Industrial Alliance has announced a new issue.
Issue Name: Industrial Alliance and Financial Services Inc. Non-Cumulative Class A Preferred Shares, Series F
Issue Size: 4-million shares (=$100-million). No greenshoe.
Dividends: 5.90% p.a. (=$1.475), payable quarterly M/J/S/D. Initial dividend payable 2010-6-30 for $0.50110, assuming closing 2010-2-26.
Redemption: From 2015-3-31 to 2016-3-30 @ 26.00
From 2016-3-31 to 2017-3-30 @ 25.75
From 2017-3-31 to 2018-3-30 @ 25.50
From 2018-3-31 to 2019-3-30 @ 25.25
After 2019-3-30 @ 25.00
Comparators are:
IAG Straights 2010-2-17 |
Ticker |
Dividend |
Quote, 2/17 |
Bid Yield to Worst |
IAG.PR.A |
1.15 |
19.87-96 |
5.89% |
IAG.PR.E |
1.50 |
25.41-59 |
5.92% Based on call 2019-1-30 at 25.00 |
IAG.PR.? |
1.475 |
25.00 Issue Price |
5.92% |
The new issue looks expensive – I don’t think it will see much buying from those who understand the principles of the Straight Perpetual Implied Volatility Calculator introduced in the January 2010 PrefLetter!
Update: IAG has issued a rather lengthy press release:
Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc. (“Industrial Alliance” or the “Company”) has today entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters co-led by BMO Capital Markets and RBC Capital Markets under which the underwriters have agreed to buy, on a bought deal basis, 2,950,000 Common Shares (the “Common Shares”) from Industrial Alliance for sale to the public at a price of $34.00 per Common Share, representing aggregate gross proceeds of $100 million, and 4,000,000 Non-Cumulative Class A Preferred Shares Series F (the “Series F Preferred Shares”) from Industrial Alliance for sale to the public at a price of $25.00 per Series F Preferred Share, representing aggregate gross proceeds of $100 million. The Company has also granted the underwriters an option to buy up to an additional 15% of the Common Shares at the offering price to cover over-allotments, if any.
These share offerings are expected to close on or about February 26, 2010. Their purpose is to increase the Company’s financial flexibility, further improve its balance sheet and provide it with the necessary capital to finance potential acquisitions. The net proceeds of these issues will be added to Industrial Alliance’s capital.
Preferred Shares
The Series F Preferred Shares will yield 5.90% per annum, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Company. The Series F Preferred Shares will not be redeemable prior to March 31, 2015. Subject to regulatory approval, on or after March 31, 2015, Industrial Alliance may, on no less than 30 or more than 60 days’ notice, redeem the Series F Preferred Shares in whole or in part, at the Company’s option, by the payment in cash of $26.00 per Series F Preferred Share if redeemed prior to March 31, 2016, at $25.75 per Series F Preferred Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2016 but prior to March 31, 2017, at $25.50 per Series F Preferred Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2017 but prior to March 31, 2018, at $25.25 per Series F Preferred Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2018 but prior to March 31, 2019 and at $25.00 per Series F Preferred Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2019, in each case together with all declared and unpaid dividends up to but excluding the date fixed for redemption.
Impact of the Share Issues
According to pro forma data as at December 31, 2009, an issue of $100 million of Common Shares and $100 million of Preferred Shares would increase Industrial Alliance’s solvency ratio from 208% to 226% (228% if the over-allotment is exercised).
These issues will also improve the leeway available to the Company to absorb potential stock market downturns. The Company thus estimates that the solvency ratio will remain above 175% as long as the S&P/TSX stays above about 6,900 points (compared to 7,700 points without these issues) and will remain above 150% as long as the S&P/TSX index stays above about 5,400 points (compared to 6,300 points without these issues).
Notwithstanding the Common Share and Preferred Share offerings, the Company is maintaining its 2010 guidance regarding earnings per share and return on common shareholders’ equity that it gave to the financial markets on February 12, 2010 when it published its results for the fourth quarter of 2009.
Posted in New Issues | 2 Comments »
Tuesday, February 16th, 2010
The Kansas City Fed has published a working paper by Pier Asso, George Kahn and Robert Leeson titled The Taylor Rule and the Practice of Central Banking, a review of the manner in which policymakers’ views have been shaped by the availability of a simple tool for prescribing systematic policy actions. Unfortunately, the KC Fed has seen fit to encrypt the file and content copying is not allowed … so if you want to learn a little more, you’ll have to read it yourself, because I’m sure not going to do all that retyping.
There may be funding pressure on the UK mortgage market:
British banks will struggle to refinance 319 billion pounds ($500 billion) of bonds backed by home loans as the government prepares to withdraw two aid programs, Moody’s Investors Service said.
“It is highly uncertain that the mortgage-backed securities market will have the capacity to absorb the level of refinancing needed in the required timeframe,” according to the report. … Banks have raised about 10 billion pounds of mortgage- backed securities publicly since mid-2009 without state aid, Moody’s said.
“The funding gap may once again put financial pressure on mortgage originators, in particular smaller lenders, ” according to the report.
Spend-Every-Penny announced new mortgage rules today:
The Government will therefore adjust the rules for government-backed insured mortgages as follows:
- Require that all borrowers meet the standards for a five-year fixed rate mortgage even if they choose a mortgage with a lower interest rate and shorter term. This initiative will help Canadians prepare for higher interest rates in the future.
- Lower the maximum amount Canadians can withdraw in refinancing their mortgages to 90 per cent from 95 per cent of the value of their homes. This will help ensure home ownership is a more effective way to save.
- Require a minimum down payment of 20 per cent for government-backed mortgage insurance on non-owner-occupied properties purchased for speculation.
The backgrounder elucidates:
These adjustments to the mortgage insurance guarantee framework are intended to come into force on April 19, 2010. Exceptions would be allowed after April 19 where they are needed to satisfy a binding purchase and sale, financing, or refinancing agreement entered into before April 19, 2010.
My first impulse is to laugh. First, the politicians decide that borrowing for real estate is more socially worth-while than borrowing for (e.g.) capital investment, so subsidize it by writing cheap Credit Default Swaps out of the CMHC. Then they pretend to be surprised when the distorting effects of these subsidies become apparent. Finally, instead of yanking the price on the CDSs to reflect their contribution to overall systemic risk (a very cool phrase to use nowadays) they create new rules instead, to gratify their central planning instincts.
However, there was no announcement of one rule that needs action: extending deposit insurance to cover GICs and term deposits with more than a five-year term.
Testimony of Daniel K Tarullo of the Federal Reserve to the Senate Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance,
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs lays out the case that the best possible institution to regulate systemic risk is (surprise!) the Federal Reserve. There was one item of note:
One key feature of the recent crisis was the heavy reliance on short-term sources of funds to purchase long-term assets, which led to a poor match between the maturity structure of the firms’ assets and liabilities. Such maturity transformation is inherently fragile and leaves institutions and entire markets susceptible to runs.
In Canada, of course, we address the problem, in part, by offloading the problem onto consumers of mortgages – by making 5-year terms standard – thus exacerbating housing price responses to changes in five-year rates. It’s a funny old world.
Prof Lars E O Svensson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank delivered a speech titled Inflation targeting after the financial crisis in which he opined:
Many have claimed that excessively easy monetary policy by the Federal Reserve after 2001 helped cause a bubble in house prices in the U.S., a bubble whose inevitable bursting proved to be a major source of the financial crisis.5However, as I see it, the crisis was mainly caused by factors that had very little to do with monetary policy and were mostly due to background macro conditions, distorted incentives in financial markets, regulatory and supervisory failures (also when central banks have been responsible for regulation and supervision), information problems and some specific circumstances, including the U.S. housing policy to support home ownership for low-income households.
Footnote: See Bean (2009) for an extensive and excellent discussion of the crisis, including the credit expansion and housing boom, the macroeconomic antecedents, the distorted incentives, the information problems, the amplification and propagation of the crisis into the real economy, the policy responses and the lessons for monetary policy and economics generally. The Bank for International Settlements (2009) provides a more detailed account of the possible macro- and microeconomic causes of the crisis.
Reference: Bean, Charles R. (2009), “The Great Moderation, the Great Panic and the Great
Contraction”, Schumpeter Lecture, Annual Congress of the European Economic Association,
www.bankofengland.co.uk.
A solid day for preferreds, with both PerpetualDiscounts and FixedResets gaining about 7bp on the day, amidst an uptick in volume. Floaters continued to astonish.
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
Index |
Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues |
Day’s Perf. |
Index Value |
Ratchet |
3.01 % |
3.65 % |
27,762 |
20.23 |
1 |
-0.0532 % |
1,835.2 |
FixedFloater |
5.71 % |
3.78 % |
36,449 |
19.23 |
1 |
-0.2618 % |
2,769.5 |
Floater |
2.01 % |
1.75 % |
43,223 |
23.16 |
4 |
0.4866 % |
2,290.7 |
OpRet |
4.84 % |
-2.70 % |
103,219 |
0.09 |
13 |
0.0059 % |
2,325.2 |
SplitShare |
6.29 % |
-2.40 % |
132,977 |
0.08 |
2 |
0.1740 % |
2,134.3 |
Interest-Bearing |
0.00 % |
0.00 % |
0 |
0.00 |
0 |
0.0059 % |
2,126.2 |
Perpetual-Premium |
5.76 % |
5.37 % |
86,341 |
1.99 |
7 |
-0.2258 % |
1,897.0 |
Perpetual-Discount |
5.82 % |
5.85 % |
165,964 |
14.09 |
69 |
0.0690 % |
1,811.4 |
FixedReset |
5.41 % |
3.52 % |
309,836 |
3.77 |
42 |
0.0654 % |
2,187.5 |
Performance Highlights |
Issue |
Index |
Change |
Notes |
ELF.PR.F |
Perpetual-Discount |
-1.72 % |
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-16
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 6.72 % |
RY.PR.H |
Perpetual-Premium |
-1.05 % |
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-16
Maturity Price : 24.33
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 5.78 % |
BAM.PR.K |
Floater |
1.03 % |
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-16
Maturity Price : 16.72
Evaluated at bid price : 16.72
Bid-YTW : 2.37 % |
POW.PR.D |
Perpetual-Discount |
1.15 % |
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-16
Maturity Price : 21.14
Evaluated at bid price : 21.14
Bid-YTW : 6.00 % |
BMO.PR.M |
FixedReset |
1.33 % |
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.04 % |
BAM.PR.B |
Floater |
1.39 % |
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-16
Maturity Price : 16.76
Evaluated at bid price : 16.76
Bid-YTW : 2.36 % |
Volume Highlights |
Issue |
Index |
Shares Traded |
Notes |
MFC.PR.B |
Perpetual-Discount |
53,153 |
RBC crossed 44,700 at 20.43.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-16
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 5.81 % |
RY.PR.A |
Perpetual-Discount |
38,796 |
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-16
Maturity Price : 19.97
Evaluated at bid price : 19.97
Bid-YTW : 5.60 % |
BMO.PR.P |
FixedReset |
37,548 |
RBC crossed 25,000 at 27.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.07
Bid-YTW : 3.58 % |
TRP.PR.A |
FixedReset |
36,337 |
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 3.83 % |
BNS.PR.P |
FixedReset |
34,413 |
RBC crossed 10,800 at 26.50; Nesbitt bought 16,300 from CIBC at 26.41.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.42
Bid-YTW : 3.22 % |
BMO.PR.K |
Perpetual-Discount |
31,870 |
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-16
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.96
Bid-YTW : 5.74 % |
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. |
Posted in Market Action | No Comments »
Tuesday, February 16th, 2010
As previously announced, the January edition of PrefLetter discussed the pricing of embedded options:
The January edition contains an appendix examining the calculation of Implied Volatility for PerpetualDiscount preferred shares and a discussion of the model and its applicability for portfolio management.
A calculator was developed to accompany this article and is available for download, with the permanent link under “On-Line Resources” in the right hand panel.
As always, I recognize that improvements are possible. If anybody sends me an improvement which I incorporate into the version of the spreadsheet published here, rest assured that this contribution will be fully credited.
Update, 2010-3-22: More issues now incorporated on spreadsheet.
Posted in PrefLetter, Publications | 9 Comments »
Tuesday, February 16th, 2010
In a prior post I discussed IFRS and the Assets-to-Capital Multiple with respect to banks and their mortgage securitization habits, but I’ve just realized there’s another nuance lying in ambush behind the thickets of regulation.
The OSFI Draft Advisory on Conversion to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) by Federally Regulated Entities (FREs) states:
With respect to life insurance entities, current CGAAP specifically requires that segregated funds should be accounted for separately (off balance sheet). However, IFRSs do not specifically address accounting for segregated funds. As a result, most segregated funds are expected to require consolidation treatment because of the “control” tests in IAS 27 and SIC 12. Most life insurers are, therefore, expected to report their segregated fund assets and liabilities on balance sheet through a one-line reporting format rather than commingled with other asset and liability categories. … OSFI is not issuing any additional accounting guidance or clarification in this area at this time.
OSFI will consider the accounting treatment of segregated funds if it becomes apparent that life insurers intend to commingle assets and liabilities, rather than use the expected one-line reporting format. … With respect to segregated funds, risk based capital requirements already exist and OSFI requires that the current treatment continue. Therefore, although segregated funds will appear on the balance sheet, they would not attract asset specific capital charges outside of the existing Segregated Fund Risk charge.
This is interesting in light of recent OSFI speeches by Julia Dickson:
As OSFI regulates non-operating insurers acting as holding companies, we are considering updating our current regulatory guidance for these entities to promote a more integrated and consistent approach to determining regulatory capital requirements. For example, OSFI’s MCCSR tests could be used to evaluate the group’s consolidated risk-based capital – and a test similar to the asset-to-capital multiple (ACM) test could be used to evaluate leverage.
… and her speech-tester, Mark White:
For example, OSFI’s Minimum Continuing Capital and Surplus Requirements (MCCSR) tests could be used to evaluate a financial group’s consolidated risk based capital – and an ACM like-test could be used to evaluate leverage.
These speeches were reported on PrefBlog in the posts OSFI Looking Closely at Lifeco Consolidated Capital and OSFI to Address Double-Leverage?, respectively.
If we look at, for instance, the Manulife 4Q09 Report we see that total capital is $33.2-billion, and total funds under management are $440-billion, which includes the general fund of $187-billion and seg-funds (on balance sheet, but not included in “Total Assets”) of about $192-billion.
After consolidation – particularly if mutual funds, etc., are consolidated – we could see reported total assets change dramatically:
MFC 4Q09 CAD Billions |
Total Assets as Currently Reported |
205 |
Seg Funds |
192 |
Other Funds under Management |
64 |
Potential Total Assets |
461 |
Capital of 33.2 implies an ACM of about 14x; not only have we not been particularly thorough in digging up off-balance sheet committments, but it should also be remembered that a big chunk of these AUM are equities and should logically be constrained by a lower ACM than the banks’ loan-based accounts.
Life could well get interesting in the next few years!
Posted in Regulation | 5 Comments »
Tuesday, February 16th, 2010
An Assiduous Reader writes in and says:
I know how much you love to play the guess the ACM game. But here’s a new twist: what do you think the ACM of your favourite DTI’s are after OSFI requires all the billions of dollars of CMHC NHA MBS to be consolidated back on balance sheet? [link])
But here are some more interesting questions:
- -why has no OSFI regulated publicly traded company commented on how this proposed change will affect their ACM? (home capital got through their entire earnings call without any mention of the ACM) they’ve obviously done the work (IFRS has been planned for years) but have chosen not to share their findings with investors.
- -why has OFSI or the government (although perhaps this is too technical to score political points) not provided any timely clarity on this issue given the importance to the entire mortgage and residential real estate market? (The draft advisory was dated october 2009)
- -will the government/cmhc allow the mortgage business to simply move into lightly capitalized unregulated vehicles to avoid the new OFSI rules? (i.e. is it OK to setup a shell company with $2MM in it that issues $10B in MBS pools?, do we really want the majority of mortgage origination occurring in the unregulated space as a public policy matter?)
A glossary will be helpful here:
OSFI : Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
DTI: Deposit Taking Institution
FRE: Federally Regulated Entity
MBS: Mortgage Backed Securities
CMHC: Canada Mortgage & Housing Corporation
ACM: Assets to Capital Multiple
CGAAP: Canadian Generally Agreed Accounting Principles
The advisory states:
OSFI notes that off balance sheet assets under CGAAP have, during the recent financial turmoil, resulted in DTIs increasing their balance sheet assets during times of stress in respect of assets that no longer qualified to be derecognized and securitization conduits which were no longer exempted from consolidation. Lessons learned in the recent financial turmoil are that certain securitization structures did not transfer the risk out of the FREs as expected. OSFI is of the view that securitization assets which are not derecognized or which are not exempted from consolidation should be included in the calculation of the ACM.
Given that the implementation of IFRSs is expected to increase FREs’ on balance sheet assets and therefore to increase the ACM of DTIs and the borrowing multiple of cooperative credit associations, OSFI is of the view that, in some cases, an immediate application of those rules may be difficult for FREs to meet.
Insured mortgages securitized through the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation’s (CMHC’s) National Housing Act (NHA) Mortgage Backed Securities and Canada Mortgage Bond Programs (MBS/CMB Programs) are unlikely to achieve derecognition and will therefore be brought on balance sheet under IFRSs. To facilitate compliance with the ACM under IFRSs and permit an orderly transition, OSFI will permit mortgages sold through the MBS/CMB Programs up to and including December 31, 2009 to be excluded from the ACM calculation when IFRSs are adopted, regardless of whether they are brought onto the balance sheet under IFRSs. If so, FREs will be required to exclude pre December 31, 2009 MBS/CMB programs from the assets in the ACM calculation. However, to create an ACM which is more consistent and which reflects the lessons from the recent financial turmoil, MBS/CMB exposures occurring after December 31, 2009 will be included in the calculation of the ACM under the current ACM definition and limits; that is, they will be included in the asset definition of the ACM upon implementation of IFRS if (but only if) they are accounted for as on balance sheet exposures under IFRSs. No changes will be made to the non capital regulatory returns and FREs will be required to report in accordance with IFRSs; FRFIs will be required to adjust their assets included in their ACM calculation to give effect to the transition provisions.
Footnote: Irrespective of the IFRS determination of what is on balance sheet, the ACM should reflect the MBS/CMB originator’s risk profile. Where the risk profile of the MBS/CMB originator is not materially improved by participation in such a securitization, continued inclusion in the ACM may be appropriate.
Overall, this is not an enormous problem. OSFI reports that the Assets to Capital Multiple for all domestic banks was 15.58x as of 3Q09, with total capital at about $161-billion. The special NHA MBS buying programme is $25-billion and the CMHC had about $200-billion assets on the 2008 books … so consolidating the securitizations will add another multiple of 1 to the total ACM for the system.
As the Assiduous Reader points out, though, there could be trouble at the margins, particularly with specialty lenders; additionally, OSFI has shown in the past that it is incapable of running stress tests that include attention to the ACM.
This one bears watching …
Posted in Reader Initiated Comments, Regulation | 5 Comments »
|
ACO.PR.A to be Redeemed
Thursday, February 18th, 2010ATCO Ltd. has announced:
ACO.PR.A closed last night at 26.20-38, so the risks of holding issues with negative yields-to-worst are illustrated yet again! Of course, one reason they are priced so high appears to be buying by CPD and other indexers in response to the issue’s addition to TXPR in the January rebalancing.
ACO.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in connection with the calculation of yield-to-issuer-best. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is a constituent of the Operating Retractible subindex.
Update: I have uploaded a Chart of the ACO.PR.A / CM.PR.A bid prices from 2009-12-31 to 2010-2-17 (CM.PR.A is the best comparator I can find, although not a very good one). There is a clear bump in the price of ACO.PR.A in the period in which it may be assumed CPD was buying. See the post POW.PR.C: Yes, CPD is the Buyer for another example.
Update, 2010-3-16: S&P announcement of removal from TXPR.
Posted in Issue Comments | 4 Comments »