Turnover declined a little in September, to about 5%.
There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:
- Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
- DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
- DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)
This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.
To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.
And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.
There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.
As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.
Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.
Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on September 30 was as follows:
| MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2015-9-30 | |||
| HIMI Indices Sector | Weighting | YTW | ModDur |
| Ratchet | 0% | N/A | N/A |
| FixFloat | 0% | N/A | N/A |
| Floater | 0% | N/A | N/A |
| OpRet | 0% | N/A | N/A |
| SplitShare | 0% | N/A | N/A |
| Interest Rearing | 0% | N/A | N/A |
| PerpetualPremium | 0% | N/A | N/A |
| PerpetualDiscount | 5.7% (+1.5) | 5.86% | 14.13 |
| Fixed-Reset | 70.2% (+0.2) | 7.23% | 10.35 |
| Deemed-Retractible | 7.9% (+0.3) | 7.00% | 7.35 |
| FloatingReset | 3.8% (-0.2) | 4.47% | 16.47 |
| Scraps (Various) | 12.2% (-1.3) | 6.84% | 12.70 |
| Cash | +0.1% (-0.5) | 0.00% | 0.00 |
| Total | 100% | 6.98% | 10.85 |
| Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero. | |||
| DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)
Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue. |
|||
| Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming a constant GOC-5 rate of 0.78% and a constant 3-Month Bill rate of 0.40% | |||
The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.
Credit distribution is:
| MAPF Credit Analysis 2015-9-30 | ||
| DBRS Rating | Weighting | |
| Pfd-1 | 0 (0) | |
| Pfd-1(low) | 17.9% (-1.1) | |
| Pfd-2(high) | 35.5% (+0.6) | |
| Pfd-2 | 3.1% (+1.0) | |
| Pfd-2(low) | 31.8% (+1.3) | |
| Pfd-3(high) | 5.8% (-0.6) | |
| Pfd-3 | 3.3% (0) | |
| Pfd-3(low) | 2.0% (-0.5) | |
| Pfd-4(high) | 0% (0) | |
| Pfd-4 | 0% | |
| Pfd-4(low) | 0% (0) | |
| Pfd-5(high) | 0% (0) | |
| Pfd-5 | 0.6% (0) | |
| Cash | +0.1% (-0.6) | |
| Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end. | ||
| The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5 by S&P and is unrated by DBRS | ||
| A position held in NPI.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3(high)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3(high). | ||
| A position held in INE.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3. | ||
Liquidity Distribution is:
| MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2015-9-30 | |
| Average Daily Trading | Weighting |
| <$50,000 | 2.6% (+0.9) |
| $50,000 – $100,000 | 20.3% (-0.4) |
| $100,000 – $200,000 | 61.7% 65.4% (-3.7) |
| $200,000 – $300,000 | 5.5% (+2.8) |
| >$300,000 | 9.8% (+1.0) |
| Cash | +0.1% (-0.6) |
| Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end. | |
MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.
A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:
- MAPF credit quality is better
- MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
- MAPF Yield is higher
- Weightings
- MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
- MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
- MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
- MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
- MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets
James,
I am wondering why the following is occurring in the fund: “MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet”. The way I read your commentary on PrefBlog you believe that Floaters have been unduly punished.
Using your latest PrefLetter data, in the case of FixedReset FloatingReset Strong Pairs the implication is that 3month bills have to be lower on average than -0.85% for the next 5 years for the FixedReset to be a better deal. It doesn’t sound like you expect that to happen either.
I hold a few FixedReset pref shares already and am looking to add a few new FloatingReset issues to the mix in the current pessimism (within my planned allocation percentages). If I pick them on the Strong Pair lists with a very low Implied 3 month Bill Rate, I have the additional advantage of being able to optionally switch back at the next exchange date.
But I am asking myself, in a bit of insecurity, why doesn’t your fund buy more of these FloatingResets with a StrongPair? i.e. what am I missing?
But I am asking myself, in a bit of insecurity, why doesn’t your fund buy more of these FloatingResets with a StrongPair? i.e. what am I missing?
You must remember that Strong Pair theory provides a conclusion about the relative valuation of the two elements against each other. It does not provide any information regarding the relative valuation of either element of the pair against the rest of the universe.
So one element of the pair could, hypothetically, be $1 cheap against its sibling and simultaneously $1 expensive against every other issue in the investment universe.
There are presently only four investment-grade non-bank FixedReset/FloatingReset Strong Pairs in existence. All the bank pairs currently trading are NVCC non-compliant. Of the four non-bank pairs, one is an insurance issue, which I deem to be subject to the NVCC rules although the rest of the market doesn’t.
So it’s a pretty tiny, segmented market!
Make sense to me when you describe the tiny segmented market.
Maybe as a supplemental question, could you comment on why MAPF portfolio composition is currently 3.8% FloatingReset in the sectorial analysis? I haven’t looked at the 12.2% Scraps to see if there are any other floaters in there. I ask this because I am wondering about Floaters in general (without StrongPairs) as well.
Quoting the above post on weightings, “MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet”.
The way I read your commentary on PrefBlog you believe that Floaters have been unduly punished. It seems to me to be a good time to buy some Floating Resets as a class. My perception is also that there is a real lack of appetite in the market for these.
Maybe as a supplemental question, could you comment on why MAPF portfolio composition is currently 3.8% FloatingReset in the sectorial analysis?
It’s mainly because there aren’t all that many investment grade pairs. If every FixedReset had a currently trading FloatingReset counterpart, I’m sure the proportion would be much higher.