NPI.PR.A, FFH.PR.G, ALA.PR.A: Convert Or Hold?

September 10th, 2015

It will be recalled that

The deadline for notifying the companies of the intent to convert is September 15 at 5pm; but note that these are company deadlines and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert! However, if you miss the brokerage deadline they’ll probably do it on a ‘best efforts’ basis if you grovel in a sufficiently entertaining fashion.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., NPI.PR.A and the FloatingReset, NPI.PR.?, that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

pairs_FR_150910
Click for Big

The market appears to have a marked distaste at the moment for floating rate product; every single one of the implied rates until the next interconversion are lower than the current 3-month bill rate and nearly all pairs have a break-even yield significantly below zero! Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the three FixedResets, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for their soon-to-be-issued FloatingReset counterparts given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Estimate of FloatingReset Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread -2.00% -1.00% 0.00%
NPI.PR.A. 14.71 280bp 12.08 13.05 14.02
ALA.PR.A 15.40 266bp 12.71 13.70 14.69
FFH.PR.G 14.50 256bp 11.79 12.78 13.76

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to be cheap and trading well below the price of their FixedReset counterparts. Therefore, I recommend that holders of NPI.PR.A, FFH.PR.G and ALA.PR.A continue to hold these issues and not to convert. I will note that current conditions make extant FloatingResets so cheap (in general) that it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – presumably, according to this analysis – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the future path of policy rates. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Note as well that conversion rights are dependent upon at least one million shares of each series being outstanding after giving effect to holders’ instructions; e.g., if only 100,000 shares of NPI.PR.A are tendered for conversion, then no conversions will be allowed; but if only 100,000 shares of NPI.PR.A will remain after the rest are all tendered, then conversion will be mandatory. However, this is relatively rare: all 30 Strong Pairs currently extant have some version of this condition and all but two have both series outstanding.

September 10, 2015

September 10th, 2015

CP Rail sold a century bond!

The railroad’s $900 million [USD] 100-year bond, sold with a coupon of 6.125 percent, shows how the once-troubled company has won over investor hearts and minds under new Chief Executive Officer Hunter Harrison, even as it embarks on a share-repurchase plan that would boost its debt load.

The century bond sale was the biggest by CP Rail since 1986. The company also issued $300 million in 20-year bonds with a 4.8 percent coupon. The average maturity on the Bank of America Merrill Lynch 15+ Year BBB US Corporate Index is 25 years with a yield of 5.5 percent, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch data. The last century bond was issued by Brazil’s Petrobras Global Finance in June with a 6.85 percent coupon, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Calgary-based Enbridge Inc., a pipeline operator, issued C$100 million ($76 million) of century bonds in Canada in 2012.

BMO has announced a major acquisition:

Bank of Montreal, Canada’s fourth-largest lender, agreed to buy General Electric Co.’s transportation finance business in the U.S. and Canada.

The unit had net earning assets of about C$11.5 billion ($8.7 billion) as of June 30, the Toronto-based bank said Thursday in a statement that didn’t disclose terms. The GE unit’s management team and about 600 employees will join Bank of Montreal, according to a presentation on the bank’s website.

Bank of Montreal’s agreement is the latest in a U.S. expansion that began in 1984 with its purchase of Chicago-based Harris Bank. The lender’s last major U.S. deal was its July 2011 takeover of Milwaukee-based Marshall & Ilsley Corp., which doubled deposits and branches and strengthened its commercial lending focus across the U.S. Midwest.

The relationship between ETFs, funds and crisis liquidity has been a hot issue. Barclays weighs in with some musings on ‘first-mover’ advantage:

Illiquidity in corporate bonds would in theory spell bad news for bond funds that promise investors the ability to immediately get out of their positions. The concern here is that once investors get a whiff of an impending mass selloff in bonds, they could potentially rush for the exits to try to get ahead of it.

With liquidity already low, that could put massive pressure on debt prices. Those who manage to squeeze through the keyhole first get rewarded for their speed but end up exacerbating this downward spiral. The slowest investors, meanwhile, get left with a portfolio of bonds that’s potentially much reduced in price.

By how much, you ask? Barclays estimates about 2 percent for funds that hold junk-rated corporate debt (boldface ours):

Mutual fund investors are, thus, faced with a first mover’s advantage to redeem in large selloff days because of a combination of inflated pricing and potential rebalancing costs. The magnitude of this advantage can be very meaningful economically. Assuming a 10 percent market shock leads to 10 percent outflows, we estimate that the first mover advantage is as much as 1.78 percent, or 1.61 percent from [net asset value] inflation and 0.17 percent from rebalancing costs.The benefit to early redeemers is effectively a tax on investors who remain invested through big downturns and ironically encourages demanding more liquidity.

They suggest a ‘scaled exit fee’:

“An “exit fee” that charges investors to withdraw their money from bond funds could arguably help slow theoretical outflows. (There is, of course, a converse argument that says such a fee would merely exacerbate the rush to the exit.) Barclays argues for a more refined approach that involves scaled fees:

Redemption fees are relatively straightforward and could be set such that they exactly neutralize the advantage of redeeming first in a down market. In our worst-case scenario, a redemption fee on the order of 2.0% would do the trick. That said, redemption fees are a somewhat blunt instrument. They penalize anyone withdrawing funds equally, regardless of how much liquidity the investor is demanding. Indeed, penalizing every investor based on a worst-case scenario may not be necessary. We believe a more nuanced approach would be to enforce minimum redemption fees according to a settlement schedule, with the minimum fee declining to zero as the investor allows settlement time to increase.

We wonder what the bond fund managers would say.

Well, PrefBlog says that, as stated, the idea is moronic, a typical product of a trading house that knows all about trading and nothing about investing.

What price will the redemption be at? Say you’ve got a million bucks in the fund and give me thirty days notice that you want out. So, notice period be damned, the price you’ll get is the day of actual redemption, thirty days hence. So should I sell securities now to raise the cash? Then I’ve got cash in the fund, which is kind of not the point of a fund (although the concept of fund investment is being increasingly circumscribed by liquidity rules and policies, as discussed on June 12). And I have to hold that cash in the fund for thirty days, reducing my duration and watching the market go up (because it always goes up in situations like this). So, nope, I’m not going to do it. I’m going to sell when I can get prices that will reasonably approximate the prices I use for determining the redemption value, which is to say, maybe half an hour prior to the close on the redemption date. So thirty day’s notice hasn’t done me a lot of good, has it?

The idea can be rescued by paying a blended price. Never mind “thirty day’s” notice, give me “twenty trading day’s” notice and agreed to get paid a blended price comprised of the NAV at the end of every equally weighted trading day. Then I can confidently sell 5% of your redemption value every day without screwing my other clients. There could be problems with this; if, for instance, a very large fund was to have a commitment to sell $10-million in preferreds for cash every day for the next twenty and this information becomes public … well, there won’t be much buying interest from other players for the next 15 trading days! So that’s got to be top-secret information … and in this business, ain’t nuthin’ top-secret.

A battle is brewing in the States over the right to bear screwdrivers:

Apple doesn’t publish repair manuals or sell parts to customers, and its warranty doesn’t apply if unauthorized repair damages its device. Samsung wouldn’t say why it doesn’t share repair information, though it makes some parts available to shops. Even John Deere gives only approved technicians access to the embedded software that controls systems in its machines. The manufacturers argue these limitations keep products working safely, and that copyright law lets them protect their intellectual property so it isn’t pirated.

“Bulls–t,” says Gay Gordon-Byrne, executive director of the Digital Right to Repair Coalition, based in North Haledon, N.J. “Repair is a profit center for a lot of companies, and sometimes it is more profitable than selling hardware.” Maintaining “repair monopolies,” she says, pushes up costs and makes customers more likely to simply junk old models for new ones. Apple charges $79 to replace an iPhone 4 battery. Repair website IFixit charges $20 for a battery and DIY kit for the same job.

Gordon-Byrne’s organization and advocates such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation are supporting bills introduced this year in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York that would require manufacturers to sell parts and provide manuals to hardware owners and independent repair shops. Separate efforts in Congress would amend the federal Digital Millennium Copyright Act by giving explicit permission for consumers to circumvent a manufacturer’s digital lock on its software for a lawful reason such as repair.

Times are tough in the dairy business:

Record prices last year primed farmers to bolster output in the U.S., where milk production in 2015 will reach 208.7 billion pounds—the fifth consecutive record-setting year. In April the EU, seeking to liberalize trade, removed quotas that had been in place for the past 30 years, leading to increased production from Ireland, the Netherlands, and the U.K. China is producing more milk thanks to investments such as a $140 million, 20,000-cow facility that China Modern Dairy Holdings, partly owned by private equity firm KKR, unveiled in 2013. The Chinese are also consuming stockpiled milk powder and importing less. Global milk supply grew 3.7 percent last year, almost triple the growth rate of 2013, the USDA says.

Overcapacity “is a long-term problem that a short-term fix won’t address,” says Robbie Turner, head of European markets at Rice Dairy International.

Nope, the only fix is to squeeze out the high-cost producers during times of oversupply, giving low-cost producers room to expand during times of undersupply. It’s called “economics”, though some prefer “competition”.

It was a mixed day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 1bp, FixedResets off 9bp and DeemedRetractibles up 2bp. FixedResets comprised the entire good side of the Performance Highlights table. Volume was very, awfully, miserably, disgustingly, quietly low.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150910
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 20.15 to be $0.94 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +164, is $1.21 cheap at its bid price of 13.15.

impVol_MFC_150910
Click for Big

Another good fit today for MFC, with Implied Volatility falling a bit today.

Most expensive is MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, bid at 24.26 to be 0.44 rich, while MFC.PR.G, resetting at +290bp on 2016-12-19, is bid at 22.76 to be 0.36 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150910
Click for Big

The fit on the BAM issues continues to be horrible.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 17.01 to be $1.41 cheap. BAM.PF.F, resetting at +286bp on 2019-9-30 is bid at 22.70 and appears to be $0.93 rich.

impVol_FTS_150910
Click for Big

FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 19.73, looks $0.45 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 19.13 and is $0.62 cheap.

pairs_FR_150910
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -1.17%, with no outliers. Note that the distribution is bimodal, with NVCC non-compliant bank issues averaging -1.32% and the unregulated issues averaging -0.94%. There are two junk outliers below -2.00% and one above 0.00%.

pairs_FF_150910
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.8657 % 1,633.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.8657 % 2,856.2
Floater 4.49 % 4.57 % 58,488 16.20 3 -1.8657 % 1,736.6
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3523 % 2,782.8
SplitShare 4.62 % 4.92 % 63,980 3.08 3 0.3523 % 3,261.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3523 % 2,544.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.72 % 2.89 % 56,870 0.08 8 0.0693 % 2,491.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.42 % 5.50 % 71,363 14.59 30 0.0129 % 2,607.5
FixedReset 4.68 % 4.12 % 172,457 15.92 74 -0.0872 % 2,170.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.14 % 5.21 % 94,479 5.38 33 0.0189 % 2,585.4
FloatingReset 2.44 % 3.89 % 54,843 5.93 9 -0.2756 % 2,171.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -2.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 12.47
Evaluated at bid price : 12.47
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 10.50
Evaluated at bid price : 10.50
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %
HSE.PR.E FixedReset -2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 21.88
Evaluated at bid price : 22.32
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset -1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 14.56
Evaluated at bid price : 14.56
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 10.61
Evaluated at bid price : 10.61
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 17.01
Evaluated at bid price : 17.01
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
HSE.PR.C FixedReset -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 20.85
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 22.50
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.02
Bid-YTW : 7.84 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 10.45
Evaluated at bid price : 10.45
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.59
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 22.52
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 13.15
Evaluated at bid price : 13.15
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 14.15
Evaluated at bid price : 14.15
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 17.22
Evaluated at bid price : 17.22
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.58
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 21.29
Evaluated at bid price : 21.58
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.27
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 20.15
Evaluated at bid price : 20.15
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 15.52
Evaluated at bid price : 15.52
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.15
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 15.25
Evaluated at bid price : 15.25
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 21.56
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset 2.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 19.73
Evaluated at bid price : 19.73
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 2.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 19.13
Evaluated at bid price : 19.13
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 2.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.35
Bid-YTW : 7.87 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 40,520 RBC crossed 10,000 at 21.68; Scotia crossed 20,200 at 21.66.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 20,486 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 17.01
Evaluated at bid price : 17.01
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 16,684 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 19.57
Evaluated at bid price : 19.57
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 16,140 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 21.29
Evaluated at bid price : 21.58
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 16,089 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 10.61
Evaluated at bid price : 10.61
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 15,985 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 21.86
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
There were 6 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IFC.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 20.75 – 21.60
Spot Rate : 0.8500
Average : 0.6733

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %

TRP.PR.F FloatingReset Quote: 14.56 – 15.24
Spot Rate : 0.6800
Average : 0.5079

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 14.56
Evaluated at bid price : 14.56
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.02 – 23.51
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3381

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-10
Maturity Price : 22.73
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %

MFC.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 21.01 – 21.49
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3450

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %

GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.45 – 22.95
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3764

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %

MFC.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 20.63 – 21.45
Spot Rate : 0.8200
Average : 0.6975

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.63
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %

September 9, 2015

September 9th, 2015

The top news of the day is the unchanged BoC overnight rate:

The Bank of Canada today announced that it is maintaining its target for the overnight rate at 1/2 per cent. The Bank Rate is correspondingly 3/4 per cent and the deposit rate is 1/4 per cent.

Inflation has evolved in line with the outlook in the Bank’s July Monetary Policy Report (MPR). Total CPI inflation remains near the bottom of the target range, reflecting year-over-year price declines for consumer energy products. Core inflation has been close to 2 per cent, with disinflationary pressures from economic slack being offset by transitory effects of the past depreciation of the Canadian dollar and some sector-specific factors. The dynamics of GDP growth in Canada outlined in July’s MPR also remain intact. The stimulative effects of previous monetary policy actions are working their way through the Canadian economy.

Canada’s resource sector continues to adjust to lower prices for oil and other commodities, with some spillover to the rest of the economy. These adjustments are complex and are expected to take considerable time. Economic activity continues to be underpinned by solid household spending and a firm recovery in the United States, with particular strength in the sectors of the U.S. economy that are important for Canadian exports.

Increasing uncertainty about growth prospects for China and other emerging-market economies, in contrast, is raising questions about the pace of the global recovery. This has contributed to heightened financial market volatility and lower commodity prices. Movements in the Canadian dollar are helping to absorb some of the impact of lower commodity prices and are facilitating the adjustments taking place in Canada’s economy. While the overall export picture is still uncertain, the latest data confirm that exchange rate-sensitive exports are regaining momentum.

Meanwhile, risks to financial stability are evolving as expected. Taking all of these developments into consideration, the Bank judges that the risks to the outlook for inflation remain within the zone for which the current stance of monetary policy is appropriate. Therefore, the target for the overnight rate remains at 1/2 per cent.

Nice piece in the NYT magazine about the state of American campuses:

As Benjamin Ginsberg details in his 2011 book, ‘‘The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All-Administrative University and Why It Matters,’’ a constantly expanding layer of university administrative jobs now exists at an increasing remove from the actual academic enterprise. It’s not unheard-of for colleges now to employ more senior administrators than professors. There are, of course, essential functions that many university administrators perform, but such an imbalance is absurd — try imagining a high school with more vice principals than teachers. This legion of bureaucrats enables a world of pitiless surveillance; no segment of campus life, no matter how small, does not have some administrator who worries about it. Piece by piece, every corner of the average campus is being slowly made congruent with a single, totalizing vision. The rise of endless brushed-metal-and-glass buildings at Purdue represents the aesthetic dimension of this ideology. Bent into place by a small army of apparatchiks, the contemporary American college is slowly becoming as meticulously art-directed and branded as a J. Crew catalog. Like Niketown or Disneyworld, your average college campus now leaves the distinct impression of a one-party state.

In the interest of fairness, here’s something for people who hate drones:

A new laser weapon that can burn up targets in just a few seconds recently melted and destroyed a test drone flying over California.

Known as the Compact Laser Weapons System, the futuristic, drone-shooting weapon is a smaller, more versatile version of the High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD), a system developed by Boeing to be mounted on top of U.S. Army vehicles.

It was another good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 24bp, FixedResets up 26bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 27bp. The lengthy Performance Highlights table was notable for a large population of winning FixedResets, but Floaters made a triumphant appearance at the summit. Volume was very low.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.52%, equivalent to 7.18% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.2%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 300bp, unchanged from the level reported September 2.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150909
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 19.93 to be $0.76 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +164, is $1.13 cheap at its bid price of 13.29.

impVol_MFC_150909
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Another good fit today for MFC, with Implied Volatility rising a bit today.

Most expensive is MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, bid at 24.01 to be 0.32 rich, while MFC.PR.K, resetting at +222bp on 2018-9-19, is bid at 19.92 to be 0.41 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150909
Click for Big

The fit on the BAM issues continues to be horrible.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 17.32 to be $1.10 cheap. BAM.PF.F, resetting at +286bp on 2019-9-30 is bid at 22.70 and appears to be $0.93 rich.

impVol_FTS_150909
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FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 19.27, looks $0.30 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 18.67 and is $0.79 cheap.

pairs_FR_150909
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -1.13%, with no outliers. Note that the distribution is bimodal, with NVCC non-compliant bank issues averaging -1.29% and the unregulated issues averaging -0.91%. There are two junk outliers below -2.00% and one above 0.00%.

pairs_FF_150909
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 2.6165 % 1,664.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 2.6165 % 2,910.5
Floater 4.41 % 4.46 % 58,021 16.40 3 2.6165 % 1,769.6
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1493 % 2,773.0
SplitShare 4.64 % 5.03 % 66,212 3.09 3 0.1493 % 3,249.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1493 % 2,535.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.72 % 2.69 % 57,783 0.08 8 0.0297 % 2,489.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.42 % 5.52 % 72,447 14.60 30 0.2415 % 2,607.2
FixedReset 4.68 % 4.12 % 177,218 15.89 74 0.2629 % 2,172.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.14 % 5.21 % 97,239 5.50 33 0.2663 % 2,584.9
FloatingReset 2.44 % 3.84 % 55,594 5.93 9 0.2709 % 2,177.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BIP.PR.A FixedReset -2.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 21.54
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset -2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.00
Bid-YTW : 8.70 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 20.46
Evaluated at bid price : 20.46
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 13.29
Evaluated at bid price : 13.29
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 23.08
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 24.05
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.73
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.29
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.81
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 15.06
Evaluated at bid price : 15.06
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.39 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 14.85
Evaluated at bid price : 14.85
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 21.55
Evaluated at bid price : 21.82
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 7.66 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.85
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 15.35
Evaluated at bid price : 15.35
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
BNS.PR.D FloatingReset 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.35
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 2.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 10.60
Evaluated at bid price : 10.60
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 2.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 10.82
Evaluated at bid price : 10.82
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 21.36
Evaluated at bid price : 21.66
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 3.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 10.74
Evaluated at bid price : 10.74
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PF.B FixedReset 129,791 RBC sold 10,000 to Scotia at 20.30 and crossed blocks of 38,300 and 38,000 at the same price. Scotia crossed 25,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 20.32
Evaluated at bid price : 20.32
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %
TD.PF.F Perpetual-Discount 34,543 RBC crossed 15,000 at 24.49.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 24.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset 32,490 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.00
Bid-YTW : 8.70 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 27,938 Nesbitt crossed 22,600 at 22.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 21.93
Evaluated at bid price : 22.32
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
BMO.PR.Z Perpetual-Discount 26,116 RBC crossed 15,000 at 24.88.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 24.43
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 22,960 Scotia crossed 20,000 at 25.21.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-10-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : -5.91 %
There were 13 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 20.70 – 21.45
Spot Rate : 0.7500
Average : 0.5631

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.70
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %

MFC.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 19.92 – 20.41
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3350

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.92
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %

TRP.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 19.93 – 20.49
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.4057

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-09
Maturity Price : 19.93
Evaluated at bid price : 19.93
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %

BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 21.50 – 21.83
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2019

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %

MFC.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 24.01 – 24.48
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3673

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %

BMO.PR.R FloatingReset Quote: 22.37 – 22.70
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2318

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.37
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %

September 8, 2015

September 9th, 2015

In reaction to the trashing of five-hundred years of bankruptcy law as irrelevant, DBRS is proposing yet another tier of bank obligation for analytical purposes:

DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS) is proposing to introduce a Preferred Obligations Rating (POR), initially in jurisdictions where legislation is in place or is expected to be introduced under the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). This rating would address the risk of default of particular obligations/exposures at certain banks that have a higher probability of remaining in a continuing bank in the event of the resolution of a troubled bank. Even though these preferred obligations may not be explicitly excluded from being bailed-in under the BRRD, DBRS expects them to receive preferential treatment relative to other senior obligations.

A preferred obligations rating would likely encompass, but not be limited to, the following obligations:

– Derivatives and collateralized exposures
– Payment and collection services
– Obligations of a bank as issuer of covered bonds, referred to as the covered bond attachment point in DBRS’s covered bond methodology
– Certain liquidity lines/ contingent liabilities

Some of these preferred obligations may be part of structured finance transactions and therefore have implications for DBRS’s structured finance ratings. DBRS notes as well that Article 79 of the BRRD protects, in all but extreme circumstances, structured finance arrangements from being broken up or amended.

Covered bonds are explicitly excluded from bail-in, and Article 79 of the BRRD applies to covered bonds as well as structured finance arrangements. In addition, DBRS expects the likelihood that the covered bond programme remains part of a continuing bank in resolution to be high if the covered bond programme is considered part of the bank’s critical functions. Hence, the attachment point for a covered bond is expected to be higher than the rating of senior bonds.

Geez, I wish they’d stayed away from the word “preferred”!

Here’s the latest in 3-D printing news:

Britain’s navy could be using a fleet of unmanned surface and underwater vessels and small 3D-printed ships within 15 years, according to a report from the former government defense-research laboratory, Qinetiq Group Plc.

Three-dimensional printing of craft up to 15-meters (50 feet) long and formed from layers of metal and plastic powder would permit cheaper and quicker production, according to the Global Marine Technology Trends 2030 report, published Monday. Navies could also use the process to print mission-critical equipment at sea, allowing them to spend less time in dock.

And, since talk about 3-D printing immediately brings drones to mind, here’s a good Thanksgiving project for all you home handy-men out there: The Swarm Manned Aerial Vehicle Multirotor Super Drone Flying:

The Swarm man carrying multi-rotor airborne flight testing montage. 54 counter-rotation propellers, six grouped control channels with KK2.15 stabilization. Take off weight 148kg, max lift, approx. 164kg. Endurance10 minutes. Power approx. 22KW.

Just a bit of fun for my self, never intended for making a significant journey or flying much above head height. Approx cost £6000.

It was good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 21bp, FixedResets winning 27bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 2bp. The Performance Highlights table is notable for its contingent of TRP winners, which have been hit relatively hard through the last month of the downturn. Volume was very low.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150908
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 19.86 to be $0.67 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +164, is $1.02 cheap at its bid price of 13.45.

impVol_MFC_150908
Click for Big

Another good fit today for MFC, with Implied Volatility rising a bit today.

Most expensive is MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, bid at 24.14 to be 0.52 rich, while MFC.PR.K, resetting at +222bp on 2018-9-19, is bid at 19.73 to be 0.42 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150908
Click for Big

The fit on the BAM issues continues to be horrible.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 17.29 to be $1.06 cheap. BAM.PF.G, resetting at +284bp on 2020-6-30 is bid at 22.50 and appears to be $0.92 rich.

impVol_FTS_150908
Click for Big

FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 19.25, looks $0.52 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 18.57 and is $0.62 cheap.

pairs_FR_150908
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -1.11%, with no outliers; not only that, but all data points are negative! Note that the distribution is bimodal, with NVCC non-compliant bank issues averaging -1.32% and the unregulated issues averaging -0.81%. There are two junk outliers below -2.00%.

pairs_FF_150908
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6026 % 1,622.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6026 % 2,836.3
Floater 4.52 % 4.60 % 58,358 16.13 3 -0.6026 % 1,724.5
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0949 % 2,768.9
SplitShare 4.65 % 5.08 % 65,694 3.09 3 -0.0949 % 3,245.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0949 % 2,531.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.73 % 3.48 % 58,561 0.08 8 -0.0099 % 2,488.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.44 % 5.51 % 73,699 14.59 30 0.2147 % 2,600.9
FixedReset 4.69 % 4.14 % 178,868 15.98 74 0.2662 % 2,167.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.15 % 5.26 % 99,946 5.50 33 0.0202 % 2,578.0
FloatingReset 2.44 % 3.91 % 54,279 5.93 9 -0.1677 % 2,171.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 10.36
Evaluated at bid price : 10.36
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %
TD.PR.Z FloatingReset -1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.27
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.73
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 14.40
Evaluated at bid price : 14.40
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.53
Evaluated at bid price : 21.53
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.52
Bid-YTW : 7.96 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.09
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 14.65
Evaluated at bid price : 14.65
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.74
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.04
Evaluated at bid price : 21.04
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.01
Bid-YTW : 7.85 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.95
Bid-YTW : 8.18 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.42
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
NA.PR.W FixedReset 2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset 2.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 19.25
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
HSE.PR.E FixedReset 2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 22.30
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 2.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 13.45
Evaluated at bid price : 13.45
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 2.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 17.28
Evaluated at bid price : 17.28
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 2.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 18.03
Evaluated at bid price : 18.03
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 3.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 3.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 12.77
Evaluated at bid price : 12.77
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.D FixedReset 46,900 RBC crossed 39,200 at 23.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 22.69
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
RY.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 16,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 23.99
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
BMO.PR.Z Perpetual-Discount 15,833 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 24.41
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
TD.PF.F Perpetual-Discount 15,200 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 23.99
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 15,131 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 13.45
Evaluated at bid price : 13.45
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 14,265 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
There were 10 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 21.53 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 1.4700
Average : 0.9484

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.53
Evaluated at bid price : 21.53
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 16.01 – 16.88
Spot Rate : 0.8700
Average : 0.6017

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.01
Bid-YTW : 7.85 %

BMO.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 21.35 – 22.08
Spot Rate : 0.7300
Average : 0.4733

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %

FTS.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 21.04 – 21.69
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.3999

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 21.04
Evaluated at bid price : 21.04
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.41 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.3619

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 17.28 – 18.00
Spot Rate : 0.7200
Average : 0.5049

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-09-08
Maturity Price : 17.28
Evaluated at bid price : 17.28
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %

NSI.PR.D on Review-Negative by S&P

September 9th, 2015

As mentioned in the post EMA Outlook-Negative by S&P; Review-Developing by DBRS, Emera’s Canadian subsidiary Nova Scotia Power has been put on Outlook-Negative by S&P:

  • •On Sept. 4, Emera announced the US$10.4 billion proposed acquisition of TECO Energy, a Florida-based holding company that wholly owns regulated utilities Tampa Electric Co. and New Mexico Gas Co.
  • •The proposed acquisition is partly being financed with the issuance of convertible debentures, and the additional debt load pushes Emera’s adjusted funds from operations-to-debt ratio to below 11%, the downgrade trigger.
  • •As a result of the financing risk associated with this large acquisition that will double the size of the company, we are revising our outlook on Emera and its Canadian subsidiary Nova Scotia Power Inc. to negative from stable.
  • •We are also revising the financial risk profile to “aggressive” from “significant”. The business risk of the consolidated entity post acquisition remains “excellent”.
  • •We are affirming all ratings on Emera and NSPI, including our ‘BBB+’ long-term corporate credit ratings.


The negative outlooks on Emera and NSPI reflect the financing risk associated with this large acquisition and our expectation that the consolidated pro forma credit metrics will materially weaken due to the C$1.9 billion convertible debenture issuance to finance, in part, the purchase of TECO Energy.

Although we expect that the debentures have a high likelihood of conversion due to several factors including no interest after acquisition close, targeted sale to institutions that would be buyers of Emera equity, not debt), in the meantime credit metrics are expected to be below 11%. If conversion does not occur as expected and metrics remain below 11%, we could lower the ratings on Emera and NSPI.

We could revise our outlook to stable within our two-year outlook period if we expect consolidated AFFO-to-debt to be sustained comfortably above 11%, all else being equal. This could occur if the debentures are successfully converted.

The DBRS announcement regarding Emera made no mention of Nova Scotia Power.

EMA Outlook-Negative by S&P; Review-Developing by DBRS

September 9th, 2015

Emera Inc. announced on Friday:

a definitive agreement for Emera to acquire TECO Energy (the “Transaction”), creating a North American energy leader, with over US$20 billion of assets and more than 2.4 million electric and gas customers. Upon closing, TECO Energy will become a wholly owned subsidiary of Emera.

Under the terms of the all-cash deal, which has been unanimously approved by the Board of Directors of both companies, TECO Energy shareholders will receive US$27.55 per common share, a 48 percent premium based on TECO Energy’s unaffected closing stock price on July 15, 2015 (the last trading day prior to news reports regarding TECO Energy’s strategic review) and 25 percent above TECO Energy’s unaffected 52-week high. This represents an aggregate purchase price of approximately US$10.4 billion including assumption of approximately US$3.9 billion of debt.

The closing of the Transaction, which is expected to occur by mid-2016, is subject to TECO Energy common shareholder approval and certain regulatory and government approvals, including approval by the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and compliance with any applicable requirements under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, as amended, and the satisfaction of customary closing conditions.

… and announced today:

that its direct wholly-owned subsidiary, Emera Holdings NS Company (the “Selling Debentureholder”), has agreed to sell $1,900,000,000 aggregate principal amount of 4.00% convertible unsecured subordinated debentures (“Debentures”) of Emera in a secondary offering on a “bought deal” basis (the “Offering”). In connection with the Offering, the underwriters have also been granted an over-allotment option to purchase up to an additional $285,000,000 aggregate principal amount of Debentures at the offering price, within 30 days from the date of the closing of the Offering solely to cover over-allotments, if any, and for market stabilization purposes.

All Debentures are being sold on an instalment basis at a price of $1,000 per Debenture, of which $333 is payable on the closing of the Offering and the remaining $667 is payable on a date (the “Final Instalment Date”) to be fixed by the Company following satisfaction of all conditions precedent to the closing of Emera’s acquisition of TECO Energy, Inc. (NYSE:TE).

On September 4, 2015 Emera announced that it had entered into an agreement and plan of merger pursuant to which it will indirectly acquire TECO Energy, Inc. (“TECO Energy”), a Florida and New Mexico regulated electric and gas utilities holding company, for an aggregate purchase price of approximately US$10.4 billion including the assumption of approximately US$3.9 billion of debt.

As a result of this activity, S&P has announced:

  • •On Sept. 4, Emera announced the US$10.4 billion proposed acquisition of TECO Energy, a Florida-based holding company that wholly owns regulated utilities Tampa Electric Co. and New Mexico Gas Co.
  • •The proposed acquisition is partly being financed with the issuance of convertible debentures, and the additional debt load pushes Emera’s adjusted funds from operations-to-debt ratio to below 11%, the downgrade trigger.
  • •As a result of the financing risk associated with this large acquisition that will double the size of the company, we are revising our outlook on Emera and its Canadian subsidiary Nova Scotia Power Inc. to negative from stable.
  • •We are also revising the financial risk profile to “aggressive” from “significant”. The business risk of the consolidated entity post acquisition remains “excellent”.
  • •We are affirming all ratings on Emera and NSPI, including our ‘BBB+’ long-term corporate credit ratings.


The negative outlooks on Emera and NSPI reflect the financing risk associated with this large acquisition and our expectation that the consolidated pro forma credit metrics will materially weaken due to the C$1.9 billion convertible debenture issuance to finance, in part, the purchase of TECO Energy.

Although we expect that the debentures have a high likelihood of conversion due to several factors including no interest after acquisition close, targeted sale to institutions that would be buyers of Emera equity, not debt), in the meantime credit metrics are expected to be below 11%. If conversion does not occur as expected and metrics remain below 11%, we could lower the ratings on Emera and NSPI.

We could revise our outlook to stable within our two-year outlook period if we expect consolidated AFFO-to-debt to be sustained comfortably above 11%, all else being equal. This could occur if the debentures are successfully converted.

Prior to the announcement of the convertible debt issue, DBRS announced:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today placed the BBB (high) Issuer Rating, BBB (high) Medium-Term Notes and Pfd-3 (high) Preferred Shares – Cumulative ratings of Emera Inc. (Emera or the Company) Under Review with Developing Implications.

The primary focus of DBRS’s FRA [financial risk assessment] analysis is on Emera’ non-consolidated capital structure (parent level) and cash flow from the subsidiaries to the parent to service the parent’s debt and corporate expenses. On a non-consolidated basis, the cash flow-to-interest expense ratio was reasonable at 12.3x in LTM 2015, while debt-to-capital was approximately 19%. DBRS notes that the non-consolidated leverage of 19% is well within the 30% threshold.

Currently, it is uncertain as to how Emera plans to ultimately finance the Acquisition. As a result, DBRS has placed the ratings of Emera Under Review with Developing Implications. DBRS will further review the Company’s financing plan when it is finalized. Upon final review, if the Company finances the Acquisition in such a way that its non-consolidated debt-to-capital structure exceeds 30% and its other non-consolidated credit metrics deteriorate significantly without corrective action within a reasonable time frame, then a negative rating action is likely to occur.

Affected issues are EMA.PR.A, EMA.PR.B, EMA.PR.C, EMA.PR.E and EMA.PR.F. S&P’s announcement also affects NSI.PR.D, which will be posted separately.

MAPF Performance: August, 2015

September 7th, 2015

The fund underperformed the indices in August, weighed down by its heavy weighting in FixedResets, particularly those with a low Issue Reset Spread which performed poorly.

The poor performance of the preferred share market is getting to be ridiculous and has started to attract press comment, such as Why you can’t trust the yields on preferred share ETFs and “‘Slaughter’ of preferred shares is alarming”, discussed on September 2.

When I wrote eMail To A Client towards the end of July, one had to go back to January, 2011, to find a starting point that would give you a positive return through the holding period. As of the end of August, the required starting point has moved back another month, to December month-end, 2010. This incredible period is illustrated in the following graph of cumulative total returns:

BMOCM50_cumRet
Click for Big

As may be seen, the current 56-month total cumulative return of basically zero was only exceeded during the Credit Crunch – and even then, the figure was only negative for seven months, from October 2008 to April 2009 inclusive. The discussion in eMail To A Client still applies … but more so, now!

ZPR, is an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues and a very high proportion of junk issues, returned -4.91%, -13.37% and -22.10% over the past one-, three- and twelve-month periods, respectively (according to the fund’s data), versus returns for the TXPL index of -4.95%, -13.40% and -21.93% respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $982.1-million since inception in November 2012; AUM declined by $21.9-million in August; given an index return of -4.95% a decrease of about $49.7-million was expected, so there was a very significant cash inflow over the month. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents … although for this month it appears that buying from this ETF was swamped by other sellers!

TXPR had returns over one-, three- and twelve-months of -3.82%, -10.63% and -15.44% respectively with CPD performance within expectations.

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for the month were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to August, 2015
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat N/A N/A
Floater -17.91% -27.18%
OpRet N/A N/A
SplitShare -0.06% -0.16%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium -0.22% -1.31%
PerpetualDiscount -1.56% -7.03%
FixedReset -4.44% -10.73%
DeemedRetractible -0.41% -2.46%
FloatingReset -3.28% -6.27%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close August 31, 2015, was $8.4914.

Returns to August 31, 2015
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month -5.44% -3.62% -3.82% N/A
Three Months -13.05% -9.85% -10.63% N/A
One Year -16.27% -14.77% -15.44% -15.54%
Two Years (annualized) -3.45% -5.18% -5.03% N/A
Three Years (annualized) -2.64% -3.36% -3.71% -4.05%
Four Years (annualized) -0.97% -1.16% -1.55% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +1.99% +1.13% +0.37% -0.08%
Six Years (annualized) +3.20% +1.97% +1.29%  
Seven Years (annualized) +9.73% +2.87% +2.02%  
Eight Years (annualized) +8.29% +1.79% +0.92%  
Nine Years (annualized) +7.73% +1.63%    
Ten Years (annualized) +7.55% +1.83%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +7.45% +2.12%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +8.30% +2.43%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +9.04% +2.73%    
Fourteen Years (annualized) +8.91% +2.77%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -3.52%, -9.50% and -11.86%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is -2.02%; five year is +1.35%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv [into which was merged Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund)] (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -5.02%, -12.23% & N/A, respectively.
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -3.89%, -9.48% & -13.30%, respectively. Three year performance is -2.48%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are -3.95%, -9.86% and -14.76% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is -4.91%, -13.37% and -22.10% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively. Two year performance is -9.59%.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund (Dividend Tax Credit Class, the best performing) are -%, -% and -% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are -9.28% and -13.58% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series Fare -3.70%, -10.56% and -16.41% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The two-, three- and five-year figures are -6.43%, -5.36% and -1.34%, respectively.
Figures for the First Asset Preferred Share Investment Trust (PSF.UN) are -5.14%, -13.69% and -19.58% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The two-, three-, four- and five-year figures are -8.73%, -6.22%, -4.19% and -2.84%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past four years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. Until the market became so grossly segmented, there were many comparables for any given issue – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio was, in effect ‘locked in’ to the low coupon DeemedRetractibles due to projected long-term gains from a future OSFI decision to the detriment of trading gains, particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index, and in June, 2013, when the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles behaved like PerpetualDiscounts in a sharply negative market. Nowadays, the fund is ‘locked-in’ to the low-spread FixedResets from these companies: GWO.PR.N, MFC.PR.F, and SLF.PR.G.

In August, insurance DeemedRetractibles performed worse than bank DeemedRetractibles:

BankInsDRPerf
Click for Big

… and about the same as Unregulated Straight Perpetuals (a category which includes bank Straights that are explicitly NVCC-compliant).

InsStraightPerf_150831
Click for Big

Correlations were not very good for bank DeemedRetractibles (11%), rotten for insurance (6%; not shown) and lousy for unregulated/NVCC-compliant issues (2%; not shown).

A lingering effect of the downdraft of 2013 has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility but given my recent updates in recent daily market reports, I will not discuss them further in this post.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles; something that dismays me, particularly given that the market does not yet agree with me regarding the insurance issues! There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
December, 2014 10.5701 4.83% 1.009 4.787% 1.0000 $0.5060
March, 2015 9.9573 4.99% 1.001 4.985% 1.0000 $0.4964
June, 2015 9.4181 5.55% 1.002 5.539% 1.0000 $0.5217
August, 2015 8.4914 6.21% 0.994 6.247% 1.0000 $0.5305
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The same reasoning is also applied to FixedResets from these issuers, other than explicitly defined NVCC from banks.

Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.
Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates. For June 30, 2015, yields of 0.91% and 0.52%, respectively, were assumed; base rates in August were 0.73% and 0.34%, respectively.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on June 30; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a small position in these issues.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Dividend Yield” of 4.5% as of August 29, 2014, but this is the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF was 4.89% as of August 29, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s a little higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to discuss it in the context of portfolio reporting is misleading.

However, BMO has taken a significant step forward in that they are no longer reporting the “Portfolio Yield” directly on their website; the information is taken from the “Enhanced Fund Profile” which is available only as a PDF link. CPD doesn’t report this metric on the CPD fact sheet or on their website. I may have one less thing to mock the fundcos about!

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance has generally been due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Low-Spread FixedResets: August 2015

September 7th, 2015

As noted in MAPF Portfolio Composition: August 2015, the fund now has a large allocation to FixedResets, mostly of relatively low spread.

Many of these were largely purchased with proceeds of sales of DeemedRetractibles from the same issuer; it is interesting to look at the price trend of some of the Straight/FixedReset pairs. We’ll start with GWO.PR.N / GWO.PR.I; the fund sold the latter to buy the former at a takeout of about $1.00 in mid-June, 2014; relative prices over the past year are plotted as:

GWOPRN_GWOPRI_bidDiff_150831
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Given that the August month-end take-out was $6.85, this is clearly a trade that has not worked out very well.

In July, 2014, I reported sales of SLF.PR.D to purchase SLF.PR.G at a take-out of about $0.15:

SLFPRG_SLFPRD_bidDiff_150831
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There were similar trades in August, 2014 (from SLF.PR.C) at a take-out of $0.35. The August month-end take-out (bid price SLF.PR.D less bid price SLF.PR.G) was $4.28, so that hasn’t worked very well either.

November saw the third insurer-based sector swap, as the fund sold MFC.PR.C to buy the FixedReset MFC.PR.F at a post-dividend-adjusted take-out of about $0.85 … given an August month-end take-out of $4.88, that’s another regrettable trade, although another piece executed in December at a take-out of $1.57 has less badly.

MFCPRF_MFCPRC_bidDiff_150831
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This trend is not restricted to the insurance sector, which I expect will become subject to NVCC rules in the relatively near future and are thus subject to the same redemption assumptions I make for DeemedRetractibles. Other pairs of interest are BAM.PR.X / BAM.PR.N:

BAMPRX_BAMPRN_bidDiff_150831
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… and FTS.PR.H / FTS.PR.J:

FTSPRH_FTSPRJ_bidDiff_150831
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… and PWF.PR.P / PWF.PR.S:

PWFPRP_PWFPRS_bidDiff_150831
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I will agree that the fund’s trades highlighted in this post may be decried as cases of monumental bad timing, but I should point out that in May, 2014, the fund was 63.9% Straight / 9.5% FixedReset while in May 2015 the fund was 12% Straight / 86% FixedReset, FloatingReset and FixedFloater (The latter figures include allocations from those usually grouped as ‘Scraps’). Given that the indices are roughly 30% Straight / 60% FixedReset & FloatingReset, it is apparent that the fund was extremely overweighted in Straights / underweighted in FixedResets in May 2014 but this situation has now reversed. HIMIPref™ analytics have been heavily favouring low-spread issues and the fund’s holdings are overwhelmingly of this type.

Summarizing the charts above in tabular form, we see:

FixedReset Straight Take-out
December 2013
Take-out
MAPF Trade
Take-out
December 2014
July 2015 August 2015
GWO.PR.N
3.65%+130
GWO.PR.I
4.5%
($0.04) $1.00 $2.95 5.70 6.85
SLF.PR.G
4.35%+141
SLF.PR.D
4.45%
($1.29) $0.25 $2.16 5.01 4.28
MFC.PR.F
4.20%+141
MFC.PR.C
4.50%
($1.29) $0.86 $1.20 4.46 4.88
BAM.PR.X
4.60%+180
BAM.PR.N
4.75%
($2.06)   $0.17 4.73 5.80
FTS.PR.H
4.25%+145
FTS.PR.J
4.75%
$0.60   $5.68 5.46 7.05
PWF.PR.P
4.40%+160
PWF.PR.S
4.80%
($0.67)   $3.00 5.55 6.39
The ‘Take-Out’ is the bid price of the Straight less the bid price of the FixedReset; approximate execution prices are used for the “MAPF Trade” column. Bracketted figures in the ‘Take-Out’ columns indicate a ‘Pay-Up’

Changes were varied from July month-end to August month-end.

In January, a slow decline due to fears of deflation got worse with Canada yields plummeting after the Bank of Canada rate cut with speculation rife about future cuts although this slowly died away.

And in late March / early April it got worse again, with one commenter attributing at least some of the blame to the John Heinzl piece in which I pointed out the expected reduction in dividend payouts! In May, a rise in the markets in the first half of the month was promptly followed by a slow decline in the latter half; perhaps due to increased fears that a lousy Canadian economy will delay a Canadian tightening. Changes in June varied as the markets were in an overall decline.

In August we saw increased fear of global deflation emanating from China, although the ‘China Effect’ is disputed.

All in all, I take the view that we’ve seen this show before: during the Credit Crunch, Floaters got hit extremely badly (to the point at which their fifteen year total return was negative) because (as far as I can make out) their dividend rate was dropping (as it was linked to Prime) while the yields on other perpetual preferred instruments were skyrocketing (due to credit concerns). Thus, at least some investors insisted on getting long term corporate yields from rates based (indirectly and with a lag, in the case of FixedResets) on short-term government policy rates. And it’s happening again!

There is further discussion of the extremely poor YTD performance of FixedResets in the post eMail to a Client.

Here’s the August performance for FixedResets that had a YTW Scenario of ‘To Perptuity’ at mid-month.:

FRPerf_150831_1Mo
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The market continues to be rather disorderly, but correlations between Issue Reset Spread and monthly performance for the “Pfd-2 Group” for August improved to 37% while the “Pfd-3 Group” correlation is a mere 4%. However, the correlation for returns against term to reset are still lousy at 8% and 0% for Pfd-2 and Pfd-3 issues respectively.

FRPerfTerm_150831_1Mo
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Ultra-low or negative interest rates: what they mean for financial stability and growth

September 6th, 2015

Assiduous Readers will remember that I was recently quoted as saying:

“It is simply not sustainable for a five-year Canada to trade below inflation forever,” he said. “That simply cannot go on.”

I have been challenged to substantiate this assertion and my immediate response was:

You are correct – it’s because the real yield is not just negative, but significantly negative.

Some bond investors have to put up with this kind of thing; banks, for instance, are required to hold a large quantity of government bonds. Central banks will, in general, place a very high premium on liquidity, since when they want to trade they want do it in size and they also place a high premium on the ability to transact at the height of a crisis.

But the marginal investor will eventually get tired of losing money on a real basis while tying up their money for five years. In addition, the marginal borrower will step up borrowing because he’s getting paid – in real terms – to do so. We are already seeing significant economic distortions resulting from these marginal borrowers because instead of buying productive assets, they’re buying houses in Toronto and Vancouver … eventually, all the stresses will be relieved, and there will be a positive real yield on five year Canadas … either because government yields go up or because we enter a period of deflation.

These will be familiar themes to Assiduous Readers; the requirement for banks to own an increasing number of sovereign bonds for highly politicized (and economically illiterate and fiscally expedient) reasons was discussed on September 4, for instance.

While poking around for more authoritative and crushing retorts, I came across Remarks by Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General Manager, Bank for International Settlements, at the Eurofi High-Level Seminar, Riga, 22 April 2015, titled Ultra-low or negative interest rates: what they mean for financial stability and growth. He was mainly concerned with the European situation:

When policy interest rates came down to almost zero and central bank balance sheets expanded due to large-scale market interventions in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, the consensus was that this unconventional monetary policy (UMP) would be temporary. More than six years later, the prospect of normalisation seems remote in most advanced economies. Indeed, most of continental Europe (the euro zone, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland) have moved towards a much more extreme form of UMP by introducing negative policy interest rates, and/or negative central bank deposit rates. Together with forward guidance and large scale asset purchases, such measures have created an unprecedented situation where nominal interest rates in a number of European countries are negative across a range of maturities in the benchmark yield curve, from overnight out to five years.

There is no precedent in economic history for negative nominal interest rates, even during the Great Depression in the United States.[Footnote] Not even Keynes, who coined the terrifying metaphor of the “euthanasia of the rentiers”, ever contemplated negative nominal interest rates. An experiment is under way in continental Europe to test the “boundaries of the unthinkable” in monetary policy.

[Footnote reads] In the wake of the Great Depression, US short-term nominal interest rates fell to near-zero levels in 1932 but they never turned negative.

He shouldn’t be quite so absolute in his footnotes! There were brief episodes of negative US bill rates in 2013:

Treasury bills that mature as soon as November traded below zero today [2013-9-26], with the bill maturing on Nov. 29 having a negative 0.005 percent rate at 2:02 p.m. New York time. The three-month bill rate was negative 0.0051 percent, compared to 0.0152 percent yesterday. Treasury bills that mature on Oct. 24 were at a rate of 0.038 percent, up from 0.018 percent yesterday.

and in 2014:

A scramble for safe, short-term debt left some investors on Tuesday paying for the privilege of lending to the U.S. government.

The demand, which intensified following the Federal Reserve’s decision this month to curb a popular overnight-lending program, pushed up bond prices and drove down yields. The yield on the U.S. Treasury bill maturing on Oct. 2 traded at negative-0.01%, according to Tradeweb, the first negative yield in eight months. Yields on other Treasury bills due in three months or less hovered around zero.

Short-term debt trading at negative yields was essentially unheard of before the 2008 financial crisis. But since then, the condition has cropped up at times of market stress, reflecting extraordinarily expansive central-bank policy and anemic growth in much of the world. Yields on some U.S. bills traded below zero at the end of each of the past three years amid strong demand for liquid assets, according to analysts.

and shortly after the speech:

For all the anxiety over the global selloff in bonds, the big worry in money markets is the havoc being created by a dearth of U.S. Treasury bills.

The magnitude of the problem was on display last week, when not even the Treasury Department’s surprise announcement to boost sales could do much to lift bill rates. Over the past two weeks, some of those rates have turned negative, reaching levels last seen during the financial crisis.

With supply at multi-decade lows, investors are signaling alarm as regulations intended to shore up banks and prevent a run on money-market funds exacerbate the bill shortfall. JPMorgan Chase & Co. expects an extra $900 billion of demand for government securities during the next 18 months, putting pressure on a sizable chunk of the $1.4 trillion bill market.

The mismatch between supply and demand has been so acute that four-week bill rates fell to minus 0.0304 percent on April 29, the lowest on a closing basis since December 2008. Yields on three-month bills also turned negative. The Treasury responded by saying at its quarterly refunding announcement on May 6 it would increase issuance to meet growing demand.

… and in the US in the Great Depression:

1The interest rate on Treasury bills would tend to not fall below zero if currency incurs no taxes, storage costs, or insurance costs. Absent such costs, if the Treasury bill rate were to be negative the holders of Treasury bills would prefer to hold currency because currency has the advantage of being a more liquid asset and its implicit interest rate of zero would be greater than the negative rate on Treasury bills. Holders of Treasury bills would sell them, drive down their price, and increase their interest rate until the interest rate reaches at least zero. For simplicity, we assume the lower bound on short-term interest rates is zero, even though nominal yields dropped slightly below zero in the United States in the Great Depression (as discussed in footnote 15) and in Japan recently (as discussed in footnote 22).

15See Federal Reserve Board (1943, p. 462). Two reasons for this phenomenon, perhaps responsible for a few basis points of the negative yield on Treasury bills, are as follows: First, Treasury bills were exempt from personal property taxes in some states, while cash was not. Thus, the after-tax rate of return on cash holdings was negative in some states. Second, Treasury securities were required as collateral for a bank to hold U.S. government deposits, so the total return, net of the collateral benefits, could have been zero or positive for banks. During this period, negative yields were also reported on Treasury bonds with up to two years maturity, owing to a valuable exchange privilege implicit in holding the securities. Cecchetti (1988) provides a detailed explanation of this phenomenon and shows that once the value of this exchange privilege is accounted for, yield estimates on those securities become positive. These factors allowing for negative pecuniary yields emphasize that institutional considerations such as these make it dicult to be precise about the actual lower bound for nominal interest rates.

But let’s be fair … perhaps Mr. Hannoun meant “short-term bonds” when he said “short-term” and perhaps he is not so much of a pedant as to specify “after accounting for special privileges”. Still, he could quite easily have said “rare and transient”.

At any rate, Mr. Hannoun first reviewed the effects of low interest rates on growth:

In essence, the monetary stimulus aims to lift short-term growth via five main channels: by boosting credit to the real economy (the credit channel), by lifting asset prices (the asset valuation channel), by forcing investors away from safe assets towards riskier ones (the portfolio balance and risktaking channels), by lowering the exchange rate (the exchange rate channel) and by attempting to nudge inflation up towards objectives with a view to warding off a so-called deflationary spiral (the reflation channel).

It’s all good stuff, but one thing worth highlighting is his discussion of the portfolio balance and risk-taking channel:

Advocates of UMP argue that these policies will encourage investors to shift out of government bonds and into riskier assets. This is the portfolio balance channel. Indeed, the search for yield engineered by zero or negative nominal policy interest rates has fuelled more risk-taking, leading to a convergence between the returns of risky assets and those of low-risk assets, as currently seen in the euro zone’s sovereign credit spreads. These appear to be re-enacting the extreme compression of sovereign spreads, invariant to differences in credit quality, that occurred before the crisis (Graph 2). If, as many would agree, the euro zone’s sovereign risks were mispriced then, we now seem to be heading back to that situation. The European Commission’s prudential policy of applying a uniform zero risk weight to all sovereigns in EU bank regulation strengthens this effect. The problem here is that risk weights are not differentiated according to credit quality, contrary to the Basel II requirements.

In reaction to negative yields in the short- and medium-term segment of the euro zone sovereign yield curves, investors are piling up interest rate risk by investing in long-dated securities at very low yields. And, in fact, the effective duration of euro-denominated debt has risen significantly since the second half of 2014 (Graph 3). As a result, an eventual normalisation of long-term yields would inflict significant and widespread losses on investors, with potentially serious consequences for financial and economic stability.

This makes it a matter of urgency to address the gap in global regulation on interest rate risk in the banking book. Pillar 1 currently does not provide for any capital charge against this risk, an anomaly that will, we hope, soon be corrected by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). As monetary policymakers, central banks in Europe have contributed heavily to the build-up of duration risk by bringing nominal yields in the two- to five-year part of the yield curve down to near zero and even negative levels. As supervisors or systemic risk managers, they should ensure that commercial banks are allocating enough capital to cover the interest rate risk they are accumulating. All this puts a premium on introducing a Pillar 1 charge on interest rate risk in the banking book as soon as possible.

EuroDenominatedDebtDuration
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However, I’m more interested in the section titled Longer-term unintended consequences of ultra-low or negative
interest rates (emphasis added):

From a longer-term perspective, there are five main risks that may make the prolongation of ultra-low or negative nominal interest rates counterproductive. These can be summarised as: disincentive, distraction, distortion, disruption and disillusion.

Bond market prices in the euro zone may no longer adequately reflect the risk inherent in record high debt levels. At the same time, equity prices are artificially inflated as investors are forced into increasingly risky assets. All this involves the risk of a major correction when confidence in inflated valuations is lost. The question is not whether this will happen again, but when. Of course, nobody can say when the next “Minsky moment”, a generalised loss of confidence in artificially inflated valuations, will occur. Yet there is no doubt that the probability and severity of another financial crisis is increased by the prolongation of ultra-low or negative rates.

Advocates of ultra-low or negative interest rates argue that macroprudential tools can be used to offset/mitigate the financial risks and distortions resulting from ultra-easy monetary policy.

The risk of disillusion also looms large for households in the new world of low returns. Ultra-low or negative interest rates will add to their worries by making it difficult for them to build up enough retirement savings. Thus households are more likely to increase their savings rate than to reduce it.

Negative rates on deposited savings – effectively a form of taxation – will feed the debate on the
“financial repression” of savers.

True, some households stand to gain from low mortgage rates, but this benefit will accrue only to those who can afford to buy a house. Moreover, the positive effect of low mortgage loan rates is largely offset by the increase in property prices fuelled by ultra-low interest rates.

There is also the question of inequality. Most households will lose from the dwindling returns on their savings without gaining anything from asset price inflation. They are not sophisticated asset managers who can realise capital gains in financial markets when long-term yields fall, and they will be affected by the low returns on their savings.

It will be noted that the word “macroprudential” is basically the new cool way to say “credit rationing”:

In the UK the Bank of England has been flashing an amber light for months about the complacency shown by low market volatility, but in house-price obsessed Britain, mortgage excess is the focus of its worry. Last month it became the first of the major central banks to set out to try to control credit using non-monetary tools: in the jargon, “macroprudential measures”. Ms Yellen has been highlighting macropru as the first line of defence against bubbles for a while.

The problem is simple. Central bankers want money to lubricate the real economy, not to flow into pointless leverage of existing assets. Higher rates could reduce the incentives to leverage, but at the cost of damage to the real economy. Their solution is to set up barriers inside the banks to direct the flow.

As financial historian and CLSA consultant Russell Napier pointed out recently, credit rationing was a disaster in the 1970s. The theory relies on markets being so bad at allocating resources that the job is better done by a handful of men and women at central banks and regulators.

We’ve seen some of this credit rationing in Canada, of course, in the tightening of mortgage requirements by the CMHC and bank regulators; wildly cheered on by established Canadians who inherited their house from Mommy and Daddy and don’t like the idea that immigrants and the working class might get a shot at ownership.

Mr. Hannoun concludes:

The policy of prolonged ultra-low, or negative, interest rates relies on transmission channels with uncertain effectiveness and potentially serious unintended consequences. For central banks, such policies raise the risk of financial dominance, exchange rate dominance and fiscal dominance – that is, the danger that monetary policy becomes subordinated to the demands of propping up financial markets, massaging the exchange rate downwards, and keeping public refinancing costs low in the face of unprecedented public debt burdens. These risks have been present before,13 but never so acutely as today.

Meanwhile, financial markets continue to set the stage for policy deliberations by fuelling expectations for continued, and additional, monetary accommodation. Behind the enthusiasm of market participants for extreme monetary policy, of course, lurks the fear that asset prices might collapse when the music of monetary easing stops.

So, yeah, this speech belongs in a list of justifications for my statement!

MAPF Portfolio Composition: August, 2015

September 6th, 2015

Turnover increased a little in August, to about 10%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on August 31 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2015-8-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0% N/A N/A
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 4.2% (+1.6) 5.78% 14.20
Fixed-Reset 70.0% (-3.5) 6.33% 10.57
Deemed-Retractible 7.6% (-0.3) 6.61% 7.47
FloatingReset 4.0% (-2.1) 3.93% 17.62
Scraps (Various) 13.5% (+4.0) 6.43% 13.14
Cash +0.6% (+0.1) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.21% 11.05
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from July month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming a constant GOC-5 rate of 0.73% and a constant 3-Month Bill rate of 0.34%

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The increase in “Scraps” and decrease in “FixedResets” is largely due to the migration of ENB issues in the portfolio between the two classifications due to the DBRS downgrade of ENB preferred shares to junk.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2015-8-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 19.0% (-0.1)
Pfd-2(high) 34.9% (+3.3)
Pfd-2 2.1%(+2.1)
Pfd-2(low) 30.5% (-8.1)
Pfd-3(high) 6.4% (+4.7)
Pfd-3 3.3% (-0.9)
Pfd-3(low) 2.5% (-0.6)
Pfd-4(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0% (0)
Pfd-5(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-5 0.6% (+0.1)
Cash +0.7% (+0.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5 by S&P and is unrated by DBRS
A position held in NPI.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3(high)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3(high).
A position held in INE.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2015-8-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 1.7% (-0.7)
$50,000 – $100,000 20.7% (+2.9)
$100,000 – $200,000 65.4% (+9.2)
$200,000 – $300,000 2.7% (-13.3)
>$300,000 8.8% (+1.7)
Cash +0.7% (+0.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from July month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
    • MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets