… while Section E.5 of the

The price that will be paid for Common Shares under the Plan on any Dividend Payment Date (the “Market Price”) will be determined as follows:

For Treasury Purchases, the Market Price will be equal to the weighted average closing trading price of the Common Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange on the five trading days preceding the Dividend Payment Date, subject to a possible discount of up to 5% that may be applied on Treasury Purchases of Dividend Shares. No discount will apply on Treasury Purchases of Optional Cash Purchase Shares.

For Market Purchases of Dividend Shares and Optional Cash Purchase Shares, the Market Price allocated to each Plan Share, or fraction thereof, acquired by the Plan Agent under the Plan on each Dividend Payment Date will be the volume-weighted average of the applicable best efforts open market purchase price paid per Common Share by the Plan Agent for all Common Shares purchased on that Dividend Payment Date under the Plan.

The Corporation will announce by press release whether purchases of Common Shares under the Plan will be Market Purchases or Treasury Purchases and the applicable discount, if any, for Treasury Purchases of Dividend Shares.

This is, frankly, pretty useless information. I am unable to find one of the fabled press releases and suspect that they will be released only after the end of the registration period, making it impossible to plan.

I do not bother reporting reinvestment plans that do not include a discount to market price and was of two minds as to whether to report this one … but the potential is there – do with it as you see fit.

I recommend an eMail to Sun Life Shareholder Services demanding that, at the very least, the company commit itself one way or the other at time of dividend declaration.

The last mention of Sun Life preferreds in general on PrefBlog reported S&P’s one-notch bond-scale downgrade. These preferreds trade with the symbols SLF.PR.A, SLF.PR.B, SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D, SLF.PR.E & SLF.PR.F.

DBRS: Bank Capital Levels Robust

Friday, June 19th, 2009

DBRS has published a newsletter highlighting Canadian bank capital levels, which is interesting in the light of their Review-Negative of non-Equity Tier 1 Capital.

They make the following rather curious statement:

DBRS believes the bank’s ability to access the capital markets for funding in good and bad times is an importantconsideration in its capital profile.

Well… has the ability of the banks to access capital markets in bad times really been tested? “Challenging” times, OK. “Difficult” times, why not? But can the past two years really be described as “bad” for Canadian banks?

They note:

The mix, quality and composition of capital are other important considerations in the overall assessment of capital. Thequality of capital has been a key rating consideration in DBRS’s assessment of Canadian banks for an extended periodof time. DBRS has a preference for common equity over hybrids, as the first loss cushion for bondholders and othersenior creditors. On average, 17% and 14% of the regulatory Tier 1 capital is made up of preferred shares andinnovative instruments, respectively, which DBRS views as reasonable. DBRS expects the quality of capital to remainrelatively steady given the recent focus by the market on “core capital,” although OSFI does allow this percentage tonow go as high as 40%, up from 30% as of November 2008.


Click for big

June 19, 2009

Friday, June 19th, 2009

The Bank for International Settlements has released its Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems.

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?:

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged two accountants who produced bogus financial statements and an Antiguan regulator who took bribes to look the other way as Robert Allen Stanford conducted an alleged $8 billion Ponzi scheme.

“Instead of buying the safe and sound investments he promised his clients, Stanford bought Antigua’s top securities cop,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “While Stanford quarterbacked his massive Ponzi scheme, he paid the referee to spy on the huddles and provide an insider’s play-by-play of the SEC’s investigation.”

The SEC’s complaint alleges that King facilitated the Ponzi scheme by ensuring that the FSRC conducted sham audits and examinations of SIB’s books and records. In exchange for bribes paid to him over a period of several years, King made sure that the FSRC did not examine SIB’s investment portfolio. King also provided Stanford with access to the FSRC’s confidential regulatory files on him, including the SEC’s requests for information from FSRC in its investigation. King went so far as to allow Stanford to essentially dictate the FSRC’s responses to the SEC on those information requests. King made false assurances that there was no cause for concern about Stanford International Bank. He collaborated with Stanford to withhold significant information being requested by the SEC.

Speaking of scams, the FDIC is warning of a new one:

FDIC-insured institutions should be aware of any unsolicited deposits received through third-party referrals. Certain insurance companies and other financial services firms are offering above-market rate certificates of deposit (CDs) through FDIC-insured institutions to attract customers. However, the actual rate offered by the insured institution is usually much lower. In some cases, these third parties use the FDIC official sign, seal, logo or similar representations in connection with these offers.

When a customer expresses an interest in buying a CD, the third party takes the customer’s contact information for future marketing opportunities. When the customer buys the FDIC-insured CD, the third party refers the customer to an insured institution’s Web site. For the customer to receive the above-market rate CD, the third party must make a payment to the issuing institution on behalf of the customer to “make up” the difference between the institution’s actual rate and the above-market rate. This may misrepresent the actual rate offered by the insured institution by adding “promotional” funding to the principal balance of the CD, and therefore could be contradictory with the institution’s Truth-in-Savings disclosures. Institutions may become aware of such practices when they receive two checks for the purchase of a single CD. All insured institutions should have controls in place to flag unusual deposit activity.

Hmm … so at a relatively small cost, you get an address list of people who are willing to write large cheques … I couldn’t figure out the point of the scam at first!

The law firm of Wachtell, Lipton has come out strongly against Credit Default Swaps:

Any action the Commission attempts to take against manipulative short selling will not be completely effective without parallel, reinforcing reforms applied to the derivatives market, particularly with respect to credit default swaps (“CDS”). The responsiveness of equity prices to changes in CDS spreads makes the purchase of CDS a powerful device for bear raids, particularly when used in connection with short sales. Combining a short sale with the purchase of CDS sends a false signal into the marketplace about a company’s credit and, accordingly, causes a drop in the stock price that makes the short position profitable. Such manipulation is dangerously cost-effective, as a relatively small investment in an institution’s CDS is sufficient to spark rumors of default or a ratings downgrade and immediately sink stock prices.

To prevent this and other abuses of the CDS market, we believe that only those who are economically exposed to the underlying credit risk of a company should be allowed to buy CDS protection on the company. The purchase of a “naked” CDS, made by a purchaser with no exposure to the reference company, is more akin to gambling than obtaining insurance, and such instruments are capable of causing serious distortions in the market. A prohibition on naked CDS would allow the appropriate use of these instruments while restraining those using the CDS market in a manipulative and abusive way. As an intermediate step, the Commission should use its ability to regulate short sales to require a waiting period between any purchase of a CDS and short sale involving the same reference company. In addition, to alert the marketplace to situations when CDS are being used to manipulate share prices in conjunction with short selling, the Commission should require disclosure when an actual or synthetic short position in a company’s equity securities is accompanied by a long position in the company’s CDS.

Combining a short sale with the purchase of CDS sends a false signal into the marketplace about a company’s credit, eh? I guess there’s no possibility – none whatsoever – that it could be sending a true signal into the marketplace?

Volume in the preferred share market was off slightly today, but the market was able to advance a little.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3432 % 1,225.7
FixedFloater 7.02 % 5.48 % 34,418 16.34 1 0.0000 % 2,150.2
Floater 3.11 % 3.38 % 78,920 18.80 3 0.3432 % 1,531.3
OpRet 4.97 % 3.78 % 134,662 0.92 14 -0.1409 % 2,193.3
SplitShare 5.80 % 6.36 % 62,405 4.22 3 0.3817 % 1,880.9
Interest-Bearing 5.96 % 6.95 % 23,135 0.51 1 0.3992 % 1,999.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1831 % 1,740.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.32 % 6.30 % 166,903 13.38 71 0.1831 % 1,603.4
FixedReset 5.67 % 4.80 % 533,118 4.35 40 0.0361 % 2,012.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 11.36
Evaluated at bid price : 11.36
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.31
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 24.95
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 18.35
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 23.67
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 21.74
Evaluated at bid price : 21.74
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.14 % Asset coverage of 1.9-:1 as of May 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.75
Bid-YTW : 10.71 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 3.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 15.03
Evaluated at bid price : 15.03
Bid-YTW : 2.61 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 890,295 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 207,120 RBC crossed 200,000 at 18.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 18.35
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 97,810 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 54,480 Nesbitt bought two blocks from RBC, 33,000 and 18,000 shares, both at 21.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 21.34
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 46,659 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 43,500 RBC crossed 34,700 at 18.49.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 18.41
Evaluated at bid price : 18.41
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BMO.PR.P Settles at Slight Premium on Huge Volume

Friday, June 19th, 2009

BMO.PR.P, the new FixedReset 5.40%+241 announced last week, settled today and traded 889,295 shares in a range of 25.05-19 before closing at 25.09-12, 10×18.

The deal size was 14-million shares (=$350-million) with a 2-million share (=$50-million) greenshoe. It is not clear whether or not the greenshoe has been exercised.

Vital statistics are:

BMO.PR.P FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-19
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %

BMO.PR.P has been added to the HIMIPref™ FixedResets subindex.