Archive for March, 2010

HPF.PR.A and HPF.PR.B Redeemed

Friday, March 12th, 2010

Navina Asset Management Inc. (formerly Lawrence Asset Management Inc.) has announced:

that in accordance with a proposal to amend the articles of the Corporation (the “Articles”) approved at a Special Meeting of Shareholders held on February 25, 2010, HI PREFS will be terminated as of market close on March 12, 2010 (the “Termination Date”) and the Series 1 Shares (TSX:HPF.pr.a) and Series 2 Shares (TSX:HPF.pr.b) will be delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange.

In accordance with the terms of the amended Articles, HI PREFS will redeem all of the outstanding Series 1 Shares, Series 2 Shares and Equity shares of the Corporation on the Termination Date. Shareholders are not required to take any action to cause their shares to be redeemed. Redemption proceeds calculated in accordance with the Articles will be paid to Computershare on March 12, 2010 for distribution to shareholders.

Each holder of Series 1 Shares will receive an aggregate payment equal to $27.80 for each Series 1 Share held by them, such amount representing (a) the original investment amount of $25.00 paid in respect of each Series 1 Share, plus (b) the amount of all declared but unpaid dividends payable to holders of the Series 1 Shares and any dividends accrued up to the Termination date of March 12, 2010.

Each holder of Series 2 Shares will receive an aggregate payment equal to $16.46 per Series 2 Share, such amount representing (a) the original investment amount of $14.70 paid in respect of each Series 2 Share less $0.28 per share (such amount representing one-half of the costs, on a per share basis, to wind up and terminate the Corporation early), plus (b) the amount of all declared but unpaid dividends payable to holders of the Series 2 Shares and any dividends accrued up to the Termination date of March 12, 2010.

From and after the Termination Date, Shareholders will cease to be entitled to any dividends of HI PREFS and will not be entitled to exercise any of the rights of shareholders of HI PREFS unless payment of the redemption amount in respect of the shares is not duly made by the Corporation. For more information please visit www.lawrenceasset.com.

These issues will not be missed.

HPF.PR.A and HPF.PR.B were last mentioned on PrefBlog when the approval for early wind-up was announced. HPF.PR.A and HPF.PR.B were tracked by HIMIPref™, but were relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

March 11, 2010

Thursday, March 11th, 2010

Nothing happened again today.

Volume was good in the Canadian preferred share market today, and so was the direction, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 9bp and FixedResets gaining 7bp, with yields on the latter edging closer to the magic 3.50% level.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.64 % 2.68 % 48,815 20.74 1 -0.5574 % 2,094.8
FixedFloater 5.15 % 3.27 % 42,445 19.86 1 -1.1710 % 3,067.6
Floater 1.93 % 1.72 % 43,803 23.26 4 -0.6352 % 2,388.4
OpRet 4.89 % 1.75 % 106,689 0.22 13 0.1436 % 2,311.8
SplitShare 6.38 % 6.26 % 125,620 3.71 2 -0.0660 % 2,137.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1436 % 2,113.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.89 % 5.91 % 125,858 5.85 7 0.0000 % 1,888.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.89 % 5.94 % 174,191 13.99 71 0.0858 % 1,793.0
FixedReset 5.37 % 3.51 % 327,327 3.71 43 0.0749 % 2,197.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -3.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-11
Maturity Price : 22.29
Evaluated at bid price : 22.56
Bid-YTW : 1.72 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-11
Maturity Price : 21.92
Evaluated at bid price : 22.04
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 437,233 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-11
Maturity Price : 24.83
Evaluated at bid price : 24.88
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 128,328 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 19.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-11
Maturity Price : 19.95
Evaluated at bid price : 19.95
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 67,175 RBC crossed 39,400 at 22.75; RBC crossed 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-11
Maturity Price : 22.31
Evaluated at bid price : 22.79
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 52,250 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 18.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-11
Maturity Price : 18.92
Evaluated at bid price : 18.92
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 41,011 Desjardins crossed 32,100 at 26.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.87
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 40,016 National crossed 25,000 at 27.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.07
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
There were 48 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

TRP.PR.B Slips on Opening, But Volume Good

Thursday, March 11th, 2010

TransCanada Corp. has announced:

that it has completed its public offering of cumulative redeemable first preferred shares, series 3 (the “Series 3 Preferred Shares”). As the underwriters fully exercised their option to acquire an additional two million Series 3 Preferred Shares, the size of the offering increased to a total of 14 million shares resulting in gross proceeds of $350 million.

The offering was first announced on March 4, 2010 when TransCanada entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters in Canada led by Scotia Capital Inc. and RBC Capital Markets.

The net proceeds of the offering will be used to partially fund capital projects, for general corporate purposes and to reduce short term indebtedness of TransCanada and its affiliates, which short term indebtedness was used to fund TransCanada’s capital program and for general corporate purposes.

TRP.PR.B is the new FixedReset 4.00%+128 announced March 4. TRP.PR.B traded 437,233 shares in a range of 24.83-95 before closing at 24.88-90, 48×2.

Vital statistics are:

TRP.PR.B FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-11
Maturity Price : 24.83
Evaluated at bid price : 24.88
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %

The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™. It has been added to the FixedReset sub-index; at some point this index will be split into Premium and Discount moieties, similarly to the Straight Perpetuals, as the behaviour of Premium and Discount issues in response to yield shocks will be different.

March 10, 2010

Thursday, March 11th, 2010

No news worth reporting today. There was some more Greek speculator-blame being tossed around, but I can’t make fun of Greek politicians every day!

It was a quiet day for Canadian preferred shares, but volume was good. PerpetualDiscounts lost 4bp and FixedResets gained 3bp, yields on the latter edging slowly, slowly, closer to 3.50%. Only a single entrant for the performance highlights; no prizes for guessing which sub-class of preferred!

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.94%, equivalent to 8.32% interest at the standard equivalency ratio of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.9% – maybe a bit under – so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the seniority spread) now stands at about 245bp, unchange from the level reported March 3.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.62 % 2.75 % 44,998 20.85 1 1.4609 % 2,106.6
FixedFloater 5.09 % 3.21 % 42,536 19.94 1 -0.2336 % 3,103.9
Floater 1.91 % 1.66 % 45,481 23.45 4 -0.1939 % 2,403.7
OpRet 4.88 % 2.42 % 106,316 0.22 13 -0.0446 % 2,308.5
SplitShare 6.38 % 6.25 % 125,048 3.71 2 0.0000 % 2,139.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0446 % 2,110.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.89 % 5.89 % 130,038 6.88 7 0.1308 % 1,888.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.89 % 5.94 % 175,216 13.98 71 -0.0363 % 1,791.5
FixedReset 5.40 % 3.52 % 319,539 3.71 42 0.0313 % 2,195.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-10
Maturity Price : 22.74
Evaluated at bid price : 21.53
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.E FixedReset 155,869 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 28.01; National crossed 35,000 at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.05
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 112,002 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 28.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.03
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 103,800 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-10
Maturity Price : 24.20
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 55,530 National crossed 40,000 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 54,519 National crossed 35,000 at 26.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 50,000 Also on the Performers list. Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 21.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-10
Maturity Price : 22.74
Evaluated at bid price : 21.53
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %
There were 40 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BRF.PR.A Holds Firm on Good First-Day Volume

Thursday, March 11th, 2010

Brookfield Renewable Power Fund has announced:

the closing of the previously announced public offering of 10 million Class A Preference Shares, Series 1 (the “Series 1 Preferred Shares”) of Brookfield Renewable Power Preferred Equity Inc., at $25.00 per share for gross proceeds of $250 million. The offering was made on a bought deal basis through a syndicate of underwriters led by Scotia Capital Inc., CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and TD Securities Inc.

The Series 1 Preferred Shares commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the symbol BRF.PR.A.

This is a FixedReset, 5.25%+262, announced February 18 and upsized to $250-million after announcement. The issue traded 388,252 shares in a range of 24.79-07 (the low price was the opening) before closing at 25.05-07, 3×20.

Vital statistics are:

BRF.PR.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %

March 9, 2010

Tuesday, March 9th, 2010

The Brookfield Renewable Power FixedReset, 5.25%+262, announced February 18, commences trading tomorrow with the symbol BRF.PR.A.

Brookfield’s dalliance with General Growth Properties got a boost:

General Growth Properties Inc. said its biggest debt and equity holders offered to jointly invest $3.93 billion in the company, bolstering a plan with Brookfield Asset Management Inc. to bring the mall owner out of bankruptcy.

The investments from Bruce Berkowitz’s Fairholme Capital Management LLC and William Ackman’s Pershing Square Capital Management LP would allow unsecured creditors to be paid in full with cash, General Growth said in a statement last night. Their funds are in addition to $2.63 billion pledged by Brookfield.

Royal Bank may make US acquisitions, but only if they’re big enough to generate fawning press commentary:

Royal Bank of Canada is interested in U.S. banks with $10 billion in assets or more to add to its consumer lending business, said James Westlake, an executive who oversees the international unit.

“Most of the deals we are seeing are 12 branches or 25 branches and they don’t really move the needle,” Westlake said. “But I wouldn’t detect anything that suggests we aren’t welcome.”

The recent Federal Budget had a paragraph I missed (on page 104):

One of the lessons of the global financial crisis is that financial institutions need to have access to a variety of funding sources. The Government will help federally regulated financial institutions diversify their funding sources by introducing legislation setting out a framework for covered bonds. Covered bonds are debt instruments that are secured by high quality assets, such as residential mortgages. The legislation will increase legal certainty for investors in these debt instruments, thereby making it easier for Canadian financial institutions to access this low-cost source of funding.

RBC recently issued CAD 850-million five-years at 3.188%. As stated by RBC’s Hiren Lalloo in the ECBC 2009 Handbook:

There is no dedicated legal framework for the issuance of Covered Bonds in Canada. As such, Canadian Covered Bonds are based on contractual agreements structured within the general legislation.

The lack of specific legislation has been referred to as a risk factor for buyers of Canadian originated covered bonds, most recently in the DBRS assessment of the new RBC issue:

Despite the above strengths, the Covered Bonds have the following challenges. … And lastly, there is no specific covered bond legislative framework in Canada. This is mitigated by the contractual obligations of the transaction parties, supported by the opinions provided by legal counsel to RBC and a generally creditor-friendly legal environment in Canada.

Good volume on the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualDiscounts off again, down 9bp this time, while FixedResets gained 3bp, bringing them closer to the 3.50% yield barrier. The market was again well-behaved, with only three issues gaining or losing more than 1% … two of them were Floating Rate gainers!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.66 % 2.72 % 41,466 20.69 1 1.9212 % 2,076.2
FixedFloater 5.08 % 3.19 % 42,017 19.95 1 3.3816 % 3,111.2
Floater 1.91 % 1.66 % 44,951 23.46 4 0.2917 % 2,408.4
OpRet 4.88 % 2.39 % 107,904 0.22 13 0.0089 % 2,309.5
SplitShare 6.38 % 6.25 % 123,898 3.71 2 0.1984 % 2,139.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0089 % 2,111.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.90 % 5.90 % 130,403 6.88 7 -0.1873 % 1,886.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.89 % 5.93 % 176,990 13.97 71 -0.0899 % 1,792.1
FixedReset 5.40 % 3.53 % 320,204 3.71 42 0.0313 % 2,194.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-09
Maturity Price : 19.16
Evaluated at bid price : 19.16
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-09
Maturity Price : 21.72
Evaluated at bid price : 21.22
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 3.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.40
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.K FixedReset 133,900 Nesbitt bought 18,300 from National at 28.00, then crossed blocks of 75,000 and 17,000, then bought another 17,100 from National, all at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.01
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 117,200 TD crossed 100,000 at 24.63; RBC crossed 13,600 at 24.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-09
Maturity Price : 24.29
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 110,010 TD crossed 45,000 at 28.00; then Nesbitt bought blocks of 17,500 and 17,800 from National at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 107,900 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 26.05, then TD crossed blocks of 45,000 and 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : 1.01 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 98,751 TD crossed blocks of 39,600 and 45,000 at 27.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.72
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Premium 59,350 RBC crossed 56,800 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-09
Maturity Price : 24.70
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
There were 53 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Citigroup Files Prospectus for Maybe IT1C

Tuesday, March 9th, 2010

Bloomberg reports that Citigroup is about to offer a new issue of TruPS:

The 30-year fixed-to-floating rate securities may initially yield about 8.875 percent, according to a person familiar with the offering who declined to be identified because terms aren’t set. Citigroup plans to issue as much as $2 billion of the securities as soon as tomorrow, another person said.

Citigroup’s $2.35 billion of 8.3 percent fixed-to-floating bonds due in 2057 rose 1.4 cent to 96.5 cents on the dollar, according to Trace, the bond-price reporting system of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. The hybrid debt has more than tripled in price in the last year from 30.5 cents, Trace data show.

What makes this interesting is a novel (to me!) clause in the prospectus:

On December 17, 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“Basel”) proposed, among other proposals, revisions to its definition of Tier 1 capital for banks. Provided certain other conditions more fully described in “Description of the Capital Securities — Special Event Redemption” below are satisfied, the adoption of, or announcement of intent to adopt, Basel’s revised definition of Tier 1 capital by the Capital Regulator could qualify as a Regulatory Capital Event (as defined herein) that would permit Citigroup Capital to redeem the capital securities.

This prospectus refers to a Tax Event, an Investment Company Event or a Regulatory Capital Event as a “Special Event.” Provided that Citigroup obtains any required regulatory approval, if a Special Event occurs and continues, Citigroup may, upon not less than 30 nor more than 60 days’ notice, redeem the junior subordinated debt securities, in whole or in part, for cash within 90 days following the occurrence of such Special Event. Following such redemption, trust securities with an aggregate liquidation amount equal to the aggregate principal amount of the junior subordinated debt securities so redeemed shall be redeemed by Citigroup Capital at the redemption price on a ratable basis. If, however, at the time there is available to Citigroup or Citigroup Capital the opportunity to eliminate, within such 90-day period, the Special Event by taking some ministerial action, such as filing a form or making an election or pursuing some other similar reasonable measure that will have no adverse effect on Citigroup Capital, Citigroup or the holders of the trust securities, then Citigroup or Citigroup Capital will pursue such measure instead of redemption and provided further that in the case of a Regulatory Capital Event, where a result of which is that only a portion of the capital securities will not qualify as Tier 1 capital of Citigroup, Citigroup may redeem an amount of junior subordinated debt securities up to the amount that corresponds to the capital securities that would no longer qualify as Tier 1 capital as a result of such Regulatory Capital Event.

The December 17 proposal has been reported on PrefBlog. The sticking point in the proposed revisions is, I believe, Criteria for inclusion in Tier 1 Additional Going Concern Capital #4:

Is perpetual, ie there is no maturity date and there are no incentives to redeem

whereas the prospectus states:

The capital securities have no stated maturity date but will be redeemed upon the maturity of the junior subordinated debt securities, or earlier on the dates and to the extent the junior subordinated debt securities are redeemed. See “Description of the Junior Subordinated Debt Securities — Optional Redemption.” The junior subordinated debt securities will mature on , 2040, and may be redeemed, in whole or in part, at any time on or after , 2015 at a redemption price equal to 100% of the principal amount being redeemed, plus accrued and unpaid interest through the date of redemption. The junior subordinated debt securities can also be redeemed at any time, in whole or in part, in certain circumstances upon the occurrence of a Tax Event, an Investment Company Event or a Regulatory Capital Event (each as defined below) at a redemption price equal to 100% of the principal amount being redeemed, plus accrued and unpaid interest through the date of redemption.

If then required, Citigroup will obtain the concurrence or approval of the Capital Regulator before exercising its redemption rights prior to the maturity date Upon the maturity of the junior subordinated debt securities, the proceeds of their repayment will simultaneously be applied to redeem all outstanding trust securities at the redemption price. Upon the redemption of the junior subordinated debt securities, whether in whole or in part, either at the option of Citigroup or pursuant to a Tax Event, an Investment Company Event or a Regulatory Capital Event, Citigroup Capital will use the cash it receives upon the redemption to redeem trust securities having an aggregate liquidation amount equal to the aggregate principal amount of the junior subordinated debt securities so redeemed at the redemption price. Before such redemption, holders of trust securities will be given not less than 30 nor more than 60 days’ notice. In the event that fewer than all of the outstanding capital securities are to be redeemed, the capital securities will be redeemed on a ratable basis as described under “— Book-Entry Only Issuance.” See “— Special Event Redemption” and “Description of the Junior Subordinated Debt Securities — Optional Redemption.” If a partial redemption of the capital securities resulting from a partial redemption of the junior subordinated debt securities would result in a delisting of the capital securities, Citigroup may only redeem the junior subordinated debt securities in whole.

The Capital Securities are what’s being sold to the public; the Junior Subordinated Debt Securities are what the vehicle holds to secure payments to the Capital Security holdes (i.e., this is a loan-based IT1C).

Update: Whisper yield cut to 8.5%:

The bank plans to issue $2 billion of the securities, known as TruPS, as soon as today, according to a person familiar with the offering who declined to be identified because terms aren’t set. The 30-year fixed-to-floating rate securities may initially yield about 8.5 percent, lower than the 8.875 percent expected yesterday, another person said.

Themis Trading on Pegged Orders

Tuesday, March 9th, 2010

Themis Trading will be known to Assiduous Readers due to its presence on the right-hand links panel. Sal L. Arnuk and Joseph Saluzzi write in Toxic Equity Trading Order Flow on Wall Street:

More than half of all institutional algo orders are “pegged” to the National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO). The problem is, if one trader jumps ahead of another in price, it can cause a second trader to go along side of the first one. Very quickly, every algo trading order in a given stock is following each other up or down (or down and up), creating huge, whip like price movements on relatively little volume.

This has led to the development of predatory algo trading strategies. These strategies are designed to cause institutional algo orders to buy or sell shares at prices higher or lower than where the stock had been trading, creating a situation where the predatory algo can lock in a profit from the artificial increase or decrease in the price.

To illustrate, let’s use an institutional algo order pegged to the NBBO with discretion to pay up to $20.10. First, the predatory algo uses methods similar to the liquidity rebate trader to spot this as an institutional algo order. Next, with a bid of $20.01, the predatory algo goes on the attack. The institutional algo immediately goes to $20.01. Then, the predatory algo goes $20.02, and the institutional algo follows. In similar fashion, the predatory algo runs up the institutional algo to its $20.10 limit. At that point, the predatory algo sells the stock short at $20.10 to the institutional algo, knowing it is highly likely that the price of the stock will fall. When it does, the predatory algo covers.
This is how a stock can move 10 or 15 cents on a handful of 100 or 500 share trades.

This is the type of behaviour considered desirable by Omega ATS in their response to the pegged order consultation.

So the question is: is such behaviour a Good Thing or a Bad Thing?

I suggest that this is a good thing. Intra-day volatility leads to a wider variety of entry- and exit-points for real-money players who have bothered to calculate entry- and exit-points. If I own Stock A and want to swap it into Stock B, I must definitely have a spread in mind: if I don’t, then I am grossly incompetent.

Themis’ example represents a bleeding of money from incompetent real-money players into those of the day traders and to competent real-money players; thus, it can be thought of as a Public Good, since it will serve to help differentiate between skill levels on the buy side.

The Fed Funds Market During the Financial Crisis

Tuesday, March 9th, 2010

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has released a Staff Report by Gara Afonso, Anna Kovner, and Antoinette Schoar titled Stressed, Not Frozen: The Federal Funds Market in the Financial Crisis:

This paper examines the impact of the financial crisis of 2008, specifically the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, on the federal funds market. Rather than a complete collapse of lending in the presence of a market-wide shock, we see that banks became more restrictive in their choice of counterparties. Following the Lehman bankruptcy, we find that amounts and spreads became more sensitive to a borrowing bank’s characteristics. While the market did not contract dramatically, lending rates increased. Further, the market did not seem to expand to meet the increased demand predicted by the drop in other bank funding markets. We examine discount window borrowing as a proxy for unmet fed funds demand and find that the fed funds market is not indiscriminate. As expected, borrowers who access the discount window have a lower return on assets. On the lender side, we do not find that the characteristics of the lending bank significantly affect the amount of interbank loans it makes. In particular, we do not find that worse performing banks began hoarding liquidity and indiscriminately reducing their lending.

Normally, Fed Funds borrowers are allocated a line by their lender and rates are generic within that limit. After the Lehman bankruptcy, rate stratification was observed:

We use transaction level data of participants in the fed funds market to investigate the provision of credit in this market after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. We find a much more nuanced picture: Under “normal” or pre-crisis conditions the fed funds market functions via rationing of riskier borrowers rather than prices, e.g. adjustments of spreads.1 After Lehman we see a different picture emerge: In the days immediately after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy the market seems to become sensitive to bank specific characteristics, not only in the amounts lent to borrowers but even in the cost of overnight funds. We see sharp differences between large and small banks in their access to credit: Large banks (especially those with high percentages of nonperforming loans) show drastically reduced daily borrowing amounts after Lehman and borrow from fewer counterparties. In fact, the interest rate spread at which large banks borrow in the fed funds market after Lehman falls below pre-crisis levels after September 16th, 2008. We interpret this initial response as an effect of credit rationing. In contrast, smaller banks were able to increase the amount borrowed from the interbank markets and even managed to add lending counterparties during the crisis; but to do so they faced higher interest rate spreads. Different from the predictions of many theoretical models of interbank lending, when faced with a market wide shock, we do not observe a complete cessation of lending but instead we see increased differentiation between borrowers of high versus low type.

Too-Big-to-Fail moral hazard had an immediate market effect:

After the AIG bailout is announced, spreads for the largest banks fall steeply, falling below the rate in the week before Lehman. We interpret the return to pre-crisis spreads as the effect of the government’s support for systematically important banks, because the same is not true for small banks: these banks continue to face higher spreads till well after the announcement of the CPP.

There was a high degree of differentiation shown by discount window usage:

Because of the high interest rate and potential for stigma, banks usually access the discount window only if they face severe unmet liquidity needs. Thus use of the discount window gives a lower bound for the unmet liquidity needs in the fed funds market. We find that even in the days after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy only very poorly performing banks, those with low ROA, access the discount window. It seems reasonable to assume that these are banks which were rationed by private banks lending in the fed funds market. While again it is difficult to assess whether this means that interbank markets operated efficiently after the crisis, it is, however, reassuring that we do not observe that well performing banks are forced to turn to the discount window. This would have been a very alarming indication of dysfunction in the fed funds market.

Penny Algorithms: Examples Wanted

Tuesday, March 9th, 2010

Penny Algorithms are automated trade entry systems that will improve the posted quote of a security by a penny.

They’ve been mentioned on PrefBlog several times:
GAndreone:

In addition I find that order placed via my discount broker sometimes are overtaken by “trading robots”. That is, a buy order places at lets us say 1 cent above the highest order showing on level 2 quotes never makes the top of the list. A new smaller order appears at 1 cent above the order just placed. If you remove the order the smaller order also disappears.

Annette:

Are those orders “automatized” or is there a trader watching all day long the stock? As soon as you buy the 2, 5 or 10 lots where the iceberg lies, it is almost immediately topped off with more lots. I sometimes play with it putting a bid one cent lower (sell order) or higher (buy order) to see it going almost immediately one cent in front of me. It will better me up to a certain point. I witdraw mine it goes back to where it was. I sometimes suspect it is one of you guys playing games.

I am currently engaged in a dispute regarding the very existence of penny algorithms for preferred shares (arising from an article on Pegged Orders that is now in preparation), and ask that those who notice one in operation for the next week or so either eMail me or tell me about it in the comments.