CP Rail sold a century bond!
The railroad’s $900 million [USD] 100-year bond, sold with a coupon of 6.125 percent, shows how the once-troubled company has won over investor hearts and minds under new Chief Executive Officer Hunter Harrison, even as it embarks on a share-repurchase plan that would boost its debt load.
…
The century bond sale was the biggest by CP Rail since 1986. The company also issued $300 million in 20-year bonds with a 4.8 percent coupon. The average maturity on the Bank of America Merrill Lynch 15+ Year BBB US Corporate Index is 25 years with a yield of 5.5 percent, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch data. The last century bond was issued by Brazil’s Petrobras Global Finance in June with a 6.85 percent coupon, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Calgary-based Enbridge Inc., a pipeline operator, issued C$100 million ($76 million) of century bonds in Canada in 2012.
BMO has announced a major acquisition:
Bank of Montreal, Canada’s fourth-largest lender, agreed to buy General Electric Co.’s transportation finance business in the U.S. and Canada.
The unit had net earning assets of about C$11.5 billion ($8.7 billion) as of June 30, the Toronto-based bank said Thursday in a statement that didn’t disclose terms. The GE unit’s management team and about 600 employees will join Bank of Montreal, according to a presentation on the bank’s website.
Bank of Montreal’s agreement is the latest in a U.S. expansion that began in 1984 with its purchase of Chicago-based Harris Bank. The lender’s last major U.S. deal was its July 2011 takeover of Milwaukee-based Marshall & Ilsley Corp., which doubled deposits and branches and strengthened its commercial lending focus across the U.S. Midwest.
The relationship between ETFs, funds and crisis liquidity has been a hot issue. Barclays weighs in with some musings on ‘first-mover’ advantage:
Illiquidity in corporate bonds would in theory spell bad news for bond funds that promise investors the ability to immediately get out of their positions. The concern here is that once investors get a whiff of an impending mass selloff in bonds, they could potentially rush for the exits to try to get ahead of it.
With liquidity already low, that could put massive pressure on debt prices. Those who manage to squeeze through the keyhole first get rewarded for their speed but end up exacerbating this downward spiral. The slowest investors, meanwhile, get left with a portfolio of bonds that’s potentially much reduced in price.
By how much, you ask? Barclays estimates about 2 percent for funds that hold junk-rated corporate debt (boldface ours):
Mutual fund investors are, thus, faced with a first mover’s advantage to redeem in large selloff days because of a combination of inflated pricing and potential rebalancing costs. The magnitude of this advantage can be very meaningful economically. Assuming a 10 percent market shock leads to 10 percent outflows, we estimate that the first mover advantage is as much as 1.78 percent, or 1.61 percent from [net asset value] inflation and 0.17 percent from rebalancing costs.The benefit to early redeemers is effectively a tax on investors who remain invested through big downturns and ironically encourages demanding more liquidity.
They suggest a ‘scaled exit fee’:
“An “exit fee” that charges investors to withdraw their money from bond funds could arguably help slow theoretical outflows. (There is, of course, a converse argument that says such a fee would merely exacerbate the rush to the exit.) Barclays argues for a more refined approach that involves scaled fees:
Redemption fees are relatively straightforward and could be set such that they exactly neutralize the advantage of redeeming first in a down market. In our worst-case scenario, a redemption fee on the order of 2.0% would do the trick. That said, redemption fees are a somewhat blunt instrument. They penalize anyone withdrawing funds equally, regardless of how much liquidity the investor is demanding. Indeed, penalizing every investor based on a worst-case scenario may not be necessary. We believe a more nuanced approach would be to enforce minimum redemption fees according to a settlement schedule, with the minimum fee declining to zero as the investor allows settlement time to increase.
We wonder what the bond fund managers would say.
Well, PrefBlog says that, as stated, the idea is moronic, a typical product of a trading house that knows all about trading and nothing about investing.
What price will the redemption be at? Say you’ve got a million bucks in the fund and give me thirty days notice that you want out. So, notice period be damned, the price you’ll get is the day of actual redemption, thirty days hence. So should I sell securities now to raise the cash? Then I’ve got cash in the fund, which is kind of not the point of a fund (although the concept of fund investment is being increasingly circumscribed by liquidity rules and policies, as discussed on June 12). And I have to hold that cash in the fund for thirty days, reducing my duration and watching the market go up (because it always goes up in situations like this). So, nope, I’m not going to do it. I’m going to sell when I can get prices that will reasonably approximate the prices I use for determining the redemption value, which is to say, maybe half an hour prior to the close on the redemption date. So thirty day’s notice hasn’t done me a lot of good, has it?
The idea can be rescued by paying a blended price. Never mind “thirty day’s” notice, give me “twenty trading day’s” notice and agreed to get paid a blended price comprised of the NAV at the end of every equally weighted trading day. Then I can confidently sell 5% of your redemption value every day without screwing my other clients. There could be problems with this; if, for instance, a very large fund was to have a commitment to sell $10-million in preferreds for cash every day for the next twenty and this information becomes public … well, there won’t be much buying interest from other players for the next 15 trading days! So that’s got to be top-secret information … and in this business, ain’t nuthin’ top-secret.
A battle is brewing in the States over the right to bear screwdrivers:
Apple doesn’t publish repair manuals or sell parts to customers, and its warranty doesn’t apply if unauthorized repair damages its device. Samsung wouldn’t say why it doesn’t share repair information, though it makes some parts available to shops. Even John Deere gives only approved technicians access to the embedded software that controls systems in its machines. The manufacturers argue these limitations keep products working safely, and that copyright law lets them protect their intellectual property so it isn’t pirated.
“Bulls–t,” says Gay Gordon-Byrne, executive director of the Digital Right to Repair Coalition, based in North Haledon, N.J. “Repair is a profit center for a lot of companies, and sometimes it is more profitable than selling hardware.” Maintaining “repair monopolies,” she says, pushes up costs and makes customers more likely to simply junk old models for new ones. Apple charges $79 to replace an iPhone 4 battery. Repair website IFixit charges $20 for a battery and DIY kit for the same job.
Gordon-Byrne’s organization and advocates such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation are supporting bills introduced this year in Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York that would require manufacturers to sell parts and provide manuals to hardware owners and independent repair shops. Separate efforts in Congress would amend the federal Digital Millennium Copyright Act by giving explicit permission for consumers to circumvent a manufacturer’s digital lock on its software for a lawful reason such as repair.
Times are tough in the dairy business:
Record prices last year primed farmers to bolster output in the U.S., where milk production in 2015 will reach 208.7 billion pounds—the fifth consecutive record-setting year. In April the EU, seeking to liberalize trade, removed quotas that had been in place for the past 30 years, leading to increased production from Ireland, the Netherlands, and the U.K. China is producing more milk thanks to investments such as a $140 million, 20,000-cow facility that China Modern Dairy Holdings, partly owned by private equity firm KKR, unveiled in 2013. The Chinese are also consuming stockpiled milk powder and importing less. Global milk supply grew 3.7 percent last year, almost triple the growth rate of 2013, the USDA says.
…
Overcapacity “is a long-term problem that a short-term fix won’t address,” says Robbie Turner, head of European markets at Rice Dairy International.
Nope, the only fix is to squeeze out the high-cost producers during times of oversupply, giving low-cost producers room to expand during times of undersupply. It’s called “economics”, though some prefer “competition”.
It was a mixed day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 1bp, FixedResets off 9bp and DeemedRetractibles up 2bp. FixedResets comprised the entire good side of the Performance Highlights table. Volume was very, awfully, miserably, disgustingly, quietly low.
For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.
Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread
Here’s TRP:
TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 20.15 to be $0.94 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +164, is $1.21 cheap at its bid price of 13.15.
Another good fit today for MFC, with Implied Volatility falling a bit today.
Most expensive is MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, bid at 24.26 to be 0.44 rich, while MFC.PR.G, resetting at +290bp on 2016-12-19, is bid at 22.76 to be 0.36 cheap.
The fit on the BAM issues continues to be horrible.
The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 17.01 to be $1.41 cheap. BAM.PF.F, resetting at +286bp on 2019-9-30 is bid at 22.70 and appears to be $0.93 rich.
FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 19.73, looks $0.45 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 19.13 and is $0.62 cheap.
Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -1.17%, with no outliers. Note that the distribution is bimodal, with NVCC non-compliant bank issues averaging -1.32% and the unregulated issues averaging -0.94%. There are two junk outliers below -2.00% and one above 0.00%.
Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -1.8657 % | 1,633.5 |
FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -1.8657 % | 2,856.2 |
Floater | 4.49 % | 4.57 % | 58,488 | 16.20 | 3 | -1.8657 % | 1,736.6 |
OpRet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.3523 % | 2,782.8 |
SplitShare | 4.62 % | 4.92 % | 63,980 | 3.08 | 3 | 0.3523 % | 3,261.3 |
Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.3523 % | 2,544.6 |
Perpetual-Premium | 5.72 % | 2.89 % | 56,870 | 0.08 | 8 | 0.0693 % | 2,491.2 |
Perpetual-Discount | 5.42 % | 5.50 % | 71,363 | 14.59 | 30 | 0.0129 % | 2,607.5 |
FixedReset | 4.68 % | 4.12 % | 172,457 | 15.92 | 74 | -0.0872 % | 2,170.9 |
Deemed-Retractible | 5.14 % | 5.21 % | 94,479 | 5.38 | 33 | 0.0189 % | 2,585.4 |
FloatingReset | 2.44 % | 3.89 % | 54,843 | 5.93 | 9 | -0.2756 % | 2,171.0 |
Performance Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
TRP.PR.B | FixedReset | -2.35 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 12.47 Evaluated at bid price : 12.47 Bid-YTW : 4.18 % |
BAM.PR.K | Floater | -2.23 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 10.50 Evaluated at bid price : 10.50 Bid-YTW : 4.57 % |
HSE.PR.E | FixedReset | -2.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 21.88 Evaluated at bid price : 22.32 Bid-YTW : 4.90 % |
TRP.PR.F | FloatingReset | -1.95 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 14.56 Evaluated at bid price : 14.56 Bid-YTW : 3.89 % |
BAM.PR.B | Floater | -1.94 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 10.61 Evaluated at bid price : 10.61 Bid-YTW : 4.52 % |
BAM.PR.R | FixedReset | -1.79 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 17.01 Evaluated at bid price : 17.01 Bid-YTW : 4.78 % |
HSE.PR.C | FixedReset | -1.65 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 20.85 Evaluated at bid price : 20.85 Bid-YTW : 4.87 % |
TD.PF.D | FixedReset | -1.47 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 22.50 Evaluated at bid price : 23.40 Bid-YTW : 3.79 % |
MFC.PR.F | FixedReset | -1.42 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 16.02 Bid-YTW : 7.84 % |
BAM.PR.C | Floater | -1.42 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 10.45 Evaluated at bid price : 10.45 Bid-YTW : 4.59 % |
NA.PR.S | FixedReset | -1.39 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 21.70 Evaluated at bid price : 22.00 Bid-YTW : 3.81 % |
TD.PF.B | FixedReset | -1.19 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 21.30 Evaluated at bid price : 21.59 Bid-YTW : 3.72 % |
CM.PR.Q | FixedReset | -1.05 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 22.52 Evaluated at bid price : 23.45 Bid-YTW : 3.79 % |
TRP.PR.C | FixedReset | -1.05 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 13.15 Evaluated at bid price : 13.15 Bid-YTW : 4.53 % |
HSE.PR.A | FixedReset | -1.05 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 14.15 Evaluated at bid price : 14.15 Bid-YTW : 4.56 % |
TRP.PR.A | FixedReset | -1.03 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 17.22 Evaluated at bid price : 17.22 Bid-YTW : 4.12 % |
GWO.PR.I | Deemed-Retractible | -1.01 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.58 Bid-YTW : 6.47 % |
RY.PR.Z | FixedReset | -1.01 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 21.29 Evaluated at bid price : 21.58 Bid-YTW : 3.68 % |
MFC.PR.H | FixedReset | 1.08 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.27 Bid-YTW : 4.42 % |
TRP.PR.E | FixedReset | 1.10 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 20.15 Evaluated at bid price : 20.15 Bid-YTW : 4.23 % |
FTS.PR.H | FixedReset | 1.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 15.52 Evaluated at bid price : 15.52 Bid-YTW : 3.71 % |
MFC.PR.K | FixedReset | 1.15 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 20.15 Bid-YTW : 6.04 % |
SLF.PR.H | FixedReset | 1.21 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 19.25 Bid-YTW : 6.34 % |
BAM.PR.X | FixedReset | 1.26 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 15.25 Evaluated at bid price : 15.25 Bid-YTW : 4.66 % |
TRP.PR.G | FixedReset | 1.72 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 21.56 Evaluated at bid price : 21.90 Bid-YTW : 4.29 % |
FTS.PR.K | FixedReset | 2.39 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 19.73 Evaluated at bid price : 19.73 Bid-YTW : 3.86 % |
FTS.PR.G | FixedReset | 2.46 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 19.13 Evaluated at bid price : 19.13 Bid-YTW : 4.02 % |
IFC.PR.A | FixedReset | 2.54 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2025-01-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 17.35 Bid-YTW : 7.87 % |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
FTS.PR.M | FixedReset | 40,520 | RBC crossed 10,000 at 21.68; Scotia crossed 20,200 at 21.66. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 21.35 Evaluated at bid price : 21.65 Bid-YTW : 3.97 % |
BAM.PR.R | FixedReset | 20,486 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 17.01 Evaluated at bid price : 17.01 Bid-YTW : 4.78 % |
TRP.PR.D | FixedReset | 16,684 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 19.57 Evaluated at bid price : 19.57 Bid-YTW : 4.29 % |
RY.PR.Z | FixedReset | 16,140 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 21.29 Evaluated at bid price : 21.58 Bid-YTW : 3.68 % |
BAM.PR.B | Floater | 16,089 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 10.61 Evaluated at bid price : 10.61 Bid-YTW : 4.52 % |
BAM.PF.D | Perpetual-Discount | 15,985 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2045-09-10 Maturity Price : 21.86 Evaluated at bid price : 22.15 Bid-YTW : 5.63 % |
There were 6 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. |
Wide Spread Highlights | ||
Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
IFC.PR.C | FixedReset | Quote: 20.75 – 21.60 Spot Rate : 0.8500 Average : 0.6733 YTW SCENARIO |
TRP.PR.F | FloatingReset | Quote: 14.56 – 15.24 Spot Rate : 0.6800 Average : 0.5079 YTW SCENARIO |
ELF.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 23.02 – 23.51 Spot Rate : 0.4900 Average : 0.3381 YTW SCENARIO |
MFC.PR.M | FixedReset | Quote: 21.01 – 21.49 Spot Rate : 0.4800 Average : 0.3450 YTW SCENARIO |
GWO.PR.H | Deemed-Retractible | Quote: 22.45 – 22.95 Spot Rate : 0.5000 Average : 0.3764 YTW SCENARIO |
MFC.PR.N | FixedReset | Quote: 20.63 – 21.45 Spot Rate : 0.8200 Average : 0.6975 YTW SCENARIO |
NPI.PR.A, FFH.PR.G, ALA.PR.A: Convert Or Hold?
September 10th, 2015It will be recalled that
The deadline for notifying the companies of the intent to convert is September 15 at 5pm; but note that these are company deadlines and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert! However, if you miss the brokerage deadline they’ll probably do it on a ‘best efforts’ basis if you grovel in a sufficiently entertaining fashion.
The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., NPI.PR.A and the FloatingReset, NPI.PR.?, that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.
We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).
Click for Big
The market appears to have a marked distaste at the moment for floating rate product; every single one of the implied rates until the next interconversion are lower than the current 3-month bill rate and nearly all pairs have a break-even yield significantly below zero! Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.
Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.
If we plug in the current bid price of the three FixedResets, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for their soon-to-be-issued FloatingReset counterparts given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to be cheap and trading well below the price of their FixedReset counterparts. Therefore, I recommend that holders of NPI.PR.A, FFH.PR.G and ALA.PR.A continue to hold these issues and not to convert. I will note that current conditions make extant FloatingResets so cheap (in general) that it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – presumably, according to this analysis – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the future path of policy rates. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the new pairs will reflect these conditions.
Note as well that conversion rights are dependent upon at least one million shares of each series being outstanding after giving effect to holders’ instructions; e.g., if only 100,000 shares of NPI.PR.A are tendered for conversion, then no conversions will be allowed; but if only 100,000 shares of NPI.PR.A will remain after the rest are all tendered, then conversion will be mandatory. However, this is relatively rare: all 30 Strong Pairs currently extant have some version of this condition and all but two have both series outstanding.
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