Archive for June, 2009

June Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation

Friday, June 12th, 2009

The markets have closed and the June edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents (two of them recently added); the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The June edition will contain a longer than usual appendix introducing the concept of “Break-Even Rate Shock”, my latest attempt to understand the forces driving pricing of the FixedReset market versus PerpetualDiscounts.

Additionally, those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on attendance at, or later viewing of, my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The June issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the June Issue.

June 12, 2009

Friday, June 12th, 2009

More trader games in the CDS market – and now the rules might change:

At issue in the Amherst trades is whether sellers of protection on mortgage bonds can purchase loans underlying the debt at above-market prices to prevent a default that would trigger payments to buyers of the contracts. Credit-default swaps pay the buyer if the securities aren’t repaid as expected.

The call of the securities at their face value of $29 million, the amount remaining in the 2005 subprime-mortgage bond issue, caused the banks to lose money. Bankers on the American Securitization Forum call probably couldn’t ban the strategy for existing trades, the people said.

Proposals included creating agreements for new swaps that would force sellers to disclose whether they have the right to call the securities, and “best practices” guidelines to say such trades shouldn’t be executed, they said.

$29-million? Banks are prepared to admit that their traders lost a lot of money in a $29-million market?

They haven’t learned a damn thing, have they? Giving a block of capital to some kid with an MBA but not enough brains to realize you don’t play in a rigged market – or one that’s small enough to rig. $29-million? That’s not even a big ticket.

What does buying CDS protection mean, anyway? It’s nothing more nor less than shorting a bond. What kind of moron shorts into a $29-million market? What kind of useless twerp is the moron’s supervisor?

Let’s not have any more rules. Let’s just see a few bozos get fired. Or, at least, eating their losses like big boys and learning from the experience. As I have stressed many times on this blog, debt decoupling can result in strange things happening … particularly in a rinky dink $29-million market.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has released a working paper by Todd Prono that looks interesting, but which I don’t have time to read now. So, without comment, here’s the abstract:

A pricing restriction is developed to test the validity of the CAPM conditional on a prior belief about the correlation between the true market return and the proxy return used in the test. Distinguishing this pricing restriction from competing tests also based upon the relative efficiency of the proxy return is a consideration for the proxy’s mismeasurement of the market return. Failure to account for this mismeasurement biases tests of the CAPM towards rejection by overstating the inefficiency of the proxy. A time-varying version of this pricing restriction links mismeasurement of the market return to time-variation in beta

Pretty much a nothing day in the major sectors of the market, but volume continued heavy and Floating Rate issues continued to shine.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.5718 % 1,332.8
FixedFloater 6.87 % 5.38 % 30,438 16.45 1 3.4618 % 2,197.3
Floater 2.86 % 3.21 % 85,498 19.22 3 1.5718 % 1,665.1
OpRet 4.98 % 3.81 % 141,865 3.63 14 0.0849 % 2,188.3
SplitShare 5.82 % 5.97 % 57,155 4.24 3 -0.2435 % 1,875.2
Interest-Bearing 5.99 % 7.46 % 23,160 0.53 1 0.0999 % 1,991.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0655 % 1,737.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.32 % 6.31 % 159,942 13.46 71 -0.0655 % 1,600.5
FixedReset 5.69 % 4.85 % 542,562 4.37 39 0.0900 % 2,008.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 17.01
Evaluated at bid price : 17.01
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 24.53
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 15.45
Evaluated at bid price : 15.45
Bid-YTW : 7.73 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 17.41
Evaluated at bid price : 17.41
Bid-YTW : 6.49 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 19.92
Evaluated at bid price : 19.92
Bid-YTW : 6.55 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.02 % Asset coverage of 1.9-:1 as of May 31, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 10.91 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 7.22 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 12.23
Evaluated at bid price : 12.23
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 18.86
Evaluated at bid price : 18.86
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 2.31 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 3.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.84
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 127,185 National crossed 110,000 at 19.91.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 19.93
Evaluated at bid price : 19.93
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 122,035 National crossed 50,000 at 26.95; RBC crossed 10,000 at 26.97, then another 29,100 at 26.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 101,400 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 91,364 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 70,675 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 62,780 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 18.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-12
Maturity Price : 18.51
Evaluated at bid price : 18.51
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
There were 43 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MFC Prefs Downgraded to A- [Negative Outlook] by Fitch

Friday, June 12th, 2009

Fitch Ratings has announced that it:

has downgraded the debt and preferred stock ratings of Manulife Financial Corporation (MFC) by one notch. Fitch also assigns an ‘A’ rating to MFC’s CAD1 billion 4.896% notes due 2019 and its 7.768% notes due 2019, and an ‘A-‘ rating to MFC’s non-cumulative preferred class 1, series 1 shares. The Rating Outlook is Negative.

The one-notch downgrade of MFC’s parent company-related ratings reflects Fitch’s decision to move to standard notching of parent company ratings relative to insurance company subsidiary ratings. This is primarily as a result of the increased volatility in earnings and capital of the group, declining fixed-charge coverage at the holding company level, and a moderate increase in financial leverage. Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to fixed charges declined to 2.6 times (x) in 2008, from an average of 13.1x for the previous three years ending 2008. Fitch considers MFC’s payment capacity to be solid and expects fixed charge coverage in 2009 to range between 6x and 7x in a generally flat equity market scenario.

Fitch’s Negative Outlook reflects:

–Fitch’s view that near-term conditions in the financial markets will likely continue for an extended period, which could cause the company to experience higher-than-expected volatility in its financial results and additional challenges in 2009;
–The potential for higher-than-expected credit related investment losses;
–The potential need to further increase the capital supporting the company’s large, unhedged variable annuity business, driven by further declines in equity markets.

It was very recently that Fitch rated MFC Prefs at A with a negative outlook. These are fast changes for the credit rating!

Fitch rates SLF Prefs at BBB+ and GWO prefs at A … so beer tonight all ’round at GWO headquarters – they’re a notch better in Fitch’s view, at any rate!

MFC has the following issues outstanding: MFC.PR.A (OpRet), MFC.PR.B & MFC.PR.C (PerpetualDiscount) and MFC.PR.D & MFC.PR.E (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™

The MFC credit was last mentioned on PrefBlog when Moody’s downgraded the “Insurer Financial Strength”.

IMF Releases June 09 Finance & Development Publication

Friday, June 12th, 2009

The International Monetary Fund has released Finance & Development, June 2009, with the following articles (what follows is largely a copy-paste from their press release … sorry, not much time today!):

  • Crisis Shakes Europe: Stark Choices Ahead: looks at the harsh toll of the crisis on both Europe’s advanced and emerging economies because of the global nature of the shocks that have hit both the financial sector and the real economy, and because of Europe’s strong regional and global trade links. Marek Belka, Director of the IMF’s European Department, writes in our lead article that beyond the immediate need for crisis management, Europe
    must revisit the frameworks on which the European Union is based because many have been revealed to be flawed or missing.

  • Stress Test for the Euro and The Euro’s Finest Hour: In many respects, one key European institution has proved its mettle-the euro. Both Charles Wyplosz and Barry Eichengreen discuss the future of the common currency.
  • The Perfect Storm: IMF
    economists rank the current recession as the most severe in the postwar period

  • Preparing for a Post-Crisis World: John Lipsky, the Fund’s First Deputy Managing Director, examines the IMF’s role in a postcrisis world;
  • Asset Price Booms: How Can They Best be Managed?: Giovanni Dell’Ariccia assesses what we have learned about how to manage asset price booms to prevent the bust that has caused such havoc.
  • Interview: Oxford economist Paul Collier about how to help low-income countries during the current crisis,
  • Start This Engine: Donald Kaberuka, President of the African Development Bank, writes about how African policymakers can prepare to take
    advantage of a global economic recovery.

  • Picture This: looks at what happens when aggressive monetary policy combats a crisis;
  • Back to Basics gives a primer on fiscal policy
  • Data Spotlight takes a look at the recent large swings in commodity prices.

As Assiduous Readers will know, the IMF is the Venerated Regulator du jour and all right-thinking people expect it to lead us to the promised land. Those Assiduous Readers who are not Capitalist-Deviationists are urged to keep a copy with them at all times, to assist them to smartly rebut the running dog lackeys of the pro-bonus clique.

BoE Publishes 2Q09 Quarterly Bulletin

Friday, June 12th, 2009

The Bank of England has released its Quarterly Bulletin 2Q09, filled with the usual charts and top-quality research.

Corporate bond liquidity, as measured by bid/offer spreads, is healing:

There is still a huge CDS basis, implying poor ability to borrow for leverage:

In addition to the general review, there are longer “Research and Analysis” articles on:

  • Quantitative Easing
  • Public Attitudes to Inflation and Monetary Policy
  • The Economics and Estimation of Negative Equity
  • Summaries of recent Boe Working Papers

Sadly, there is no chart of the decomposition of corporate bond spreads into default / default uncertainty / liquidity. It is my understanding that the system has been so stressed that they are reviewing all their embedded assumptions and calculations in their model to take a view on whether they can still trust it. A lot of quant models have blown up over the past two years!

June 11, 2009

Thursday, June 11th, 2009

Incompetent Portfolio Managers now have a new object of veneration: the Globe and Mail has published a hagiography of St. Busseri the Crybaby after he squared his rot for a good boo-hoo-hoo:

Mr. Busseri found himself in the crosshairs of what he called a “character assassination” attempt by TriNorth.

The attack came in the form of a published group letter that criticized his management skills at previous jobs, including his stint restructuring Environmental Management Solutions Inc., a onetime proxy battle target now known as Englobe Corp.

“When you’re married and have kids, it’s disturbing and disappointing when people behave like this,” Mr. Busseri said. “It feels like intimidation.”

The published group letter makes interesting reading:

Busseri has no record of creating shareholder value as a leader of a public company.
The facts are:
• From October 2004 to January 2008, while Busseri was President and CEO and a Board Member of EnGlobe Corp. (TSX: EG) the company share price fell 58%.
• The TSX Composite rose 56% over the same period.
• Between 2004 and 2007, EnGlobe had cumulative operating losses of about $8.2 million, on $317 million of revenues
• Busseri led Capital Environmental Resources Inc. (later re-named Waste Services Inc.) from 1997 until his departure in August 2000.
• In the last 14 months of Busseri’s tenure, Capital / Waste Services share price fell 73%.
• The S&P rose 17% over the same period.
• Busseri was no longer employed with the company after Capital / Waste Services reported a loss of $6.6 million – its largest loss ever.
• Busseri recently left the position of Executive Vice President at Hanfeng Evergreen Inc. in April 2009 after a four-month tenure.

Um … where’s the character assassination? Where’s the stuff that makes marriage and kids such an issue?

I have no idea who is better suited to lead Trinorth. I don’t care. It makes no difference to me. But in mounting his proxy battle, Busseri has necessarily voiced his opinion on the competence of Trinorth’s board:

It is clear to the Concerned Shareholders that the Current Board – the same directors being nominated by management of TriNorth – are either unable or unwilling to preserve, protect and build value for all shareholders.

OK, so he’s got an opinion. It’s necessarily an opinion. So the competence of the person giving that opinion is fair game. I see nothing in the Trinorth letter that is objectionable: they didn’t make any allegations regarding his personal life; they stuck very closely to the man’s business track record.

When I read someone’s opinion about the markets, I want to know their track records – which is why opinions from journalists and sell-side analysts are ignored, although data is always gratefully received. I suppose, in Mr. Busseri’s eyes – and in the eyes of the extremely sympathetic Globe reporters – my desire to review performance track records when assessing opinion makes me a Bad Person. And, I suppose, non-disclosure of performance history is to be considered an entirely reasonable adjunct to dispensing portfolio advice.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has expanded:

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision decided to broaden its membership and to invite as new members representatives from the G20 countries that are not currently in the Basel Committee. These are Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. In addition, Hong Kong SAR and Singapore have also been invited to become members. The Basel Committee’s governing body will likewise be expanded to include central bank governors and heads of supervision from these new member organisations.

Since the New Activism will create a lot of jobs for ex-regulators, it’s important that regulators everywhere have a chance to burnish their resumes!

The Bank of Canada has published a new working paper by Bruno Feunou, Jean-Sebastian Fontaine and Romeo Tedongap, The Equity Premium and the Volatility Spread: The Role of Risk-Neutral Skewness:

We introduce the Homoscedastic Gamma [HG] model where the distribution of returns is characterized by its mean, variance and an independent skewness parameter under both measures. The model predicts that the spread between historical and risk-neutral volatilities is a function of the risk premium and of skewness. In fact, the equity premium is twice the ratio of the volatility spread to skewness. We measure skewness from option prices and test these predictions. We find that conditioning on skewness increases the predictive power of the volatility spread and that coefficient estimates accord with theory. In short, the data do not reject the model’s implications for the equity premium. We also check the model’s implications for option pricing and show that the information content of skewness leads to improved in-sample and out-of-sample pricing performances as well as improved hedging performances. Our results imply that expanding around the Gaussian density is restrictive and does not offer sufficient flexibility to match the skewness and kurtosis implicit in option data. Finally, we document the term structure of option-implied volatility, skewness and kurtosis and find that time-dependence in returns has a greater impact on skewness.

I do not pretend to be an expert on option pricing theory, but the paper looks very interesting!

Mark Carney made a speech today – nothing much new, but he wants to create new jobs for regulators:

Fourth, all countries must accept their responsibilities for promoting an open, flexible, and resilient international monetary system. Responsibility means recognizing spillovers between economies and financial systems and working to mitigate those that could amplify adverse dynamics. It means submitting to peer review within the Financial Stability Board and external review by the International Monetary Fund.

Treasuries bounced back when the long bond auction did not go as badly as expected:

The yield on the 10-year note fell nine basis points, or 0.09 percentage point, to 3.86 percent, after climbing as high as 4.0038 percent, at 4:40 p.m. in New York, according to BGCantor Market Data. The yield last touched 4 percent on Oct. 16. The 3.125 percent security maturing in May 2019 rose 23/32, or $7.19 per $1,000 face amount, to 94.

The 30-year bond yield fell seven basis points to 4.69 percent. It earlier touched 4.8391 percent, the highest since October 2007.

The bonds sold today drew a yield of 4.72 percent, the highest since August 2007. The average forecast by eight bond- trading firms surveyed by Bloomberg News was 4.80 percent. The sale is a reopening of the $14 billion 30-year bond auction on May 7, which drew a yield of 4.288 percent.

Incidentally, those who are impressed by how much long corporates have tightened may be interested to learn … it ain’t just Canada:

One veteran salesman and friend of the blog notes that there are no sellers and only buyers. He offers that volume is lighter than one would expect because the street is not carrying much paper and that has made some paper very prices.

By way of example of the steaminess of the market he cited the McDonald 2018 bond which traded at T + 90 today. One month ago the bond was at 150 and two months ago around 20.

There is a 2035 Walmart which traded + 105 yesterday. That boond was T+ 200 a month ago.

The rally is relentless and marches on.

Mind you, that’s not as impressive as it sounds. A month ago, long Treasuries were at 4.18%.

PerpetualDiscounts shone today on continued heavy volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.7608 % 1,312.2
FixedFloater 7.10 % 5.60 % 30,066 16.16 1 -1.6699 % 2,123.8
Floater 2.89 % 3.26 % 85,801 19.11 3 1.7608 % 1,639.3
OpRet 4.99 % 3.80 % 146,570 3.62 14 0.3178 % 2,186.5
SplitShare 5.80 % 5.92 % 59,455 4.25 3 0.3666 % 1,879.7
Interest-Bearing 5.99 % 7.61 % 24,108 0.54 1 0.0000 % 1,989.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2625 % 1,739.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.32 % 6.31 % 160,503 13.44 71 0.2625 % 1,601.6
FixedReset 5.69 % 4.84 % 550,668 4.37 39 -0.1111 % 2,006.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.31
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 24.47
Evaluated at bid price : 24.52
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 18.64
Evaluated at bid price : 18.64
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.66
Bid-YTW : 10.76 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 12.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.00
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 23.51
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 24.26
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 7.11 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 17.85
Evaluated at bid price : 17.85
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 3.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 16.76
Evaluated at bid price : 16.76
Bid-YTW : 2.37 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 4.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 17.50
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 6.60 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 157,200 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 22.00; Scotia crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 21.64
Evaluated at bid price : 21.92
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 115,840 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 88,153 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 67,970 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 23.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 22.69
Evaluated at bid price : 22.91
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 55,180 RBC crossed 25,000 at 18.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-11
Maturity Price : 18.47
Evaluated at bid price : 18.47
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 52,643 National crossed 25,000 at 27.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 4.85 %
There were 60 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

CU.PR.B Closes at Premium

Thursday, June 11th, 2009

It’s been a long time … but if the issue can hold on to its gains for another three weeks, then we’ll have a member of the long neglected PerpetualPremium index.

Vital statistics are:

CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %

It was transferred from PerpetualPremium to PerpetualDiscount at the June 2008 rebalancing, which left four issues in the PerpetualPremium index as of 2008-6-30.

June 10, 2009

Wednesday, June 10th, 2009

Here’s a switch! Treasuries were under pressure today … Russia’s concerned about credit quality:

Thirty-year bond yields reached the most in a year after a Russian central bank official said the nation may buy International Monetary Fund bonds.

Russia’s central bank may switch some of its reserves from Treasuries to International Monetary Fund bonds, the bank’s first deputy chairman, Alexei Ulyukayev, said in Moscow today. His comments were confirmed by a bank official who declined to be named, citing bank policy.

Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said last month that Russia planned to buy $10 billion of IMF bonds using money from its foreign reserves.

Russia holds $138.4 billion of U.S. debt. China is the largest U.S. creditor, with $767.9 billion. The U.S. government must rely on foreign investors to sustain record borrowing.

The dollar fell as Russia’s announcement added to speculation central banks around the world may try to diversify their reserves away from the U.S. currency. The Dollar Index, used by the ICE to track the greenback against the euro, yen, pound, Canadian dollar, Swiss franc and Swedish krona, decreased 0.2 percent to 79.649, after sliding 1.3 percent yesterday.

“The market is reacting to this Russia thing,” said Arthur Bass, a managing director of derivatives in New York at the brokerage Newedge USA LLC. “The dollar has restarted its dive to lower levels.”

Perhaps not surprisingly, the Treasury 10-year auction was horrible:

Treasuries declined, pushing 10-year yields to the highest level since October, as the government sold $19 billion of the securities and Russia said it may switch some reserves from U.S. debt.

The notes drew a yield of 3.99 percent, the highest since August 2008. The auction was the second of three sales this week that will raise $65 billion, part of the government’s record borrowing program. A Russian central bank official said the nation may buy International Monetary Fund bonds.

“There are an awful lot of Treasuries being auctioned and there’s going to be more and more and more and more,” said Jay Mueller, who manages about $3 billion of bonds at Wells Fargo Capital Management in Milwaukee.

The yield on the 10-year note rose seven basis points, or 0.07 percentage point, to 3.92 percent at 2:44 p.m. in New York, according to BGCantor Market Data. It earlier reached 3.99 percent, the highest since Oct. 16. The 3.125 percent security maturing in May 2019 declined 1/2, or $5.00 per $1,000 face amount, to 93 1/2.

The 30-year bond yield touched 4.83 percent, the highest in a year. The government is scheduled to sell $11 billion of the securities tomorrow.

Lots of volume but not much price action for preferreds today, although Floaters got hit – largely due to TRI.PR.B, which had low volume and a high closing spread, so it’s not clear how seriously the decline should be taken. PerpetualDiscounts closed with a yield of 6.35%, equivalent to 8.89% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x; long corporates are now yielding about 6.6%, having returned +3.43% on the month-to-date, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 229bp … up from the 213bp calculated on June 4 due almost entirely to a decline in long corporate bonds that has – over the week – been unmatched by preferred shares … the yield on PerpetualDiscounts is actually fractionally higher that it was at the last calculation.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.9893 % 1,289.5
FixedFloater 6.98 % 5.51 % 30,057 16.28 1 0.4516 % 2,159.9
Floater 2.92 % 3.28 % 86,200 18.96 3 -1.9893 % 1,610.9
OpRet 4.98 % 3.81 % 135,650 0.94 14 0.1757 % 2,179.5
SplitShare 5.82 % 5.88 % 60,155 4.25 3 -0.0611 % 1,872.9
Interest-Bearing 5.99 % 7.57 % 25,082 0.54 1 0.0000 % 1,989.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0174 % 1,734.4
Perpetual-Discount 6.33 % 6.35 % 160,883 13.37 71 -0.0174 % 1,597.4
FixedReset 5.68 % 4.79 % 557,261 4.36 39 0.0137 % 2,008.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater -5.25 % Not necessarily a meaningful decline, as this traded 1,975 shares in a range of 16.01-17.15 before closing at 16.25-10, 3×10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 23.91
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 18.60
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 18.78
Evaluated at bid price : 18.78
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 17.55
Evaluated at bid price : 17.55
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 18.66
Evaluated at bid price : 18.66
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 7.36 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 16.05
Evaluated at bid price : 16.05
Bid-YTW : 7.59 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 18.56
Evaluated at bid price : 18.56
Bid-YTW : 7.29 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 2.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 15.96
Evaluated at bid price : 15.96
Bid-YTW : 7.63 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 128,920 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : 6.76 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 99,685 National bought two lots of 10,000 from RBC at 26.95, then crossed 30,000 at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.96
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 98,740 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 88,225 RBC crossed 75,000 at 26.10, then another 10,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 66,350 National bought 10,000 from Scotia at 27.10, then crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.02
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 56,779 RBC crossed 25,000 at 24.99, then bought 10,000 from National at the same price. It is interesting to note that BNS.PR.Q carries terms of 5.00%+170 resetting in October 2013 and trades in block size at par … while today’s new BMO issue is 5.40%+241 resetting in February 2015. Huh. Make of it what you will … that’s a pretty hefty new issue concession … or something.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-06-10
Maturity Price : 24.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 4.58 %
There were 51 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

FloatingRate Video Seminar Accredited for CE Hours

Wednesday, June 10th, 2009

I am pleased to announce that the Seminar on FloatingRate issues has been accredited for four hours of IDA Continuing Education – Professional Development.

Note that this seminar does not cover FixedResets; it deals exclusively with the issues eligible for the HIMIPref™ sub-indices comprising FloatingRate; that is, Ratches, FixedFloaters and Floaters.

Access to the material may be purchased by clicking the icon below:

New Issue: BMO FixedReset 5.40%+241

Wednesday, June 10th, 2009

Issue: Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class B Preferred Shares Series 23

Size: 8-million shares (=$200-million) + greenshoe 3-million shares (=$75-million)

Dividends: 5.40% (=$1.35 annually); reset to 5-Year Canadas + 241bp each Reset Date. First dividend lovely and fat at $0.58808 payable November 25, 2009, assuming a June 19 close.

Reset Dates: February 25, 2015 and every five years thereafter.

Convertable: By holder every Reset Date to and from Series 24, which pay 3-month bills +241bp, reset quarterly.

Redeemable: Every Reset Date at $25.00. Series 24 is redeemable every Reset Date at $25 and at $25.50 at all other times.

BMO Press Release.

Update: I am advised on good authority that the size of the deal has been increased to 14-million shares (=$350-million) with a 2-million share greenshoe (=$50-million).

Update, 2009-6-19: Press Release confirming the size increase.